



governmentattic.org

"Rummaging in the government's attic"

Description of document: FBI File 65-HQ-59264 FBI Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, 1950-1951

Released date: 16-April-2011

Posted date: 21-January-2013

Source of document: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attn: FOI/PA Request
Record/Information Dissemination Section
170 Marcel Drive
Winchester, VA 22602-4843
Fax: (540) 868-4391/4997
Email: foiparequest@ic.fbi.gov

Note: This file contains Sections 1-3 of FBI File 65-HQ-59264

The governmentattic.org web site ("the site") is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535
April 16, 2011

Subject: FILE NUMBER 65-HQ-59264

FOIPA No. 1145596- 000

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552

- ☐ (b)(1)
- ☒ (b)(2)
- ☐ (b)(3) _____
- _____
- _____
- ☐ (b)(4)
- ☐ (b)(5)
- ☒ (b)(6)

Section 552a

- ☐ (b)(7)(A)
- ☐ (b)(7)(B)
- ☒ (b)(7)(C)
- ☒ (b)(7)(D)
- ☒ (b)(7)(E)
- ☐ (b)(7)(F)
- ☐ (b)(8)
- ☐ (b)(9)
- ☐ (d)(5)
- ☐ (j)(2)
- ☐ (k)(1)
- ☐ (k)(2)
- ☐ (k)(3)
- ☐ (k)(4)
- ☐ (k)(5)
- ☐ (k)(6)
- ☐ (k)(7)

773 **page(s)** were reviewed and 623 **page(s)** are being released.

☒ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

- ☒ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- ☒ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

☒ You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

☐ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).

If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

☒ See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,



David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

Enclosed is the first interim release of documents responsive to your FOIA request on file number 65-HQ-59264. This interim release consists of one CD consisting of sections one thru three from file 65-HQ-59264. Additional releases will be made until the processing of all responsive documents is complete.

No fee is being assessed at this time. When the second interim release is made in this case, we will charge you for the \$5.00 fee associated with this first release as well as the \$15.00 duplication fee on the second release for a total of \$20.00. After the second release of material, each subsequent release will be made at a cost of \$15.00

On March 7, 2011, The U.S. Supreme Court limited the use of the b2 exemption to only records relating to agency personnel rules and practices. Nevertheless, the b2 exemption, in this release, was used with other applicable exemptions. Thus, no additional information will be released.

FBI File 65-HQ-59264
FBI Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference - Section 1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

~~SECRET~~

DATE: January 27, 1950

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
 Plan proposed by Director of Intelligence,
 Alaskan Command, to place network of
 sleeper agents in Alaska.

AIR MAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Clegg	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12/BTA/ISS
 ON 5/31/94 342551

On January 25, 1950 Captain MINOR HEINE, U. S. Navy, Director of Intelligence, Alaskan Command, called at my office stating that he had received a memorandum

He suggested a conference on the morning of January 27, 1950 in his office at Fort Richardson, Alaska. ASAC FRED A. FROHBOSE and myself attended. Those present at the meeting in Captain HEINE's office were:

Referral/Consult

Captain MINOR HEINE, U. S. Navy, Director of Intelligence,
 Alaskan Command.

Colonel WALLIS S. PERRY, U. S. Army, head of G-2 in Alaska.

Lieutenant Colonel DONALD L. SPRINGER, U. S. Air Force,
 Wing Intelligence.

Lieutenant Colonel ANDREW J. CHOOS, J-2, U. S. Army, who works
 under Colonel PERRY.

Special Agent in Charge JOHN H. WILLIAMS, Anchorage Division.

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, FRED A. FROHBOSE, Anchorage Division.

~~DECLASSIFIED RECORDING~~

After Captain HEINE reiterated the reason for the meeting, Lieutenant Colonel CHOOS advised that

CLASSIFIED 7/1/94
 DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 b/c/1102
 ON: 25X
 PER OGA HAN 042 7/20/98
 #342551

EX - 00
 (U) - 3

INDEXED - 35

Referral/Consult

66-82
 JHW:vw

COPIES DESTROYED
 R 584..01 21 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

Referral/Consult


~~SECRET~~

Memo: 1/27/50 to HBS
 2-3-50
 CPO: [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

Anchorage File 66-82



Captain HEINE stated that the proposed plan had been brought to the attention of General TWINING and his aide, Brigadier General FRANK A. ARMSTRONG, Jr., U. S. Air Force, at a recent staff meeting. At that time, as Captain HEINE states, "They went for it."



Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Anchorage File 66-82

Referral/Consult

As is pointed out above, Lieutenant Colonel CHOOS is being separated from service in the U. S. Army. He is undoubtedly on a look-out for a job and it is believed that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ~~(S)~~ - (U)

The above plan, even if approved, does not appear to be feasible for a number of reasons, but the merits of the plan were not discussed.

These data are being passed on for the Bureau's information for such action as is necessary. The Anchorage Office is in constant contact with Captain HEINE and will obtain information concerning any developments and make it available immediately.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SAC, Anchorage

February 15, 1950

The Director, FBI

CONFERENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
Plan proposed by Director of Intelligence,
Alaskan Command, to place network of sleeper
agents in Alaska.

65-51264-XI

RECORDED - 2

EX - 66

Reference is made to your letter to the Bureau dated January 27, 1950, regarding the above-captioned matter. An inquiry at the Office of Naval Intelligence headquarters, Washington, D. C., has reflected that this agency knows nothing of the "sleeper network" as mentioned in referenced letter.

It is desired that you keep the Bureau constantly advised of any further developments in this matter.

CDD:hb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/27/94 BY SP12 BJS/KS

RECEIVED DIRECTOR
F B I
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FEB 16 2 54 PM '50

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

MAILED 13
FEB 16 1950
COMM - FBI

FEB 16 12 23 PM '50
F B I
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. H. B. FLETCHER *WAF*

DATE: February 3, 1950

FROM : V. P. KEAY *WPK*SUBJECT: CONFERENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
Plan proposed by Director of Intelligence,
Alaskan Command, to place network of
sleeper agents in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

Pursuant to your instructions, Mr. DeLoach contacted Captain S. W. DuBois, Office of Naval Intelligence, on February 2, 1950, regarding the captioned matter. Captain DuBois advised that details of this matter had not been made available to either the ONI or the Chief of Naval Operations. He stated that ONI was [REDACTED]

Captain DuBois suggested that this matter be referred to the Working Committee of IIC for discussion. He additionally stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Captain DuBois was advised that his views on this matter would be brought to the attention of the Bureau.

Referral/Consult

ACTION:

That the above matter be considered for discussion by the Working Committee of IIC.

CDD:slm *slm*ADDENDUM: 2/15/50

After consulting you regarding this matter it ~~was~~ considered advisable to withhold this matter from the Standing Committee of IIC until further developments warrant such action. A letter to the SAC at Anchorage *in Alaska* advising him that Navy knows nothing regarding this matter and that he should keep the Bureau fully advised of any further developments.

CDD:hb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BJS/STW

RECORDED - 39

INDEXED - 39

EX - 66

65-59264-X1
11-8605-751
FEB 21 1950
1 10

copy
copy

Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the event of Invasion

*Let SAC Anchorage
2-15-50
CPD:kk*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: 3/7/50

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
Plan proposed by Director of Intelligence
Alaskan Command, to place network of sleeper
agents in Alaska.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

Re Anchorage letter dated 1/27/50 and Bureau reply dated 2/15/50.

At the intelligence conference in the office of Captain MINOR HEINE, U. S. Navy, at Fort Richardson, Alaska on March 2, 1950, Captain HEINE advised that the document proposing the network of sleeper agents in Alaska had been submitted by his office to the Office of General NATHAN F. TWining, U. S. Air Force, Commander in Chief, Alaskan Command, but to date it had not been sent to Washington for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This matter will be watched closely and any further data received concerning it will be passed on immediately to the Bureau.

~~RECORDING~~

RECEIVED

MAR 13 3 33 PM '50

JHW:MR
66-82DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTJ/LS
ON 5/27/94

342251

RECORDED - 64

EX-136

65-59264-X2

166-8603-757

MAR 10 1950

13-27

5 APR 1950

757

Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage
in Alaska in the event of Invasion

(COPY)
MS

RANDUM . UNITED STATES

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: MAY 8, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING,
May 10, 1950

7/1/79
CLASSIFIED BY SP4bjc/fdw -
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X J

PER DCA letter dtd 7/20/78 #342251

A meeting of the IIC Working Committee is scheduled for 2:00 p.m., May 10, 1950, in the office of William E. Carpenter, Room 4E1081, Pentagon Building.

Attached hereto is the agenda for instant meeting.

In connection with the second item on the agenda, you will recall that the Director in commenting on [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~ (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

If approved by you, copies of agenda will be distributed via liaison to the other Working Committee members.

Attachment

ESS:hke

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/9/01 BY SP4bjc/fdw -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

65-59264-✓
NOT RECORDED
119 SEP 23 1950

SEP 26 1950

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-8603-764

10 Proposed Plans for intelligence collection in the West of Europe

~~SECRET~~7/1/99 #342251
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bjc/hdw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
PER OGA letter dtd 7/24/98

AGENDA FOR WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
MAY 10, 1950

A meeting of the Working Committee, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, is scheduled for 2:00 p.m., May 10, 1950, in the office of Colonel William E. Carpenter, Room 4E1081, Pentagon Building.

The order of business will be as follows:

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/9/99 BY SP12 BJS/LTC

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ENCLOSURE

65-59264

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~137032~~

Referral/Consult

Port Security Program For The
Protection of Vessels, Harbors,
Ports, And Water-Front Facilities

By letter dated March 6, 1950, the IIC advised ICIS that there is presently available in the files of the investigative and intelligence agencies a considerable amount of information concerning Communist and other subversive infiltration into the various water-front facilities and longshoremen's unions. This letter pointed out that there is presently no appropriate and responsible agency or agencies empowered to use this information in a realistic and aggressive manner.

By letter dated April 13, 1950, ICIS has acknowledged receipt of the March 6, 1950 letter and has advised that various phases of this problem are being considered by the ICIS Subcommittees on Industrial Security, Exit and Entry, and Defense Against Unconventional Attack. The April 13, 1950 letter states, "If you believe that any of the file material mentioned in your letter might be of assistance to the subcommittees working on the problem, the ICIS would be glad to receive it for reference, in whole or in part, to the appropriate subcommittees."

The Working Committee may wish to decide whether such subversive information will be furnished to ICIS subcommittees or held until such time as the appropriate agency or agencies are empowered to use it.

Attachment

~~137032~~
- 2 - ~~SECRET~~

(COPY)

MS

OFFICE MEMORANDUM . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD
FROM : A. H. BELMONT
SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING,
MAY 10, 1950

DATE: May 15, 1950

Attached hereto are the minutes of the IIC Working Committee meeting held on May 10, 1950.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, it is recommended that copies of these minutes be furnished to the other members of the IIC Working Committee.

Attachment

ESS:hke

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/4/88 BY SP12 BTJ/STP

65-59264-
NOT RECORDED
119 SEP 23 1950

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-8603-68

Proposed Plan for setting up working committee in Washington in the event of a national emergency

SEP 20 1950

(COPY)

ms:

7/1/98
CLASSIFIED BY SP12815
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X #342251
Per OGA letter dtd 7/20/98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MINUTES OF MEETING
WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
MAY 10, 1950

A meeting of the Working Committee, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, was held on May 10, 1950, in the office of Colonel William E. Carpenter, Room 4E1081, Pentagon Building. The meeting began at 2:05 p.m. and those in attendance were as follows:

For the Department
of the Army

Colonel Ernest A. Barlow

For the Department
of the Navy

Captain S. W. DuBois
Captain H. E. Keisker

For the Federal Bureau
of Investigation

Mr. D. M. Ladd

Secretary

Mr. Edward S. Sanders

Referral/Consult

The points for discussion were as follows:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12815
C7 5-31-94

ENCLOSURE

65-59264

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

Port Security Program For The
Protection Of Vessels, Harbors,
Ports, And Water-Front Facilities

Colonel Carpenter pointed out that by letter dated March 6, 1950, the IIC advised ICIS that there is presently available in the files of the investigative and intelligence agencies a considerable amount of information concerning Communist and other subversive infiltration into the various water-front facilities and longshoremen's unions. This letter pointed out that there is presently no appropriate and responsible agency or agencies empowered to use this information in a realistic and aggressive manner.

By letter dated April 13, 1950, ICIS acknowledged receipt of the March 6, 1950 letter and advised that various phases of this problem are being considered by the ICIS Subcommittees on Industrial Security, Exit and Entry, and Defense Against Unconventional Attack. The April 13, 1950 letter from ICIS states, "If you believe that any of the file material mentioned in your letter might be of assistance to the subcommittees working on the problem, the ICIS would be glad to receive it for reference, in whole or in part, to the appropriate subcommittees."

Colonel Carpenter stated that he sees no particular reason why this subversive type of information should be furnished to ICIS subcommittees

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

inasmuch as they have been advised of the existence of such information and the information would not apparently help ICIS in its responsibility for setting up an agency or agencies empowered to use it.

Mr. Ladd pointed out that much of this information is of a highly sensitive character and should not be distributed any more than is necessary.

It was agreed that the information would be furnished to the appropriate agency or agencies when properly established or empowered by ICIS but should not at the present time be furnished to ICIS subcommittees.

* * * * *

There being no further business to come before the Committee, the meeting was adjourned at 3:30 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE MEMORANDUM . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 2, 1950

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: IIC MEETING, JUNE 8, 1950

Attached hereto is the proposed agenda for the IIC meeting scheduled to be held in your office at 2:30 p.m., June 8, 1950.

"I THINK ROTATION
IS DESIRABLE."
H.

In connection with the third item on the agenda, pertaining to the selection of an IIC Chairman for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1950, Special Agent Sanders has advised that Colonel Barlow, of the Army, has remarked that he and General Irwin feel that you should continue as Chairman due to the fact that you are permanently in Washington and not subject to transfer as are military personnel. Sanders has advised that Captain DuBois, of the Navy, has expressed similar views and that General Carroll has indicated a desire that you continue as Chairman.

"I AGREE"
H.

Although the Bureau has agreed to furnish a permanent secretary for the IIC, it may be desirable, as indicated in item three on the agenda, to have the secretary from the same organization as the Chairman. As you know, Special Agent Edward S. Sanders has been the secretary since April 26, 1949.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, it is recommended that copies of the attached agenda be furnished to the other IIC members through liaison.

Attachment

ESS:hke

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-19-01 BY SP12 BT/ST/SC

NOT RECORDED

119 SEP 23 1950

SEP 26 1950

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-8603-786

(COPY)

ms

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 BTJ/SC
ON 5-31-90

7/1/97
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bjc/dlw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
PER OGA/ctt dtd 7/20/98

~~SECRET~~

342251

AGENDA

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE MEETING

JUNE 8, 1950

A meeting of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference is scheduled for 2:30 p.m., June 8, 1950, in the Office of the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Room 5633, Department of Justice Building.

The following are topics for discussion:

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ENCLOSURE

65-59264

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

Election Of IIC Chairman
For Fiscal Year Beginning
July 1, 1950

At the April 26, 1949 meeting of the IIC, Mr. Hoover was elected to serve as Chairman until July 1, 1950, and it was agreed that a Chairman would be elected to serve for each fiscal year thereafter, as provided in the IIC Charter.

At the same meeting, Mr. Hoover offered to furnish a permanent secretary from the personnel of the FBI. The IIC may wish to consider, however, that it might be desirable to have a secretary from the same service as the newly-elected Chairman in order to facilitate the work of the Chairman and the Secretary.

Joint Informal Meeting
With ICIS

The Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security has formally invited the IIC members, members of the IIC Working Committee and the IIC secretary to attend a joint informal meeting with ICIS to be held from 4:00 to 6:00 p.m., June 8, 1950, at the Officers Club, Fort McNair.

This invitation has been accepted by the IIC, and it is contemplated that the IIC representatives indicated will attend the joint informal meeting subsequent to instant IIC business meeting.

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To : MR. D. M. LADD
From : MR. A. H. BELMONT
Subject : AGENDA FOR WORKING COMMITTEE,
IIC, JUNE 28, 1950

6-23-50

Attached is the proposed agenda for the Working Committee, IIC, scheduled for 2:00 p.m., June 28, 1950 in the office of Colonel John W. Middleton, Room 2E516, Pentagon Building.

The members of the Working Committee have been contacted and have no suggestions or additions to this agenda.

If this agenda meets with your approval, copies will be disseminated to the Working Committee, IIC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/27/90 BY SP-12B TS/JS

342-251

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-8603-778

65-59264-

NOT RECORDED

19 SEP 23 1950

63 SEP 26 1950

Proposed agenda for working committee in IIC, scheduled for 2:00 p.m., June 28, 1950 in the office of Colonel John W. Middleton, Room 2E516, Pentagon Building.

~~SECRET~~

AGENDA
FOR WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
JUNE 28, 1950

A meeting of the Working Committee, IIC, is scheduled for 2:00 p.m., June 28, 1950 in the office of Colonel John W. Middleton, Room 2E516, Pentagon Building.

The order of business will be as follows:

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/ldw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
PER OGA letter dated 7/20/98
#342251

Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee
On Internal Security - Neutralizing
Espionage and Subversive Activities
of Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-19-90 BY SP12 BJS/SC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ENCLOSURE

65-59264

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Chairman of the IIC received from the Chairman of the ICIS a report of a subcommittee of ICIS on foreign diplomatic and official personnel. This problem, #1, entitled, "To neutralize so far as possible espionage and subversive activities of personnel of foreign diplomatic, consular or other missions, including international organizations" was referred to the ICIS by the IIC by letter dated August 4, 1949. The Chairman of the ICIS desires any comments the IIC may care to make on the report. The report has been disseminated to the IIC members.

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security -
Subcommittee Report - Restrictions on Representatives
of Foreign Countries Handling Classified Work Within
the United States

The Chairman of the IIC received a communication from the Chairman of the ICIS which attached a report of a Standing Committee of the ICIS dealing with restrictions on representatives of foreign countries handling classified work within the United States.

At the IIC meeting on June 8, 1950, Mr. Coyne advised the IIC that the ICIS has been preparing this report and that it would be submitted to the IIC for approval prior to final action by ICIS. The IIC members agreed that such action was desirable in order that each of the IIC agencies would have a chance to review information to be obtained in the questionnaire disseminated to the IIC members.

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SAC, Anchorage

Director, FBI

June 20, 1950

**PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE; EVENT OF INVASION
STAY-BEHIND AGENTS**

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference is considering a plan for the development of individuals who could act as agents for the United States in the event that Alaska is occupied by a foreign power. You should immediately confer with the local representatives of the Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force, in Alaska to determine what action has been taken toward the development of prospective stay-behind agents.

You should advise the Bureau immediately subsequent to this conference as to the results of the conference in addition to your comments as to the action you believe the Bureau should take in this connection. You should give consideration as to whether or not any of the informants of your office would fit the requirements of a stay-behind agent.

This information is desired by the Bureau for the Bureau's assistance in discussing this further with the members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. Please answer by radiogram.

NOTE: This problem will be placed on the agenda of the Working Committee of the IIC for the meeting to be held on June 28, 1950.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/27/90 BY SP2 BJS/18C

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tolson ☒
 Ladd ☒
 Clegg ☒
 Glavin ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tracy ☒
 Harbo ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Nease ☒
 Gandy ☒

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (S) (u)

(6-24-50) (S) (u) NR 240200

3:03 A.M.

FROM ANCHORAGE

DIRECTOR

URGENT

INTER DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE STAY BEHIND AGENTS
 RE BUREAU MEMORANDUM TWENTIETH INSTANT. CONFERENCE HAD WITH
 HEADS OF OSI, MIS, AND CAPTAIN MINER HEINE, U.S. NAVY, WHO IS
 DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE ALASKA COMMAND. THE IDEA CONCERNING
 STAY BEHIND AGENTS FORWARDED BY CAPTAIN MINER HEINE TO JOINT
 CHIEF OF STAFF IN FEBRUARY, 1950, AND LETTER RECEIVED IN REPLY (u)
 IN APRIL, 1950, TELLING HIM TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION HERE,
 INASMUCH AS MATTER IS BEING CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON. SEE
 ANCHORAGE MEMORANDUM DATED JANUARY 27, 1950, ENTITLED CONFERENCE (u)
 WITH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES, PLAN PROPOSED BY THE DIRECTOR OF
 INTELLIGENCE, ALASKAN COMMAND, TO PLACE NETWORK OF SLEEPER AGENTS
 IN ALASKA. ALSO SEE GENERAL SECURITY SURVEY OF TERRITORY OF
 ALASKA DATED MAY 9, 1950, SUBMITTED BY THIS OFFICE. IT IS BELIEVED (u)
 THAT WHILE BUREAU SHOULD AID AGENCY DESIGNATED TO ESTABLISH SUCH
 A NETWORK IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE, IT SHOULD NOT ASSUME THE RESPONSIB-
 ILITY OF THE PROJECT ITSELF, INASMUCH AS THE SUGGESTION WAS PRO-
 JECTED TO OBTAIN POSITIVE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IF AND AFTER ALASKA
 IS HELD BY AN ENEMY. ANCHORAGE INFORMANTS PRESENTLY PREVAILING NOT
 BELIEVED TO BE TYPE SUITABLE FOR THIS PROJECT, ALTHOUGH OFFICE
 HAS CONTACTS WHO POSSIBLY COULD FUNCTION IN SUCH A PROGRAM.

RECEIVED

(6-24-50) (S) (u) 4:25 A.M.

GW

CORRECTED

(6-24-50) (S) (u) 9:21 P.M.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

RECORDED - 127

SP3-BN/jm
 4-19-2000

00-1164

Declassify on: OADR

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
 outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
 order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Proposed plan for intelligence coverage
 in Alaska in the event of invasion

TO: MR.D.M.LADD

~~SECRET~~

June 27, 1950

FROM: A.H.BELMONT

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING
JUNE 28, 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-19-94 BY SP12 BTJ/ST

Attached is the agenda for instant Working Committee meeting.
Following your instructions, copies of the agenda have been distributed
to the other members of the Working Committee.

Referral/Consult

The following information is submitted for your use at this
meeting:

Interdepartmental Committee On
Internal Security - Neutralizing
Espionage and Subversive Activities
of Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/fdw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
Per OGA letter dated 7/20/98

The report referred to under this heading, with a memorandum dated
June 16, 1950 summarizing the report, is attached hereto. (Tab 2)

Attachments
ESS:lae

NOT RECORDED

119 SEP 23 1950

63 SEP 26 1950

~~SECRET~~

*Proposed Plan for Attorneys General
in Alaska in the event of invasion*

00 00

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal
Security - Subcommittee Report - Restrictions
on Representatives of Foreign Countries Handling
Classified Work Within the United States

On June 8, 1950, the Standing Committee of ICIS adopted a report in connection with this problem.

You will recall that at the last IIC meeting the Director expressed a desire to have the Working Committee review the ICIS report prior to its final adoption in order that the IIC agencies would have a chance to make suggested changes in the procedures or in the questionnaire developed for use in connection with this problem.

The report adopted by the ICIS Standing Committee provides generally for the following:

(1) The foreign government must transmit to the United States a personal history statement concerning the individual to be working in the United States.

(2) A foreign country must certify that it has information corroborating the questions in the personal history statement and that such representative will not endanger or constitute a threat to the security of the United States and that classified government data of the United States will be safeguarded in a manner acceptable to the United States.

(3) Fingerprints and a photograph of the proposed representative must be submitted.

(4) Copies of the personal history questionnaire will be distributed to the FBI, IDA, OSI, ONI and other likely sources of information. ~~(S)~~ - (U)

(5) Fingerprints will be transmitted to the Bureau for processing.

(6) The Department of State and will be requested to furnish pertinent information. ~~(S)~~ - (U)

(7) The proposed procedure should apply to all representatives of foreign governments who will have access to classified government data.

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

(8) These papers will be filed in an appropriate agency within the United States in order that venue would be established in the event false information is furnished.

You will recall that originally it was planned that the foreign government would supply a summary of the information in its possession, in respect to such representatives, or in the alternative the information itself. This requirement has been dropped. At the last LIC meeting it was indicated

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The personal history statement appears to be complete.

The report proposed for adoption by ICIS is attached hereto. (Tab 3)

RECOMMENDATION

The foregoing is for your use during instant meeting.

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: THE DIRECTOR
FROM: D. M. LADD
SUBJECT: IIC MEETING, JULY 6, 1950

DATE: July 3, 1950

An IIC meeting is scheduled to be held in your office at 2:30 p.m., July 6, 1950.

Attached hereto is the proposed agenda for the meeting.

Also attached in connection with the problem pertaining to the Neutralizing Espionage and Subversive Activities of Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel is a memorandum analyzing the ICIS report in connection with this problem. (Tab 1)

In connection with the problem of Restrictions on Representatives of Foreign Countries Handling Classified Work Within the United States, there is attached hereto a copy of the report submitted for approval by ICIS. The report has been outlined in the agenda and there appears to be no objection to the policy outlined in the report other than the fact that it excludes all officially accredited diplomatic or consular representatives. The Working Committee has suggested that the State Department designate only certain diplomatic representatives to be excluded. (Tab 2)

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, copies of the agenda will be distributed by liaison to the other IIC members and Pat Coyne.

Attachments

ESS:ilw; hke

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BTJ/SK

65-59264-✓
NOT RECORDED

119 SEP 23 1950

SEP 26 1950

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-8603-776

Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Atlantic in the context of Invasion

~~SECRET~~

MINUTES OF MEETING
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
JULY 6, 1950

A meeting of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference was held in the office of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Room 5633, Department of Justice Building, which meeting began at 2:40 p.m. on July 6, 1950. Those in attendance were as follows:

For the Department of the Army	Major General S. LeRoy Irwin Colonel John W. Middleton
For the Department of the Navy	Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson Captain Emory P. Hylant
For the Federal Bureau of Investigation	Director John Edgar Hoover Assistant to the Director D. M. Ladd
For the Department of the Air Force	Lieutenant Colonel Walter R. Graelman Mr. Gilbert Levy
For the National Security Council	Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
Secretary	Mr. Edward S. Sanders

The following was the order of business:

7-1-2000

SP3-BTS/m

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bjt/HW

DECLASSIFY ON: 1

PER OGA LETTER DTD 7/20/98

PER OGA LETTER DTD 7/20/98 00-1164

#342251

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ENCLOSURE

65-59264 ✓

Classified by SP4 BTJ/SC
Declassify on: 07 342251

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Levy advised that he would keep the Bureau advised in this regard.

ICIS - Neutralizing Espionage and Subversive
Activities of Foreign Diplomatic and
Official Personnel

Mr. Hoover advised that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security has considered this problem and has furnished for IIC comment a report of its sub-committee, which report had been adopted by ICIS.

It was pointed out that ICIS advised that, due to the variable factors of each case, it has not been possible to establish definite overall policy to be followed when it is shown that a foreign diplomat or official representative is engaged in subversive or espionage activities. The report provides that each case, with all relevant facts, should be brought to the attention of the Secretary of State who will consider the case and advise concerning the individual's official status, whether his alleged activities are relevant to his official duties, whether action against an individual who does not enjoy complete diplomatic immunity would injure this country's foreign relations, and, in the case of a person enjoying diplomatic immunity, whether those activities warrant his being declared persona non grata.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

It was noted that the Working Committee had recommended that the ICIS be advised by letter that the report had been reviewed and that the IIC has no objections to the report.

The Working Committee prepared a suggested letter to ICIS in this connection which further referred to related problems being considered by ICIS and asked that the IIC be informed of decisions made in connection with the related questions.

Mr. Hoover stated that he felt that the related problems of detention of diplomatic personnel, diplomatic establishments, [redacted] and other related matters should receive early consideration by ICIS, inasmuch as there is a definite need for a policy to be followed immediately upon outbreak of hostilities. He pointed out that highly secret plans have already been made in connection with the suspension of habeas corpus and other related matters, and that such plans have been implemented to the point where the IIC agencies can move immediately, in the event of hostilities.

The other members of the IIC agreed and Colonel Graalman suggested that the letter to ICIS definitely point out an immediate need for having such policy established.

Referral/Consult

Mr. Coyne advised that this matter had been the subject of several discussions in the ICIS Standing Committee and that [redacted]

Mr. Hoover stated that, as in the case of Pearl Harbor, he was afraid there would be so much confusion that delay would result which would place the intelligence agencies in the same position as they found themselves in subsequent to Pearl Harbor. Such delays would materially and adversely affect the operations of intelligence agencies and might endanger the internal security of the country.

The members agreed that the letter to ICIS should contain a paragraph setting forth the IIC feelings and stressing the urgency of early consideration and decision in connection with these related problems.

The suggested letter is being prepared by the Secretary and the approval of each of the IIC members will be obtained prior to the forwarding of the letter to ICIS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ICIS - Subcommittee Report -
Restrictions on Representatives of
Foreign Countries Handling Classified
Work within the United States

Mr. Hoover advised that the ICIS Standing Committee has adopted a report of its subcommittee in connection with this problem. Copies of the report were furnished to the IIC Secretary and thereafter distributed to the IIC members. The report has not as yet been adopted by ICIS inasmuch as it was felt necessary to clear this report with various interested agencies prior to its final adoption by ICIS.

The report pertains to representatives of foreign governments working within the United States and its territories and possessions on specified programs or projects of this government and provides generally for the following:

1. The foreign government must transmit to the United States a personal history statement concerning the individual to be working in the United States.
2. The foreign country must certify that it has information corroborating the answers in the personal history statement and that such representative will not endanger or constitute a threat to the security of the United States and that classified government data of the United States will be safeguarded in a manner acceptable to the United States.
3. Fingerprints and a photograph of the proposed representative must be submitted.
4. For the purpose of checking the name through the various intelligence files, copies of the personal history statement will be distributed to the FBI, IDA, OSI, ONI ☐ and other likely sources of information.
5. The fingerprints will be transmitted to the FBI for processing.

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. The Department of State and [] will be requested to furnish pertinent available information obtained in the country represented by the individual. Referral/Consult
7. The proposed procedures should apply to all representatives of foreign governments who will have access to classified government data.

The report states that this does not apply to officially accredited diplomatic or consular representatives.

The Working Committee recommended that a letter be addressed to ICIS, which letter would advise that the report has been reviewed by IIC and that there is no objection to the report other than the exclusion from its provisions of all diplomatic or consular representatives. The Working Committee was of the opinion that if all the diplomatic and consular representatives are excluded, steps would immediately be taken by many foreign individuals to be included on the official diplomatic or consular list in order to escape the requirements contemplated by the report. The Working Committee suggested that the State Department designate a list of diplomatic personnel that should be excluded. The Working Committee felt that all individuals with the exception of top-ranking diplomats should be included within the provisions of instant report. Referral/Consult

[]
[]
A general discussion of this problem revealed that there is apparently []

[]
[] General Schmidt is a member of ICIS and will report to ICIS.

[]
[] It was agreed that no action in this connection will be taken by IIC until such time as this problem

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

Conferences Covering Internal Security
Matters

Referral/Consult

During the course of the discussion concerning restrictions on representatives of foreign countries handling classified work within the United States, reference was made to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Mr. Hoover advised that he had ascertained that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (u)

Referral/Consult

Mr. Coyne stated that he desired that the IIC records of this meeting indicate that subsequent to the June 8, 1950, IIC meeting, he had contacted [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

Mr. Hoover stated that in spite of the fact that IIC inquiries concerning the conferences had met with the receipt of such information, the conferences nevertheless did touch on matters pertaining directly to the internal security of the country. He stated that the Fuchs case was investigated entirely by the FBI; that there are additional related cases under investigation by the Bureau and that there are several cases awaiting prosecution in connection with the Fuchs case.

Referral/Consult

He stated that he was concerned over the fact that such meetings and conferences are being held and that representatives from the agencies charged with the internal security responsibilities are not being requested to attend the conferences. Mr. Hoover stated that although [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

Admiral Johnson inquired as to who called the conferences and under what authority. He was advised that apparently the conferences had been [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

General Irwin suggested that a letter be directed to Mr. Coyne or to the National Security Council objecting to such procedures and urging that steps be taken in order that such conferences cannot be called in the future without the appropriate representation from IIC or ICIS. General Irwin further stated that he did not think such conferences were authoritative or fruitful without such representatives.

It was agreed that such letter should be addressed to the National Security Council. A letter is being prepared in this regard by the Secretary

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

and approval thereof will be obtained from each of the IIC members prior to its transmittal to the National Security Council.

Issuance of a Presidential Directive
Regarding Investigative Work in Matters
Pertaining to Espionage, Sabotage,
Subversive Activities and Related Matters

Mr. Hoover called attention to the fact that, by letter dated July 5, 1950 addressed to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, a suggested Presidential Directive had been forwarded which set forth the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation pertaining to investigative work on matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters, Mr. Hoover pointed out that for the most part this is a reissuance of prior Presidential Directives but that the prior Directives are brought up to date and contained in one suggested directive.

Copies of this suggested directive and the letter to the Executive Secretary, NSC, have been previously furnished to each of the IIC members and to Mr. Coyne.

Request of NSC for Preparation of Papers
on "United States Objectives and Programs
for National Security"

Mr. Hoover pointed out that the FBI had received on July 3, 1950 a memorandum from Mr. Coyne transmitting copies of a report made by the Secretaries of State and Defense, a copy of the request made to NSC by the President in connection with the report and a suggested draft copy of a paper concerning the Internal Security Program which had been prepared by Mr. Coyne. Mr. Hoover pointed out that the IIC and ICIS have been requested to prepare papers covering the Internal Security Program in order that the combined reports from IIC and ICIS may be included in an over-all report to be furnished to the President by NSC.

Mr. Hoover also stated he was concerned with the short period of time in which the IIC is supposed to prepare the report, it being noted that

~~SECRET~~

the report is due back to Mr. Coyne by July 20, 1950.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Coyne advised that it was not until June 30, 1950, that a decision was reached by the National Security Council Staff that a request be made of the IIC and ICIS agencies to prepare the portion of the report pertaining to their respective responsibilities in the internal security field.

Mr. Hoover stated that FBI personnel are presently working on the FBI portion of the report and suggested that the other IIC agencies designate representatives to meet with Bureau representatives for the purpose of preparing instant report. Each of the IIC members advised that a representative would be designated.

Mr. Hoover stated that he felt that the coordination of the IIC and ICIS reports should be made probably by Mr. Coyne inasmuch as he did not feel the IIC had time to prepare an adequate report and correlate it with the ICIS report by July 20.

Mr. Coyne suggested that he would be glad to meet with representatives of IIC and ICIS after each had completed the necessary report. Mr. Coyne stated he felt that would probably be the most desirable way in which to handle the coordination if the plan met with the approval of the IIC members.

It was agreed that the IIC should compile its report, approved by each of the IIC members, and that the report could then be correlated with the ICIS report with Mr. Coyne's assistance and that the report, after correlation, should again be approved by each of the IIC members.

Mr. Coyne suggested that if at all possible the joint memorandum to be included for the President should not exceed more than four or five pages. He suggested, however, that any material desired could be placed in an appendix.

Mr. Hoover stated that it would not be possible to write the report in four pages, but that a summary of the report could be reduced to the desired number of pages and the IIC and ICIS reports attached in the appendix.

FBI Special Agent to be assigned to Panama Canal Zone
for liaison duties.

General Irwin referred to previous discussions with Mr. Hoover concerning the designation of an agent of the FBI to serve in a liaison capacity with the armed services in the Panama Canal Zone and inquired as to whether Mr. Hoover had received his letter in this regard. Mr. Hoover stated that he had just received the letter and that a Special Agent would be designated immediately.

There being no further business to come before the conference, the meeting was adjourned at 3:40 P.M. The next regular meeting is scheduled for August 3, 1950.

~~SECRET~~

TO: THE DIRECTOR

FROM: D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: IIC MEETING
JULY 6, 1950

DATE: July 7, 1950

Attached hereto are the minutes of the IIC Meeting held in your office on July 6, 1950.

If approved by you, it is suggested that the attached letter to General Irwin forwarding a copy of the minutes be dispatched. Copies of the letter to General Irwin with copies of the minutes are attached for the other members of the IIC and Mr. Coyne.

Attachment

ESS:lw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/21/94 BY SP2 BTB/KC


342251

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-8603-785

65-59264-
RECORDED
119 SEP 23 1950

63 SEP 26 1950

*Proposed plan for intelligence coverage in
in Berlin in the event of invasion*



OCT 9-1950

65-59264-5
CHANGED TO
65-59264-1X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-90 BY SP12B/TJ/KFC

342251

C

SAC, Anchorage

July 7, 1950

Director, FBI

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
ESPIONAGE - R

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/SC
ON 8/27/94

342251

At the June 8, 1950, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, it was pointed out that the Alaskan Joint Command is preparing a plan which will provide for a means of obtaining intelligence information in the event Alaska or a part of Alaska is occupied by enemy forces. The plan contemplates the selection, training and equipping of selected United States citizens who are long established residents of the section of Alaska for which they would be expected to provide coverage. The plan further contemplates that these individuals would have no previous military record.

Referral/Consult

On July 6, 1950, at the IIC meeting it was agreed that the FBI should set up and provide for the operation of the stay-behind agents who would obtain intelligence information if all of Alaska or a portion thereof might be occupied by the enemy.

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult


You are instructed to

draft a proposed program for the operation of stay-behind intelligence agents in Alaska in the event of an emergency. Your plans for this project are to be submitted to the Bureau for review at the earliest possible date. The Bureau is likewise studying this problem and you will be promptly informed of any pertinent developments in this regard.

You should bear in mind at the outset the objectives of this program, namely:

1. The type of intelligence information desired from Alaska in case of conquest by the enemy
2. Methods of communication with stay-behind agents whereby the desired information and reports can be received.
3. Location of strategic areas and vital facilities where immediate coverage would be of first and paramount importance, such as the coast line, shipping lanes and other transportation and communication centers.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____



RECORDED - 2

52 OCT 6 1950
WTB:se

65-57264

Special consideration should be given by you to that portion of the proposed plan dealing with the selection, training and equipping of stay-behind agents. In this connection the question of payment of funds to stay-behind agents should be explored.

The importance of this proposed plan cannot be over emphasized. It is one in which good imagination must be used, and practical results are expected.

You are to give this matter your personal attention. It is imperative that the Bureau fulfill its commitments in regard to this program and an early reply to this communication is expected.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson _____

Mr. Ladd _____

Mr. Glavin _____

Mr. Nichols _____

Mr. Rosen _____

Mr. Tracy _____

Mr. Harbo _____

Mr. Belmont _____

Mr. Mohr _____

Tele. Room _____

Mr. Nease _____

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 7/24/50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
ESPIONAGE - R

Referral/Consult

Rebulet July 7, 1950.

Immediately upon the receipt of the Bureau communication,
this matter was discussed with [REDACTED]

Unless advised to the contrary, [REDACTED]

JHW:MR

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/27/94 BY SP128 BTG/lscDECLASSIFIED BY SP128 BTG/lsc
ON 5/27/94
34225/HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

RECORDED - 27

JUL 27 1950

12

324
AUG 14 1950
AUG 18 1950

(COPY)

ms

OFFICE MEMORANDUM • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: August 7, 1950

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING
AUGUST 9, 1950

A meeting of the IIC Working Committee is scheduled for 2 p.m., August 9, 1950, in the office of Captain Hyland, Room 5C611, Pentagon Building. Attached hereto is the agenda for instant meeting.

Item Number 3 on the agenda pertains to Public Law Number 513, and it is contemplated that the discussion on this law, dealing with communications intelligence, will be general. There is attached for your use, however, a copy of a recent Bureau Bulletin pertaining to this law.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, this agenda would be distributed to the other members of the Working Committee by liaison.

Attachments

ESS:lw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/94 BY SP12 BTG/SLC

34225/

1/11/51

65-59264-✓

NOT RECORDED

119

SEP 23 1950

SEP 26 1950

66-8603-792

Proposed plan for IIC as discussed in letter in the past of 8/1/50

~~SECRET~~

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bjo/ddw
DECLASSIFY ON: ESK 1
Per OGA letter dtd 7/20/98 #342251

~~SECRET~~
AGENDA
FOR WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
AUGUST 9, 1950

A meeting of the Working Committee, IIC, is scheduled for 2 p.m., August 9, 1950, in the office of Captain Emory P. Hylant, Room 5C611, Pentagon Building.

The order of business will be as follows:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/7/94 BY SP4 BJO/ddw

Referral/Consult

Clearances For Red
Cross Representatives

Colonel Carpenter has advised that representatives from the Red Cross have contacted the military services for the purpose of determining what arrangements, if any, can be made for the clearances of new employees of the Red Cross, who will be assigned to duty with the armed services or any position to see classified material. Colonel Carpenter has pointed out that he has discussed this matter with Red Cross representatives who have pointed out that Red Cross is extremely desirous of maintaining proper liaison and proper security in connection with its employees. Colonel Carpenter has advised he will brief the Committee in connection with this problem at instant meeting. He has advised that the total number of such new employees will be approximately 250.

~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

1557964
~~SECRET~~

Public Law Number 513,
81st Congress

Colonel Middleton has pointed out that Public Law Number 513 of the 81st Congress makes it unlawful for any individual to transmit, use, or publish information concerning the communications intelligence of this Government. He has advised that while it is realized that violations of this law are within the primary jurisdiction of the FBI, it is the feeling of certain individuals within the Defense Establishment that efforts should be made to publicize the existence of this new law in order that the appropriate individuals will be aware of its existence and thereby not violate the law. He has stated that the Defense Department is very anxious that steps be taken in order to prevent violations rather than to prosecute such violations after they occur. Colonel Middleton will discuss this matter at instant meeting in order to determine whether the Committee has any objections to the appropriate officials of NME publicizing instant law.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The
Committee may wish to refer this matter to ICIS inasmuch as it would appear to be within the jurisdiction of that Committee.

Referral/Consult

Psychological Warfare

By letter dated March 6, 1950, the IIC forwarded to ICIS a letter pointing out certain types of propaganda being distributed throughout the United States. By letter dated July 17, 1950, ICIS has furnished a copy of a report dated May 17, 1950, concerning public morale and education. This report reaches the following conclusions:

- a. That the establishment of a Domestic Information program is outside the province of the ICIS.

- b. That there exist adequate medio consisting of the Public Relations Officials or Offices in the several agencies and departments of the Government through which internal security educational and informational material can be released.
- c. That the advantages and disadvantages of publicizing the projects and programs resulting from their deliberations may be considered by the subcommittees of ICIS in their recommendations.
- d. That in reviewing reports, including progress reports from other agencies, the ICIS may consider and recommend to the responsible agency such public dissemination of information in regard thereto as ICIS deems appropriate.

This matter has been included on this agenda inasmuch as the Working Committee may wish to take cognizance of this report in the minutes for instant meeting.

Conferences Concerning
Internal Security Matters

As agreed at the IIC meeting of July 6, 1950, an approved letter dated July 12, 1950, was forwarded to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, protesting the fact that conferences are being called by other Government agencies, during which conferences matters of an internal security nature are discussed without representatives of IIC or ICIS being present or invited.

By letter dated July 13, 1950, Mr. Lay advised that the IIC letter had been forwarded to [redacted]
[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] No members of the IIC or ICIS were present.

This matter is placed on the agenda at this time in order that the IIC agencies will be aware of the action taken in this matter to date.

ICIS Ad Hoc Committee
Concerning Industrial Security

By letter dated August 7, 1950, ICIS advised that ICIS recognizes that there appears to be overlapping of interests in the industrial security field. The letter states that the overlapping appears to be in the interests of the NSRB, the Department of Defense, the ICIS, and the IIC.

The letter states it is believed that problems relating to personnel security investigations of plant employees and the availability of information resulting from such investigations are matters which are, of course, within the province of the IIC interests and responsibility.

ICIS suggests that the IIC designate a representative to sit on an Ad Hoc Committee concerning the over-all problem of industrial security, which Committee is to have representatives from the Department of Defense, the Civil Defense Office of the NSRB, the Munitions Board of the Department of Defense, the IIC, and the ICIS. Colonel George W. Hanson of OSD is to be the Chairman of this Committee.

~~SECRET~~

MINUTES OF MEETING
WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
AUGUST 9, 1950

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bjk/fdw
DECLASSIFY ON: EOX 1
PER OGA letter JAG 7/20/98 #342251

A meeting of the Working Committee, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference was held on August 9, 1950, in the office of Captain H. F. Hylant, Room 5C611 Pentagon Building. The meeting began at 2:10 P.M. Those in attendance were as follows:

For the Department of the Army

Colonel John W. Middleton

For the Department of the Navy

Captain Emory P. Hylant
Captain H. E. Keisker

For the Federal Bureau of
Investigation

Mr. V. P. Keay


For the Department of the Air Force

Colonel William E. Carpenter

Secretary

Mr. Edward S. Sanders

The points for discussion were as follows:



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-31-98 BY SP4 BJK/fdw 342251

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

65-59264

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

CLEARANCES FOR RED CROSS
REPRESENTATIVES

Colonel Carpenter advised that the Air Force had been contacted by Mr. Roy Johnson and Mr. Jack Prosser of the Red Cross, who had advised they had previously contacted the Army and Navy in connection with establishing a close liaison in the services for the purpose of securing the necessary clearances for Red Cross personnel, who would be assigned to the armed services and who might necessarily need access to certain classified information in order that the appropriate Red Cross planning could be conducted. The plan is for such Red Cross representatives to be cleared in the manner that other individuals are cleared for classified military information and the clearances of the individuals would be in such manner as to be accepted by all three services.

Colonel Carpenter advised that a discussion of this matter indicated there would probably be 150 individuals who would be handling rather highly classified information and who would be working in administrative positions for the Red Cross. In addition, there would be a maximum number of approximately 1,000 that would need some type of clearances. The latter group would be assigned in hospitals, Army camps, etc.

Mr. Keay inquired as to whether actual investigations were required.

Colonel Middleton suggested that the clearances would have to follow the same rule as for any other individuals having access to classified

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

material - a background investigation for those requiring access to any top secret material, but only a national agency check for the majority of the individuals. It was estimated that the 150 individuals would need to be cleared for top secret.

Referral/Consult

Colonel Carpenter pointed out that arrangements had been made whereby [redacted]

It was suggested that the investigations would be handled under the provisions of the Delimitations Agreement in the same manner as followed concerning employees of industrial concerns handling classified contracts.

It was pointed out by Colonel Carpenter that the Red Cross is to appoint the Security Officer who would handle this entire program for the Red Cross and that information would be supplied only to the Security Officer. It was pointed out that one exception to this rule might be a request from General George C. Marshall.

Mr. Keay pointed out that the FBI has conducted name checks for the Red Cross in the past and is presently handling a few of the name checks. It was suggested that this program be handled entirely through the military services in the future in order to prevent duplication of work. Mr. Keay further stated it is of interest to the Bureau that the Red Cross is planning to appoint a Security Officer.

It was agreed that this matter should be placed on the next IIC Agenda and when final decisions are made a letter should be addressed to the Red Cross by the IIC Chairman advising of the procedures to be followed.

PUBLIC LAW NUMBER 513.
81st CONGRESS

Colonel Middleton pointed out that Public Law Number 513 of the 81st Congress makes it unlawful for any individual to transmit, use or publish information concerning the Communications Intelligence of this Government. He stated that this matter [redacted]

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

This matter was discussed briefly at instant meeting and action thereon deferred until the next meeting of the Working Committee in order that the members might study the report and make appropriate recommendations for the next IIC meeting.

Referral/Consult

After a general discussion of this, it was agreed that a letter be written to ICIS furnishing this information to ICIS for what value it may have. It was noted that ICIS is considering related problems at the present time. It was agreed that this matter should not be held for the IIC Agenda and that a letter should be prepared in this connection by the Secretary for the signature of the IIC Chairman. The military members of the Committee gave approval of the letter at instant meeting. A letter is being prepared by the Secretary.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By letter dated March 6, 1950, the IIC forwarded to ICIS a letter pointing out certain types of propaganda being distributed throughout the United States. By letter dated July 17, 1950, ICIS has furnished a copy of a report dated May 17, 1950, concerning public morale and education. This report reaches the following conclusions:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- a. That the establishment of a Domestic Information program is outside the province of the ICIS.
- b. That there exist adequate media consisting of the Public Relations Officials or Offices in the several agencies and departments of the Government through which internal security educational and informational material can be released.
- c. That the advantages and disadvantages of publicizing the projects and programs resulting from their deliberations may be considered by the subcommittees of ICIS in their recommendations.
- d. That in reviewing reports, including progress reports from other agencies, the ICIS may consider and recommend to the responsible agency such public dissemination of information in regard thereto as ICIS deems appropriate.

The members of the Committee suggested that the minutes of the meeting reflect that this matter has been noted and suggested that it be placed on the next IIC Agenda in order that the official minutes of IIC will reflect the receipt of instant report from ICIS.

CONFERENCES CONCERNING
INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS

As agreed at the IIC meeting of July 6, 1950, an approved letter dated July 12, 1950, was forwarded to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council protesting the fact that conferences are being called by other Government agencies, during which conferences matters of an internal security nature are discussed without representatives of IIC and ICIS being present or invited.

Referral/Consult

By letter dated July 13, 1950, Mr. Lay advised that the IIC letter had been forwarded to [redacted] for any consideration and action deemed appropriate. It is to be recalled that the [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] No members of the IIC or ICIS were present.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~139332~~

It was agreed that the minutes of instant meeting should reflect that the receipt of the letter from Mr. Lay has been noted.

ICIS AD HOC COMMITTEE CONCERNING
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

Captain Hylant advised that by letter dated August 7, 1950 ICIS advised that ICIS recognizes that there appears to be overlapping of interests in the industrial security field. The letter states that the overlapping appears to be in the interests of NSRB, the Department of Defense, the ICIS, and the IIC.

The letter states it is believed that problems relating to personnel security investigations of plant employees and the availability of information resulting from such investigations are matters which are, of course, within the province of the IIC interests and responsibility.

ICIS suggests that the IIC designate a representative to sit on an Ad Hoc Committee concerning the over-all problem of industrial security, which Committee is to have representatives from the Department of Defense, the Civil Defense Office of the NSRB, the Munitions Board of the Department of Defense, the IIC, and the ICIS. Colonel George W. Hanson of OSD is to be the Chairman of this Committee.

The members of the Working Committee agreed that the ICIS letter is of such general character that it cannot be determined just what problems are concerned. It was agreed that the IIC Secretary should contact the ICIS Secretary for additional information and that the matter should be considered at the next IIC Working Committee meeting.

There being no further business to come before the Committee, the meeting was adjourned at 3:45 P.M.

~~SECRET~~

(COPY)
ms

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: August 11, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING
AUGUST 9, 1950

Attached hereto are the minutes of the IIC Working Committee meeting, which was held on August 9, 1950.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, it is recommended that copies of the minutes be furnished to the other members of the Working Committee via Liaison.

Attachment

ESS:ilw

ALL INFO CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/27/94 BY SP12 BJS/KSC

66-2603-775

ORIGINAL FILED IN

65-59264-✓
RECORDED
19 SEP 25 1950

SEP 26 1950

*Approved - memo for Intelligence Committee
+ in minutes in the matter of procedure*

REC-50-2

SEP 15, 1950

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

640, 1000-1000

RAJENDRA PRASAD
USNYA - 1911/12

1-57214-2X

~~FILED IN MAY 1960 - UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL~~

[illegible]

SHOULD ENSURE

[Illegible handwritten notes]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/19/95 BY SP12

13

... of justice

RECTOR

14)
(2)
(0107-1212
EDL)

(U)

Classified by ~~221285~~ 510
Declassify on: ~~0107~~ 34225

4-19-2004

CO-1164

ison _____
 dd _____
 egg _____
 avin _____
 chols _____
 sen _____
 acy _____
 rpo _____
 lmont _____
 hr _____
 le. moon _____
 use _____
 rdy _____

OCT 1952

(C) 14/1

61 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

Radio (8/16/50)

10:03 AM

for Mr

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: August 14, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Referral/Consult olsonSUBJECT: STAY-BEHIND AGENTS AND ESCAPE AND
EVASION PLANS FOR ALASKA

Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Subsequent to the July 6, 1950, IIC meeting it was agreed that [redacted] Bureau would develop a network of stay-behind agents to be used by the Commanding General in Alaska in the event a portion or all of Alaska is occupied. [redacted] the Bureau field offices in Alaska were notified to proceed with plans for these stay-behind agents. The plan is to be closely coordinated with the desires of the Alaskan Commander.

Referral/Consult

Also under consideration was the plans for escape and evasion procedures for Alaska. This plan contemplates a system whereby U. S. air men brought down in Alaska during a period of occupation, would be able to escape and return to U. S. forces. You will recall that [redacted]

At the August 9, 1950, IIC Working Committee meeting the Air Force representative advised that no decision has as yet been reached in connection with the escape and evasion program. [redacted]

[redacted] Air Intelligence is a member of the IAC and not of the IIC. Colonel Carpenter advised further that this matter will be brought up at the IAC meeting on August 18, 1950, and that the discussion will include stay-behind agents even though that portion of the question is settled and being handled by the IIC. The OSI representative feels that only confusion could result should [redacted] enter the picture for either of these programs. It was agreed that IIC members who also belong to IAC will take the position that the stay-behind agents program in Alaska is strictly an internal security matter and is presently being handled by the IIC.

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the Bureau representative at the IAC meeting take the position that no problem exists insofar as the stay-behind agents program is concerned inasmuch as that problem is receiving the appropriate attention by [redacted] the Bureau.

It is further recommended that the Bureau representative take the position that escape and evasion plans in Alaska are also an internal security matter, the coordination of which is the responsibility of the IIC. In this connection it is recommended that IAC be advised that the IIC will, of course, coordinate this matter closely with Air Intelligence and give early consideration to any suggestions on the part of Air Intelligence or other IAC members. AUG 18 1950

ESS:raw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/1/94 BY SP12 BTJ/SC

34225/
62-81487-116

24

FILED
J

of proposed plan for intelligence coverage in Alaska in the event of invasion

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

DATE: August 15, 1950

FROM : MR. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

PURPOSE:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/19/94 BY SP12 BTB/lpc

To advise of the present status of the captioned program in which the Bureau is participating.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

It is recalled that at the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference meeting on July 6, 1950, it was agreed that the FBI [redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of stay-behind agents who would obtain intelligence information if all Alaska or a portion thereof might be occupied by the enemy.

By letter dated July 7, 1950, the Special Agent in Charge of the Anchorage Office was instructed by the Bureau to [redacted] draft a proposed program for the operation of stay-behind intelligence agents in Alaska in the event of an emergency.

The problem of "escape and evasion plans for Alaska", (a system whereby US air men brought down in Alaska during a period of occupation would be able to escape and return to US forces), was not discussed in the Bureau's letter of July 7, 1950, to Anchorage in view of the fact that no decision at that time had been reached as to which agencies of the US Government would be responsible for directing such a program.

Referral/Consult

By letter dated July 24, 1950, advice was received from the SAC at Anchorage that immediately upon receipt of the Bureau's communication the matter of stay-behind agents was discussed with [redacted]

The SAC at Anchorage added that the completion of the draft of the proposed program would be held up until [redacted]

WTB:ADS

RECORDED - mmw

AUG 21 1950

63 OCT 6 1950

RECOMMENDATION:

The above is for your information.

There is attached a proposed radiogram to the Anchorage Office, and if same meets with your approval, it is recommended it be transmitted to Anchorage.

Attachment

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: August 17, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROGRESS REPORT ON INTERNAL SECURITY
PREPARED BY MR. COYNE OF NSC

By memorandum dated August 8, 1950, Pat Coyne has furnished to the IIC members a copy of a Progress Report which he proposes to make on August 21, 1950, to the National Security Council. The Progress Report covers the activities of the IIC and ICIS for the period, February 18, 1950 to July 31, 1950.

In so far as the IIC is concerned the report favorably comments upon the following items which have been handled by the IIC:

Referral/Consult

1. Delimiting the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI in security matters in the Military Sea Transportation Service.
2. Agreement concerning FBI responsibility in the setting up of a "stay-behind agent" program in Alaska.
3. Designation of FBI Agent to serve in a liaison capacity in the Panama Canal Zone.
4. Generally providing for additional intelligence coverage.
5. Discussions concerning the ramifications of the Fuchs Atomic Energy Case.

The foregoing matters are all of record in the minutes of the IIC.

Coyne has, in his report, pointed out the close coordination between IIC and ICIS and has mentioned that a coordinated plan for the acceleration of internal security measures is being prepared to be included in an over-all report to the President. This coordinated report concerning an accelerated internal security program has been completed by IIC and ICIS and referred to Coyne.

Coyne, in his report, likewise discusses the various accomplishments of ICIS during the pertinent period.

There is nothing in the report which reflects unfavorably upon the Bureau or upon the IIC. The other IIC members have advised Special Agent Sanders, IIC Secretary; they have no comments or objections concerning the report.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-9-00 BY 12878/SC

65-59264-✓
RECORDED

SEP 23 1950

SEP 26 1950

Progress Report for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the West of Europe

100-5092-99 VI CTIN TWE-70

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the minutes of the next IIC Working Committee meeting and of the next IIC meeting take note of the mentioned report. No reply to Coyne is necessary.



OFFICE MEMORANDUM • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING
AUGUST 23, 1950

DATE: August 21, 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/9/94 BY SP12BTP/8C

A meeting of the IIC Working Committee is scheduled to be held in your office at 2:00 P. M. August 23, 1950.

Attached hereto is the agenda for instant meeting. In connection with the item concerning Public Law No. 513, which makes it unlawful for any individual to transmit, use or publish information concerning the Communications Intelligence of this Government, it is noted that the

that [redacted] would not react unfavorably upon the Bureau or IIC, that the decision as to [redacted] should be left entirely to the [redacted]

It is recommended that the Bureau take this position at instant meeting of the IIC Working Committee in connection with this problem.

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you, it is recommended that the copies of the agenda be distributed by Liaison to the other members of the Working Committee.

ESS:ilw

65-59264-✓
NOT RECORDED
115 SEP 25 1950

SEP 26 1950

Proposed plans for intelligence coverage in connection with the event of invasion

66-8600-777

(COPY)

ms

August 10, 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~VIA MAISON~~

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Pat:

In reply to your letter of August 7, 1950, with which you enclosed a copy of a letter from Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine, Acting Deputy Under Secretary, Department of State, addressed to Mr. Lay, I desire to point out that Mr. Humelsine's letter is not responsive to the letter of July 13, 1950, which was submitted by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.

It will be recalled that referenced letter raised the point that in the future where matters dealing with internal security are discussed, it was felt that representatives of the appropriate intelligence agencies should be in attendance. Mr. Humelsine's reply does not indicate whether steps will be taken to see that representatives of either the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference or the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security are in attendance at future meetings of this nature.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Attachment No. 2

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/KSC
ON 5/31/94

342251

ENCLOSURE

65-59264 ✓

MINUTES OF MEETING
WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
AUGUST 23, 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BTB WSC

A meeting of the Working Committee, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, was held on August 23, 1950, in the office of Mr. D. M. Ladd, Room 5736, Department of Justice Building. The meeting began at 2:10 p. m. Those in attendance were as follows:

For the Department of the Army	Colonel John W. Middleton
For the Department of the Navy	Captain Emory P. Hylant
For the Federal Bureau of Investigation	Mr. D. M. Ladd Mr. V. P. Keay
For the Department of the Air Force	Colonel William E. Carpenter
Secretary	Mr. Edward S. Sanders

The points for discussion were as follows:

Escape and Evasion
Program for Alaska

Mr. Ladd, the acting chairman, advised that [redacted] FBI are presently preparing a stay-behind agent program to be put into effect in Alaska in the event a portion or all of Alaska is occupied. It was noted that [redacted]

Mr. Ladd pointed out that to date no decision had been made in so far as to which agencies would handle the escape and evasion program and that apparently [redacted]

Referral/Consult

ENCLOSURE

65-59064

Referral/Consult

[redacted]
Colonel Carpenter pointed out that this matter has been pending since April or May and that the question still seems to be unsettled in so far as [redacted]

[redacted] He pointed out that, inasmuch as [redacted]

[redacted] he is of the opinion that the IIC should assert its jurisdiction and go on record as being ready, willing and able to coordinate the preparation of the escape and evasion program as well as the stay-behind agent program in Alaska.

Colonel Carpenter pointed out that, if IIC takes this positive stand, everyone concerned will be cognizant of this stand and, if anyone has any objections, it will bring the matter to a head.

Mr. Ladd advised that the FBI will be glad to go along with that recommendation and that in his opinion the matter needs to be settled in the immediate future inasmuch as the need for such programs is at present rather than in the future.

Referral/Consult

This matter was generally discussed, and it was agreed by the members of the committee that the recommendation be made to the IIC at its next meeting that the Air Force be advised that it is the view of the IIC that this is a problem that should be worked out in Alaska by [redacted] the FBI. If there is no objection raised, the appropriate instructions can then be forwarded to Alaska and work can be instituted looking towards the completion of this escape and evasion program.

Public Law Number 513
81st Congress

Referral/Consult

Colonel Middleton at the August 9, 1950 meeting of the Working Committee pointed out that recently passed Public Law Number 513 makes it unlawful for any individual to transmit, use, or publish information concerning the Communications Intelligence of this Government. He advised that the matter was [redacted]

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]

The matter was discussed at the August 9, 1950 meeting briefly and action thereon deferred until instant meeting of the IIC Working Committee. It was pointed out at the August 9th meeting that [REDACTED] would not react unfavorably in all probability upon the IIC agencies in connection with their enforcement of Public Law Number 513. There was some belief, however, that should [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]

It was agreed that further consideration would be given this matter at instant meeting.

Mr. Ladd suggested that it might be appropriate to refer this matter to the National Security Resources Board, which is charged with censorship matters, inasmuch as the [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

This matter was discussed by the members of the committee, and it was agreed that it be recommended to the IIC that this matter be [REDACTED] with the comment that it is believed more damage might ensue [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

Conferences Concerning
Internal Security Matters

Mr. Ladd pointed out that as agreed at the IIC meeting of July 6, 1950, an approved letter dated July 12, 1950, was forwarded to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, protesting the fact that conferences are being called by other Government agencies during which conferences matters of an internal security nature are discussed without representatives of IIC and ICIS being present or invited.

By letter dated July 13, 1950, Mr. Lay advised that the IIC letter had been forwarded to the [REDACTED] for any consideration and action deemed appropriate. It is

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

to be recalled that [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] No

members of the IIC or ICIS were present.

Referral/Consult

By memorandum dated August 7, 1950, Mr. Coyne forwarded to the IIC Chairman [redacted]
[redacted]

Also attached hereto, marked Attachment No. 2, is a copy of letter dated August 10, 1950, addressed to Mr. Coyne by the IIC Chairman, which points out that [redacted] to the IIC letter of July 13, 1950, inasmuch as [redacted]
[redacted]

Referral/Consult

It was agreed that this matter should be noted in the minutes of instant Working Committee meeting and should be placed on the agenda for the next IIC meeting in order that this correspondence may be noted in the minutes of the IIC.

Progress Report on Internal Security
Prepared by Mr. Coyne of NSC

By memorandum dated August 8, 1950, Mr. Coyne furnished to IIC members a copy of a Progress Report, which he proposed to make on August 21, 1950, to the National Security Council. The Progress Report covers the activities of the IIC and ICIS for the period of February 18, 1950 to July 31, 1950.

In so far as the IIC is concerned, the report favorably comments upon the following items which have been handled by the IIC:

1. Delimiting the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI [redacted] in security matters in connection with the Military Sea Transportation Service.
2. Agreement concerning [redacted] FBI responsibility in the setting up of

Referral/Consult

OO OO

a "stay-behind" agent program in Alaska.

3. Designation of an FBI Agent to serve in a liaison capacity in the Panama Canal Zone.
4. Generally providing for additional intelligence coverage.
5. Discussions concerning the ramification of the Fuchs Atomic Energy Case.

The foregoing matters are on record in the minutes of the IIC.

Coyne has, in his report, pointed out the close coordination between IIC and ICIS and has mentioned that a coordinated plan for the acceleration of internal security measures is being prepared to be included in his over-all report to the President. This coordinated report concerning an accelerated internal security program has been completed by IIC and ICIS and referred to Coyne.

In his report, Coyne likewise discusses the various accomplishments of ICIS during the pertinent period.

The members of the Working Committee agreed that there is no objection to Coyne's report and agreed that the minutes of the Working Committee should reflect that this report has been noted. It was also agreed that this matter should be placed on the agenda for the next IIC meeting in order that the IIC minutes will reflect the approval of this report.

* * * * *

There being no further business to come before the committee, the meeting was adjourned at 3:05 p.m.

Attachments

AGENDA
FOR WORKING COMMITTEE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
AUGUST 23, 1950

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-1-94 BY SP12875/SC

34225/

A meeting of the Working Committee, IIC, is scheduled for 2:00 P. M. August 23, 1950, in the office of Mr. D. M. Ladd, Room 5736, Department of Justice Building. The order of business will be as follows:

Referral/Consult

The [redacted] FBI are presently preparing a stay-behind agent program to be put into effect in Alaska in the event a portion or all of Alaska is occupied. At the August 9, 1950 meeting of the Working Committee, it was pointed out by the OSI representative that no agreement has as yet been reached in connection with the escape and evasion program to be used in Alaska in case of such an emergency. It was pointed out that [redacted]

[redacted] The decision was made however that [redacted] FBI should prepare the stay-behind agent program and that further discussions would be held looking towards a solution for the escape and evasion program.

Referral/Consult

Public Law Number 513
81st Congress

Colonel Middleton at the August 9, 1950 meeting of the Working Committee pointed out that recently passed Public Law Number 513 makes it unlawful for any individual to transmit, use, or publish information concerning the Communications Intelligence of this Government. He advised that the matter

ENCLOSURE

65-57264 ✓

Referral/Consult

was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The matter was discussed at the August 9, 1950 meeting briefly and action thereon deferred until instant meeting of the IIC Working Committee. It was pointed out at the August 9th meeting that [REDACTED] would not react unfavorably in all probability upon the IIC agencies in connection with their enforcement of Public Law Number 513. There was some belief, however, that should [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED] they would react unfavorably and might consider the receipt of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It was agreed that further consideration would be given this matter at instant meeting.

Conferences Concerning
Internal Security Matters.

As agreed at the IIC meeting of July 6, 1950, an approved letter dated July 12, 1950, was forwarded to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, protesting the fact that conferences are being called by other Government agencies during which conferences matters of an internal security nature are discussed without representatives of IIC and ICIS being present or invited.

By letter dated July 13, 1950, Mr. Lay advised that the IIC letter had been forwarded to [REDACTED] for any consideration and action deemed appropriate. It is to be recalled that the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

2. Agreement concerning [] FBI responsibility in the setting up of a "stay-behind" agent program in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

3. Designation of an FBI agent to serve in a liaison capacity in the Panama Canal Zone.
4. Generally providing for additional intelligence coverage.
5. Discussions concerning the ramification of the Fuchs Atomic Energy Case.

The foregoing matters are on record in the minutes of the IIC.

Coyne has, in his report, pointed out the close coordination between IIC and ICIS and has mentioned that a coordinated plan for the acceleration of internal security measures is being prepared to be included in his over-all report to the President. This coordinated report concerning an accelerated internal security program has been completed by IIC and ICIS and referred to Coyne.

In his report, Coyne likewise discusses the various accomplishments of ICIS during the pertinent period.

The members of the Working Committee were contacted by the Secretary and it was determined that there was no objection to the report, inasmuch as nothing in the report reflected unfavorably upon the activities of the IIC.

It is suggested that the minutes of instant meeting reflect the receipt and approval of Coyne's report.

(COPY)

ms

August 10, 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA BLAISON

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Referral/Consult

Dear Pat:

In reply to your letter of August 7, 1950, with which
you enclosed a copy of a letter from [redacted]
[redacted] addressed
to Mr. Lay, I desire to point out that [redacted] letter is
not responsive to the letter of July 13, 1950, which was submitted
by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.

Referral/Consult

It will be recalled that referenced letter raised the
point that in the future where matters dealing with internal
security are discussed, it was felt that representatives of
the appropriate intelligence agencies should be in attendance.
[redacted] reply does not indicate whether steps will be
taken to see that representatives of either the Interdepart-
mental Intelligence Conference or the Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security are in attendance at future meetings of this
nature.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

DWL:dad:ljt

DECLASSIFIED BY SP120TR/SC
ON 8-31-94
342257

(COPY)

ms

OFFICE MEMORANDUM • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: August 25, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: IIC WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING,
AUGUST 23, 1950

Attached hereto are the minutes of the IIC Working Committee meeting which was held in your office on August 23, 1950.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that copies of the minutes, if approved by you, be distributed by liaison to the other members of the Working Committee.

Attachment

ESS:hke

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/29/01 BY SP12 BTG/KC

65-59264-
113 SEP 25 1950

SEP 26

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-59264-82



4-42

~~SECRET~~

- Tolson _____
- Ladd _____
- Clegg _____
- Glavin _____
- Nichols _____
- Rosen _____
- Tracy _____
- Harbo _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Nease _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/1/83 BY 60321 JAL/STW

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/SM

4-19-2000

-D-E-C-O-D-E-D C O R Y

00-1164

FROM ANCHORAGE

(8-25-50)

NR 252050

6-08 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION. REBU RADIOGRAM (AUGUST 16) LETTER BEING SUBMITTED
TODAY WITH OUTLINE TENTATIVE PLAN

RECEIVED

(8-25-50)

8-14 P.M.

GW

Classified by SP2-BTS/180

Declassify on: OADR 3/22/57

RECORDED - 36

EX-105

65-59264-3

(AUG 31 1950)

~~SECRET~~

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems


S/WB3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65-59264



~~SECRET~~



RADIOGRAM

URGENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC, ANCHORAGE

(CODE) (S) (C) (U)

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION

ESPIONAGE - R. NEURLET (JULY TWENTYFOUR) (S) (C) (U) FURNISH IMMEDIATELY COPY

REFERENCED BULET (JULY SEVEN) (S) (C) (U) FURNISH IMMEDIATELY COPY

REFERENCED BULET (JULY TWENTY-SEVEN) (S) (C) (U)

HOOVER

LT:2AR

NP 210022

(Enc 22)
0025-004

RECORDED

65-57264-3X

(Clerk 0050-0105)
(U)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/m
ON 4-19-2000
00-1164

Classified by SP3-BTJ/m
Declassify on: OADR 3/22/51

C. F. S. (S) (C) (U)

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/04 BY 60322~~

- Tolson _____
- Ladd _____
- Clegg _____
- Glavin _____
- Nichols _____
- Rosen _____
- Tracy _____
- Harbo _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Tele. Rm. _____
- Nease _____
- Gandy _____

sent via Radio (9/20/50) 9:11 P.M. (S) (C) (U)

65-59264

OCT 18 1950 (S) (C) (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: 8-25-50

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
ESPIONAGE - R

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/KC
 ON 5/31/94

Re:

1. Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated 1-27-50 entitled, "Conferences with Intelligence Authorities; Plan Proposed by Director of Intelligence, Alaskan Command, to Place Network of Sleeper Agents in Alaska."

2. Bulet dated 2-15-50 to Anchorage entitled as No. 1 above.

3. Bulet dated 6-20-50 to Anchorage entitled "Inter-Departmental Intelligence Conferences; Stay-behind Agents."

4. Bureau radiogram dated 6-23-50 titled as No. 3 above.

5. Bulet dated July 27, 1950 entitled "Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in Event of Invasion; Espionage - R."

Referral/Consult

6. Bureau radiogram dated 8-16-50 to Anchorage titled as No. 5.

The following documents, which were made available to this office by [redacted] on a confidential basis, are being submitted to the Bureau for aid in its study of this proposal. It should be pointed out that all of these documents are labeled "Top Secret" [redacted] It is suggested that direct reference to them should not be made by Bureau officials in conferences with other agencies. It is noted that copies of the [redacted]

These documents are: 100
 INDEXED 100

Enclosure - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JHW:MR

R 584 NOV 21 1950

EX-71

b6
b7c

51-FBI ALASKA
 PLAN ON 11C-WC
 AGENDA FOR
 9-27-50, FER E
 LW

RADIO ANCHORAGE
 9-20-50
 LW

108

8-25

J

WAB
 Sargent

BWAB
 Ryan

166-2603-795

[REDACTED]

Also as of possible aid to the Bureau in the contemplation of this proposal the following observations of this Division are being set forth:

1. It is noted that all information to be obtained by the Agents of the proposed network will be of a military nature.

What about radio?
 2. The best possible means of communication between principal and agent in this network would appear to be contact by airplane. This infers a dominance of the Air Force in this particular phase of the operation.

3. The training of the Agents in this network must necessarily be profoundly influenced by the military authorities to teach agents such subjects as identification of planes; identification of weapons; interpretation of troop movements and activities and other matters of interest only to the military.

4. All agents located in isolated areas must be taught arctic survival, provided with appropriate gear and weapons. These facilities are available at the present time only to the military, which would infer that they would dominate this phase.

Referral/Consult

5. It is noted that in the enclosure from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

However, no outward manifestation of such reluctance has come to my attention.

6. It is believed that an operation of the type proposed can be more efficiently effected by a single agency handling requests from the various services and passing on data obtained to the interested services. A joint enterprise would lack the necessary speed of decision and fixing of responsibility.

Any suggestions which the Bureau may have in the furtherance of this matter will be sincerely appreciated by the Anchorage Division.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 9-20-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

~~PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL~~SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
ESPIONAGE - R

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Rebutel 9-20-50.

Copies of the referenced Bulet of July 7, 1950, referred to in Anchorage letter of July 24, 1950, are being transmitted herewith.

The referenced Bureau letter of July 27, as noted in Anchorage letter of August 25, 1950, was dated inadvertently. The correct date should have been Bulet of July 7, 1950. Hence, it is the same letter referred to in paragraph one above.

Enclosure

JHW:MR
65-298DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/KFC
ON 5-31-94
342251

RECORDED - 42

SEP 23 1950

37

63 SEP 29 1950

TO: SAC, Anchorage

FROM: Director, FBI

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
ESPIONAGE - R

C
O
P
July 7, 1950 Y

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

At the June 8, 1950, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, it was pointed out that the Alaskan Joint Command is preparing a plan which will provide for a means of obtaining intelligence information in the event Alaska or a part of Alaska is occupied by enemy forces. The plan contemplates the selection, training and equipping of selected United States citizens who are long established residents of the section of Alaska for which they would be expected to provide coverage. The plan further contemplates that these individuals would have no previous military record.

Referral/Consult

On July 6, 1950, at the IIC meeting it was agreed that the FBI [redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of the stay-behind agents who would obtain intelligence information if all of Alaska or a portion thereof might be occupied by the enemy.

[redacted]

You are instructed to [redacted]

[redacted] draft a proposed program for the operation of stay-behind intelligence agents in Alaska in the event of an emergency. Your plans for this project are to be submitted to the Bureau for review at the earliest possible date. The Bureau is likewise studying this problem and you will be promptly informed of any pertinent developments in this regard.

You should bear in mind at the outset the objectives of this program, namely:

1. The type of intelligence information desired from Alaska in case of conquest by the enemy.
2. Methods of communication with stay-behind agents whereby the desired information and reports can be received.
3. Location of strategic areas and vital facilities where immediate coverage would be of first and paramount importance, such as the coast line, shipping lanes and other transportation and communication centers.

COPIES DESTROYED
R584 NOV 31 1960

65-59264-4

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/SC
ON 5-31-94
342257

C
O
P
Y

Special consideration should be given by you to that portion of the proposed plan dealing with the selection, training and equipping of stay-behind agents. In this connection the question of payment of funds to stay-behind agents should be explored.

The importance of this proposed plan cannot be over emphasized. It is one in which good imagination must be used, and practical results are expected.

You are to give this matter your personal attention. It is imperative that the Bureau fulfill its commitments in regard to this program and an early reply to this communication is expected.

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Nease ✓
Gandy ✓

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

b6
b7C

LP

(DECODED COPY) (S) (E) (U)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(9-25-50) (S) (E) (U)

NR 252105

PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL. RE BUREAU LETTER (SEPTEMBER 19) RE
POSSIBLE VISIT COLONEL JUSTICE MARION CHAMBERS. CAPTAIN MINOR
HEINE, PROGRESSIVE, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ALASKAN COMMAND,
TELEPHONICALLY INFORMED, JUSTICE MARION CHAMBERS AND WALTER R.
WALSH, PROGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, PREPAREDNESS SUB COMMITTEE,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, WHO PRECEDED SENATOR HUNT OF
WYOMING, SALTENSTALL OF MASSACHUSETTS AND MORSE OF OREGON, REQUESTED
INTERVIEW WITH ME 11 AM, (26TH) INSTANT. THEY ARE CHECKING DEFENSE (U)
NEEDS OF ALASKA AND WILL PROBABLY QUERY ME REGARDING GENERAL INFO
ON INTERNAL SECURITY. CAPTAIN HEINE STATED THEY HAD LETTER CHIEF
OF STAFF OF AIR FORCE REQUESTING FULL COOPERATION. INTERVIEW
WILL BE HELD WHITE GUARD TODAY. GENERAL QUESTIONS WILL BE ANSWERED,
BUT REQUESTS FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFO WILL BE REFERRED TO BUREAU.
DATA RE INTERVIEW WILL BE SUBMITTED IMMEDIATELY AFTER SAME HELD.

UNDERLINED PORTIONS ACTUAL (DECODE) AWAITING CORRECTIONS.

RECEIVED

(9-25-50) (S) (E) (U)

6-41 PM

TED

G.I.R.-6

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/sm

ON 4-19-2000

00-1164

unless otherwise instructed

Classified by SP3-BTS/SC

Declassify on: OADR 8/22/51

RECORDED - 127

cc: Mr. Belmont

INDEXED - 127

EX-29

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (S) (E) (U)

~~SECRET~~

SAC, Anchorage.

September 21, 1950

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA
ESPIONAGE - R

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/SC
ON 5-31-94
342251

65-59264-7

Reurlet dated September 13, 1950.

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 88

EX-16

The proposed plan for intelligence coverage in Alaska in the event of an invasion submitted by you has been reviewed. You should now

present concrete proposals for putting into effect the various parts of the program. Hereinafter the various points in your plan will be commented upon and instructions issued with regard to each.

Administration

You should make immediate recommendation as to the agency which should administer the plan.

Selection of Agents

You should make known to the Bureau immediately the number, identity, and location of each person now under consideration by you as a logical individual to be utilized in this plan. You should also advise the Bureau promptly concerning the number, location, and occupation of individuals being considered by OSI in connection with this plan.

You should also advise the Bureau promptly regarding your proposals for a program of recruitment of additional individuals.

You should take into consideration in connection with the utilization of any person the fact that he may be immobilized or liquidated or deported immediately by the Soviets in the event he falls within any of the categories known to have been deported or liquidated by the Soviets in their occupation of the Baltic States and Eastern Poland. You will recall that those areas were originally Czarist territory as was Alaska.

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

52 OCT 18 1950

MAILED 12
SEP 27 1950
COMM - FBI

RECEIVED
OCT 2 15 1950

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
SEP 25 1950

In this regard, you should bear in mind that individuals singled out for arrest by the Soviets in the Baltic States and Eastern Poland included members of non-Communist Political Parties, members of the State Police, Gendarmerie and prison staffs, officers, military judges and volunteers of national armies, persons expelled from the Communist Party, Trotskyites, Anarchists, refugees, representatives of foreign firms, persons who have travelled abroad, Government officials and civil servants, staff members of the Red Cross, persons active in local Religious Parishes, clergymen and their secretaries, "Aristocrats," Land owners, wealthy merchants, small traders and merchants, bankers, industrialists, hotel and restaurant proprietors, university professors, teachers, doctors, engineers, employees of the Forestry Service, farmers, skilled workmen, trade union officials, students, and employees of Transportation Services.

(61-7559 Sub 2 Serial 5182
62-60950 Sub 25 Serial 28)

You will note from the foregoing list that the best "stay behind" Agents in urban areas from the standpoint of long range survival would be unskilled or semi-skilled workmen not engaged in any of the occupations indicated above and who were not officials of labor unions. You should also take into consideration the fact that wives and children of men deported were likewise deported.

Another point for consideration is the possible use of women as Agents. You are, of course, aware that in the Soviet Union women are assigned tasks involving heavy labor under guard and able-bodied female survivors of any invasion would probably be placed in labor battalions.

Location of Agents

You indicated in your plan that Southeastern Alaska has less strategic value than other parts of the territory. Consequently, efforts in developing a network of "stay behind" Agents should be concentrated in the most strategic areas.

In your letter of May 8, 1950, captioned "General Security Survey, Territory of Alaska" you indicated that



Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

You should determine immediately through OSI and other available military sources the most likely targets for invasion for the ensuing months of this year and concentrate your efforts toward recruiting Agents so as to appropriately cover those areas first and then extend your activities to other less strategic sections of Alaska.

You should submit to the Bureau immediately your plans in this regard.

Training of Agents

Referral/Consult

[redacted] you should recommend immediately a program of training indicating where, by whom, and under what circumstances the training would be given. You should also submit a suggested curriculum.

Payment of Agents

With regard to the payment of Agents you, of course, realize that possession of U. S. Currency in occupied territories will be illegal and all U. S. money of any description will probably be confiscated by the Soviets for their own purposes. You should determine what can be used in lieu of money payments to Agents, bearing in mind that under Soviet occupation barter will probably be the most useful means of subsistence. Your recommendations in this regard should be specific.

Types of information to be obtained

Referring to the training of Agents, the types of information to be obtained should be clearly spelled out to the trainee so that there will be no confusion or as little confusion as possible in his mind as to the type and quality of data which he should risk communicating.

Communications

Your specific recommendations regarding the type of communications necessary in the various strategic areas in which you intend to establish your intelligence network should be carefully thought out and presented to the Bureau. It is realized that each area may present a different problem in communications. You should bear in mind the utilization of the most reliable and most loyal amateur radio operators in the territory.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Equipment

[redacted] Coordinating with assistance
 as is necessary from other military sources, you should make
 prompt recommendations regarding the minimum and maximum pieces
 of equipment which should be given to Agents in urban areas and
 to Agents in suburban areas. You should bear in mind that any
 such equipment or list of equipment should be compact, simple,
 maintainable, and susceptible of concealment.

These matters should be handled promptly by you. It
 is noted that in your letter of May 8, 1943, regarding the
 "General Security Survey, Territory of Alaska," it was indicated
 that the month of April was the best for the Russians in a world-
 wide campaign which would include air attacks upon Alaska. You
 should not consider that we have an April deadline to meet.
 Your planning should be pointed toward the immediate future.

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: September 21, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
ESPIONAGE - RALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-90 BY SP12 BPS/SC

Tolson	✓
Ladd	✓
Clegg	✓
Glavin	✓
Rosen	✓
Tracy	✓
Harbo	✓
Mohr	✓
Tele. Room	✓

Referral/Consult

Gandy

Purpose:

To advise that under date of September 13, 1950, the Anchorage Office submitted a proposed outline of a program for intelligence coverage in Alaska in the event of an invasion, which was the result of [redacted] to advise that the program merely states a recognition of the problems involved, namely, administration of the program, selection and training of "stay behind" agents to be located in areas of strategic importance, the problem of payment and communications, the types of information to be obtained and equipment to be issued such "stay behind" agents. To submit for your approval a letter to Anchorage instructing that a detailed working plan be submitted promptly to show how they intend to cope with the problems pointed out in their letter of September 13; to recommend that these matters be discussed at the Seat of Government between FBI Liaison [redacted] after which additional suggestions and instructions will be issued to Anchorage.

Details:

Referral/Consult

Under date of September 13, 1950, the Anchorage Office submitted a proposed plan for intelligence coverage in Alaska in the event of invasion which had been prepared as a result of [redacted]. This is attached for your information. The program sets forth the bare outlines of such activity and does not present any concrete proposals for putting into effect the selection and training of "stay behind" agents.

The proposed plan does, however, point out the problems which must be considered.

Hereinafter will be set forth a summation of the various problems raised and suggested comments on each:

Analysis of Plan

The plan would provide an organization within Alaska designed to obtain and transmit such intelligence information as may be of value to the United States, to the Commander in Chief of the Alaska Command or to whatever other command may be charged with responsibilities for operations in the Territory of Alaska in the event that a part or all of that territory is invaded and occupied by the Armed Forces of an enemy.

RECORDED - 89
EX-16OCT 9 1950
37

LW:bar

COMMENT: This statement of purpose is adequate.

The plan should be administered by an agency designated by the proper United States authorities having its headquarters outside of combat territory but the individual or individuals charged with liaison with the agents should be accessible to the Commander in Chief of the Alaska Command or to whatever other command of the United States as may be charged with responsibilities for operations in the Territory of Alaska.

Referral/Consult

COMMENT: The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference has already agreed that the FBI [] should embark upon the program of selection and training of such an intelligence organization as may be required. The agency to administer the program when invasion of Alaska occurs should be decided upon now at the Seat of Government.

The person or persons responsible for selecting, training, paying and maintaining communications with the "stay behind" agents should be chosen with the aid and advice of representatives of the FBI and interested military and naval officials in Washington, D. C.

COMMENT: The person or persons directly responsible for selection, training, etc. of the agents should be under the direct supervision of the agency assigned to the execution of the plan. There should be at all times a complete chain of responsibility once the program has been definitely set. The FBI, if not the administering agent, should nevertheless have a voice in the selection of the persons mentioned since it is contemplated that the FBI will have had a hand in the selection of the "stay behind" agents themselves.

Agents selected should be residents of Alaska with established means of livelihood and logical reasons for being placed where they intend to operate and consideration should be given to businessmen, farmers, trappers, fishermen and "bush pilots." Selection of agents from the native groups, Eskimos, Indians, Aleuts, should be avoided because of their basic unreliability.

COMMENT: In making selection of agents, one should bear in mind the lessons of the Russian occupation of the Baltic countries and Eastern Poland which were areas originally owned by the Czar and which were occupied by the Soviets for incorporation into the USSR. Alaska was likewise a Czarist territory which the Soviets in line with their imperialistic policy might well occupy in the same manner that they occupied the Baltic states and Poland.

Depending on the individual situation of a community occupied by the Soviets, they might shoot the entire male population of a community. On the other hand, they might seize and deport to forced labor under guard to the Soviet Union or to some other portion of occupied Alaska a third or more of the population. For example, in the Baltic states and in Eastern Poland the following categories which would have equivalents in Alaska were seized and deported: Members of non-Communist political parties, members of state police, gendarmerie and prison staffs, war veterans, officers and military judges of national armies and volunteers of national armies, refugees and political emigres, representatives of foreign firms, persons who have traveled abroad, officials of national Government, Red Cross representatives, persons active in local religious parishes, clergymen and their secretaries, "aristocrats," landowners, merchants, bankers, industrialists, hotel and restaurant proprietors, university professors, teachers, Doctors, engineers, members of the Forestry Service, well-to-do-farmers, some poor farmers, skilled workers and anyone considered anti-Soviet and socially undesirable.

(62-60950sub-25-28)

Assuming that such a list as that above would be given special attention in Alaska, the "stay behind" agents should be chosen unless compelling circumstances dictate otherwise from categories not so included. It should also be born in mind that non-Communist officials of labor unions were also given special attention in this regard by the Soviets.

(62-60950sub-25-28)

Referral/Consult

At the present time, the number of individuals contemplated for use in this program by FBI, Anchorage [redacted] who would fall outside of the above-mentioned categories is not known.

"Stay behind" agents should be placed in strategic areas in Alaska with particular emphasis on the areas where airfields and ports are located. In this regard, Southeastern Alaska is of less strategic value than other parts of the territory for the placement of agents.

COMMENT: Because of the time element involved and the vast expanse of Alaskan territory to be covered, there should be a positive and immediate statement of priorities as to areas obtained from the military both in Alaska and at the Seat of Government.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]
[redacted] priority in selection and training of agents should be given to these communities and their adjoining areas.

Agents should be trained singly and their identities withheld from each other and in addition to normal intelligence training, they should be trained in arctic survival, air drop and pick-up techniques, scouting, patrolling, map reading and sketching.

COMMENT: Because of the emergency, it may not be practicable to train such individuals singly. However, it is sound intelligence technique to conceal identities of agents from each other so that the minimum amount of damage would be done if one was caught and broken by the Soviets.

Referral/Consult

A proposed training program should be set up by FBI [redacted]
[redacted] and responsibility for the training fixed immediately.

The payment of agents will be handled by the person or persons operating them and worked out on an individual basis.

COMMENT: It should be recognized that under the Soviets occupation, American money would be called in and the use of it in Alaska made illegal. The matter of payment should be carefully worked out by FBI [redacted] and suggestions made since populations under Soviet control might likely subsist on a barter basis.

Referral/Consult

Agents should furnish military or non-military information as requested or indicated by their principals. They should also furnish information which would be of value which comes to their attention.

COMMENT: The type of information to be furnished or which would be considered desirable should be carefully spelled out in the training program so that there would be no confusion in the mind of the individual agent as to what he was to furnish.

Communications should be handled solely between principal and agent and never between agents. The types of communications would include short wave radio, either stationary or mobile to stationary or mobile listening posts. They might on occasion be handled by courier or by airplane pickup.

Referral/Consult

COMMENT: The type of communication best suited for each area in which it will be necessary to establish "stay behind" agents should be carefully thought out now by the FBI [redacted]. Consideration should be given to utilizing the most loyal and reliable individuals among the numerous amateur radio operators in the territory.

Equipment to be placed at the disposal of an agent will depend entirely upon his physical location.

Referral/Consult

COMMENT: There should be determined immediately by FBI [redacted] the minimum and maximum urban and rural equipment to be issued to "stay behind" agents. Under all circumstances, the equipment should be simple, workable and susceptible of careful concealment.

ACTION:

Referral/Consult

Attached for your approval is a letter to Anchorage setting forth the Bureau's observations on the various points covered above in the proposed plan and instructing Anchorage to [redacted] supply the desired information to the Bureau. It is also recommended that liaison discuss the proposed plan [redacted] at the Seat of Government in line with the comments made above and thereafter, the results of the observations [redacted] and such additional instructions as are necessary for the Anchorage Office should be submitted to Anchorage.

OK.
H.

V. J. [signature]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

W
TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: 9-13-50

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
ESPIONAGE - R

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson _____

Mr. Ladd _____

Mr. Clegg _____

Mr. Glavin _____

Mr. Nichols _____

Mr. Rosen _____

Mr. Tracy _____

Mr. Egan _____

Mr. Gurnea _____

Mr. Harbo _____

Mr. Mohr _____

Mr. Pennington _____

Mr. Quinn Tamm _____

Mr. Nease _____

Miss Gandy _____

Referral/Consult

Re Anchorage letter to Bureau dated 8/25/50.

There are transmitted herewith two copies of a blind, undated memorandum captioned as above, which is the result of conferences [redacted]

[redacted] The participants in these conferences were ASAC JOHN E. DESMOND and myself representing this Division [redacted]

It is pointed out that the members of the intelligence conferences of this Division are cognizant of this plan and have been apprised of the context of the attached blind memorandum. These individuals represent the Director of Intelligence of the Alaskan Command, Captain MINOR HENIE; Director of G-2, Colonel WALLIS PERRY; Head of ONI, Kodiak, Naval Base, Captain WILLIAM A. KAITNER, U.S.N.

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTJ/KSC
ON 5/31/98
342251

JHW:MR
65-298

EX-16

MEMO Ladd
9-19-50 LW

MEMO DIR
LET. ANCHORAGE
9-21-50 LW

RECORDED - 89


EX-16

SEP 18 1950

34

COPIES DESTROYED
R 584 NOV 21 1960

165-59264-7
Rosen
W. C. Sullivan
H. C. Smith



SECRET



4-42

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY

b6
b7C

FROM ANCHORAGE (9-27-50) NR 271600

3:43 P.M.

DIRECTOR URGENT

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL. RE BUREAU RADIOGRAM (SEPTEMBER 19) RE POSSIBLE VISIT OF COLONEL JUSTICE MARION CHAMBERS. REFER TO MY RADIOGRAM (25TH) INSTANT, MAJOR WALTER R. WALSH, FORMER BUREAU AGENT, PROFESSIONAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE, PREPAREDNESS SUB-COMMITTEE, SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, CALLED ON ME TODAY IN COMPANY OF CAPTAIN MINOR HEINE, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ALASKA COMMAND. NO REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION MADE BY WALSH. CHAMBERS NOT PRESENT.

RECEIVED (9-27-50) 4:45 P.M. LL

Proposed Bill for Intelligence in Alaska in the Coast of America

RECORDED - 64

INDEXED - 64

1.65-51214-8
(OCT 6 1950)
(2) 5-100
(14)

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-1-81 BY 1045
CHL/MS~~

Classified by SP3-BTJ/JM
Declassify on: OADR 3442251

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/JM
ON 4-19-2000 00-1164

COPIES DESTROYED
ON 5-3-4 NOV 21 1960

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

47/
55 OCT 18 1950 (S) (2) (14)

SAC, Anchorage

October 4, 1950

Director, FBI

ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

RECORDED - 64

Referral/Consult

It has now been agreed that [redacted] the Bureau have the responsibility for the development of an Escape and Evasion Program in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

You should immediately contact [redacted] in this regard and initiate the necessary conferences for the purpose of determining the needs in connection with this program in Alaska. Particular attention should be paid in this regard to the desires of the Commanding General of the Alaskan Command.

For your information, representatives of the Bureau [redacted] are presently making the appropriate arrangements for the obtaining of instructors for individuals to be utilized in the Stay-Behind Agent Program and the Escape and Evasion Program in Alaska. Special attention is also being given to special types of equipment which can be obtained for use in these programs. You will be kept advised of the results of conferences in Washington. You should however continue, [redacted] your study of the two programs and the Bureau should be kept advised of your needs, ideas and suggestions.

Referral/Consult

ESS:eb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-1-94 BY SP12BTJ/18

CC: Mr. Whitson
Mr. Baker

5
2 PM '50
JUL 11 1950
DIRECTOR

VPR

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

52 OCT 19 1950

OCT 5 4 27 PM '50
RECEIVED
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd *DL*

DATE: October 4, 1950

FROM : A. H. Belmont *AK*SUBJECT: STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM AND
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM IN ALASKA

Referral/Consult

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

On October 2, 1950, [redacted] discussed
the Stay-Behind Agent Program in Alaska with Special Agent
Sanders.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

As you know at the TIC Working Committee Meeting on September
27, 1950, [redacted]

[redacted] should also handle the Escape and
Evasion Program in Alaska.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Attachment

ESS:eb

RECORDED - 64

OCT 10 1950

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/94 BY SP12BTJ/SC

INDEXED - 64

34225

FIVE

J

Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in
Alaska in the event of invasion

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the attached letter to the Anchorage Office be forwarded which advises that the Escape and Evasion Program is now a responsibility of IIC to be administered by [redacted] the Bureau. The letter instructs that the SAC should immediately contact [redacted] in order to make plans in this connection.

It is further recommended that a Bureau representative be designated to coordinate these two programs [redacted] on a headquarters level and that Liaison immediately arrange for joint discussions concerning these programs.

Referral/Consult

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]



(OCTOBER 11, 1960)
SAC, ANCHORAGE

ADICGRAM

SP3-B11/101

4-19-2000

66-1164

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA, (U)
(U) ADVISE BY RADIOGRAM IMMEDIATELY (ONE) NUMBER AND LOCATION OF STAY-BEHIND AGENTS DEVELOPED TO DATE (TWO) MOST LIKELY TARGETS IN ALASKA FOR INVASION DURING EARLY MONTHS OF THIS YEAR (THREE) WHAT STEPS YOU HAVE TAKEN TO DATE IN ESTABLISHMENT OF RECOMMENDED TRAINING PROGRAM FOR STAY-BEHIND AGENTS, IN CONNECTION WITH BUREAU LETTER (OCTOBER FOUR) ENTITLED ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM ADVISE BY RADIOGRAM NO LATER THAN (OCTOBER SIXTEEN) SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN TO EFFECT DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, ANCHORAGE WILL ADVISE THE BUREAU BY RADIOGRAM EVERY FOURTEEN DAYS OF PROGRESS BEING MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THESE TWO PROGRAMS. THIS MATTER MUST RECEIVE YOUR CONTINUOUS PERSONAL ATTENTION AND NO DELAYS IN HANDLING WILL BE PERMITTED. MAINTAIN CLOSE AND EFFECTIVE LIAISON [] AND KEEP THE BUREAU CURRENTLY ADVISED OF ALL PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS BY RADIOGRAM.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
Referral/Consult

HOOVER

65-59204

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-1-94 BY SP120/SP180

WTB:bar

6-21-94
Classified by SP120/SP180
(U) Declassify on: OADR 12-25-1

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
F B I
RECEIVED READING ROOM
OCT 11 5 58 PM '60

RECORDED

- Tolson _____
- Ladd _____
- Clegg _____
- Glavin _____
- Nichols _____
- Rosen _____
- Tracy _____
- Harbo _____
- Mohr _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Nease _____
- Gandy _____

Sent via Radio

10-12-60

(U) 1-13 A

Per. []

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. (October 16, 1950)

RADIOGRAM
URGENT

Transmit the following message to: SAC, ANCHORAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REUR RADIOGRAM

(OCTOBER THIRTEEN) ADVISE BY RADIOGRAM TOTAL NUMBER OF STAY BEHIND AGENTS

NECESSARY FOR ADEQUATE COVERAGE THIS PROGRAM IN ALASKA WITH BREAKDOWN

AS TO GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF PROPOSED AGENTS. ADVISE IMMEDIATELY

IDENTITY OF EIGHT INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED YOUR RADIOGRAM (OCTOBER THIRTEEN)

AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS, TOGETHER WITH SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

AVAILABLE IN FILES OF ANCHORAGE OFFICE CONCERNING THEM. TO FACILITATE

ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING AT BUREAU, DATA CONCERNING STAY BEHIND AGENTS

SHOULD BE REPORTED UNDER INSTANT CAPTION. INFORMATION CONCERNING ESCAPE

AND EVASION PROGRAM SHOULD BE REPORTED IN SEPARATE CASE FILE ENTITLED

QUOTE ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM - ALASKA. UNQUOTE. THESE MATTERS ARE

TO RECEIVE YOUR IMMEDIATE PERSONAL ATTENTION.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-19-00 BY 34225/SC

HOOVER

WIB:de

Classified by 34225/SC
Declassify on: 34225/SC

RECORDED - 907

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

BUFILE 65-59204

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
RECEIVED READING ROOM
OCT 18 3 35 PM '50

TELETYPE UNIT BY SP3-BTS/m
OCT 19 4-19-2000

00-1164

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-19-00 BY 34225/SC

50 (SENT VIA Radio) (10/16/50) 9:46 P. M.

Per [Signature]

RECORDED - 30

15-596

SAC, Anchorage

November 7, 1950

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Re your radiogram October 19, 1950.

A review of the files of the Bureau reflects no information, derogatory or otherwise, which is not already in the possession of the Anchorage Office concerning the following persons suggested by you as being potential stay-behind agents:

1. Frank B. Moore
2. [REDACTED]
3. Dr. Howard G. Romig
4. [REDACTED]
5. Antonio Polet
6. Sam Romack, aka Sinun Benich Skojo
7. Joe Danich

b6
b7C

You should immediately furnish the Bureau with the names of additional individuals who are being considered for development in connection with the Stay-Behind Agent Program.

WTB:lfc:mod

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/14/83 BY SP12BPS/KC

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
F B I
RECEIVED READING ROOM
NOV 7 5 19 PM '50

Tolson _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

1-13

NOV 22 1950

52 NOV 10 1950

NOV 8 1950
COMM. FBI

AB

CN

WTB
2-10-50

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BJS/ST
ON 4-19-2000 00-1164

~~SECRET~~

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECODED COPY (S)(E)(U)

b6
b7C
b7D

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(10-19-50)

NR 190605

4-26 P.M.

DIRECTOR URGENT

In the event of invasion, Kerry

PROPOSED PLANS FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REBURAD SIXTEENTH INSTANT. PRESENT ESTIMATES OF AGENTS NECESSARY FOR COVERAGE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS ARE: ANCHORAGE 10, FAIRBANKS 6, NOME 2, SEWARD 2, KOTZEBUE 1. IDENTITY OF INDIVIDUALS WHO POSSIBLY COULD MATURE AS AGENTS IN FOLLOWING LOCATIONS TOGETHER WITH CERTAIN DATA CONCERNING THEM FROM ANCHORAGE FILES AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE SET OUT BELOW: AT ANCHORAGE - FRANK B. MOORE, ALASKAN RESIDENT SINCE 1939, LICENSED HUNTING GUIDE, PRESENTLY EMPLOYED AS CARPENTER, APPROXIMATELY 45 YEARS OF AGE, FILES HERE REFLECT NOTHING CONCERNING HIM BUT PERSONALLY KNOWN TO SEVERAL AGENTS THIS OFFICE

[REDACTED] HAS COVERED MUCH OF ALASKA, OWNS PLANE, ANCHORAGE FILE REFLECTS NOTHING CONCERNING HIM; DOCTOR HOWARD G. ROMIG, NATIVE BORN ALASKAN, WORKED IN ANCHORAGE, LICENSED GUIDE, OWNS PLANE, HAS TEMPERAMENT AND DESIRE OF OUTDOOR LIFE, PERSONALLY KNOWN TO AGENTS THIS OFFICE, HAS BEEN CONTACTED FOR NUMBER OF YEARS BY AGENTS ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS. NOTHING DEROGATORY IN FILES THIS OFFICE. AT FAIRBANKS - [REDACTED] POSSIBLE AGENT. HAS BEEN IN TERRITORY FOR NUMBER OF YEARS AND WORKED AS

[REDACTED] AND HAS GIVEN INFORMATION THIS OFFICE CONCERNING INDIVIDUALS BELIEVED DISLOYAL TO U.S.; NO DEROGATORY DATA IN ANCHORAGE FILES. AT NOME - ANTONIO POLET, BORN CAROLEW, ITALY 1881, CAME TO NOME DURING GOLD RUSH ABOUT 1900. OPERATES NATIVE CRAFT SHOP [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WELL ACQUAINTED WITH ALASKA AND PEOPLE ON SEWARD PENINSULA, NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION IN FILES ANCHORAGE. AT SEWARD, SAM ROMACK BORN SINUN BENICH SKOJO AT DALMATIA, 1892, NATURALIZED SEWARD, ALASKA, 1939, HAS BEEN IN ALASKA APPROXIMATELY 30 YEARS, WAS REPORTEDLY BOOTLEGGER DURING PROHIBITION AND ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED, UNVERIFIED AND UNCORROBORATED, THAT HE WAS PRO-NAZI DURING WORLD WAR TWO, HAS WORKED AS FISHERMAN, BRISTOL BAY AREA DURING SEASON FOR APPROXIMATELY TWENTY FIVE YEARS, NOW BAR PROPRIETOR AND HOTEL OWNER, HAS AIDED THIS OFFICE IN INVESTIGATIONS, INQUIRIES MADE CONCERNING HIM AND REPORTED IN MATTER ENTITLED QUOTE SAM ROMACK, WA, IS

RECORDED
INDEXED - 45

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5/3/94
Classified by SP3-BJS/ST
Declassify on: OADR
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/3/94 BY SP3-BJS/ST

Herb Koch

Case file

165-57264-17

Handwritten initials and signatures

SECRET

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

(DECODED COPY)

(4)

b6
b7C

PAGE 2

SUBMITTED TO BUREAU BY SPECIAL AGENT HAROLD F. DODGE, MAY 31, 1941
 AT JUNEAU, ALASKA. AT GIRWOOD ON ALASKA RAILROAD - JOE DANICH,
 POSSIBLE PROSPECT FOR AGENT, BORN ~~ANDREW GOSLAVIA~~ ^{yugoslavia}, APPROXIMATELY
 FIFTY TWO YEARS AGO, CAME TO UNITED STATES AT AGE OF TWO, HAS BEEN
 IN ALASKA APPROXIMATELY THIRTY YEARS. VOCATION INCLUDES COAL
 MINER, COAL MINE OPERATOR, PROPRIETOR OF BAR AND NOW OWNS ONLY
 HOTEL AND BAR IN GIRWOOD AREA, AS WELL AS GOLD MINE IN THAT AREA,
 IS WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THAT AREA AND PERSONS RESIDING THERE, HAS
 BEEN ARRESTED. IDENTICAL WITH F.B.I. NUMBER 5113769, HAS BEEN CON-
 TACTED BY AGENTS THIS OFFICE IN PAST AND GIVEN FULL COOPERATION
 PARTICULARLY IN CRIMINAL MATTERS IN AND AROUND ANCHORAGE. AT
 KOTZEBUE [REDACTED] WAS BEING CONSIDERED BUT HE APPEARS
 UNSTABLE AND LOQUACIOUS, LIKEWISE OPINIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED THAT
 HE WOULD POSSIBLY DEAL WITH ANY ENEMY IF IT SERVED HIS OWN ENDS.
 ATTEMPTS WILL BE MADE TO OBTAIN OTHER PROSPECT THERE. CONFERENCE
 WAS HELD WITH [REDACTED] SIXTEENTH INSTANT AT WHICH TIME [REDACTED] (4)

CONFERENCE WAS HELD EIGHTEENTH INSTANT WITH [REDACTED]
 PROGRESS ON DETAILED PLANS WILL BE SUBMITTED WITHIN (4)

NEXT WEEK.

RECEIVED (10-19-50) 4:50 P.M. (4)

LL

Referral/Consult

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baker

SECRET

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
 outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
 order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (4)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: October 17, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT *AB*SUBJECT: *X* ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM
IN ALASKA

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

Referral/Consult

Reference is made to radiogram from Anchorage October 13, 1950, which set forth the extent of planning to date in connection with the Stay-Behind Agent Program and which stated that [redacted]

The Director's notation on reference radiogram was, "Can't we get this settled one way or the other soon. H."

Referral/Consult

SA E. S. Sanders has been in constant touch with [redacted] in connection with these programs. [redacted]

Immediately upon receipt of this paper it will be analyzed for your information.

RECOMMENDATION

The foregoing is for your information.

ESS:lae

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12BTS/SC

342251

INDEXED - 45

RECORDED - 45

56 OCT 31 1950

165-59564-13
OCT 27 1950
37

*Prepared / Hand in - [unclear]
[unclear] in [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
of [unclear]*

*yes do so
[unclear]*

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

4-22a

Supervisor @BAKER

Room 4243

Subj: SAM ROMACK

☐ Exact Spelling
☒ All References
☐ Subversive Ref.
☐ Main File
☐ Restricted to Locality of

Searchers
Initial Line
Date 10/21/50

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

440-29746 I Amber
445-9780-2 I
442-62736-3 I
Samuel Romack
NR
S. Romack
NR
one Romack
442-56397-204 NI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12073/80

342257
12073/80

complete

(3)

Initialed

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

4-22a

Supervisor Baker Room 4243

Subj: one Romig

☒ Exact Spelling
☒ All References
☐ Subversive Ref.
☐ Main File
☐ Restricted to Locality of

Searchers
Initial hmy
Date 10/21/50

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

44-3845-2	NI
25-18	NI
44-362-63	NI
46-3869-13	microfilm
41-15133-23	microfilm
44-2978-1/2/3/4/5	NI
49-11578-4	NI

6
Initialed

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

4-22a

Supervisor BAKER

Room 4243

b6
b7C

Subj:

☒ Exact Spelling
☒ All References
☐ Subversive Ref.
☐ Main File
☐ Restricted to Locality of _____

Searchers

Initial JD

Date 10-12-50

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

NR.

~~42-33133~~

NI

D.

~~40-40579~~

NI

~~70-9028~~

NI

~~69-4-4-39-215~~

NI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BJS/SLS

342251

Copy

13

Initialed

copy

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

4-22a

Supervisor BAKER Room 4243

Subj: DR. HOWARD G. ROMIG

☒ Exact Spelling
☐ All References
☐ Subversive Ref.
☐ Main File
☐ Restricted to Locality of _____

Searchers
Initial hsm
Date 10/21/50

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BJS/RC

NR
Howard Romig

NR
Mrs Howard G. Romig

~~100-147920-2587~~ wife - Perry

H. G. Romig

~~100-147920-2587~~ NT

~~100-135791-2~~ NT

~~100-494745-8~~ No dering.

~~100-135331-6~~ NT

~~100-124687-2773~~ N.I.

Complete

(5)

Initialed

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

4-22a

Supervisor BAKER

Room 4243

Subj:

b6
b7C

☒ Exact Spelling
☒ All References
☐ Subversive Ref.
☐ Main File
☐ Restricted to Locality of _____

Searchers

Initial mal

Date 10-21-50

FILE NUMBER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BTJ/SLC

343256
150

~~400-243140-86~~ NI

~~400-7660-~~ 45761575 NI

~~111-944444-79~~ NI

~~416-78636~~ NI

~~400-34421-~~ 4, L. L.

H.

~~44-32001-~~ 1-9, NI

~~44-1486~~ I. Has-

~~432-21370-9~~ NI

~~400-3057-20~~ I-derg

(10)

Initialed

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

4-22a

Supervisor Baker

Room 4243

Subj:

☒ Exact Spelling
☒ All References
☐ Subversive Ref.
☐ Main File
☐ Restricted to Locality of _____

Searchers
 Initial mdh
 Date 10-21-50

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

~~48-23-~~ 5 NT

~~48-20891-~~ 1 NT

~~48-20891-~~ 2-78 I-nothing

~~41-30-~~ 5 NT

~~48-26102-~~ 1 NT

~~48-25219-~~ NT

~~48-25219-~~ NT

~~42-24167-~~ NT

copy 2

11

Initialed

with

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

4-22a

Supervisor BAKER Room 4243

Subj: ANTONIO POLET

☐ Exact Spelling
☒ All References
☐ Subversive Ref.
☐ Main File

Searchers
Initial SM
Date 10-21-50

☐ Restricted to Locality of

SP-100-158901-1
FILE NUMBER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-94 BY SP12BJ/S/K

SP-100-158901-1 ni
SP-100-75901-1 not derog.
SP-100-75901-1 not derog.
SP-100-75901-1 not derog.
SP-100-75901-1 not derog.
SP-100-75901-1 I - anchorage
A. Polet

SP-100-75901-1 N. I.
SP-100-75901-1 I. I. I. anchorage
SP-100-75901-1 not derog.
SP-100-75901-1 " "
SP-100-75901-1 not derog.
SP-100-75901-1 " "

Copy 1 1
Initialed

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

4-22a

Supervisor BAKER

Room 4243

b6

b7C

Subj:

☐ Exact Spelling
☒ All References
☐ Subversive Ref.
☐ Main File
☐ Restricted to Locality of _____

Searchers

Initial and

Date 10-21-58

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BTJ/SLC

342251
100

NR

402-1-83 NI

400-348393-35, 7029 NI

One

400-1566 NI

400-1715-13 NI

605-56402-1-1315 NI

400-6071 NI

400-1647-1293, 367 NI

400-8467-40 NI

400-175-38 NI

605-56495-2 NI

105-8467-16 NI

Initialed

Handled

(9)

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

4-22a

b6
b7C

Supervisor

Baker

Room

4243

Subj

[Redacted Subject Box]

☒ Exact Spelling
☒ All References
☐ Subversive Ref.
☐ Main File
☐ Restricted to Locality of

Searchers
Initial *and*
Date *10/21-50*

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

~~125-303022~~

NT

[Redacted File Number Box]

~~44-1486~~ *L. L.*

~~400-34421-9~~

~~200-126719-3~~ *not derog.*

[Redacted File Number Box]

~~400-34421-4~~

12

Initialed

3

caption

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

4-22a

Supervisor Reuben Room 4243

Subj: SIMON BENICHA SKD 50

☒ Exact Spelling
☐ All References
☐ Subversive Ref.
☐ Main File
☐ Restricted to Locality of _____

Searchers
Initial alc
Date 11-1-50

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

NR
SIMON BENICHA SKD 50
108-29746 P. 1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12BTS/SC

Initialed

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

4-22a

Supervisor Baker Room 4243

Subj: Al Palet (Alaska)

☒ Exact Spelling
☒ All References
☐ Subversive Ref..
☐ Main File
☐ Restricted to Locality of _____

Searchers
Initial LM
Date 10/5/42

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

~~166-8700-1-77~~ Not derog.
~~162-79036-1~~ Not derog.
Alvin Palet (Alaska)
~~165-37209-23~~ Not derog.
~~166-8900-1-21~~ Not derogatory
one Palet
~~165-53824-1~~ l. t.
Tony Palet
NR

Completed 2

Initialed

up

SECRET

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECODED COPY

Tolson ☒
 Ladd ☒
 Clegg ☒
 Glavin ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tracy ☒
 Harbo ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Nease ☒
 Gandy ☒

FROM ANCHORAGE

(10-13-50)

NR 120150

11:43 PM

DIRECTOR

(u) URGENT

In the Event of Invasion

RE PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REBURAD OCTOBER 12) EIGHT INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE SCHEDULED TO REMAIN IN ALASKA IF SAME INVADERS ARE BEING CONSIDERED AS STAY-BEHIND AGENTS. CONTACT HAS BEEN MADE WITH THEM BUT NO DIRECT OFFER OR REQUEST MADE FOR THEM TO ACT AS AGENTS. THEY ARE LOCATED IN SEWARD, GIRDWOOD ON ALASKA RAILROAD, ANCHORAGE, FAIRBANKS, NOME AND KOTZEBUE. MOST LIKELY TARGETS IN ALASKA FOR INVASION DURING ENSUING MONTHS OF YEAR ARE NOME, FAIRBANKS, ANCHORAGE, SEWARD. WITH REFERENCE TO RECOMMENDED TRAINING PROGRAM FOR STAY-BEHIND AGENTS, IT IS NOTED

BOTH OF THESE MATTERS ARE BEING GIVEN CONTINUED AND VIGOROUS ATTENTION AND THE BUREAU WILL BE CURRENTLY ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS AS DIRECTED.

RECEIVED:
 CORRECTED:

(10-13-50)
 (10-13-50)

12:43 AM
 6:00 PM

MW

37

RECORDED - 45

OCT 27 1950

Referral/Consult

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

55 NOV 24 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10-25-50

FROM: SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA
ESPIONAGE - RDECLASSIFIED BY SP128TS/80
ON 5-31-94

Referral/Consult

Rebulet 9-21-50 and Anchorage radiogram to Bureau 10-18-50.

Enclosed herewith are two copies of a memorandum [redacted]

This memorandum was prepared [redacted]

[redacted] ASAC JOHN F. DESMOND and SA JAMES T. MORELAND
were present.The points covered in the memorandum and in the referenced
Bureau letter follow the same order and it is desired to comment
upon them as follows:

Referral/Consult

I. ADMINISTRATION

In connection with the administration of the instant program, it should be noted that due to the enormous size of Alaska (1/5 the size of the Continental United States) a great amount of travel will be required and a relatively large number of Bureau personnel will have to be assigned to inaugurate the plan for the purpose of recruiting agents, studying terrain, local communities, overland communications, etc. Also, additional office space in Anchorage will be necessary in order to properly set up the work of administering the program in its initial stages. It appears at the present time that

Enclosure
ENCLOSURE ATTACHEDJFD:MR
65-298COPIES DESTROYED
R 504 NOV 21 1950

RECORDED - 28

165-59264-15

54 DEC 2 1950

AN File 65-298

the administration headquarters could be in Anchorage, Alaska, thereby being easily accessible to the Commander in Chief of the Alaskan Command.

Referral/Consult

II. DEFINITIONS

[Redacted]

III. SELECTION OF PERSONNEL

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

With regard to the number of agents to be recruited in each community, it is believed that [Redacted]

[Redacted] It is believed that for a population of 5,000 there should be one principal and five or six agents who would be required at the appropriate time to develop their own confidential informants. Even this number is relatively large. For example: In the Anchorage area, which has a population of 40,000, there would be 8 principals and 40 agents. [Redacted]

[Redacted]
The writer does not concur.

Referral/Consult

With regard to [REDACTED] it is believed that food caches, etc. are desirable for all "principals", but in the event of enemy occupation it would not necessarily follow that all principals should proceed to such caches. Some of them could remain in their natural habitat.

Also in connection with the selection of agents, it is desired to point out that there are many sections in Alaska which Bureau agents have not visited for two years or more and in some of these areas desirable agents might be developed among trappers, bush pilots, ham radio operators, etc. Canvassing such possibilities will require additional Bureau personnel.

[REDACTED] The writer does not believe that women should be excluded and that in some instances women may prove most useful.

Referral/Consult

IV. LOCATION OF AGENTS

[REDACTED] additional agents should be established in Seward, Kodiak, the Aleutian Islands, the Alaska Peninsula, along the route of the Alaska Railroad and along the Alaskan highways. Establishment of agents in these places will facilitate the transmission of communications in the event contemplated radio communications break down.

In all probability, agents established in isolated sections of Alaska will be more likely to evade capture by occupation forces and consequently should be more valuable. For example: In the event the community of Nome, Alaska (because of its location) is taken by the enemy, most, if not all of the population (1200) will be liquidated or transported to Siberia. This would mean the loss of all agents in Nome.

V. TRAINING OF AGENTS

[REDACTED] but that some agents will be in key positions and will be of greater importance than others. It is recommended that the most important agents, whether they be called principals or agents, be trained first and that all agents be trained as soon as possible.

Referral/Consult

With regard to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] this is considered just as objectionable as training two or three agents from the same community. In order to insure the security of the program, each agent and principal should be trained individually. However, it may be necessary to dispense with this requirement because of the enormous expense that would be involved and the great amount of time that would be consumed in such a program.

3. In addition to the subjects set forth in the enclosed memorandum, it is recommended that the following matters also be included:

Aircraft and ship recognition	20 hours
Basic training in use of Russian dictionary	16 hours
Firearms training	16 hours
First aid training	20 hours
Bacteriological warfare	8 hours

The amounts of time specified for each subject will vary according to the ability and previous training of the agent.

Referral/Consult

PAYMENT OF AGENTS

VI. The enclosed memorandum [REDACTED]

It is believed that receipts should be required for certain expenditures where the obtaining of receipts will not jeopardize the security of the agent.

It is further recommended that payment be made by depositing salaries to agents' accounts in various banks in the United States, both during standby periods and during active duty. It would be unwise to pay agents by check in Alaska even during standby periods, because such checks or deposits would be immediately noted in small communities in which the agents reside and would cast suspicion upon them. For that reason, it is recommended that each agent have an account set up in some stateside bank to which payments could be made.

VII. TYPES OF INFORMATION TO BE OBTAINED

VIII. COMMUNICATIONS

In addition to the recommendation set forth in the enclosed memorandum,

AN File 65-298

it is recommended that communications also be made by radio to submarine or ship and by courier. For example: Agents stationed in Seward, Kodiak and other ports would be able to communicate with nearby submarines or ships according to a prearranged schedule by radio or signal flashes.

Consideration should also be given to overland couriers in the event that radios become inoperative. For example: Agents in the vicinity of Nome could transmit communications across country by courier if suitable contact points were established.

IX. EQUIPMENT

To the list in the enclosed memorandum should be added a compass.

In connection with this program as well as with the Escape and Evasion Program, a discussion is contemplated with Col. BERNT BALCHEN, Arctic Expert, concerning desirable equipment.

It should be emphasized that for the successful execution of the instant program, as well as the Escape and Evasion Program, it will be necessary to establish caches of food and equipment and "hide outs" throughout the Territory of Alaska.

It has also been noted that many people in the Anchorage area have indicated that in the event of hostilities they will do everything possible to leave Alaska and others have indicated that they will "take to the hills."

Referral/Consult

This being so, it will be natural that a relatively large percentage of the population will endeavor to flee from the immediate vicinity of hostilities and take to the hinterlands. Agents will have to be suitably equipped so as to be able to contact these individuals living in such out of the way places.

The enclosed memorandum was discussed in detail [redacted]


[redacted] both prior and subsequent to its preparation.

The foregoing comments were made during the course of the discussions with [redacted] and they are cognizant of the writer's opinions.

AN File 65-298

Referral/Consult

*The
answer
was
me.*



The Bureau's advice would be appreciated concerning the suggestions and recommendations submitted in this letter and in Anchorage letter dated 9-13-50. Instructions are also requested as to what active investigation is desired looking toward the development of agents.

*already
answered.*

SAC, Anchorage

November 27, 1950

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Reurlet 10-25-50.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BTJ/SC
Referral/Consult

In order to definitely fix responsibility in connection with the
captioned program, additional conferences have been held by the Bureau with
[redacted] at the Seat of Government.

Referral/Consult

Certain proposals were discussed [redacted] setting forth the
Bureau's position relative to the Escape and Evasion Program and an agreement
was reached which is outlined below setting forth the specific responsibility
recognized by the Bureau in this matter.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

SELECTION OF CONTACTS

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

The FBI will assist in this program, however, by making available
names of possible contacts and informants. The FBI will make name
checks and will conduct appropriate investigation where necessary to determine
the background, reliability and loyalty of these potential contacts.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

TRAINING OF CONTACTS AND AGENTS

The FBI will participate [redacted]

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

contacts.

RECORDED - 2

65-59264 - 66

WTB: :EWT

4 DEC 5 1950

DEC 8 - 10 20 11 2 OFFICE

DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI
training of these

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

The FBI will be responsible for furnishing training relative to security, cover, informant nets and communications except radio communications. The FBI will furnish training in the preparation of coded messages and secret writing. [redacted]

OPERATION AFTER INVASION

Referral/Consult

It is envisioned that after Alaska is invaded, martial law would be declared which would bring that portion of Alaska not already occupied under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Alaska Command. After invasion, the Bureau will render such assistance as may be required by orders of the Commanding General. [redacted]

It is noted in referenced letter, Bureau advice was requested as to what immediate steps should be taken by the Anchorage Office to initiate the Escape and Evasion Program.

The Anchorage Office should immediately take the following action:

1. Confer [redacted] in order to ascertain [redacted] in connection with the selection of contacts and informants under this program.

Referral/Consult

2. Determine the areas in Alaska where, either by jurisdiction or location of installations, [redacted] can presently develop the necessary contacts under this program.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10-25-50

FROM: SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL


SUBJECT: ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM - ALASKA

*Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage
in Alaska in the Event of Invasion.*

Referral/Consult

Rebulet 10-4-50 and Anchorage radiogram to Bureau 10-12-50.

On 10-24-50 this matter was again discussed with [redacted]



In view of the foregoing, the Bureau is requested to advise as to what immediate steps should be taken by the Anchorage Office to initiate the Escape and Evasion Program.

62-227
JFD:MR

RECORDED - 58

105-59264-16
OCT 28 1950

2

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTB/SC

ON 5/31/94

342251

WAT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10-25-50

FROM: SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA
ESPIONAGE - R

Referral/Consult

Mr. Rosen
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Enclosed herewith is a memorandum entitled [redacted]

This memorandum was furnished to this office by [redacted]

[redacted] and is being
forwarded to the Bureau as it may be of possible interest in connection
with the "Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska."

65-298

JFD:MR

Referral/Consult

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTB/SD

ON

8-31-94

342251

1 ENCL

RECORDED - 129

SE

765-59264

17

INDEXED - 129

OCT 30 1950

25

55 NOV 30 1950

Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska on the
 subject of Espionage

W. J. Sanders

J. F. [unclear]

WBS

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: October 24, 1950

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT:

Proposed Plans for
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA; In The Event V. J.
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM;
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM *of mission*

Tolson ☒
 Ladd ☒
 Clegg ☒
 Glavin ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tracy ☒
 Harbo ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Nease ☒
 Gandy ☒

Referral/Consult

Special Agent E. S. Sanders received a
 telephone call from

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-1-94 BY SP12 BTG/80

I agree
 w/.

I see no
 need
 w/.

ESS:lae

I agree with Ladd.

WIE-
 NOV 16 1950

RECORDED
 NOV 13 1950

Referral/Consult

65 NOV 24 1950

S-WB

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. HENNRICH

DATE: October 23, 1950

FROM : L. L. LAUGHLIN

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLANS FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (including)
 STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
 ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

The Director instructed that a memorandum be prepared on the above programs in Alaska, showing the advantages and disadvantages from the following three positions on this problem:

(1) The Director stated that he presently understands that the Bureau is to have the responsibility for this program and that [redacted] The Director wants set forth the advantages and disadvantages of this position.

Referral/Consult

(2) The Director wants set forth the advantages and disadvantages of the reverse of this plan, namely, that [redacted] that the Bureau [redacted]

(3) The Bureau's pulling out of the problem entirely and leaving it to be handled [redacted] should be similarly discussed.

LLL:tlc

Memo Dir
 10-24-50
 CEH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BTJ/80

RECORDED - 65

NOV 13 1950

65 NOV 24 1950

EX-71

Referral/Consult

3. Thereafter the Anchorage Office should immediately assist [redacted] by making available [redacted] the names of possible contacts and informants who can be utilized [redacted] under this program in the remaining sectors of Alaska.

Referral/Consult

4. The Anchorage Office should make name checks and conduct investigation desired [redacted] along the lines set forth above under Selection of Contacts. When appropriate name checks and investigations have been conducted by the Anchorage Office on these individuals, the names of the potential contacts should be furnished to the Bureau for checking through indices at the Bureau. Administrative case files bearing the 66 classification should be opened on every potential contact or informant and the results of the investigations should be submitted in report form. All confidential sources should be adequately protected and one copy of the report should be indicated for [redacted]

Referral/Consult

5. Determine what training is deemed necessary [redacted] under this program and advise the Bureau as to your specific recommendations in this regard. You should submit to the Bureau immediately a proposed curriculum setting forth suggested topics to be covered in this training for Bureau approval.

This matter is to receive your personal, immediate and continuous attention until such time as this program is ready for operation.

As you were previously informed, it is imperative that the Bureau fulfill its commitments in regard to the Escape and Evasion Program and you are being held strictly responsible to see that the Bureau's part in this program is properly handled.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: October 25, 1950

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLANS FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Candy	_____

Referral/Consult

In accord with the information set out in my memorandum of October 24, SAC Williams, together with Supervisors W. T. Baker and E. S. Sanders, conferred with [redacted] at 9:00 A.M. today.

The proposed plan for intelligence coverage in Alaska was generally discussed and there appeared to be no problems or points of difference.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] was advised that the Bureau agrees in principle with the basic plan which has been drawn.

RECOMMENDATION:

No action. The foregoing is for your information.

JHW:ESS:mer

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12BTS/SCD

342251

NOV 13 1950

RECORDED - 66

EX-71

NOV 24 1950
65 NOV 24 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 11-13-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

~~"CONFIDENTIAL"~~

Rebulet 10-24-50.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTR/KTC
ON 5/31/94

Referral/Consult

On 11-10-50 a conference was held in the offices of the Anchorage Division attended by [redacted] SAC JOHN H. WILLIAMS and ASAC JOHN F. DESMOND at which time the following matters were discussed:

Referral/Consult

[redacted]
 [redacted] This will be attended, of course, by SAC WILLIAMS.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted] and SAC WILLIAMS will inspect several places on 11-13-50 to determine whether they would be suitable for this purpose.

COPIES DESTROYED

Referral/Consult

R 504 NOV 21 1960 With reference to the above outline concerning housing, it is believed that the tentative plans stated will work out to the satisfaction and in the best interests of the Bureau. It is contemplated, of course, that in the discharge of the Bureau's responsibilities we will very materially aid in setting up necessary files, indices, etc;

JHV:MR

62-22351
cc 65-298

RECORDED - 69

165-59264-21
NOV 16 1950

3

Cox

AN File 62-227

that an agent will be present to work in the administrative office; that all conferences will be attended by SAC WILLIAMS and representatives of the Bureau to consider matters of administration, policy and detail.

done [Any suggestions or observations of the Bureau concerning the implementation of the administration of both of these programs will be appreciated.

*See Bufile to Anchorage 11-27-50, 11-29-50 ; WTB;
and 12-18-50, ESS!*

SAC, Anchorage

December 13, 1950

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

PERSONAL ATTENTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP2 BTJ/SC

Referral/Consult

Reurlets 11-16-50 and 11-30-50.

For your confidential information, this is to advise that

Referral/Consult

As it was pointed out in Bureau radiogram of December 4, 1950, to your office, the Bureau recognizes the existing problems relative to the administrative details which must be worked out by you with [redacted] nevertheless, temporary delays experienced in this regard should not hinder your office in developing Stay-behind Agents, contacts and informants necessary under these programs.

Referral/Consult

Specific reference is made to the comments in urlet of 11-16-50 to the effect that there appears to be [redacted]

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

RECORDED - 13
65-59264 - 22

W TB:mem:bjw

EX-152

DEC 13 1950

19
OK
AB

W3

Referral/Consult

8

Your attention is directed to Bulets of 11-27-50 and 11-29-50 wherein it was set forth that certain proposals had been discussed [redacted] on a headquarters level definitely fixing the responsibility [redacted] the Bureau concerning these programs. The specific responsibilities of the Bureau in connection with these programs were set forth in Bulets to Anchorage of 11-27-50 and 11-29-50.

Referral/Consult

As a result of commitments made at meetings of the IIC on 7-6-50 and 9-27-50, it was agreed that [redacted] the FBI should set up and provide for the operation of the Stay-behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs respectively. From its very inception, the captioned matter has been considered somewhat in the nature of a "joint venture," however, every effort has been made in the past to definitely fix responsibility in this regard, and the same will be done in the future as additional problems arise.

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

The Bureau is maintaining close liaison with [redacted] and you will be advised of the results of the [redacted]

[redacted]

You should continue to keep the Bureau informed on every phase of this matter, especially as to the degree of cooperation the Anchorage office is receiving [redacted] in instant matter.

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 11-2-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION;
~~(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)~~
~~(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)~~

Rebulet 10-24-50 with which was enclosed a draft entitled,
 "Proposed Alaskan Covert Operations."

Referral/Consult

The referenced draft has been discussed with [redacted]

However, as of this date [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

cc - 62-227

JFD:MR
 65-298

DEFERRED RECORDING 3

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BT/CE
 ON 5/31/94
 34225

RECORDED - 20

INDEXED - 20

EX-123

NOV 5 1950

3

25

51 DEC 1 1950

SAC, Anchorage

November 29, 1950

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/9/94 BY SP12BTS/SC

RECORDED - 2

65-59414-24
Enclosed 10-25-50 and 11-3-50.

Referral/Consult

For the express purpose of definitely fixing
responsibility in connection with the Stay-behind Agent
Program, several conferences have been held by the Bureau
[redacted] at the Seat of Government.

After having reexamined the Bureau's position
in this matter, certain proposals were discussed [redacted]
and an agreement was reached which is outlined below
setting forth the specific responsibility recognized by
the Bureau relative to the captioned program.

Referral/Consult

ADMINISTRATION

A representative of the FBI (SAC, Anchorage)
will be in charge of this program in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

SELECTION OF AGENTS

The FBI, [redacted] will develop
potential Stay-behind Agents in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

LOCATION OF AGENTS

[redacted]
[redacted] It will be the
responsibility of the FBI in Alaska to place or develop
agents [redacted]

ADEQUACY OF COVERAGE

It will be the responsibility of the [redacted] in Alaska to determine
what coverage in this regard is adequate, bearing in mind
the fact that Alaska should be invaded.

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

WTB:bjw

54 DEC 2 1950

TRAINING OF AGENTS

The FBI will participate in the training of Stay-behind Agents.

The FBI will be responsible for furnishing training relative to security, cover, informant nets and communications except radio communications.

The FBI will furnish training in the preparation of coded messages and secret writing.

Referral/Consult

SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT

It will be the responsibility of [] FBI in Anchorage to determine what supplies and equipment will be necessary for purposes of training and the stocking of caches for Stay-behind Agents.

Referral/Consult

PAYMENT OF AGENTS

Stay-behind Agents during the recruitment and training stages will be handled on an individual basis and paid as are regular confidential informants in the field.

The SAC, Anchorage, will make appropriate recommendations in connection with expenditures when it has been determined what expenses will be necessary in connection with recruitment and training.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

[redacted] This appears to be unreasonable and

Referral/Consult

The question of financial responsibility is being explored at the Bureau and you will be advised of the results of further conferences held [redacted] on a headquarters level in this regard. For your confidential information, [redacted]

OPERATION AFTER INVASION

It is recognized that the actual utilization of agents under this program would only occur in the event of invasion by the enemy. Upon invasion, a part or all of Alaska would undoubtedly be placed under martial law and the affected region would be placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Alaska Command.

As presently interpreted, the immediate plan of action for the Anchorage office, is to promptly and adequately develop our part in this program prior to invasion. At the time Alaska might be invaded, the program would be placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, Alaska Command. Thereafter the Bureau will render such assistance as may be required by orders of the Commanding General, Alaska Command.

In connection with the specific questions raised in Anchorage letter of October 25, 1950, to the Bureau, the following observations are being made under the appropriate captions.

ADMINISTRATION

The Bureau is in agreement, as set out above, that the FBI will be responsible for the development and administration of the Stay-behind Agent Program in Alaska.

The Bureau is likewise in agreement that administration headquarters in this connection should be Alaska and preferably in Anchorage, thereby, as you pointed out, being easily accessible to the Commander-in-Chief of the Alaska Command.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

SELECTION OF PERSONNEL

As pointed out above, it is the responsibility of the Anchorage office to determine what coverage in this regard is adequate. It is not believed that any hard and fast rule can be laid down basing the number of agents to be selected in a given community upon the population of the area. Your thinking and planning in this regard should be in terms of adequacy of coverage. For instance, what will be the anticipated attrition? In what manner can we avoid a terrific loss of agents and informants in the event of invasion? These are questions of paramount concern in this matter. Here emphasis should be placed on the immediate selection of potential Stay-behind agents rather than theorizing upon the possible number of agents which should be developed. As it has been pointed out before, the Bureau feels that the success or failure of this entire program depends upon the selection of agents and the training which they will receive. It would be much better to have ten well selected Stay-behind Agents who can be of service to the United States after invasion, than a hundred poorly selected Stay-behind Agents who may be shot on sight by the enemy after invasion. Every effort, therefore, should be made to select Stay-behind agents who will not be removed or neglected by the enemy and who will be capable of developing sub-agents and informants from the remaining population.

The Bureau is in agreement with you that "saturation" is not the answer to the question of adequacy of coverage. A program based merely on numbers will be vulnerable from the standpoint of secrecy and security.

The Bureau is also in agreement with your comment that women should not be excluded as possible potential Stay-behind Agents. Your attention is called to Lulev dated September 21, 1950, in this matter, wherein it was pointed out that in the Soviet Union women are assigned tasks involving heavy labor under guard and that able-bodied female survivors of any invasion would probably be placed in labor battalions.

TRAINING OF AGENTS

The Bureau is of the opinion that the training of the Stay-behind Agents, if at all possible, should be handled within the Territory of Alaska. This procedure would be beneficial financially and from the standpoint of conservation of time.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

The Bureau concurs with your views to the effect that Stay-behind Agents should whenever possible be trained individually. If individual training can be effected, it would appear that the use of assumed names on the part of the agents would be unnecessary.

At the time you were at the Bureau during October, 1950, for conference, it was pointed out that the Bureau should be furnished with a proposed training program which can be utilized as a basis for planning the instruction to be given to the Stay-behind Agents. This matter was likewise called to your attention by Bufile of September 21, 1950, and October 24, 1950. It is noted that to date you have not complied with Bureau instructions in this regard.

Referral/Consult

You are instructed, therefore, to submit a suggested curriculum in this regard to reach the Bureau within 15 days from the receipt of this communication. It is recognized that the training given will probably vary with every agent who receives training; nevertheless, the Bureau desires to have a complete over-all picture of the proposed training program. The curriculum should be broken down into two sections, one listing the subjects which will [redacted] and the other setting forth the topics which will be handled by Bureau instructors.

A short summary should be included for every course on the curriculum showing in general terms the instruction to be covered and the number of hours to be utilized where necessary in the study of the individual subjects.

The Anchorage office should immediately take the following action:

1. Administrative case files should be opened on every potential Stay-behind Agent who is being considered for development. These files should bear the CS classification. In the future when an individual is being considered as a potential Stay-behind Agent, the indices of the Anchorage office should be checked and a report should be submitted summarizing all data available to the Anchorage office. Upon receipt of every report, the files

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Sandy _____

at the Bureau will be reviewed for any additional information concerning the individual in question and a communication will be directed to the Anchorage office setting forth the results of the file search. Where pertinent information is available in Bureau files but not in the possession of the Anchorage office, it will be necessary for a supplemental report to be submitted incorporating the additional data. These reports should be prepared in form suitable for dissemination and confidential sources should be adequately protected. Copies of these reports should not be indicated for [redacted] during the development stage.

Referral/Consult

2. After conferring with representatives [redacted] determine what training is deemed necessary under this program and advise the Bureau as to your specific recommendations in this regard. You should submit to the Bureau within fifteen days a proposed curriculum setting forth suggested topics to be covered in this training for Bureau approval.

Referral/Consult

3. Immediately advise the Bureau as to the identification of additional potential Stay-behind Agents developed to date. Your attention is directed to the fact that since your radiogram of October 19, 1960, furnishing the names of seven potential Stay-behind Agents, no further advice has been received as to the progress being made in this phase of the investigation. Specifically, your attention is called to alet of November 7, 1960, instructing that you immediately furnish the names of additional individuals who are being considered for development under this program.

Referral/Consult

In order to avoid unnecessary correspondence between the Anchorage office and the Bureau, it is suggested that you confer regularly with [redacted] and in [redacted] work on the projects involved in this undertaking on a local level wherever possible. Your proposals and recommendations should then be submitted to the Bureau. In those instances where there is disagreement, lack of understanding or question of procedure, you should

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Referral/Consult

promptly inform the Bureau and express your views. After
review, the matter will be discussed with [redacted]
[redacted] and thereafter, appropriate joint instructions will
be issued, by the Bureau to Anchorage, and [redacted]
[redacted]

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 11-3-50

FROM: SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
~~*(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)~~
~~*(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Rebulet Anchorage 10-24-50, and Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated 10-25-50.

Referenced Bureau letter instructs that a final draft of proposed action be submitted to the Bureau. Before this is submitted, advice is requested as to whether or not a reply will be received to the Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated 10-25-50 with which were submitted two copies of a



Referral/Consult

JFD:MR

65-298

cc - 62-227

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12BTS/KSP

ON

5-31-94

342251

~~DECLASSIFIED RECORDING~~

RECORDED - 2

165-59264-24

INDEXED - 2

NOV 6 1950
312-1

Ba/WB
FWD

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: November 9, 1950

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION:
*STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
*ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12BFC/TC

Tolson ☒
 Ladd ☒
 Clegg ☐
 Glavin ☐
 Nichols ☐
 Rosen ☐
 Tracy ☐
 Harbo ☐
 Mohr ☐
 Tele. Room ☐
 Nease ☐
 Gandy ☐

PURPOSE:

To submit proposed recommendations fixing the responsibility of the FBI in connection with the captioned programs.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

At the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference meetings on July 6, 1950 and September 27, 1950, it was agreed that the FBI [redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of the Stay-behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs respectively.

On July 7, 1950, the Anchorage office was instructed to begin work on the Stay-behind Agent Program and on October 4, 1950, instructions were issued to the Anchorage office on the Escape and Evasion Program.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] on October 25, 1950, was advised that the Bureau agreed in principle with [redacted]

A copy of the

is attached.

Referral/Consult

The Executives' Conference by memorandum dated October 31, 1950, summarized the question of the Bureau's participation [redacted] in developing and operating the Stay-behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs. It is to be noted that the following notation appears on this memorandum: "I concur most reluctantly. We must really see that our part of it is promptly and adequately developed and supervised. H"

PROPOSALS:

There are set out below proposals to definitely fix responsibility in connection with the Bureau's part in these

Attachment

65-59264

COPIES DESTROYED

R 584 NOV 21 1960

RECORDED - 2
 INDEXED - 2

DEC 1 1950

54 DEC 3 1950

Referral/Consult

two programs. It is proposed that discussions will be reopened [redacted] on a headquarters level so there will
be a complete working agreement as to the responsibility recog-
nized by the Bureau in connection with these programs.

STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

1. ADMINISTRATION

A representative of the FBI (SAC, Anchorage) will be in charge of this program in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

2. SELECTION OF AGENTS

The FBI, with the [redacted] will develop potential Stay-behind Agents in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

3. LOCATION OF AGENTS

[redacted]
[redacted] It will be the responsibility of
the FBI in Alaska to place or develop agents [redacted]
[redacted]

4. ADEQUACY OF COVERAGE

Referral/Consult

It will be the responsibility of the SAC at Anchorage
[redacted] to determine what coverage
in this regard is adequate, bearing in mind military needs after
Alaska has been invaded.

5. TRAINING OF AGENTS

The FBI will participate in the training of the Stay-
behind Agents.

The FBI will be responsible for furnishing training
relative to security, cover, informant nets and communications
except radio communications.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

The FBI will furnish training in the preparation of coded messages and secret writing.

It is proposed that the FBI Laboratory work out such codes and be prepared to provide suitable instruction in secret writing.

Referral/Consult

6. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT

It will be the responsibility of [] FBI in Anchorage to determine what supplies and equipment will be necessary for purposes of training and the stocking of caches for Stay-behind Agents.


Referral/Consult



7. PAYMENT OF AGENTS

Stay-behind Agents during the recruitment and training stages will be handled and paid as are regular confidential informants in the field.

The SAC, Anchorage, will make appropriate recommendations in connection with expenditures when it has been determined what expenses will be necessary in connection with recruitment and training.



It is proposed that the question of financial responsibility under the captioned programs be discussed [] on a headquarters level through liaison with the suggestion that consideration be given to requesting the necessary funds for these programs from the Department of Defense, since both programs are strictly for the benefit of the military.

Referral/Consult

ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

2. SELECTION OF CONTACTS

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

The FBI will assist in this program, however, by making available [Redacted] names of possible contacts and informants. The FBI will make name checks and will conduct appropriate investigation where necessary to determine the background, reliability and loyalty of these potential contacts.

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

5. TRAINING OF CONTACTS AND INFORMANTS

Referral/Consult

The FBI will participate [Redacted] in the training of these contacts along the same lines as set forth above under TRAINING OF AGENTS, Stay-behind Agent Program.

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

OPERATIONS AFTER INVASION

It is recognized that the actual utilization of agents, informants and contacts under these two programs would only occur in the event of invasion by the enemy. Upon invasion, a part or all of Alaska would undoubtedly be placed under martial law and the affected region would be placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Alaska Command.

As presently interpreted, the immediate plan of action for the Bureau, in light of prior commitments resulting from decisions reached at the IIC, is to promptly and adequately develop our part in these two programs prior to invasion. At the time Alaska might be invaded, the two programs would be placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, Alaska Command.

Referral/Consult

It is noted that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] therefore, it is proposed that the actual operation of the Stay-behind Agent Program and the Escape and Evasion Program after invasion be recognized as [REDACTED] and that the Bureau will render such assistance as may be required by orders of the Commanding General, Alaska Command.

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the above proposals be approved for discussion [REDACTED] through liaison on a headquarters level. Thereafter, the Anchorage office should be informed of the specific responsibilities recognized by the Bureau in these programs so that appropriate and immediate action can be taken to put the above recommended proposals into effect in order to bring these matters to a logical conclusion.

11-24-50

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: October 24, 1950

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION -
~~STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM;~~
~~ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM.~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 5-31-90 BY SP12BT/RC

Tolson _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

PURPOSE:

Referral/Consult

To advise that in accordance with IIC decision the FBI [] will be jointly responsible for the implementation and administration of both the Stay-Behind Agent Program and the Escape and Evasion Program in Alaska.

[] it is proposed that joint responsibility in these two programs will be assumed by the FBI []. The administration will be basically handled by [] an associate principal (FBI representative), both in Alaska and responsible to their respective Directors, the plans to be carried out in accordance with general requirements laid down by the Commanding General, Alaska Command. It is further proposed that under the direction of the principal and associate principal four organizational sections will be set up to administer both programs with administration of the individual sections by [] FBI representatives under the direction of the principal as follows:

Referral/Consult

[] Covert Intelligence (Stay-Behind Agents) - FBI;

[] Training and Supply - [] FBI.

The proposed organization places equal responsibility on [] FBI for all phases of both programs.

Referral/Consult

McC Williams is in agreement.
Advantages

The principal advantage to the FBI in assuming joint responsibility in these two programs is that it will preclude any other intelligence agency, such as CIA, getting into the intelligence field in Alaska at this time.

Referral/Consult

It will also provide for the FBI being aware of the activities [] in the recruitment of Agents to be used in connection with both programs.

RECORDED - 2

INDEXED - 2

It will provide for the utilization of the [] joint energies

Attachment

CEH:hke

54 DEC 5 1950

COPIES DESTROYED

R 584 NOV 21 1960

DEC 1 1950

14

5-106

of the FBI [] in developing informants at this time which will insure additional intelligence coverage, and further insure that all intelligence coverage at this time will be channeled through FBI and will continue to be so channeled after invasion.

Disadvantages

The participation of the FBI in these programs will entail a tremendous expenditure of manpower and funds in the recruitment of Agents in training and in supply. It will place on the FBI a heavy responsibility for intelligence coverage in the event of invasion both from the viewpoint of securing intelligence data for military purposes, which is primarily a military objective, and from the viewpoint of rescue under the Escape and Evasion Program, which is strictly military in character. In fulfilling our share of responsibility, it will be necessary for us to make available a large number of our contacts, confidential sources, and informants.

Estimated four (4) agents could handle.
OBSERVATIONS:

It is noted that, if we do not participate in these programs, it would probably become necessary when an invasion occurred for us to turn over to the Commanding General all of our informants, contacts, etc. In this event, they would not have been trained and would be of less value.

It is felt that basically complete direction of such programs could be more efficiently handled by one organization to avoid delays incident to joint responsibility and joint authority in both programs.

Position of Bureau If We Assume Total Responsibility for Escape and Evasion and Stay-Behind Agent Programs

Advantages:

Bureau responsibility would ensure our retaining in confidence our sources and informants.

Disadvantages:

This situation would place on us the responsibility for programs which are primarily military in nature, and in connection with escape and evasion, would make us primarily responsible for the lives and welfare of the air crews of the Strategic Bomber Command.

The Bureau in this position would necessarily be placed in the position of expending a maximum amount of manpower and funds for the complete operation of these programs.

Position of Bureau If [] Assumes Responsibility for
Escape and Evasion and Stay-Behind Agent Programs

Referral/Consult

Advantages:

Referral/Consult

In the event [] assumed total responsibility for both programs, with our incidental assistance, the expenditure of manpower and funds would be minimized.

Disadvantages:

Referral/Consult

It would be necessary for the Bureau to either make available to [] our sources and informants in Alaska, or they would engage in a recruitment program. We would not have under our control intelligence information gathered by the agents under [] direction.

Position of Bureau If We Withdraw from Both Programs

Advantages:

There would be no expenditure of manpower and funds.

Disadvantages:

Should we withdraw completely from participation in these programs, the Air Force would, in all probability, bring in CIA or other intelligence agencies to participate in setting them up and administering them. This would definitely place CIA in the domestic intelligence field.

An analysis of the proposed joint responsibility administrative setup for the handling of both the Escape and Stay-Behind Agent Programs is attached.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 10-27-50

FROM : MR. H. H. CLEGG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-1-94 BY SP2 BJS/STC

SUBJECT:

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

Concerning the request for a review of the proposed plan for intelligence coverage in Alaska in the event of an invasion, there follow the views which I have on this matter.

Referral/Consult

(1) Here is a dual responsibility which under normal circumstances in administration and operations is bad. Especially in a military operation where a part of American territory is invaded, do I think it would be doubly bad. Although there is some division of program as between [] FBI, the statement is made nevertheless that "the proposed organization places equal responsibility on [] FBI for all phases of both programs." This, I believe, should be avoided. Dual responsibility permits buck passing and finger pointing. In a matter as important as intelligence operations in an invaded area, there should be no chance for doubt as to fixed responsibility either in administration or operations.

(2) The proposed intelligence coverage plan is to be effective and productive in the event of invasion. This makes it subject to the control of the Commander in Chief of the military forces and any plan agreed upon at this time would be subject to the whims and the desires of the Commander in Chief based upon the condition which he finds at the time of the invasion. Thus, we don't know whether any plans such as those proposed would actually be applied in case of invasion or whether there would be any shifting of responsibility or change in operations. So, why should the FBI get involved in such a scheme where there is largely all brunt and no credit. If it goes bad, the FBI would be accused of failure. If it works, the military would get the credit. This is too vulnerable and undesirable a position for the FBI to get in.

After invasion or when the plan becomes operative, the information collected of an intelligence type, dealing with order of battle, disposition of forces, food supply, weather, morale, equipment, civilian attitude, etc., is information needed by the military. This is military intelligence. Therefore, why should the FBI get involved in having a responsibility for military intelligence in the field where there is military operation. This whole scheme is a scheme of operation in a combat area and the so-called "stay behind Agents" and the system of escape and communication is for the direct benefit of military operations. The Bureau's jurisdiction of counterespionage, countersabotage and internal security measures of a counterintelligence type is not designed for a combat area or an area that has already been invaded and this plan relates to the areas already invaded. COPIES DESTROYED.

RECORDED - 2 DEC 1 1950

(3) The suggestion that [] would call in CIA if the Bureau did not assume responsibility would reflect seriously upon the

HHC:DMG

Referral/Consult

30 80

Delimitations Agreements. If they are that weak, shouldn't an attempt be made to strengthen them? It would seem that the same rule and procedure should apply to Alaska as Hawaii, California, Florida, Washington State or Minnesota, if they were to be invaded. Would we now consent to such a plan of joint operation and joint responsibility for a prospective invaded area elsewhere? I would not think so and the only difference in jurisdiction in Alaska is it is probably more likely to be invaded first by the Russians in the event of war.

(4) Although the detailed plan does call for individual training as much as possible, there are further indications of a plan for classes or group training, or even training by individual networks. In a situation of this kind where the invaders would use torture and every other method to cause one spy to disclose the identity of others in his network, I do not believe that even if such a plan were put into effect that it should permit the undercover informants, referred to as "Agents," to know more than one contact. It would endanger the entire network otherwise. Thus, the training, it appears, should be largely individual training with others having no knowledge of the identity of any other person save the one contact in any network.

(5) Even if such a plan should be put into effect, the idea of 20-odd or even 50 such informants being able to supply adequate information with the setting up of concentration camps, purge lists, and other methods by the invaders would seem to be grossly inadequate for such a large area of territory, including all of Alaska and all of the Aleutian Islands.

Referral/Consult

(6) If [] desired to prepare such a program as of this time, I do not feel that it would be necessary for the Bureau to disclose its contacts, confidential sources and informants. They could remain intact until an invasion occurred and their identities need never be disclosed. A new and separate program not including our contacts and informants could be developed []

CONCLUSION:

I find nothing desirable about this from the standpoint of FBI advantage. Every phase of it I consider objectionable from an FBI standpoint.

Referral/Consult

To be of such helpfulness as may be needed, perhaps our Agents could make recommendations of proposed undercover Agents to be left in Alaska in the event of an invasion and they could be developed. Perhaps the FBI could assist in some of the training in such matters as codes, ciphers, secret inks and the like. Yet, it is quite obvious that most of the training needed would be of a military type. The FBI should not be charged, I believe, with establishing food and supply caches and should not have any responsibility or obligation in connection with this program except an indicated

Referral/Consult

willingness to cooperate wholeheartedly in any manner requested in the field of training within the scope of our knowledge and recommending potential invasion or "stay behind Agents" and furnishing any information which our Agents can obtain which would be helpful to [] in setting up this program. In the event of an invasion which is successful, I fear that all the finger pointing or accusation would be against the FBI if the proposed system did not work and, yet, we would not have any administrative control or direction after the invasion came, which is when the plan goes into operation. It seems to be a military or Air Force intelligence function.

I suggest had
bring this matter
before Executive
Conference

10727

✓ Lague,
H.

✓
See Ex. Conf. memo to
Director 10-31-50
UB

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: *October 31, 1950*

FROM : **'THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE**

SUBJECT:

Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage In
Alaska in the Event of Invasion

At a meeting of the Executives' Conference on October 31, 1950, attended by Messrs. Tolson, Clegg, Harbo, Mohr, Laughlin, Sizoo, McGuire, Tracy, Rosen, Glavin and Ladd, the question of the Bureau's participation with OSI of the Air Force in developing stay-behind Agents and Agents for use in an escape and evasion route in the event of an invasion of Alaska, was discussed.

Tolson ☒
Ladd ☒
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room ☐
Nease _____

Referral/Consult

The Conference was advised that this matter had been originally instigated by [REDACTED]

The Conference was advised that this was called to the attention of the IIC and that at the meeting on June 8, 1950, you advised the IIC that the plan contemplated the selection, training and equipping of selected U. S. citizens who were long-established residents of that section of Alaska for which they would be expected to provide coverage and that you had pointed out to the IIC that the [redacted] FBI informant coverage existing today in Alaska could be trained in detail along the lines needed in the instant proposal and that such informant networks could be turned over to the Commanding General for operation if and when such emergency in Alaska is encountered. It was further pointed out to the IIC that CIA had no authority to operate in Alaska and should not be permitted to so operate. (S) - (U)

DECLASSIFIED
#041225

This matter was further considered at the July 6, 1950 meeting of the ITC, at which time [REDACTED]

of the fact that [redacted] the FBI had agreed to [redacted] in view
program out. (S) - (U) [redacted] work this [redacted]

The Conference was advised that their views were desired as to whether the Bureau should continue its participation in the program. It was pointed out that this placed dual responsibility; that when the program is placed in effect, namely, following an invasion, the control of the program would pass to the Military; that if the program goes badly, the FBI could be accused of failure and if it works, the Military would get credit.

DML: dad / cc - Mr. Clegg
C 8 1950 Mr. Mohr

RECORDED - 2
INDEXED - 2
Ref

Referral/Consult

DEC 1 1950

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I went over the objections raised in Mr. Clegg's memorandum to Mr. Tolson with reference to this program and pointed out that the Bureau had originally [redacted] and had at the intelligence conference agreed to take it over. It was also pointed out to the conference that this would appear to be an intelligence operation and as such, should be handled by the Bureau. Further, that [redacted]

[redacted] if the Bureau did not handle this intelligence function. ~~TS~~ - (U)

It was pointed out that Alaska is no different from the rest of the United States; that in the event of an invasion of California or New York or any other portion of the United States, that this problem would also arise and that the development of informants within the civilian population was a function for the FBI even though their job would not require them to function until after an invasion.

Referral/Consult

Messrs. Tolson, Clegg, Harbo and Mohr were opposed to the Bureau's participation [redacted] in the stay-behind Agents and escape and evasion Agent program. They felt that the Bureau should merely advise [redacted] by furnishing the names of individuals whom they might contact for the purpose of developing informants for use in this program and possibly furnishing an instructor to help train any such informants [redacted] in subjects which the Bureau would normally handle in a training school.

Referral/Consult

Messrs. Glavin, Tracy, Rosen, McGuire, Sizoo, Laughlin, and Ladd recommended that we continue to participate [redacted] in the development of this program and in this connection they indicated that in the event the Bureau stays in this program it should be carefully reviewed and a program drafted for the development of the existing OSI and FBI informant coverage in order that they might be properly trained in detail with the ultimate idea that they would be turned over to the Air Force in the event of any invasion of Alaska.

~~SECRET~~

Respectfully,
For the conference

while this seems to be a 95% military operation. I concur most definitely. We must our prior commitments. Clyde Tolson really see that our are such that I believe part of it is promptly we will have to go along adequately developed with it 11-1 ~~TS~~ supervised. H.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: November 3, 1950

FROM *W* SAC, Anchorage~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SUBJECT: *Q* PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION.
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

With regard to future correspondence in connection with the instant matter, advice is requested as to whether or not copies of Bureau letters and letters from this office to the Bureau may be furnished to

Referral/Consult

If it is permissible for copies of such correspondence to be given to extra copies of letters will be made marked "cc: " except when such letters contain information which should not be disseminated outside the Bureau.

Referral/Consult

65-298
cc: 62-227
JFD:vw

memos to Anchorage
11-20-50
WTB

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~ *M*

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP12 BTG/SS*
ON *5/3/94*

842251

RECORDED - 26

165-59264-29

NOV 8 1950

3

27

71:73

WTB

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: October 23, 1950

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA
IN THE EVENT OF INVASION (including)
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-1-94 BY SP12 BJS/150

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

PURPOSE:

Referral/Consult

To analyze [redacted]

to submit for your approval additional instructions for Anchorage.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

At the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference meeting on July 6, 1950, and on September 27, 1950, it was agreed that the FBI [redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of the stay-behind agent and Escape and Evasion Programs respectively in Alaska in the event that territory is occupied by the enemy. The Bureau has issued detailed instructions to the Anchorage Office to draft a proposed program, [redacted] for the operation of the stay-behind agents, and to initiate the appropriate action [redacted] to determine their needs with respect to the Escape and Evasion Program.

In connection with the Bureau's joint responsibility in setting up these two programs, Anchorage has been instructed to:

1. Determine the total number of stay-behind agents necessary for adequate coverage in Alaska in the event of hostilities.
2. Ascertain the most likely targets in Alaska for invasion during ensuing months of 1950.
3. Commence [redacted] preparation of a definite program for the appropriate training of the stay-behind agents.

Referral/Consult

As to point #1, the Anchorage office advised by radiogram on October 19, 1950, that twenty-one stay-behind agents, according to present estimates, would be sufficient for immediate coverage in Anchorage (10), Fairbanks (6), Nome (2), Seward (2) and Kotzebue (1).

ENCLOSURE BEHIND, FILE
 WTB:mod

RECORDED - 48
 INDEXED - 48

165-59264-30
 DEC 5 1950

54 DEC 11 1950

Comments:

The Anchorage Office to date has submitted the names of seven prospective stay-behind agents. It is not believed that twenty-one stay-behind agents are sufficient for immediate coverage. In the event Russia might occupy these cities in Alaska, a large number of the twenty-one individuals might be liquidated or removed to an area where their usefulness would be terminated. To cope with this possibility, it is being recommended that efforts be made to develop approximately fifty potential stay-behind agents in the strategic areas mentioned above.

As to point #2, Anchorage has advised that the most likely targets in Alaska for invasion during the ensuing months of 1950 are Nome, Fairbanks, Seward and Anchorage.

As to point #3, the Anchorage office has not as yet submitted a recommended program of training for the stay-behind agent program due to the [redacted]

[redacted] Referral/Consult

Comments:

Referral/Consult

It is believed that the success or failure of the stay-behind agent program will depend upon the quality of the agents chosen and the training they receive to assist them in efficiently carrying out their assigned duties. It is further believed that if possible all training should be given in Alaska.

[redacted]
[redacted] A recommendation is being made that the Anchorage Office immediately submit to the Bureau for approval a suggested curriculum for this training program which should include a clear-cut recommendation regarding the Bureau's responsibility in this training program.

FBI Liaison has maintained continuous and close contact [redacted] on a headquarters level so as to expedite the formation of a working plan which can be used as basis for setting up these two programs and effecting their operation.

Referral/Consult

November 29, 1950

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
~~* Stay-behind Agent Program~~
~~* Escape and Evasion Program.~~

Referral/Consult

At the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference meetings on July 6, 1950, and September 27, 1950, it was agreed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation [redacted]

[redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of the Stay-behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs respectively.

STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

This program will provide for a means of obtaining intelligence information in the event Alaska or a part of Alaska is occupied by enemy forces. The plan contemplates the selection, training and equipping of selected United States citizens who are long established residents of the section of Alaska for which they would be expected to provide coverage. The plan further contemplates that these individuals would have no previous military record.

Referral/Consult

A representative of the FBI will be in charge of this program in Alaska. The FBI [redacted] will develop potential Stay-behind Agents in Alaska.

[redacted] The FBI will place or develop agents [redacted]

The FBI will participate in the training of the Stay-behind Agents, and will be responsible for furnishing training relative to security, cover, informant nets and communications except radio communications.

The FBI [redacted] presently determining what supplies and equipment will be necessary for purposes of training and the stocking of caches with supplies which can be utilized by the Stay-behind Agents when the operation of the program is put into effect, namely, after Alaska might be invaded.

Referral/Consult

65-59264-31

COPIES DESTROYED

R 584 NOV 21 1960

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-31-94 BY SP12AJS/SC

342251

It is anticipated that the selected Stay-behind Agents during the recruitment and training stages will of necessity have to be renumerated.

ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

This program provides for the setting up of a system whereby United States Air Force personnel shot down in Alaska during a period of occupation by the enemy would be able to escape and return to United States territory. In order to provide for such a system, it is necessary to develop contacts, informants and agents presently residing in Alaska who would be able during a period of occupation by the enemy to assist "downed" airmen to return to the U. S. lines over escape routes.

Referral/Consult

Under the present plan, [redacted] the FBI will assist by making available [redacted] names of possible contacts and informants. The FBI will make appropriate name checks and will conduct appropriate investigation where necessary to determine the background, reliability and loyalty of these potential contacts and informants [redacted]

The FBI will also participate in the training of these contacts along the same lines as set forth above under the Stay-behind Agent Program.

OPERATION AFTER INVASION

It is envisioned that after Alaska is invaded, martial law will be declared which would bring that portion of Alaska not already occupied by the enemy under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Alaska Command. After invasion, the Federal Bureau of Investigation will render such assistance as may be required by orders of the Commanding General under both the Stay-behind Agent Program and the Escape and Evasion Program.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont
 FROM : C. E. Hennrich
 SUBJECT: BUDGET MATERIAL

DATE: November 29, 1950

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Attached hereto, as requested, is a memorandum relating to the Bureau's plan for intelligence coverage of Alaska in the event of an Alaskan invasion.

It is pointed out that this info and the Bureau's activities in this field are very confidential, and that any public disclosure would work to the detriment of the program. It is, therefore, suggested that the confidential nature of this material be given consideration prior to its use in any budget hearings.

ETT:cas

Attachment

ENCL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 5-31-90 BY SP12 BT/STP

342251

RECORDED - 2

INDEXED - 2

DEC 8 1950

3

Included as part of
 Director's 1952 Budget
 material per instructions
 of Mr. Tolson

WRG/j

12/6/50

52 DEC 16 1950

ETT

Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage
 in Alaska in the Event of Invasion

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

December 4, 1950

URGENT

SAC, ANCHORAGE

CIPHER PAD CODE

RE PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REBUILT (NOVEMBER SEVEN)

LAST INSTRUCTING NAMES OF ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS ALASKA BEING CONSIDERED
DEVELOPMENT STAY BEHIND AGENTS BE FURNISHED BU IMMEDIATELY. COMPLY WITH
INSTRUCTIONS BY RETURN RADIOGRAM. TENSE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
DEMANDS IMMEDIATE ACTION BY BUREAU TO COMPLY WITH COMMITMENTS THIS REGARD.
NO DELAY HANDLING THESE PROGRAMS CAN BE JUSTIFIED. HANDLING STAY BEHIND
AND ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAMS MUST RECEIVE PRIORITY YOUR OFFICE. ADVISE
BU IDENTITIES SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED INSTANT PROJECT AND NUMBER MAN DAYS
SPENT CAPTIONED MATTER DURING NOVEMBER. URGENCY THESE PROGRAMS SHOULD BE
CALLED ATTENTION ALL BUREAU PERSONNEL ASSIGNED THIS MATTER ALASKA. BUREAU
RECOGNIZES PROBLEMS RELATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

THERE CAN BE NO DELAY IN LOCATING AND DEVELOPING STAY BEHIND
AGENTS. SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS WHETHER SEVEN INDIVIDUALS LISTED REFERENCED
CULET SHOULD BE UTILIZED AS AGENTS. ALSO SUBMIT ALL ADDITIONAL NAMES UNDER
CONSIDERATION. SUBMIT RADIOGRAM TODAY AND EACH THIRD DAY HEREFTER.
DEVELOPMENTS PROGRAM UNTIL YOU ADVISE AND BUREAU CONCURS COVERAGE ADEQUATE.

Referral/Consult

051827

RECORDED DEC 7 1950

RECEIVED RECORDING ROOM

F B I

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED ELA ROOM

RECEIVED 10720 AM 5008

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

WTB:ljh:mes

V.C. [Signature]

55 DEC 20 1950

12/5/50 5:10 P.M.

150-2100
97C
DEC 5 10 20 AM '50
chain
2-214
141

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: 11-30-50

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
CONFIDENTIAL	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Referral/Consult	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

G.I.R.-1

Referral/Consult

Reference is made to Anchorage letter dated 11-16-50.

On several occasions, the last one being November 29, 1950, I
 have had occasion [redacted]

[redacted] and inquired concerning any developments
 regarding the two captioned programs. On each occasion [redacted]

[redacted]

In view of the situation as it is, this office cannot proceed
 with its part in the implementation of these programs.

Contact will be maintained with [redacted]
 and any information obtained will be immediately passed on to the
 Bureau.

Referral/Consult

JHW:MR
 65-298

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTN/SC
 ON 5-31-94

342251

cc 62-227

HANDLED BY
 STOP DESK

RECORDED - 9

EX-122

DEC 1950

6 15

FNB

Let to Anchorage
 12-12-50
 WS

50 DEC 19 1950

GRAM

DECEMBER 12, 1950

URGENT

SAC, ANCHORAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REURADIOGRAM (DECEMBER SIX.) ^(u) AUTHORITY GRANTED CONTACT SEVEN INDIVIDUALS LISTED BULET NOVEMBER SEVEN. SUBMIT REPORTS PROMPTLY THESE INDIVIDUALS ACCORDING INSTRUCTIONS BULET NOVEMBER TWENTY NINE. ATTACH ROUTING SLIP ON REPORTS SUBMITTED THIS REGARD WITH NOTATION QUOTE ATTENTION RECORDS SECTION, STOP DESK, UNQUOTE. INCLUDE ON ROUTING SLIP COMPLETE TITLE CAPTIONED MATTER. BUREAU FILES WILL BE REVIEWED NAMES LISTED URADIOGRAMS (DECEMBER SIX AND EIGHT) ^(u) ON RECEIPT REPORTS YOUR OFFICE REFLECTING BACKGROUND INFO. SUBMIT REPORTS DAY TO DAY BASIS TO AVOID BACKLOG OF WORK.

RECORDED - 2

65-59264 - 34

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/9/94 BY SP12 BTJ/MS

WTB:jef

(HR 132011)

CF Klock

all
2015-2120
Chick just call 2125-2145

Classified by ~~SP3 BTJ/m~~
Declassify on: ~~DATE 5/12-25~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/m

ON 4-14-2000

00-1164

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

RECEIVED
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
RECEIVED
FBI
DEC 13 2 34 PM '50

Radio (14/13/50) 5:03 PM per memo

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: December 12, 1950

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-1-91 BY SP12 BTB BTB

PURPOSE:

To authorize the Anchorage office to contact Frank B. ~~X~~Moore, [redacted] Dr. Howard G. Romig, [redacted] Antonio Polet, Sam Hemack and Joe Danich, all of whom have been recommended by Anchorage as potential Stay-behind Agents.

BACKGROUND:

By radiogram 10-19-50 Anchorage submitted the names of seven Alaskan residents as potential Stay-behind Agents whose names are set out below. Bureau files were checked and it was ascertained Anchorage was in possession of all pertinent information relative to these persons and Anchorage was so advised by Bulet 11-7-50. By radiogram 12-6-50 Anchorage recommended these persons as potential Stay-behind Agents and requested authority to approach them in this regard.

A thumbnail sketch of these individuals follows:

Frank B. Moore

Alaskan resident since 1939, licensed hunting guide, presently employed as carpenter, approximately 45 years of age, personally known to Anchorage office personnel. Nothing derogatory.

[redacted] has covered much of Alaska, owns plane, [redacted] nothing derogatory.

Dr. Howard G. Romig

Native born Alaskan, presently a M.D. in Anchorage, licensed guide, owns plane, has temperament and desire of outdoor life, personally known to Special Agents of Anchorage office, has been contacted for number of years by Special Agents on official business, nothing derogatory.

Attachment

WTB:bjc

RECORDED - 21

DEC 15 1950

21

b6
b7cb6
b7c

W3

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] Has been in territory for number of years. has worked as [redacted]

[redacted] Has given information to Anchorage office concerning individuals believed disloyal to U.S. No derogatory information.

Antonio Polet

b6
b7C

Resident of Nome. Was born in Carolew, Italy in 1881, came to Nome during gold rush about 1900. operates native craft shop. [redacted]

[redacted] well acquainted with Alaska and people of Seward Peninsula. No derogatory information.

Sam Romack

Resident of Seward. Born Sinun Benich Skojo at Dalmatia, 1892, naturalized at Seward, Alaska, in 1939. Has been in Alaska approximately 30 years, was reportedly bootlegger during prohibition days and allegations received, unverified and uncorroborated, that he was pro-Nazi during World War II. Has worked as fisherman, Bristol Bay area during season for about 25 years, now operates bar and hotel of which he is owner. Has aided the Anchorage office in investigations.

Joe Danich

Born in Yugoslavia, approximately 52 years ago. Came to USA at age of 2. Vocation includes coal miner, coal mine operator, proprietor of bar and now owns only hotel and bar in Girdwood area, as well as a gold mine in that area, is well acquainted with that area and persons residing there. Has been arrested and is identical with FBI #5113769, has been contacted by Special Agents in past and given full cooperation particularly in criminal matters in and around Anchorage. The arrest referred to was for vagrancy at Valdez, Alaska, on July 5, 1938. He paid a fine of \$100.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended, subject to your approval, that the attached radiogram be sent to Anchorage authorizing that office to contact the above individuals in order to attempt their development as Stay-behind Agents.

OK
1/1
AS
sh

RECORDED - 112

65-59264-35

DECEMBER 15, 1950

RADIOGRAM

(u) URGENT

SAC, ANCHORAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPOSED PLAN INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE ALASKA. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY
FUTURE RADIOGRAMS INSTANT MATTER USE CODE WORDS QUOTE STAGE UNQUOTE
FOR STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM AND QUOTE ESCAPE AND EVASION UNQUOTE
FOR ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM.

HOOVER

WTB: JVS

Classified by SP12-BJS/SC
Declassify on: OADR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-9-04 BY SP12-BJS/SC

34225/

100-
JVS
CO. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(# 160114) (u)

(u) 6121-0138
enc 94

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BJS/SC
ON 4-19-2000

00-1164

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-9-04 BY SP12-BJS/SC~~

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Dec 15 7 36 PM '50
RECEIVED
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Sent via Radio

(12-15-50)
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9:07 PM Per 2H

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: December 13, 1950

FROM : G. E. HENRICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

Henrich

ch

Due to the large volume of radiogram traffic between the Anchorage office and the Bureau in connection with instant matter, it is suggested that the following code words be utilized to save time in coding and decoding:

CODE WORDSSTAGE

for Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

ESCAPE AND EVASION

for Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion
(Escape and Evasion Program)

b6
b7c

[redacted] of the Code Room, after checking with [redacted] of the Records Section, has advised that the code words are satisfactory and have not been previously used.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended, effective immediately, that the above code words be used in radiogram traffic between Anchorage and the Bureau. If the code words are approved, appropriate instructions will go forward to Anchorage in the next radiogram prepared in instant matter.

If you approve, it is recommended this memorandum be brought to the attention of the Communications Section.

lun
HANDLED BY
TOP DESK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BTB/180

56 DEC 13 1950

RECORDED - 112

DEC 16 1950

15-159264-35
5-103

WOB

SAC, Anchorage

December 14, 1950

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
Stay-behind Agent Program
Escape and Evasion Program

Referral/Consult

There are transmitted herewith two photostatic copies of a report marked "confidential" which was received at the Bureau on December 1, 1950, [redacted] together with one copy of their letter of transmittal.

The above is submitted for your information in connection with the captioned matter.

Enclosures

65-59264 - 36

WTB:VJM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 31-04-85 BY SP2 BTJ/KS

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____

DEC 14 1950
COMM-FI

59 DEC 22 1950

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C. E. Hennrich

DATE: December 14, 1950

FROM : W. T. Baker

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAMALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BTJ/SKTolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

As you know, the Anchorage office is actively engaged in developing Stay-behind Agents as well as informants and contacts to be used in connection with the captioned programs.

Thus far approximately 100 names of potential Stay-behind Agents have been submitted by the Anchorage office in this regard.

Referral/Consult

In order to assist with the administration and supervision of instant project, it is proposed that a record be maintained in SA W. T. Baker's office of these potential agents and contacts. This record would be in the nature of an assignment card box, broken down into three sections, with 3 x 5 index cards filed alphabetically. The cards would merely reflect the identity of the individual agent, informant or contact involved, together with corresponding case file number. One section would contain a list, alphabetically filed, of potential Stay-behind Agents; one section would contain a list of the contacts or informants

the third section would contain a list of the developed and approved selected Stay-behind Agents. There would be no duplicate cards and the clerk assigned to this office would handle the clerical work involved.

Referral/Consult

It is believed that the above procedure is desirable in order to have at hand ready reference material on this project. It would also be beneficial from a statistical standpoint and could be used as a basis for answering inquiries of Bureau officials at headquarters as to the exact and present status of the programs.

Permission is also requested to maintain tickler copies of all Bureau correspondence in this matter for an indefinite period. On July 7, 1950, a letter of instructions was directed to Anchorage. It took approximately one month

RECORDED - 98

DEC 21 1950

WTB:bjc

MAR 8 1951

1-64

65-59264

to locate the yellow out going. Another letter of instructions was forwarded to Anchorage under date of October 24, 1950. The yellow copy of this outgoing communication has been on locate since about October 27, 1950, and is still on locate.


RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the above proposed and suggested action be approved.


Jaguel

OK
11/15

OK



~~SECRET~~



4-42a

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECODED COPY

(S)(C)(U)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(12-8-50)

NR 082100


10:30 PM

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR

URGENT

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. RE ANCHORAGE
 RADIOGRAM 5TH INSTANT. ADDITIONAL NAMES OF POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND
 AGENTS ARE:



Names
 Carded.
 Awaiting
 reports
 WS.

Correction

portion of

Comparison

ON ALL POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS RECEIVED TO DATE. PRELIMINARY
 INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED, DATA IN FILES ANCHORAGE OFFICE
 BEING COMPILED AND REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE
 DATE.

RECEIVED:
CORRECTED:

12-9-50
12-9-50

2:23 AM
7:03 PM

MW

Classified by ~~SP12 BT/LS C~~
 Declassify on: ~~CRUK 842251~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BIS/m
 ON 4-19-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 22

EX-100

15-59264-38
 (S)(C)(U)

5-WS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

65-59264

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
 outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
 order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

50 JAN 3 1951

(S)(C)(U)

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

DATE: 12-5-50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Referral/Consult

Rebulet dated 11-27-50.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] fully concerning the program of this office in connection with the Stay-Behind Agent Program and offered our aid in developing agents for the Escape and Evasion Program. He was also advised that this office would conduct any investigations of proposed contacts [redacted] at any time.

Referral/Consult

It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to contact [redacted]

[redacted] in order that the implementation of this program can go forward.

Referral/Consult

JHW:MR
62-227

RECORDED: 22

165-59264-39
DEC 1950

50 JAN 3 1951

1951

ON

S-31-94

34225

J-Baker

~~SECRET~~

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECODED COPY (S)(C)(u)

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(12-11-50) NR 111950

5:19 PM

(u) DIRECTOR

URGENT

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA, STAY - BEHIND
 AGENTS. RE ANCHORAGE LETTER (DECEMBER 5) AND ANCHORAGE RADIOGRAM
 (DECEMBER 8) ADDITIONAL NAMES POTENTIAL STAY - BEHIND AGENTS ARE

b6
b7C

DOCTOR JOSEPH F. SHELTON,
 PRESENTLY CONCENTRATING ON OBTAINING POTENTIAL COVERAGE
 IN STRATEGIC SECTIONS WHERE SAME IS WEAK, NAMELY, MCGRATH, GALENA
 AND NOME AS WELL AS COMPILING AND SUBMITTING PRELIMINARY INVE-
 STIGATIVE REPORTS ON POTENTIAL AGENTS ALREADY SELECTED.

RECEIVED: (12-11-50) 5:38 PM

GLA

UNDERLINED PORTIONS OBTAINED FROM GARBLES, AWAITING CORRECTION.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

Classified by SP12 BTJ/SC
 Declassify on: OADR 5/22/51

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/M
 ON 4-19-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 22
 INDEXED - 22

DEC 28 1950

EX-100

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
 outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
 order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (S)(C)(u)

~~SECRET~~

(50 JAN 3 1951)

RECEIVED BY SP3-BTS/SM

4-19-2000

00-1164

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECODED COPY

~~SECRET~~

Tolson ☒
 Ladd ☒
 Clegg ☒
 Glavin ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tracy ☒
 Harbo ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Nease ☒
 Gandy ☒

FROM ANCHORAGE

12-6-50

NR 060600

1:05 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

Classified by SP128/BS/80

Declassify on: OADR 3/22/51

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA. REFERENCE YOUR RADIOGRAM (DECEMBER 5) LAST. ADDITIONAL NAMES OF POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS ARE:



SPECIAL

AGENTS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO MATTER: [REDACTED] AND EDWARD A. PLEVACK. IN ADDITION, FOLLOWING AGENTS WORKING PART TIME IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER ASSIGNMENTS: [REDACTED]

FIND THAT MAN DAYS SPENT ON MATTER (NOVEMBER) 17 DAYS PLUS PART OF 5 OTHER DAYS WORKED BY AGENTS ON AIR TRIPS AS THIS REGULAR WORK. IN ADDITION I HAVE WORKED ON MATTER PART OF EVERY DAY SINCE MY RETURN TO ANCHORAGE (NOVEMBER 9) LAST. ALL AGENTS THOROUGHLY BRIEFED ON THIS MATTER AND DIRECTED TO GIVE IT TOP PRIORITY. THE 7 NAMES PROPOSED BEFORE RECOMMENDED TO BE UTILIZED IF NO ADVERSE DATA DEVELOPED IN COURSE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED TO CONTACT THESE 7 AND ALL NAMES HEREIN IF BUREAU RECORDS CHECK INDICATES NO ADVERSE INFORMATION. DETAILED LETTER SUBMITTED TODAY TOUCHING ALL ASPECTS OF PROGRAM INCLUDING FACT [REDACTED] ON EITHER PHASE OF SAME. EVENT AUTHORITY TO CONTACT POTENTIAL AGENTS GRANTED AND PROGRAM

COPIES [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

52 JAN 8 1951

12-8-50

what about this?

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(DECODED COPY) (S) (C) (u)

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO

ACCELERATED, ADDITIONAL AGENT PERSONNEL WILL BE NEEDED INASMUCH AS THIS PHASE WILL ENTAIL MUCH TRAVEL, INCLUDING BUSH AND BACK COUNTRY TRAVEL IN CASE OF TRAPPERS, HUNTERS, MINERS, ETC. HOLGER LARSEN, HEAD OF FISH AND WILD LIFE SERVICE, ANCHORAGE, HAS OFFERED TO FLY SPECIAL AGENTS TO ANY POINT NECESSARY TO CONTACT POTENTIAL AGENTS. (S) (C) (u) WILL BE AVAILABLE AFTER PRESENT MOOSE SEASON ON (10TH) INSTANT. THIS WOULD BE IN CONNECTION WITH REGULAR TRAPPERS PATROL AND NO ADDED BURDEN ON FW SERVICE. LARSON ABOVE REPROACH AND DESIRES TO PARTICIPATE IN PROGRAM IN ANY CAPACITY.

RECEIVED:

(12-6-50) (S) (C) (u)

1:55 PM

MET

cc: Mr. Baker

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (S) (C) (u)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : J. M. Ladd

DATE: December 11, 1950

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA
IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-9-94 BY SP2 BTJ/50

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

PURPOSE:

Referral/Consult

To inform you that SAC John Williams of the Anchorage office has advised that

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

As you are aware, the Bureau as a result of decisions reached at IIC meetings is committed, to develop instant programs in Alaska.

By radiogram the Anchorage office on December 6, advised By letter dated December 5, 1950, which has just been received at the Bureau, the Anchorage office has advised as follows:

Referral/Consult

WTB:bjc

RECORDED - 23

EX-73

JAN 2 1951

165-59264-42

52 JAN 8 1951

5-WS

Referral/Consult

*For your information, it has been ascertained
through*

Referral/Consult

It has been ascertained through

Referral/Consult

*The SAC at Anchorage has suggested that the
Bureau may desire to contact*

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

*It is recommended that the above matters be brought
to the attention of*

FBI

AIR MAIL

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP16

RECORDED - 23

65-59864-43

Reur radiogram dated December 6, 1950,
which indicated that [redacted]

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE

7
8
9

RECEIVED AT READING ROOM

U.S. DEC 18 5 25 PM '50

RECEIVED
F B I
DEPT. OF JUSTICE

ESS:lw

AN 8


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult



You will be kept advised of any developments in connection with these programs coming to the attention of the Bureau, and you should continue to keep the Bureau advised of such developments in Alaska.



Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: December 8, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION;
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAMPURPOSE:

To advise you that with respect to the Stay-Behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs, [redacted]

Referral/Consult

BACKGROUND:

At the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference meetings on July 6, 1950, and September 27, 1950, it was agreed that FBI [redacted] should set up and provide for the operation of the Stay-Behind and Escape and Evasion Programs in Alaska. Appropriate instructions were forwarded to the Special Agent in Charge at Anchorage by the Bureau immediately following the respective meetings. SAC John Williams at Anchorage immediately [redacted]

[redacted] were studied and analyzed at the Bureau conferences were held with [redacted] and as a result, [redacted]

The Bureau has agreed in principle [redacted] were furnished to Anchorage.

By radiogram dated December 6, 1950, the Anchorage Office advised of the progress being made in the Bureau's part in these programs and included this statement: "Detailed letter submitted today (12-6-50) touching all aspects of program, including fact [redacted] With respect to this you inquired: 'What about this?'"

Referral/Consult

The above-mentioned letter has not as yet been received from the Anchorage Office, therefore, it is not possible to completely answer your inquiry concerning this matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-31-94 BY SP12 BT

WTB:jus

COPIES DESTROYED

R 584 NOV 21 1960

JAN 2 1951

6

165-59264-431
JAN 2 1951
WB

165-59264-431
12/15/50 E.S.S.

Referral/Consult

that For your information, however, this is to advise

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

ACTION:

None. For your information.

Referral/Consult

You must press on this because even if we fulfill our responsibility [Redacted] the programs & responsibilities are so interlocked that in the

even if it means the whole project might be broken down.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 85

Page 12 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 13 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 14 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 15 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 18 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 23 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 25 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 26 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 55 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 78 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 79 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 80 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 81 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 82 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 83 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 84 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 85 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 86 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 87 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 90 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 91 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 100 ~ Duplicate
Page 101 ~ Duplicate
Page 108 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 109 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 110 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 111 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 112 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 113 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 114 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 115 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 116 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 117 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 118 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 119 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 120 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 121 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 122 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 123 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 138 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 139 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 140 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 141 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 142 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 143 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 172 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 173 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 174 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 175 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 176 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 177 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 178 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 179 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 186 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 187 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 188 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 189 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 190 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 191 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 192 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 193 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 194 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 195 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 196 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 197 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 198 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 201 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 208 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 209 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 210 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 211 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 212 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 239 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 240 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 241 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 242 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 243 ~ Referral/Consult
Page 256 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 257 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 258 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 259 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 260 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 261 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 262 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 273 ~ Referral/Consult

FBI File 65-HQ-59264
FBI Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference - Section 2

SAC, Anchorage

1/19/51


Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND-AGENT PROGRAM)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Referral/Consult

For your confidential info, there are transmitted
herewith two photostatic copies of a



RECORDED - 81
65-59264 - 44
Enc. 2
WTB: eas
W

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-94 BY SP-12 BTJ/STP

EX-52

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

per

64
FEB 5 1951

COMM - FBI

JAN 20 1951
MAILED 19

JAN 19 3 46 PM '51
RECEIVED
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

AB

CAT

W3

REC-113 (12/15/50) (u)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont ☒
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

12-16-50

NR 162200

8:20 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELL. GOV. RECON. IN ALASKA




RECEIVED:

12-16-50

8:44 PM

MW

Referral/Consult



~~6-21-94~~
~~SP3-BTS/JM~~
~~342251~~

SP3-BTS/JM
6-14-2000 00-1164

RECORDED - 101

65-59261-45

EX-113

5-WB

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

52 JAN 9 1951 (u)

65-59264

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (12-22-50) NR 222100

7:36 P.M.

DIRECTOR URGENT

Referral/Consult

STAGE. ACCELERATED PRELIMINARY PROCESSING OF RECOMMENDED
 POTENTIAL AGENTS GOING FORWARD.

RECEIVED 12-22-50 8:05 P.M. LL

Referral/Consult

6-14-2000 SP3-BTJ/SM

00-1164

RECORDED - 94

EX-116

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

~~SECRET~~

DATE: December 18, 1950

FROM : D. M. Ladd *pl*SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION;
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM

Referral/Consult

Tolson	
Ladd	
Clegg	
Glavin	
Nichols	
Rosen	
Tracy	
Harbo	
Belmont	
Mohr	
Tele. Room	
Nease	
Gandy	

Re my memorandum to you dated December 8, 1950, which advised that information has been received from Alaska that

memorandum stated that

Reference

Supervisor Edward S. Sanders on December 12, 1950, met with the following individuals for a discussion of the programs in question: Colonel Perry, G-2, U.S. Army, Alaska; Lieutenant Colonel Easton, U.S.A.F., Assistant Director of Plans and Operations, Alaska Command; Lieutenant Colonel Bird, U.S.A.F. Director for Plans for Alaska Air Command; Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, U.S.A.F. Operations Headquarters, U.S.A.F.; Major Giblo, Directorate of Intelligence, Headquarters U.S.A.F., (Escape and Evasion); Major Joseph Cappucci, Headquarters OSI; Mr. Gilbert Levy, Counter-intelligence, OSI Headquarters.

Referral/Consult

A thorough discussion of the Escape and Evasion Program and the Stay-Behind Agent Program, which have been prepared by [redacted] FBI Headquarters and coordinated at Air Force Headquarters, revealed that while the basic plans have been agreed upon at Washington, they were not completely handled in Alaska inasmuch as Lieutenant Colonel Easton from the Alaska Air Command was not familiar with these plans. The Alaska Command is the over-all Command headed by an Air Force Officer and has under it in Alaska, an Air Command, an Army Command, and a Navy Command. Everyone agreed that the two basic plans prepared by [redacted] the Bureau are sound, and the only problem was the implementation of these plans.

Colonel Easton, Assistant Director of Plans and Operations for the Alaska Command, suggested, and the others agreed, that the Alaska Command instruct the Alaska Air

RECORDED - 23

INDEXED - 23

JAN 11 1951

ESS:pjb

JAN 6 1951

FIVE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY 5022
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X


6/22/80
Declassify by 6/22/80
Declassify by 6/22/80

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

Command to prepare plans for escape and evasion in Alaska and stay-behind Agents in Alaska. The plans which have been prepared by [] the Bureau could then immediately be put into effect and included in the over-all military plans for Alaska. Supervisor Sanders was advised that the order should reach the Alaska Air Command from the Alaska Command within a week and that these plans would then be in the proper channels and approved by everyone concerned. In other words, the Commanding General, Alaska Command, will instruct the Alaska Air Command to prepare the plans (which are already prepared) and supervise the implementation of these plans for him.

Referral/Consult



There was some discussion concerning []



[] This would appear to be of no concern to the Bureau inasmuch as it does not affect operations within Alaska. ~~S~~ - (U)


Referral/Consult



REMAINS CLASSIFIED PER
OCA TELEPHONE CALL
SP7 CC 3/25/98

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~



Supervisor Sanders has been advised



RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

The foregoing is furnished for your information.
It is recommended that the attached air mail letter be forwarded to the SAC, Anchorage advising him of the results of instant conference.

*Recd
12-18-50
JH*

*All I want is to get the
phon interaction & less
words.*

K.

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, ANCHORAGE

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

DATE: 1-8-51

Personal and Confidential

Rebulet 1-2-51.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12878/EC
ON 6-21-94

342251

With reference to paragraphs 6 and 7 of this letter, every effort is being made to obtain the type of potential stay-behind agent suggested by the Bureau for urban areas. However, it is pointed out that the only settlement in Alaska encompassed in this program which may be referred to as an urban area would be Anchorage. It has a white population of approximately twenty thousand people. The other areas to be covered have populations from less than 100 persons to only a few thousand. Every effort is being made and will continue to develop persons in the category of unskilled or semi-skilled workmen engaged in occupations which possibly would be of the least interest to an invading force.

With reference to the obtaining of full names and descriptions of potential stay-behind agents for inclusion in the first report submitted to aid the Bureau in searching their names, we are attempting in every instance to get sufficient data to aid the Bureau in this project. In some cases it has been difficult to obtain such information while still obtaining the discretion necessary to keep this project secret. However, upon authority of the Bureau to interview these individuals, full names, date and place of birth and description has been and will continue to be obtained.

With reference to the last paragraph of Bureau letter, all seven individuals on whom authority had been granted by the Bureau to interview have been interviewed or eliminated. Five of these individuals have consented to participate as stay-behind agents. The other two, ANTONIO POLET and SAM ROMACK, have been eliminated because of information received from confidential informants.

RECORDED - 13

INDEXED - 13

65-57261-48

Reports have been submitted on all of these individuals except [redacted] Reports on these individuals are being prepared and will be submitted immediately.

JEX:MR
63-298

COPIES DESTROYED

Referral/Consult

60 MAR 14 1951

R 584 R07 21 1950

b6
b7C

AN File 65-293

By way of recapitulation on the action taken by this office with reference to stage, approximately 65 reports on potential stay-behind agents have been submitted to the Bureau with recommendations that authority be granted to interview them. Five individuals have been interviewed upon the authority of the Bureau and all have agreed to participate. Authority was granted to interview two more, but these were not interviewed inasmuch as information came to our attention which eliminated them as potential agents. Preliminary reports on additional individuals are being compiled and will be submitted at the earliest possible moment.

These projects are receiving priority in this division and continued diligent attention will be given them.

SAC, Anchorage

1/8/51

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT
PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

710
DECODED - 13

65-59264-49
Reur radiogram 12/29/50 informing that

For your confidential info.


Referral/Consult

WTB: eas

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-94 BY SP12 BT/SC

34225/
BT/SC

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____



6448/9
52 JAN 13 1951

65-59264-

Tolson ☒
 Ladd ☒
 Clegg ☒
 Glavin ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tracy ☒
 Harbo ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Nease ☒
 Gandy ☒

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (e) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(12-29-50) (e) (u) NR 292045

6:14 P.M.

DIRECTOR

Referral/Consult

G-14-2000 SP3-BTJ/JM

URGENT

STAGE.

REPORTS REGARDING FORTY POTENTIAL AGENTS HAVE
 BEEN DISPATCHED TO BUREAU. OTHERS WILL BE SUBMITTED AS QUICKLY
 AS SAME CAN BE TYPED.

RECEIVED

(12-29-50) (e) (u)

6:19 P.M.

LL

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 13

(JAN 11 1951)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
 outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
 order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65-59264

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

CP
 DECODED COPY (e) (u)

760 FROM ANCHORAGE (1-6-51) (e) (u) NR 070115 10:17 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. REBULET (SECOND) INSTANT LAST PARAGRAPH. FRANK B. MOORE, [REDACTED] HOWARD G. ROMIG, AND JOE DANICH HAVE AGREED TO ACT AS STAY BEHIND AGENTS. ANTONIO POLET AND SAM RICHACK NO LONGER BEING CONSIDERED BECAUSE OF STATEMENTS MADE RE THEM BY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT(S). REPORTS RE THESE SIX HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED. [REDACTED] HAS BEEN UNAVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW BUT SAME BEING HANDLED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. REPORT SUBMITTED ON FIFTY OTHERS IN WHICH BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED FOR INTERVIEWS. OTHER REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED AS SOON AS SAME CAN BE TYPED. LETTER RE [REDACTED] AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWS.

RECEIVED (1-6-51) (e) (u)

10:33 PM LH

Referral/Consult

b6
 b7C

RECEIVED FBI SP3-BTT/1M
 6-14-2000

00-1164

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

RECORDED - 101

INDEXED - 101

65-57264-50
 (e) (u)
 5-WB

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (e) (u)

SAC, Anchorage

January 11, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

34225
2194 SP12 BTSL9

I desire again to call to your attention the absolute necessity of utilizing extreme caution, discretion and sound judgment in the handling of this Program.

It is imperative that you impress all Bureau personnel at Anchorage with the security measures which must be taken in developing instant Program.

A review of the reports recently submitted by Anchorage on individual potential Stay-behind Agents in some instances reflect statements to the effect that identified reliable and confidential informants "have recommended _____ as a potential Stay-behind Agent under this Program," or "_____ has been interviewed concerning instant Program."

Referral/Consult

It is recognized that the wording of the reports in this connection may merely reflect the Special Agent's general description of matters discussed with the individual potential Stay-behind Agent. It is further recognized that it has been necessary for you to personally discuss instant matter with reliable and well-established contacts of the Anchorage Office in order to identify and determine the reliability and background of various individuals being considered under this Program. Under no circumstances, however, should it become general knowledge in Alaska that the Bureau _____ are engaged in the development of this Program. Individual Stay-behind Agents should not know the identity of one another. When Special Agents are interviewing potential contacts in this regard, no indication should be given that an "espionage net" or "Stay-behind Agent Program" is being developed in Alaska.

RECORDED - 99

In all contacts with potential Stay-behind Agents, the matter of security should be stressed to the interviewing Special Agents. The individual should be cautioned not to discuss the subject matter with other persons. It might be pointed out that an indiscreet remark on the part of a potential Stay-behind Agent might very possibly, in the event of invasion, endanger his own life.

WTB:EHW

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

JAN 20 1951

117

Referral/Consult

It is suggested that you may also desire to discuss the security features of this Program with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] with the thought in mind of discreetly bringing this matter to his attention so that the personnel under his jurisdiction may become aware of the importance of the security measures involved in instant matter.

Advise the Bureau what action you have taken in order to insure that captioned Program in Alaska will be handled on a confidential and secure basis.

- 2 -

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: 1-12-51

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

6/22/94
 Classified by SP12 BT/SC
 Declassify on: OADR 3/22/51

Reference is made to Anchorage letter dated 1/8/51 and specifically to Page 3, Paragraph 3 thereof.

On 1/11/51 a conference was held in the Office of Operations, Alaska Command at Fort Richardson. Those present were:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

Col. L. R. TORRANT
 U. S. Army
 Director of Plans and Operations
 Alaska Command

Lt. Col. H. Brooks Wilson
 U. S. Air Force
 Asst. Director of Plans and Operations
 Alaska Command

Lt. Col. C. W. Bird
 U. S. Air Force
 Alaskan Air Command
 Attached to Office of Director of Plans and Operations

CLASSIFIED BY SP7CE
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
 PR 96-2 para's 345 REMAIN
 CLASSIFIED PER OGA TEL CUI.

Captain Minor Heine
 U. S. Navy
 Director of Intelligence
 Alaska Command

Lt. Col. Edwin A. Hartley
 Director
 Office of Special Investigations in Alaska

John H. Williams
 Special Agent in Charge
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Anchorage, Alaska

COPIES DESTROYED
 R584 NOV 21 1960

COPIES DESTROYED

02-110000-20
 INDEXED - 20
 EX - 36

165-51-52
 MAY 27 1961
 2-110000-20

9 MAY 1961
 62-227

Referral/Consult

5-WB

AN File 65-296
62-227

~~SECRET~~
Referral/Consult



The Bureau will be kept advised in this regard.

As was pointed out in Anchorage teletype of January 10, 1951, 101 persons have been considered by this office as potential stay-behind agents. To date 14 have been eliminated because of information received from confidential informants. Closing reports have been submitted on these 14 stating that they were no longer being considered. Five persons have been interviewed upon the authority of the Bureau and all have consented to participate. Preliminary reports have been submitted on the remaining 32 recommending that Bureau authority be granted to interview them.

SAC, Anchorage

January 15, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

It is noted in reports being submitted by the Anchorage Office on potential Stay-behind Agents, that Bureau permission is being requested to interview these individuals and that requests of this nature are being included on the administrative page of the individual report submitted. Due to the urgency of this program and in order to save stenographic and typing time, the Bureau has no objection to your continuing this practice instead of directing a cover letter to the Bureau setting out the specific request. In all other types of cases, of course, the Anchorage Office should be guided by Part I, Section 53 (d) of the FBI Handbook in setting out leads for the Bureau.

65-59264

WTB:dar:iff

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-19-94 BY SP8 BTB/SP8

JAN 16 11 02 AM '51
RECEIVED
FBI
DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECORDED - 9

65-59264-58
JAN 19 1951
80
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

EX-123

REC'D-1072012 OFFICE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

51 JAN 22 1951
COMM - FBI
JAN 16 1951
MAILED 20

WB

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

1949

1950

STOP SPECIAL

For STOP DESK ✓

For NUMBERING

For RECORDING 22

ROUTE TO

Mr. W

Room: 4245

Mr.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-94 BY SP-12 B. T. S. / 80

22

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (e) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(1-11-51) (e) (u)

NR 110330

2:14 P.M.

G. I. R. -8

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. TO DATE 101 PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THIS OFFICE. TO DATE 14 HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED BECAUSE OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. CLOSING REPORTS INDICATING THESE NO LONGER BEING CONSIDERED HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED. 5 PERSONS RECOMMENDED HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY AND ALL AGREED TO PARTICIPATE. CLOSING REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED ON THESE 5. PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED ON REMAINING 82 RECOMMENDING BUREAU AUTHORITY BE GIVEN TO INTERVIEW THEM.

RECEIVED

(1-11-51) (e) (u)

2:40 P.M.

GW

6-14-2000

SP3-BTS/m

00-1164

RECORDED - 40

65-59264-54
 (e) (u) 5-11-51

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (e) (u)

59 JAN 26 1951

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

~~SECRET~~

DATE: January 22, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF AN INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

 DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTG/SC
 ON 6-21-94
342257

Reference is made to Anchorage letter dated January 12, 1951.

 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

 CLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTG/SC
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
 For det letter dtd 7/20/99

RECORDED - 50

JAN 25 1951 Referral/Consult

65-298

cc: 27-227

 COPIES DESTROYED
 R 584 NOV 21 1950
~~SECRET~~

S-Baird

Referral/Consult

Anchorage File 65-298

This office is continuing to give attention to the recruitment of potential stay-behind agents and interviews with those authorized by the Bureau and reports on the same will be forwarded at the earliest possible time.

Referral/Consult

As has been done in the past, this office will continue to hold conferences with [redacted] and keep him abreast of all developments in the SBA Program.

It is noted that

ever, in line with the instructions received from the Bureau in its letter dated Nov. 29, 1950, (Bu file 65-59264), Paragraph 1, Page 6, no reports have been given to him. Referral

Referral/Consult

This matter will continue to receive diligent attention and the Bureau will be kept advised of all developments.

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: 1-17-51

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (Stay-Behind Agent Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-21-94 BY SP12 B.78180

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~
 JAN 20 1951

Rebulet 1-11-51.

Concerning Paragraph 3 of that letter, the wording of certain reports in these cases indicating that a confidential informant has recommended a certain person as a potential stay-behind agent represents the Special Agent's general description of the discussion had with the confidential informant. At no time are the Special Agents working on these matters in conversations with confidential informants or with the potential agents themselves telling them the exact nature of the program. The confidential informants merely know that we are interested in certain individuals in the Territory with particular reference to their loyalty, character, intentions if war comes and ability to participate in certain patriotic activities. In no instant has a confidential informant been told the exact nature of this program.

In discussing this matter with a potential agent after authority has been granted by the Bureau, he is first impressed with the confidential nature of the interview. He is then asked what his intentions are if war comes in order that our subsequent suggestions will have no undue influence upon him. He is then given enough information to allow him to make up his mind as to his participation. The identity of no other potential stay-behind agent is discussed with him. At the end of the interview the absolute security of this matter is again impressed upon him.

Concerning the penultimate paragraph in referenced letter, the security features of this program have been discussed with [redacted] on numerous occasions. He has advised me [redacted]

However, continued attention will be given the security of the program through [redacted] and by the Special Agents of this office.

Referral/Consult

65-298
 JHW:MR

RECORDED - 48

65-59264- 56
 JAN 26 1951

53 JAN 30 1950

4/6

5-301114

65-59264-

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF AN INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

DATE: February 1, 1951

Rebulet January 30, 1951, wherein the Bureau directed that the names of additional prospective agents under consideration be submitted by letter.

In addition to the names which have already been submitted, the following have been proposed and [redacted] are being made concerning them. Preliminary reports concerning these prospective agents will be submitted at the earliest possible time.

b2
b7E

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 342251
 DATE 6-21-94 BY SP12 BT/SC

As the Bureau knows, in addition to those new prospective agents listed above, this office presently has a number concerning whom preliminary reports have been submitted, Bureau authority to interview has been received and they are presently assigned for interview. The results of these interviews and the recommendations of the Anchorage Office will be submitted to the Bureau at the earliest possible time.

JHW:MMA
 65-298

RECORDED - 104
 INDEXED - 104

165-59264-57
 FEB 6 1951
 8

5 FEB 9 1951

S-Baird

listed
in 5134
Central file
US

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

CONFIDENTIAL

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

January 29, 1951

DEFERRED

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, ANCHORAGE

(CIPHER PAD CODE)

STAGE. REURAD JANUARY ELEVEN LAST. ACTION TAKEN BY BUREAU ALL ANCHORAGE
REPORTS SUBMITTED ON INDIVIDUAL SEA-S RECEIVED TO DATE. ADVISE BY RADIO-
GRAM NUMBER AND IDENTITIES INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED WHO HAVE AGREED TO ACT
AND ARE RECOMMENDED BY YOU. SUBMIT BY LETTER NAMES ADDITIONAL PROSPECTIVE
SEA-S UNDER CONSIDERATION. TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS MENTIONED
RECENT ANCHORAGE COMMUNICATIONS BEING DISCUSSED [REDACTED] AND YOU WILL BE
NOTIFIED RESULTS PROMPTLY. EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY ONE NEXT AND EVERY THURSDAY
THEREAFTER SUPAD SUMMARY PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENTS INSTANT PROGRAM.

HOOVER

Referral/Consult

WFB:VJM

65-59264

Classified by SP3-BTJ/m

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/m
ON 6-14-2000

00-1164

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

RECORDED - 20

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 31 1951

FEB 12 1951

SENT VIA

Bureau Radio

7 P M

Per

[Signature]

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (1-31-51) (u) NR 311810 4:23 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. REBURAD (JANUARY 30, 1951) (u) FOLLOWING PERSONS HAVE AGREED TO ACT AS STAYBEHIND AGENTS, HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. JOE DANICH, GIRDWOOD, ALASKA, [REDACTED]

FRANK BERTON MOORE, ANCHORAGE, [REDACTED]

HOWARD GLENMORE ROMIG, ANCHORAGE, [REDACTED]

DOCTOR JOSEPH HARRISON SHELTON, [REDACTED]

(Corrected) SEWARD, [REDACTED] FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED, AGREED TO ACT AS AGENTS AND RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED JANUARY 31 (u)

[REDACTED] LETTER SETTING OUT NAMES OF ADDITIONAL PROSPECTIVE AGENTS BEING SUBMITTED. ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS BEING MADE DAILY AND CLOSING REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

RECEIVED

(1-31-51) (u)

4:48 PM LH

SP3-BTS/SM

6-14-2000

00-1764

RECORDED - 20

INDEXED - 20

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

6 FEB 12 1951

(u)

(u)

b6
b7c

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: February 7, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Reference is made to Anchorage letters dated 12/5/50 and 1/12/51 and particularly to Page 4 of the latter reference.

Referral/Consult



In attempting to develop stay-behind agents, emphasis will be placed on getting them in the vicinities of strategic areas.

It is noted in investigating and interviewing the potential agents that many of them live in the back country where they are not accessible by any means other than a bush plane on skis in the wintertime and bush plane on pontoons in the summertime or afoot. This has materially slowed down the overall program. However, every effort is being made to contact those individuals concerning whom the Bureau has authorized an interview.

When this program has developed sufficiently to institute the training phase as much time as possible should be given this office to contact the various persons to attend particular classes inasmuch as many of them will have to be sought out individually, and the same will consume a considerable amount of time.

65-298
JHEJ:vf

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/SC
ON 6-21-94 342251

RECORDED - 48

165-59264-60
FEB 10 1951

5-13-1-113

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Harbo *PH*
 FROM : Mr. Bowles *AB*
 SUBJECT: The Steky II
 miniature camera
 Photographic Research
Sta/e

DATE: January 25, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-21-94 BY SP12BTP/SC

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to my memorandum dated December 8, 1950, setting forth details concerning the Steky II camera and suggesting certain uses for this camera. An addendum was added to this memorandum on December 13, 1950, by Mr. C. E. Hennrich of the Security Investigative Division in which it was suggested that consideration be given to the use of this camera in the Bureau's Alaska Stay-Behind the Agents Program. It was also suggested that the Bureau purchase two of these cameras and that the Laboratory conduct sufficient tests in order to express an opinion as to the use of this camera in subzero temperatures such as might be encountered in Alaska.

Two of the above cameras, including two telephoto lens, have been received. The camera has been tested at subzero temperatures and has been found to operate satisfactorily at temperatures ranging down to 20 degrees below zero. On the basis of these tests, it is not believed that any difficulty should be encountered in the use of the Steky II camera at low temperatures.

The two cameras referred to above have been turned over to the Photographic Laboratory where they are available for assignment.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the results of the Laboratory tests made with the Steky II camera be furnished the Security Investigative Division for their information.

MDP
 mdp

80-687

RECORDED - 48

165-59264-61

FEB 18 1951
34*Jan 25*

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 80-687-17

SEVEN
 FIVE
 THREE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont
 FROM : C. E. Hennrich

DATE: February 6, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA
 IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-21-94 BY SP2 BT/SJS

PURPOSE

Referral/Consult

To recommend that [redacted]
 be informed of the results of tests made by the FBI Laboratory
 concerning the miniature camera, The Steky II, which camera
 is available commercially.

BACKGROUND

Referral/Consult

As you are aware, the training program for Stay-behind
 Agents is presently being prepared at the Bureau [redacted]

Referral/Consult

There are attached self-explanatory memoranda dated
 December 8, 1950 and January 25, 1951 from Mr. Bowles to Mr.
 Harbo reflecting results of tests made by the laboratory con-
 cerning the use of the miniature camera, The Steky II, espec-
 ially as relates to the use of this camera at low temperatures.

It is noted that The Steky II is available on the
 commercial market.

RECOMMENDATION

RECORDED - 48

165-59264-62

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that [redacted]

18 1951

tests made at the FBI laboratory reflect that instant camera
 can be operated at temperatures ranging down to twenty degrees
 below zero.

65-59264

Handled Sep
 Attachments
 WTB:LJB:mhf

Referral/Consult

UNR ORDERED COPY FILED IN

W3

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: February 13, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(65-59264) *Stay -*

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP12 BTB/SC*
ON *6-21-94*
342251

There is set out hereinafter a recapitulation of the Stay Behind Agent Program in this office, including information of an administrative nature, as well as data concerning agents who have been recommended and on whom closing reports have been submitted to the Bureau, together with certain problems encountered and the approach that is being made to this assignment.

Sanders

There is transmitted herewith

I. STAY BEHIND AGENTS

Referral/Consult

In considering individuals in the territory as potential Stay Behind Agents, accent has been placed on enlisting those who have as many of the following qualifications as could be found.

- 1 - Persons with good health, loyal to the United States and who intend to stay in the territory in case of war or invasion.
- 2 - Persons with an intimate knowledge of the territory or the locale in which they reside.
- 3 - Persons with a knowledge of short wave radios.
- 4 - Persons who own short wave radios and have "ham" licenses.
- 5 - Persons who are airplane pilots.
- 6 - Persons who own airplanes.
- 7 - Persons with the ability to survive in the back country of the territory of Alaska under the most severe conditions for protracted periods of time.

RECORDED - 48

INDEXED - 48

65-59264-63

Mar 16 1951

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

*Mem to Belmont
3-2-51*

JHW:MMA
65-298
Enclosure

50 APR 9 1951

5-6-51

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

- 8 - Persons who have had some experience in caching food, clothing, arms and ammunition, gasoline and other survival gear.
- 9 - Persons who have had experience mushing dog teams.
- 10 - Persons who have had experience with small boats and who know the waters of Cook Inlet, Prince William Sound and the coast of Alaska between Shelikof Strait and Prince Rupert.
- 11 - Persons who own or have access to cabins located in areas which necessarily will be utilized in this program.
- 12 - Persons who live in and around the strategic areas listed.
- 13 - Persons who live on and can observe the highways of Alaska.
- 14 - Persons who live on and can observe the railroad.
- 15 - Persons who can assist in the operation and maintenance of a "life and supply line".

II. NUMBER OF STAY BEHIND AGENTS

As has been noted heretofore in correspondence with the Bureau, it is impossible to set a number of Stay Behind Agents who would be adequate in giving ample and comprehensive intelligence coverage during an invasion or occupation. However, the project of obtaining Stay Behind Agents will be continued until the Bureau is satisfied that the strategic areas and all items referred to in I above appear to be sufficiently covered.

There is being set out hereinafter the names and locations of persons who have been investigated, interviewed and recommended as Stay Behind Agents for the Bureau's ready reference:

LAWSON FORBES BAKER, Fairbanks - 62-93600
[redacted] - 62-93639
[redacted] - 62-93602
[redacted] - 62-93482
[redacted] - 62-93646
[redacted] - 62-93636
JOE DANICH, Girdwood
[redacted]
[redacted] - 62-93483

b6
b7C

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

[redacted] - 62-93484
[redacted] 62-93524
[redacted] - 62-93498
[redacted] - 62-93634
[redacted] - 62-93597
[redacted] 77-31169
[redacted] - 62-93628
[redacted] 62-93526
[redacted]
[redacted] - 62-93626
[redacted] 62-93624
[redacted] - 62-93496
[redacted] 62-93495
[redacted] - 62-93647
[redacted] - 62-93621
[redacted] - 62-93565
DR. HOWARD GLENMORE ROMIG, Anchorage
[redacted] - 62-93489
[redacted] 62-93518
DR. JOSEPH HARRISON SHELTON, Seward - 62-93494
FOSTER RAYMOND SIMS, Palmer - 62-93603
[redacted] - 62-93617
[redacted] - 62-93670
[redacted] - 62-93520
[redacted] - 62-93568
[redacted] 62-93643
[redacted] 77-44306
[redacted] - 62-93644

b6
b7C

32
41
All other cases on which preliminary reports have been submitted and Bureau authority requested to conduct an interview, numbering 36 at this writing, have been assigned and Agents are presently on road trips attempting to locate and interview them.

Preliminary reports on 30 additional potential Stay Behind Agents have been submitted to the Bureau with a request for authority to interview them.

Cases on 31 individuals have been closed and the individuals themselves not recommended in view of information contained in the Bureau files, information received here from confidential informants or information contained in the Anchorage files.

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

As is noted above, continued efforts will be made to obtain additional potential Agents but in the interests of completing as many as possible in the least possible time with the limited personnel at hand, this is being deferred until those concerning whom we have had authority to interview have been contacted and closing reports submitted.

It is noted that we have been able to make several interviews in such towns in strategic areas as Seward, Fairbanks, Anchorage and Palmer. However, we are now finding that persons to be interviewed reside in isolated sections and must be sought out one by one. This is consuming a considerable amount of time. In a number of instances, such persons do not live in areas covered by the established airlines and it is necessary to contact bush pilots on a charter basis so that the Agents can be flown in, waited for and flown out. In some cases it will be necessary to wait until trappers, hunters or other persons in isolated sections come into Anchorage or Fairbanks, where we have resident agencies, to be interviewed. Such persons have no contact whatsoever with the outside world and Agent personnel would not be utilized efficiently if it were detailed to spend a protracted period of time hunting them up one at a time.

It is noted also that this office has been hampered in its efforts to make contacts and interviews in the country surrounding Glenn Allen, Tok Junction and Big Delta by the severe cold. In this area in the past several weeks the temperature has been between 50 and 60 degrees below zero, making travel extremely hazardous.

III. TRAINING

Referral/Consult

Comments concerning training in this program have been made in Bureau letter of November 29, 1950, Anchorage letter of December 5, 1950, and Anchorage letter of January 8, 1951. In the last letter mentioned it is noted that [REDACTED]

Also with reference to training of the agents when this program reaches that stage, it is contemplated that all agents be fingerprinted and photographed in order that this identifying data will be available to the Bureau and to the administration of this program.

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

Referral/Consult

IV. COMMUNICATIONS

Proposed method of handling radio communications was set out in Anchorage letter of December 18, 1950, and comments concerning a review of it by the radio experts in the FBI Laboratory were returned by Bureau letter of January 31, 1951. [REDACTED]

It is noted that almost all radio installations in the territory of Alaska will be in isolated and rugged terrain and it is suggested that possibly more than one man should be detailed to operate each radio. This suggestion is augmented by the fact that in almost every case the radio will need a power unit inasmuch as electricity will not be available. It is felt that more than one man will be needed to make such a radio installation mobile or, if it is stationary, to man it for protracted periods of time. Likewise, it is felt that two men would have a better opportunity for survival, both against an enemy and against the rigors of this climate if they were able to work together.

Referral/Consult

In addition to radio communication, it is possible that a ground to air radio contact may be set up. However, in view of the fact that [REDACTED]

Communication by courier has been considered but it is pointed out that such relays will be slow to the point of being almost useless. In addition to this, in the winter courier by snowshoes and dog teams will be impossible in many sections.

Referral/Consult

It is noted that considerable time and effort will be necessary to transport radios, power units and necessary accessories to each point of location. The summer is the only season which lends itself to this function. In view of this, it is suggested that the Bureau may desire to point out to the [REDACTED] that almost a whole year will be lost if something is not done in this respect during the summer of 1951.

Likewise, it is noted that summer is the best and only practicable time to carry in materials, build caches and draft maps of the same. If this project is not started in 1951, it will almost necessarily have to be put off until 1952.

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

V. CACHING

Inasmuch as considerable caching of supplies, arms, ammunition, gasoline, radios and other Arctic survival gear will have to be done, this office is in the process of compiling a dossier on this activity. It is noted that though contact has been made with the Army and Air Force here in the territory, no written material on it has been found. Hence, we are compiling our information from various sources such as Fish and Wildlife Service; Arctic Survival Unit of the Army, particularly the Big Delta, Alaska, section; hunters, trappers and other individuals who have spent much time in the back country. This dossier will contemplate the following:

A - Essential items to be cached

- 1 - Radio parts and equipment
- 2 - Arms and ammunition and other weapons
- 3 - Clothing
- 4 - Medicines
- 5 - Foods
- 6 - Gear and supplies necessary for agents' cover such as traps, prospectors tools
- 7 - Photographic equipment
- 8 - Gear necessary for operation of agents such as field glasses, cameras where necessary, flashlight, signal panel, signal mirror and signal flags
- 9 - Snowshoes and skis where necessary
- 10 - Gasoline when and where necessary
- 11 - Explosives
- 12 - Camp gear

B - Places for caching

- 1 - In lakes, streams and rivers
- 2 - In caves
- 3 - In ground
- 4 - Stilted caches
- 5 - In trees
- 6 - In cabins

C - Manner of sealing or making weather tight the cached materials

- 1 - In sealed cans
- 2 - In water and moisture proof foil

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

- 3 - In boxes where cache is not exposed to the elements
- 4 - Canvas or burlap where suitable and cache is not exposed to the elements

D - Mapping and marking caches

- 1 - Marking same on detailed maps
- 2 - Marking same by directions based on natural terrain barriers and bounds
- 3 - By personal knowledge of person making cache

E - Amount of caching materials

- 1 - Amounts necessary to sustain life of one person for an arbitrary term of 2 years

F - Choosing cache locations

- 1 - General knowledge of the Stay Behind Agent
- 2 - Aid of an expert examining the locale in which a cache is desired

G - Methods of transporting supplies to cache location

- 1 - Flying them in
- 2 - By railroad in certain instances
- 3 - By water
- 4 - By packing them in

H - The building of caches

Referral/Consult

- 1 - By the Stay Behind Agent himself
- 2 - By experts in this field

It is realized that quite possibly the

However, this phase is being considered by this office inasmuch as it appears that time is of the essence and if the program in this respect is not accelerated and something done on it during the summer of 1951, it will have to be deferred until the summer of 1952 because of weather, terrain and other evident obstacles natural to this territory.

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

VI. LIFE AND SUPPLY LINE

As has been noted in the reports received by the Bureau in connection with interviews of those individuals who have been recommended as Stay Behind Agents, it is set out whether such individual is able to operate or owns an airplane. In this regard consideration has been given to the establishment of a lifeline for the Stay Behind Agents. It will be necessary, of course, to supply them from time to time with arms, ammunition, food, clothing and other gear necessary to the success of this endeavor and essential to the existence of the agents.

This office is making a study of the most logical mountain passes, air routes and logical spots for landing by pontoons, skis and wheels. These routes, of course, will necessarily emanate from positions in the territory of Alaska and possibly later in Canada which will be out of the zone of occupation.

While an effort has been made to obtain any type of written material on such a project, none has been found. Hence, our sources thus far have been the Fish and Wildlife Service, which habitually flies over all of this country in bush type aircraft. We are also contacting the CAA here which has detailed maps of all of the country in which we are interested. In addition, we are also obtaining information from bush pilots, big game guides who own planes and prospectors who own planes in order that we may ultimately have a complete dossier on this field.

Referral/Consult

In this regard, it is probably contemplated that [redacted]

[redacted] it is felt that such a study should be made even though it is discarded at a later date.

In connection with this project or if the Air Force provides the plane service, necessary gasoline caches will have to be made at various places in the territory inasmuch as the type of plane (bush aircraft) will not be able to fly sorties to all Stay Behind Agent locations and return to its base without refueling.

Also with reference to this life and supply line, it is pointed out that gasoline caches will have to be made during the summer months in a great part of the territory. If something is not done on this phase of the program during the summer of 1951, it necessarily will have to be deferred until the following summer.

Letter to the Director, FBI
February 13, 1951

STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

Referral/Consult



This matter will continue to receive priority attention
and the Bureau will be advised of all developments.

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson ☒
Ladd ☒
Clegg ☒
Glavin ☒
Nichols ☒
Rosen ☒
Tracy ☒
Harbo ☒
Belmont ☒
Mohr ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Nease ☒
Gandy ☒

(DECODED COPY) (u) ✓

FROM ANCHORAGE

(2-8-51) (u) NR 081800

3:08 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. SUMMARY OF PROGRAM. TO DATE 134 PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS IN THIS PROGRAM. OF THIS NUMBER 30 HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY, CLOSING REPORT SUBMITTED AND THESE PERSONS RECOMMENDED FOR INCLUSION IN PROGRAM. AUTHORITY HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM BUREAU TO INTERVIEW 42 OTHERS. THESE INTERVIEWS ASSIGNED, BEING MADE AT EARLIEST TIME, CLOSING REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE MADE. OF TOTAL NUMBER CONSIDERED 24 ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO BUREAU WITH RECOMMENDATIONS THAT BUREAU AUTHORITY BE GRANTED FOR INTERVIEWS. EIGHT MORE PRELIMINARY REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED WITH REQUEST TO INTERVIEW. OF TOTAL NUMBER, CASES ON THIRTY HAVE BEEN CLOSED BECAUSE OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES OR INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. THESE THIRTY NO LONGER BEING CONSIDERED.

RECEIVED: (2-8-51) (u) 3:21 PM

Referral/Consult

GLA

COPIES DESTROYED

RECEIVED 21 1950

SP3-BIS/17

6-14-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 48

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

59 FEB 19 1951 (u)

cc: Mr. [unclear]

"The Journal" (Editorial), Ottawa, Ontario
January 18, 1951

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Nease _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Gandy _____

Alaska and the Russians.

Amid all our concern about Korea and Western Europe there has been less talk about the possibility of invasion of this continent. The Sweetbriar and Musk-ox operations engaged in by the Canadian Army proved, above all, that war in the Arctic and sub-Arctic will be incredibly difficult and wasteful in men and resources. The Russians being as well aware of these conditions as the Canadians and Americans, the feeling seems to have grown that the battle of Democracy vs. Communism, if it has to be fought, will be decided elsewhere.

The trouble with the Russians is that their way of thought does not always follow what appears a logical pattern to Western eyes. In recent months, too, we have learned from the Chinese Communists that threats and warnings may be followed by action, as witness the surge of Red soldiers from Manchuria after declarations of their leaders this was about to happen unless the United Nations' forces withdrew.

These facts in mind, it is to be hoped that military authorities in Washington and Ottawa have paid attention to an article in the Russian *Literary Gazette*—Russian declarations appear in the strangest places—which claims the Americans have turned Alaska into a "land aircraft carrier" and a military springboard for aggression against the Soviet Union and the countries of the Pacific. In brief, the Russian publication considers American Alaska a menace, and in unkindly thoughts towards that territory it need not be expected that North-western Canada is excluded.

And just to prove that its readers will believe anything about Alaska, the *Literary Gazette* goes on to declare that since the purchase of Alaska by the United States in 1867 the high standards of culture, industry and technique established there by the Russians have disintegrated under the "notorious Western civilization" brought to the region by "Yankee militarists".

This forces us to recall ALEXANDER BARANOF, the Russian dictator of old Alaska, seated in state in his great wooden castle, cannon frowning down on the Thlinket Indians who knew too well the power of his guns and the weight of his knout, old BARANOF who received with rum or oaths, as the spirit moved him, the Canadian and American fur traders who came to his territory, some of them having eaten their snowshoe thongs and moccasins en route. If BARANOF represented culture, industry and fine technique we are prepared, here and now, to declare we are sodden clods and Russia should have Alaska and all the Barrens.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-21-96 BY

SP12875/80
342251

65-59264-65

5-WB

65-59264

SAC, Anchorage

February 3, 1951

DIRECTOR, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA
IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

As of possible interest in connection with the planning and development of instant program in Alaska, there are enclosed two photostatic copies of a self-explanatory article which appeared in the January 18, 1951 issue of "The Journal," Ottawa, Canada, which article was made available by the Bureau's liaison representative in Ottawa.

The above is furnished for your information.

65-59264

Enclosures

WTB:LJB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-21-96 BY SP12BTS/SC

ENC

FEB 3 2 13 PM '51

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
RECORDED - 38 B I 65-59264-65
RECEIVED-MAIL ROOM

FEB 8 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FEB 20 1951

COMM - FBI
FEB - 3 1951
MAILED 20

WB

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

UP (DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (1-31-51) (u) NR 312046

5:21 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

RE STAGE. REBULET (JANUARY 12) ON [REDACTED] AND BULET (JANUARY 16) ON [REDACTED] AND BULETS (JANUARY 22) ON [REDACTED] AND BULETS (JANUARY 26) ON [REDACTED] IN THESE LETTERS BUREAU STATES IN EVENT [REDACTED] CONDUCTED BY ANCHORAGE REFLECT NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CONTACT AND INTERVIEW. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED POLICY PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES WERE MADE IN LINE WITH DISCRETION AND SECURITY OF THIS PROJECT AND REPORT SUBMITTED. BUREAU ADVICE REQUESTED WHETHER INDIVIDUALS MAY BE INTERVIEWED WITHOUT FURTHER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INASMUCH AS SAME ALREADY MADE. SUREP?

RECEIVED

(1-31-51) (u)

5:25 PM LH

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/1/00 BY 60322~~

~~Classified by SP3-BTS/1M
Declassify on: OADR~~

EX-100-100000-100000
CE 6-24-2000

00-1164 RECORDED - 68

INDEXED 68

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(u)
RADIOGRAM
DEFERRED
CIPHER PAD CODE (u)

RECORDED - 68

65-59264-66

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE. REURRAD (JANUARY THIRTY ONE) LAST. REVIEW ANCHORAGE
REPORTS SUBMITTED SEVEN INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED URRAD REFLECTS
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INCOMPLETE AND CONSISTED OF
CONTACTING VARIOUS INFORMANTS. IN EVERY INSTANCE ONLY ONE
INFORMANT FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE FURNISHED INFORMATION
REGARDING INDIVIDUAL POTENTIAL AGENT. DISCREETLY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AS INSTRUCTED. IF NOTHING DEROGATORY
DEVELOPED, AUTHORITY GRANTED TO INTERVIEW.

VTB:BJW
65-59264

HOOVER

b2
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

(# 021643) (u)

BQM 1743-1815
Slew - 1838-1846
(u)

DECLASSIFIED BY: SP3-BN/PM
ON 6-14-2000

00-1164

FEB 5 10 00 AM '68

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI
RECEIVED - CIVIL

G.I.R. 7 6 21-94
Classified by SP2-BN/PM
Declassify on: OADR 34225

RECEIVED - CIVIL
FEB 5 5 32 PM '68

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

370
(51 FEB 23 1951) (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI
RECEIVED - CIVIL
FEB 2 10 00 AM '68
001
FEB 5 11 03 AM '68
(u)

2 + Via Bureau Radio (2-2-51) 2:32 P.M. [Signature]

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(2-15-51) (u) NR 151930

3:29 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

G.I.R.-7

STAGE. SUMMARY OF PROGRAM. TO DATE 41 INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY AND CLOSING REPORT SUBMITTED RECOMMENDING THEM FOR INCLUSION IN STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM. 29 AUTHORIZED INTERVIEWS STILL TO BE MADE. 30 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAVE BEEN MADE AND ALL BUT 6 OF THESE SUBMITTED TO BUREAU IN REPORT FORM WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT BUREAU AUTHORITY BE GRANTED FOR INTERVIEWS. 34 ADDITIONAL PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED FOR THIS PROGRAM BUT RECOMMENDED UNFAVORABLY IN VIEW OF INFORMATION IN BUREAU FILES, INFORMATION IN ANCHORAGE FILES OR DATA RECEIVED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS. LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 13 LAST GIVING RECAPITULATION OF STATUS OF PROGRAM EN-ROUTE. PROGRAM CONTINUING TO RECEIVE PRIORITY.

RECEIVED:

(2-15-51) (u) 4:06 PM

RTL

6-21-51
RECORDED - 25
EX-4

39264 67
(u)
S-115

SP3-BTJ/IM
6-14-2020

00-1164

cc Mr. Belmont

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

65-59264

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont ✓ _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (2) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(2-23-51) (2) (u)

NR 231845

2:38 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS OF PROGRAM. FORTY FIVE PERSONS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED, RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU TO DATE. TWENTY FOUR ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS AUTHORIZED BY BUREAU AND ATTEMPTS BEING MADE TO LOCATE AND HANDLE. PRELIMINARY REPORTS ON TWENTY THREE ADDITIONAL PERSONS HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO BUREAU WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT AUTHORITY BE GRANTED TO INTERVIEW. THIRTY FIVE PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND NOT RECOMMENDED.

RECEIVED:

(2-23-51) (2) (u)

2:45 PM

RTL

RECORDED - 122

SP3-BTJ/AM
 6-14-2000

00-1164

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (2)

(u) 65-59264

MAR 2 1951 (2) (u)

Sent via Bureau Fides (2/20/51) 4:15 P.M. Per L & L

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Nease ✓
Gandy ✓

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (2-1-51) (u)

NR 012200

5:36 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. SUMMARY OF PROGRESS. AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW VARIOUS PROSPECTIVE STAYBEHIND AGENTS HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE BUREAU AND ALL ASSIGNED FOR IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION. TWENTY PERSONS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED WITH BUREAU AUTHORITY, RECOMMENDED BY THE ANCHORAGE DIVISION AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. OTHER INTERVIEWS BEING MADE DAILY BY THREE AGENTS WORKING FULL TIME AND TWO ADDITIONAL AGENTS WORKING PART TIME. IT IS NOTED MANY INTERVIEWEES ARE TRAPPERS, PROSPECTORS OR OTHERWISE ENGAGED IN VOCATIONS WHICH NECESSITATES THAT THEY RESIDE IN BACK COUNTRY WHERE INACCESSIBLE EXCEPT BY CHARTER PLANES, FISH AND WILD LIFE PLANE OR SNOW SHOES. BITTER COLD AND DIFFICULT FLYING WEATHER MAKE CERTAIN OF THESE TRIPS HAZARDOUS AND SLOW. CLOSING REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF ANCHORAGE OFFICE WILL BE SUBMITTED AS SOON AS ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS MADE. ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS BEING MADE ON NEW PROSPECTIVE AGENTS, REPORTS BEING COMPILED AND WILL BE SUBMITTED IMMEDIATELY.

[Redacted]

This matter followed through to Mr. Ladd for Anchorage (2-13-51) NS

RECEIVED

(2-1-51) (u)

5:53 PM

Referral/Consult LH

6-14-2000

SP3-B751SM

COPIES DESTROYED
FEB 21 1960

RECORDED - 119

FEB 27 1951 (u)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

(u)

ec Hensch

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(2-23-51) (u)

NR 232145

5:32 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE.

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~DATE 10/10/00 BY 1043~~

JUSTICE

INVESTIGATION

(Referral/Consult)

MATTER.

BUREAU ADVICE REQUESTED RE THIS

RECEIVED:

(2-23-51) (u)

5:38 PM

MW

UNDERLINED PORTION OBTAINED FROM GARBLE. AWAITING CORRECTION.

SP3-BTJ/JM
 G-14-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 73

EX-55

cc: Mr. Belmont

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-100

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(14)
FEBRUARY 24, 1951

Transmit the following message to:

RECORDED - 73 65-59264-71

SAC, ANCHORAGE

RADIOGRAM
URGENT

EX-35 STAGE. REURAD (TWENTY-THIRD)

NOT DEEMED NECESSARY YOU PARTICIPATE AND NO

BUREAU REPRESENTATIVES WILL PARTICIPATE AT THIS END.

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

HOOVER

ESS:hke

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BJS/m
ON 6-14-2000

Classified by SP3-BJS/8C
Declassify on: OADR 3/22/51

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

RECEIVED

FEB 24 10 25 AM '51

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

RECEIVED

6 MAR 10 1951

Per: net

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *Ch*

DATE: February 26, 1951

FROM : V. P. Keay *VPK L*

Referral/Consult

SUBJECT: STAY-BEHIND AGENTS PROGRAM IN ALASKA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 342257
DATE 6-21-94 BY SP2 BJS/KCTolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____

[Large redacted area]

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to the SAC, Anchorage advising him that the

[Redacted area]

The letter also advises of other [redacted] in connection with the Escape and Evasion Program.

Attachment
ESS:hb *hb*

59 MAR 9 1951

RECORDED - 59
72

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: February 28, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (Bufile (65-59264))

 DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/SCD
 ON 6-21-94
 342251

Referral/Consult

Reference is made to Anchorage radiogram dated February 23, 1951 concerning a

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

REGISTERED AIR MAIL

~~SECRET~~ 342251
6-2-94 SP128TS15C

Date: February 23, 1951

To:

[Redacted]

b7D

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject:

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

These are transmittal here with two closest tie copies
of a [Redacted] (U)

b7D

The information contained in the enclosure should be brought
to the attention of the [Redacted]

b7D

You should, of course, be alert to report to the Bureau
any information which may be brought to your attention by the [Redacted]
which relates to the subject matter of the enclosure.

65-59,064

Enclosures
cc-Foreign Service Desk

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/hdw
DECLASSIFY ON: [Redacted] #342251
Per OGA letter dtd 7/20/98

WTB:ow

cc - 100-343844-18

- Tolson _____
- Ladd _____
- Clegg _____
- Glavin _____
- Nichols _____
- Rosen _____
- Tracy _____
- Harbo _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Nease _____
- Gandy _____

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/1/98 BY SP4 bja/hdw

SAC, Anchorage

February 27, 1951

Director, FBI

ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

There are transmitted herewith two copies of the report of SA [redacted] dated 2-6-51 at Anchorage.

Instant report should be rewritten, in accord with Bureau instructions contained in Bulet 1-11-51 and Buread 2-20-51 entitled "Stage", in order to delete the objectionable phraseology contained in the synopsis and paragraph two, as underlined, on page one of the report. As you are aware, it may be necessary to disseminate copies of this report in the future and under no circumstances should the report erroneously reflect that instant program has been discussed with various informants and contacts. Furnish an original and two copies of the corrected report to the Bureau immediately. All incorrect copies of the report should then be destroyed by the Anchorage Office.

There are also enclosed two copies of a Loyalty Form received at the Bureau during July 1948, which contains background information concerning [redacted] who may possibly be identical with captioned individual.

Your attention is directed to the report of SA Albert Rundbaken dated 10-19-48 at Anchorage, entitled "Detention of 17 Little Diomed Island Eskimos By Russian Authorities on Big Diomed Island, August 6, 1948; Security Matter - R." On page 8 of the cited report, information is set forth to the effect that the Little Diomed Eskimos had been questioned by the Russian authorities concerning [redacted] operator of a small freight ship and questions were asked concerning the places to which he sailed and if he ever went to Point Barrow. It is noted questions were asked about individuals who were friendly with [redacted] and inquiries were made relative to the tonnage of his vessel.

Enclosures

62-93862
cc- 65-59264 ✓

WTB:ow;vjm

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

NOT RECORDED
71 MAR 4 1951

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

ORIGINAL FILE

60 MAR 8 1951

As it appears that [redacted] is possibly identical with captioned individual, and as it is apparent that the Russian authorities know his identity and have expressed an interest in his activities and associates, authority is not being granted to contact [redacted] and he should not be given further consideration in connection with instant program.

b6
b7C

It is imperative that the indices of the Anchorage Office be thoroughly checked prior to submitting reports of this type. You should immediately call this matter to the attention of the Special Agents handling this program so that the initial report submitted will contain all information of relevancy concerning the individual under consideration as a Stay-behind Agent.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. T. Harbo *RO*

FROM : Mr. I. W. Conrad

SUBJECT: Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage
in Alaska in Event of Invasion

DATE: December 29, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Belmont ☒ _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Baby

Reference is made to the attached letter from Anchorage dated December 18, 1950, transmitting a map outlining a proposed method of handling radio communications from various Agents located around strategic areas in Alaska to a central control station.

The above mentioned letter requests views touching on the radio aspects of this problem from the Radio and Electrical Section.

This Section observes that a mobile radio headquarters unit would afford (1) additional security over a fixed station from the direction finding standpoint, (2) closer physical operation to the actual stay-behind Agents than a permanently located fixed station and (3) less desirable technical facilities than that afforded by a fixed station. This means that receiving antennas will be inferior to those which could be provided at a fixed station and outgoing messages would not have the advantage of higher power transmitters which could be utilized from such fixed locations. However, it appears that the weight of advantage is in favor of a mobile type operation, working as close to the stay-behind operators as possible in order to shorten the length of their communications lines. it being pointed out that they will probably

Referral/Consult

As a suggestion for the SAC, it is pointed out that the possibilities of these Agents working into fixed locations at least while such fixed military locations exist, should not be overlooked inasmuch as such operations would prove to be more satisfactory from a purely technical standpoint.

Regarding equipment, this is to advise that the Bureau has no stock on hand which is suitable for equipping a considerable number of undercover radio operators. In the event such a program is envisioned which would necessitate the FBI acquiring such equipment, it is believed that immediate steps should be taken to put such planning into effect inasmuch as our ability to acquire electronic equipment during war time will be necessarily limited. It would appear, however, that the military would be in the best position to handle all equipment including a variety of radio crystals which would assist in not only extending the time during which they could operate without being detected and located by direction finding equipment but also it would assist in establishing radio contact with the headquarters station.

In connection with the possibility of enemy detection of undercover radio operations once the location is overrun, it is my opinion, based on past

Attachment

RIM: AB

RECORDED - 111

65-59264-74

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BJS/KSP
ON 6-21-94

342251

66 MAR 14 1951

experience that these Agents will be highly expendable inasmuch as initial detection by military radio receivers operating in the area would be followed immediately by portable direction finding operations which are capable of pin pointing the operating transmitter with a high degree of accuracy. I am assuming that the Russians will have basic knowledge of direction finding operations which is comparable to our information and that which was available to the Germans during the past war.

Finally, there is no doubt in my mind that radio jamming operations by the Russians would follow an actual invasion, if not immediately, certainly shortly thereafter. The enemy's objective would possibly be primarily concerned with the jamming of military communications networks and secondarily radar networks. Inasmuch as this stay-behind Agent operation would be on a more limited scale and actual time on the air would be of fairly short duration, it can be assumed that the jamming process might not be applied for some time. The most vulnerable part of the operation from the jamming standpoint would be that of the central station by virtue of the fact that it would be on the air more of the time thus making detection easier by Russian radio receiving equipment and further, that it would be employing higher power which would add to the ease of detection. Once the enemy has established that this circuit was a military or closely allied operation then it can be assumed that it would become a target for both direction finding work, with a resultant search by personnel or by bombing planes and secondarily assuming that these methods failed jamming procedures would be applied. In this event jamming would be resorted to in an effort to disrupt any communications attempted over the established circuits.

These comments and observations are based upon the present rather limited knowledge which I have of the contemplated operations.

ACTION:

Referral/Consult

Supervisor W. T. Baker is handling this program at the Seat of Government, however, prior to his answer to the attached letter it will be necessary to (1) add comments from the Cryptanalysis Section regarding (a) call letters and (b) codes. (2) [redacted] as well as [redacted] regarding the use of such a mobile radio station [redacted]

Referral/Consult

b7D

It is not believed that inst. program should be discussed with this unit. 113.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 12-18-50

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

There is transmitted herewith [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

In selecting potential stay-behind agents, we have endeavored
to pick persons living in close proximity to [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

It is suggested that the [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

An additional reason for [REDACTED]

The distance from Whitehorse to each of the strategic areas is
shown in air miles.

Referral/Consult

The following observations and suggestions are being noted in
order that this letter [REDACTED] may be studied by the radio
experts in the FBI Laboratory for their comments, observations and
criticism concerning its feasibility.

Enclosure

JHW:MR
65-298COPIES DESTROYED
R 584 NOV 21 1959Let to Anch.
1-31-51
WS65-59264-74
PrattDECLASSIFIED BY 231150
ON 6-21-15

1. Equipment

Referral/Consult

It is noted that some of the potential agents already contacted have radio equipment. Accent will be given to choosing other agents who have such equipment. This likewise can be used. For those agents who do not have equipment, the same will necessarily have to be furnished by the [redacted] FBI.

2. Frequencies

It is suggested that a minimum of four frequencies be given each agent. This will entail furnishing all agent radio transmitting sets with at least four crystals. It is further suggested that two of these crystals be for day transmission and two for night transmission, it being noted that transmission and reception in the Territory of Alaska is very inconsistent and quite probably more than one frequency will have to be used during one transmission from various points in the territory. Likewise, it is noted that the frequencies more adaptable to the various locations will have to be determined by tests which can be run after the system is installed.

3. Call Letters

It is suggested that different call letters be given to all stations and that these call letters be changed on a daily basis in order that any monitor or any station will not become well acquainted with a fixed call signal.

4. Codes

It is suggested that a uniform code cannot be used for all stations inasmuch as action of a quisling nature, corruption of one agent or capture of one station will place the code in the hands of the enemy. It is suggested that possibly this could be circumvented by the use of pads similar to those presently in use by the Bureau or a different code for each station.

5. Initiative in Calling

It is suggested that in considering the correspondence between the agents and the Control Station that the agents make the initial call with the control station monitoring the agents radio frequencies. In this manner the agent will only call when he has something to report. Otherwise he can make a sign of life call periodically on possibly a weekly basis.

6. Use of [redacted]

b7D

It is suggested that discussions be had [redacted] at the Washington

level and with the [redacted] in order that the mobile unit can be used [redacted]. This will not be necessary at the inception of this program, inasmuch as all necessary tests, trial runs, etc., can be made from various points on [redacted] listed above on the Alaskan side. However, it is pointed out that tests should be made at as many points as possible on the [redacted] the Alaskan side to determine the quality of reception and transmission.

Sum | It is requested that this entire matter of radio communication be studied by the radio men in the laboratory and for criticisms, comments, and observations made available to this office. |

Sum | It is requested that in making the comments the radio experts touch on the point of the danger of the enemy detecting and locating clandestine radio stations which are well hidden in the roughest kind of mountainous and wooded terrain, which terrain will not be accessible by roads or otherwise. |

Sum | It is also requested that the radiomen touch on the point of the possibility of the enemy jamming the agents station or the control station. |

SAC, Anchorage

January 2, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

342256
62694 SPABTJ/SC

Reurlet 12-5-50 and Bulet of 12-18-50.

It is noted that urlet of 12-5-50 was an interim report on the progress being made in instant program and that Bureau comments were solicited as to the selection of agents and the proposed training program submitted by your office for Stay-behind Agents.

The proposed training program is being reviewed and modified at the Bureau and the FBI Laboratory is making the necessary preparations for appropriate instruction in secret inks and coded messages. You will be promptly informed of the Bureau's planned training program in this regard.

In connection with the selection of Stay-behind Agents, you made inquiry as to whether individuals should be considered as potential Stay-behind Agents if they have had prior military service or been employed by the U. S. Government. It is observed you recommended that men with prior military service not be excluded from consideration since it has come to your attention that many of them have the essential knowledge, stamina and experience in Alaska required for Stay-behind Agent material.

In previous correspondence, you were instructed to take into consideration the fact that a selected Stay-behind Agent may be immobilized, liquidated or deported immediately by the Soviets in the event he falls within any of the categories known to have been deported or liquidated by the Soviets in their occupation of the Baltic States and Eastern Poland. Individuals singled out for arrest by the Soviets after the invasion of the Baltic region of Europe included, among many others, employees of the forestry service, Government officials and civil servants as well as officers, military judges and volunteers of national armies.

Your attention has been called to the fact that the best Stay-behind Agents in urban areas from the standpoint of long range survival would be unskilled or semi-skilled workmen not engaged in any of the occupations indicated above and who were not officials of labor unions.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

65-59264 - 75

EX-37 WTB:jvs

MAR 30 1951

✓
JL
Cdk
uo

It is suggested, therefore, that consideration of individuals as Stay-behind Agents in urban areas who have previous military service or have previously been employed by the U. S. Government be held in abeyance until this program of recruitment has progressed further. If it is determined that adequate coverage cannot be obtained without utilizing individuals in these two groups, the Bureau should be advised. You may possibly desire to consider these individuals, however, in the "reserve pool" of Stay-behind Agents, those who would be evacuated from the area of invasion and returned to the area of occupation at a later date for a specific assignment. The Bureau interposes no objection, however, to your considering the selection of Stay-behind Agents with prior military or government service in rural areas.

In connection with the reports which are being submitted currently by the Anchorage Office on individual potential Stay-behind Agents, every effort should be made to submit the full and complete name of the individual involved instead of merely using initials for the first and middle names. Bureau file searches can also be accelerated if the initial report submitted in these cases contains a complete personal description. When Bureau authority is granted to contact a potential Stay-behind Agent, and if a complete description is not previously available, same should be included in the subsequent report covering the interview of the individual.

By Bureau radiogram of December 12, 1950, the Anchorage Office was authorized to contact seven individuals whose names had previously been submitted as potential Stay-behind Agents. Advise Bureau identities of those who agreed to serve as Stay-behind Agents in the event of invasion.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (Stay-behind Agent Program)

DATE: January 6, 1951

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 2-19-91 BY SP12 BTJ/KC

PURPOSE:

To advise that the proposed training program for selected Stay-behind Agents in Alaska submitted by the Anchorage office has been reviewed by representatives of the FBI Laboratory, the Training and Inspection Division and the Espionage Section.

To submit proposed recommendations fixing the responsibility of the FBI in connection with instant training program.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

As you are aware, the Bureau [] developing Stay-behind Agents in Alaska. These agents are presently being selected and will thereafter be trained. These individuals, it is contemplated, in the event Alaska is invaded by Russia, will remain in the enemy occupied area of Alaska and will be used to secure and supply intelligence information to the American Armed Forces.

Referral/Consult

In order to definitely fix responsibility in all phases of this matter, certain recommended proposals have been discussed with [] on a headquarters level through the liaison section of the Bureau. In this connection, the Bureau to date has agreed to the following with respect to the training phase of captioned program:

1. The FBI will participate in the training of Stay-behind Agents.
2. The FBI will be responsible for furnishing training relative to security, cover, informant nets and communications except radio communications.
3. The FBI will furnish training in the preparation of coded messages and secret writing.

Attachment

WTB:bjc

RECORDED - 114

65-57214-75

1-14-51
 2-13-51
 6-5-51

WJ
 QH

CH

WJ

The Anchorage office was instructed to furnish a proposed training program to the Bureau in this regard for review and approval. By letter dated December 5, 1950, a copy of which is attached, the Anchorage office submitted a recommended training schedule.

The proposed program submitted has been reviewed by representatives of the Training and Inspection Division, FBI Laboratory and the Espionage Section.

BASIC RECOMMENDATIONS

b6
b7C

1. [redacted] as a result of a conference among the Supervisors in the Training and Inspection Division, pointed out that the training program should be based on the primary objectives of the Stay-behind Agents, namely:

- a. How to avoid detection.
- b. Knowing what intelligence information is desired and how to get it.
- c. Becoming acquainted with methods of communications to be used between the Stay-behind Agents and their principal.

2. It was also proposed that consideration be given to the Bureau's training [redacted] to be used in connection with instant program instead of utilizing Bureau personnel to handle the direct training of the Stay-behind Agents.

Referral/Consult

In the event the Bureau's part of the training program is to be handled by Bureau personnel, it was pointed out by the Training and Inspection Division that at the present time there are only three qualified police instructors assigned to Anchorage, two of whom are the Special Agent in Charge and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge.

3. Representatives of the Training and Inspection Division and the Espionage Section have pointed out that Stay-behind Agents should be trained on

an individual basis. It was agreed that individual training for Stay-behind Agents is sound training technique from the standpoint of security and is essential for the protection of the potential informant nets.

It is proposed that through liaison with [redacted] on a headquarters level it be suggested [redacted] that consideration be given to the Bureau's [redacted]

Referral/Consult

training of Stay-behind Agents in the subjects listed hereinafter. It could be pointed out that the operation of the program will be of paramount interest to the military and since it is believed that the training should be on an individual basis, the direct training of the Stay-behind Agents [redacted]

[redacted] In this regard, it is observed that [redacted]

[redacted] It is also pointed out that a substantial saving in manpower would accrue to the FBI if the instruction of the Stay-behind Agents [redacted]

4. In every phase of the training program, the element of security will be emphasized.
5. It is contemplated that the training of individual Stay-behind Agents will be effected in Alaska at a location agreed upon by [redacted] in Alaska and the SAC, Anchorage.
6. It is recognized that the recommended curriculum set out below will serve only as a basis for the training to be given by the FBI but that the extent of training in specific subjects will depend upon the background and capabilities of the individual Stay-behind Agent.

Referral/Consult

The proposed curriculum of the training to be handled by the FBI, as suggested by the Anchorage office, is set forth below, with accompanying comments and observations of reviewing Supervisors at the Bureau:

RECOMMENDED CURRICULUM

1. Indoctrination of Agents

- a. Give purpose of Stay-behind network
- b. Obligation of agents to the country
- c. Necessity for the network
- d. Determination of the country, the military and the principal to hold Alaska
- e. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- f. Suggested time for training -- 1 hour

Comments

It is believed that nothing should be said about "informant networks" to the Stay-behind Agent except as relates to his own personal sub-agents and informants. The over-all contemplated informant espionage set-up, as a security measure, should not be called to the attention of the individual Stay-behind Agent. The Training and Inspection Division suggested that the [redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted] It is so proposed.

2. Organization of Espionage System

- a. General background of informant networks
- b. Outline of the various types of espionage systems
- c. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- d. Suggested time of training -- 5 hours

Comments

The Training and Inspection Division has questioned the need of this instruction. It was pointed out that a knowledge of "various types of espionage systems" would be of little value to the Stay-behind Agents and that the more information of this nature imparted

through instruction, the greater would be the security risk in the event one or more of the Stay-behind Agents were captured. It is proposed that this topic be deleted from the curriculum.

3. Russian Military System of Ferreting out Espionage Agents and How to Avoid Same

- a. Background of Russian Internal Security System
- b. Background of Russian formed espionage system
- c. Russian military procedure in invaded territory
- d. Soviet personalities
- e. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- f. Suggested time of training -- 8 hours

Comments

The Training and Inspection Division has questioned the need of this training and has suggested that the topic be changed to "Russian Military System of Ferreting Out Espionage Agents," and that emphasis be placed only on Russian military procedure in invaded territory. Further, that the balance of the suggested subject matter under Part 3 above be omitted. It is believed, however, that basic instruction should be given to Stay-behind Agents so they may be able, for example, to recognize the activities of the MGB, the GRU (Red Army Intelligence), and the MVD (Russian Internal Security Police). By being prepared to identify the presence of a Russian intelligence service in an occupied territory and to report on their activities would without question be of benefit to the Armed Forces of the U.S. From a practical standpoint, the presence of important Soviet personalities in an occupied area would certainly be of value to the Air Force which could possibly, upon receipt of the identity and location of a well known Soviet personality from a Stay-behind Agent, bomb the indicated target or location. It is proposed, therefore, that the topics in this category be included in the instruction to be given to Stay-behind Agents.

4. Basic Training in Use of Russian Dictionary

- a. Provide the trainees with inexpensive but adequate Russian-English dictionaries
- b. Place accent on Russian military terms
- c. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- d. Suggested time of training -- 16 hours

Comments

Supervisor P. A. Napier of the Translation Unit has pointed out that basic training in the use of the Russian dictionary is of limited value unless extensive language training is given; further, that it would be necessary to know the Russian alphabet before the dictionary could be used; that the printed letters of the alphabet are different from the script letters; and that the possession of identical dictionaries would constitute a security hazard. Mr. Napier does not believe this training is feasible considering the time element available. He pointed out that an average student would require at least two weeks of concentrated study to merely become acquainted with the Russian alphabet.

It is doubted that ^{numbers of} great Russian troops would be used in an invasion of Alaska. In observing operations in Korea at the present time, it appears that Chinese troops make up the bulk of the enemy attacking forces.

Due to the proximity of Siberia to the Territory of Alaska, it is assumed that Russia might probably utilize troops from the Siberian area which would include the Mongol, Uzbek, Kazakh, etc. As these groups do not necessarily speak Russian but have their individual languages and dialects, it is not believed that training in the use of the Russian Dictionary would be practical.

Special attention, however, is directed to point (b) above suggesting instruction on Russian military terms. It is proposed that instruction be given on Recognition of Standard Soviet Markings on Equipment and materials and Recognition of Uniforms and Insignia.

Referral/Consult

It is proposed that basic training in use of Russian dictionary be omitted, but that through

5. Codes for Radio Correspondence

- a. Radio correspondence ground to plane
- b. Radio correspondence between agent and principal
- c. Suggested number of trainees -- selected agents
- d. Suggested time of training -- 10 hours

Comments

In previous discussions

Referral/Consult

6. Secret Writing and Written Codes

- a. Types of secret inks
- b. How agent can manufacture secret inks
- c. Use of reagents
- d. Suggested number of trainees -- selected agents
- e. Suggested time of training -- 8 hours

Comments

This subject matter has been discussed with Mr. D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory. Mr. Parsons advised that the Laboratory is now prepared to give the necessary instruction and various inks are being prepared in this regard. Mr. Parsons pointed out that 8 hours instruction per selected agent would be sufficient for this course of training and that in the event approximately 5 days would be needed for secret inks and an additional period of 5 days for written codes. In the actual

Referral/Consult

instruction given to Stay-behind Agents, the practical aspects of this topic should be emphasized, that is, actual practice in coding and encoding messages and use of inks. Stay-behind Agents should also receive instruction as to the proper manner of preparing a summary type, effectively worded message.

7. Cover Stories, Pretexts, Deception and Security

- a. Need for identity and necessary reason for agent's presence in a particular locality.
- b. Methods of advising principal if agent has been identified as such, corrupted and forced to operate as double agent
- c. Methods of concealing secret codes, maps, implements and supplies
- d. Methods of destroying espionage gear to avoid detection and same falling into hands of enemy
- e. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- f. Suggested time of training -- 8 hours

Comments

The subject matter of this topic is pertinent, however, the title of same is being changed to "Deception and Security." The Training and Inspection Division has suggested that in connection with instant topic, a short lecture be included on "What can be concealed on the person?"; further, that a short discussion on "How to detect and lose surveillances" be added. It is proposed that instruction be included on "What can be concealed on the person", however, that the discussion of "How to detect and lose surveillances" be limited to a discussion of what the Stay-behind Agent should do and how he should act in case he is placed under surveillance by the Russians. Hunters and trappers will be used as Stay-behind Agents in rural areas where surveillances would not be a problem. The urban areas will probably be decimated and limited to Russian Army establishments which would also limit any problems arising from surveillances.

8. Methods for Agents to Use in Selecting and Training Sub-agents and Informants

- a. Necessity for security
- b. Careful direction for exact mission
- c. ~~That agent divulge no data regarding the Stay-behind Agent network~~
- d. Care in selecting sub-agents and informants
- e. Availability of desired information to sub-agent
- f. Methods of transmitting information from sub-agent to agent
- g. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- h. Suggested time of training -- 10 hours

Comments

For effective operation of the Stay-behind Agent program and in order to provide for the necessary resulting adequate coverage, the subject matter of this topic is probably one of the most important. It is proposed, however, that point (c) above not be mentioned during the course of instruction. As previously pointed out, Stay-behind Agents should not know one another's identity, and should not be informed of the existence of the Stay-behind Agent or "espionage network". It is proposed that a discussion on "What to do when someone approaches agent with proposition to act as a sub-agent or informant?" be included.

It is also proposed that in connection with this subject matter, instruction should be provided on action to be taken when the Stay-behind Agent is "uncovered" by the Russians in order to continue the use of the sub-agents and informants that the Stay-behind Agent has developed.

The necessity of security will be emphasized in this matter especially as relates to the "contacts" effected by the Stay-behind Agent to develop his individual informant or sub-agent network.

9. Administration of Plan from Agents Point of View

- a. Data re food caches to which he will have access
- b. Data re materials needed
- c. How to request needed equipment and supplies
- d. Suggested number of trainees -- all agents
- e. Suggested time of training -- 1 hour

Comments

The Training and Inspection Division has pointed out that the items to be covered in instant topic should be limited to subjects taught by the FBI and [redacted]

Referral/Consult

10. Suggested additions to Curriculum

- a. The Training and Inspection Division has suggested that the [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Comments

It is proposed that inquiry be made through [redacted]

Referral/Consult

- b. Instructor N. A. Watson of the Training and Inspection Division has informed that [redacted]

b2
b7E


Referral/Consult

Comments

It is proposed that this matter be discussed with



- c. It is noted the suggested curriculum submitted by Anchorage does not reflect instruction on what information of an intelligence nature would be desired in the event Alaska is invaded. It is proposed, therefore, that an additional topic be included in the training program entitled "Intelligence Information Desired from Enemy Occupied Area", since transmittal to the agent of requests on specific intelligence targets may not be possible at the outset of the occupation.



Referral/Consult

It is further proposed that




- d. No mention is made in the suggested curriculum submitted by Anchorage relative to the subject of "Photography".

In previous discussions



Referral/Consult



ACTION:

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the above proposals be approved for discussion [redacted] through liaison on a headquarters level. Specifically, it is recommended that the Bureau. [redacted]

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the FBI [redacted]

Thereafter, the Anchorage office should be informed of the specific responsibilities recognized by the Bureau in connection with the training phase of this program and provided with the curriculum approved by the Bureau in this regard.

1/15

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: 12-5-50

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTJ/KSC
 ON 6-21-94

Reference is made to Bulet dated 11-29-50. 842251

There is set out hereinafter an interim report on the Stay-Behind Agent Program, indicating its status in this Division, progress being made and certain difficulties which have been encountered.

Referral/Consult

With Anchorage letter of 11-16-50 there were transmitted
 two enclosures: (1)

(2)

COPIES DESTROYED

JHW:MR
65-298

R 584 NOV 23 1960

COPIES DESTROYED

R 584 NOV 21 1960

59 MAR 20 1951

RECORDED - 1165-27264-75

S. Paffa

memo Belm 12-11-50
 memo Ladd 12-12-50
 Ladd to Anchorage 12-12-50

copy 4/10/51

AN File 65-298



SELECTION OF AGENTS

There has been no intention to set or limit the number of potential agents selected, inasmuch as it is well-known that a number of our prospects upon contact will decline to act; a number will be found to lack qualifications which we desire; and some, no doubt, will be qualified and agree to act and then later change their minds.

It is recommended that men with prior military service not be excluded from this program inasmuch as in considering the best prospects who

AN File 65-298

have come to our attention we find many of them have had military service. Likewise, these men have the qualifications, stamina and knowledge which is being sought. Also, certain of them are bush pilots and own airplanes; certain of them own shortwave radios and are able to operate the same; and some are licensed big game guides or have other qualifications from which excellent results could be expected. Also a number of these ex-military men are located in the wilderness as hunters, trappers, etc., and would be caught there in case of invasion and would have to stay in the Territory. This they know. It is the opinion of the military and other individuals with whom I have talked and in whose judgment I have confidence, that it will be virtually impossible to clear out all inhabitants from the interior or even find them and such persons could be used to excellent advantage. It is requested that the Bureau comment on this particular angle. A loss of ex-servicemen would probably deprive the program of some of its best material.

It is also recommended that persons who are or have been employed by the Federal Government not be excluded from participation in the Stay-Behind Agent Program. It is noted that probably such persons as employees of the Fish and Wildlife Service, CAA and other federal employee groups have the best knowledge of the interior of the Territory of Alaska as compared with any other persons. By the same token, a number of the Fish and Wildlife men with whom I am personally acquainted fit the qualifications of prospective agents better than any persons we have considered thus far. It is recommended that the Bureau comment concerning this group.


The selection of prospects for stay-behind agents has been made and will continue to be made from personnel known to the agents assigned to this division and with the advice of individuals whose integrity is thought to be unimpeachable. This latter group includes such persons as Judge ANTHONY J. DIKOND, Federal Judge, Anchorage, Alaska; Judge HARRY PRATT, Federal Judge, Fairbanks, Alaska, and HOLGER LARSEN, Fish and Wildlife Agent, in charge of the Anchorage Office, Fish and Wildlife Service. In contacting these men, the real purpose of our inquiry has not been divulged. However, it is noted here that HOLGER LARSEN has spent much of his life in the interior of the Territory of Alaska, is possibly as good a woodsman as there is here, is a man of the highest integrity and who I am sure would be more than willing to participate with us in any manner in this program. The services of such a man should not be lost.

Administrative files are being opened on each prospect obtained under the 66 classification, using the character "Administrative". It is believed that some more identifying designation should be used in the character and is suggested that the Bureau may desire to note the full character as "Administrative - SBA" or "Administrative - EE". In this manner the reports can be more easily routed in the Bureau. Any information contained

AN File 65-298

in the files of the Anchorage Division or obtained from persons who are contacted on the highest confidential basis will be included in the report in accordance with instructions from the Bureau in referenced letter.

There is set out hereinafter a complete list of the persons who are being considered at this time as prospective stay-behind agents. It is noted that none of these individuals has been contacted by agents here in connection with this program and it is recommended that they not be contacted until the preliminary investigative report is sent in, the program has progressed further and the training phase of the program is ready.



b6
b7C

FOSTER R. SIMS





-- b6
b7C

TRAINING

Referral/Consult

Inasmuch as both the Bureau and this office feel that the training in the interest of economy and efficiency should be done in the Territory of Alaska, it is felt that its best location would be at Fort Richardson which is located at Anchorage, Alaska. However, in this regard [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] It is pointed out that setting up training schools in Anchorage proper is not deemed advisable. All locations which are suitable would, of course, be known to too many persons in town. The agent trainees in many instances will be well-known to the citizens of Anchorage and to each other to be in Anchorage for any length of time without the entire plan and its participants being of general knowledge in the Territory of Alaska. It is felt because of the size of Fort Richardson and the fact that most of its inhabitants are military personnel and strangers to the Territory, the agent trainees could come and go there without creating too much curiosity and speculation. However, inasmuch as it is impossible to obtain housing for the training school on Fort Richardson Base at the present time, attempts will be made to obtain the same in Anchorage or its proximity if the Bureau so desires.

It is recommended that the Bureau discuss the matter [redacted]

[redacted] The time of conducting the training school, can not be decided upon, of course, until the names of proposed agents have been obtained, checked through the files of the Anchorage Division [redacted] central files of the FBI in Washington, [redacted]

[redacted] and any other files that the Bureau may deem necessary; a preliminary investigation has been made by the Anchorage Division and they have been interviewed.

Referral/Consult

*Summary
classified
separated,
MEMO -
Anchorage to JAG
1-6-51
WS:*

*done
See Bufile 65-
Anchorage
12-12-50*

AN File 65-298

With reference to the investigations conducted concerning the prospective agents, it is recommended that it be limited in scope in the communities in which the agents live, particularly if such communities are small. This will avoid the entire community obtaining knowledge that the Bureau is interested in such individual and ultimately in their knowing all concerning the program.

With reference to the number of persons in a training class, it is, of course, believed that the agents should be trained individually if possible. However, this does not appear to be possible in view of a lack of sufficient time and a lack of a sufficient number of qualified instructors. Also it would prove to be very expensive. It is felt that instruction could be given in classes of from 12 to 20. Agents in any particular class could be selected from various sections of the Territory so that there would be no two agents from the same section. In addition, if there were several instructors available, they could break the class of 12 down to groups of 2 or 3 and give the training in several different buildings, thus keeping the agent trainees separated.

With reference to the length of the class necessary to train the agents, it is noted that a curriculum is set out below and the length of time estimated to be consumed by the Bureau is approximately 67 hours. However, this time may be changed after the curriculum is reviewed by the Bureau Laboratory experts who possibly will revise the estimates. It is felt that all agent trainees can work a ten-hour day, classes continuing from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., with appropriate lunch and dinner hour.

Referral/Consult

The curriculum of the training to be handled by the FBI is as follows:

Begin here → 1. Indoctrination of Agents

- a. Give purpose of stay-behind network.
- b. Obligation of agents to the country.
- c. The necessity for the network.
- d. The determination of the country, the military and the principal to hold Alaska.
- e. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
- f. Suggested time for training --- one hour.

2. Organization of Espionage System

- a. General background of informant networks.
- b. Outline of the various types of espionage systems.
- c. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
- d. Suggested time of training --- 5 hours.

3. Russian Military System of ferreting out Espionage Agents and How to Avoid Same.

- a. Background of Russian Internal Security System.
- b. Background of Russian formed espionage system.
- c. Russian military procedure in invaded territory.
- d. Soviet personalities
- e. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
- f. Suggested time of training --- 8 hours.

4. Basic Training in Use of Russian Dictionary.

- a. Provide the trainees with inexpensive, but adequate Russian-English dictionaries.
- b. Place accent on Russian military terms.
- c. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
- d. Suggested time of training --- 16 hours.

5. Codes for Radio Correspondence

- a. Radio correspondence ground to plane.
- b. Radio correspondence between agent and principal.
- c. Suggested number of trainees --- selected agents.
- d. Suggested time of training --- 10 hours.

6. Secret Writings and Written Codes

- a. Types of secret inks.
- b. How agent can manufacture secret inks.
- c. Use of reagents.
- d. Suggested number of trainees --- selected agents.
- e. Suggested time of training --- 8 hours.

7. Cover stories, Pretexts, Deception and Security

- a. Need for identity and necessary reason for agents presence in a particular locality.
- b. Methods of advising principal if agent has been identified as such, corrupted and forced to operate as double agent.


- c. Methods of concealing secret codes, maps, implements and supplies.
 - d. Methods of destroying espionage gear to avoid detection and same falling into hands of enemy.
 - e. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
 - f. Suggested time of training --- 8 hours.
8. Methods for Agents to Use in Selecting and Training Sub-Agents and Informants
- a. Necessity for security.
 - b. Careful direction for exact mission.
 - c. That agent divulge no data regarding the stay-behind agent network.
 - d. Care in selecting sub-agents and informants.
 - e. Availability of desired information to sub-agent or informant.
 - f. Methods of transmitting information from sub-agent to agent.
 - g. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
 - h. Suggested time of training --- 10 hours.
9. Administration of Plan from Agents Point of View
- a. Data re food caches to which he will have access.
 - b. Data re materials needed.
 - c. How to request needed equipment and supplies.
 - d. Suggested number of trainees --- all agents.
 - e. Suggested time of training --- 1 hour.

To have

It is suggested that the Bureau review the above outlined curriculum to determine whether in its opinion all subjects for which the Bureau is responsible have been covered and elaborate upon or delete from the subjects set out.

Referral/Consult


AN File 65-298



Supplies and Equipment

With reference to supplies and equipment for that portion of the training for which the FBI is responsible, it is suggested that the curriculum contained in this memorandum be reviewed with the Laboratory experts who are qualified to advise concerning such matters.

The supplies and equipment necessary for stocking caches for stay-behind agents will, of course, vary according to the needs of the individual agent. This matter



Payment of Agents

Referral/Consult

It is believed that the payment of agents should be handled individually and every effort should be made to obtain their services at the least possible expense to the Bureau. However, the first thing to be considered in the way of expenditures of this nature is for transportation of agents to the training school, housing and board while the agents are in school and in a number of instances the agents will have to be reimbursed

*See Ref. to
Quincy
12-19-50*

AN File 65-298

b2
b7E

for money lost during the time they are away from their respective businesses. In Bureau letter of reference dated November 29, 1950 it was stated that during recruitment and training stages of the program expenses could be handled on an individual basis and paid as are the regular confidential informants in the field. In this regard it is noted that the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This, of course, is not adequate. By way of giving the Bureau an insight on possible expenditures, a few necessary items and their expense are noted below:

Plane fare from Nome to Anchorage and return ---- \$108.00 without tax.
Plane fare from Fairbanks to Anchorage and return -- \$60 without tax.
Plane fare from Kodiak to Anchorage and return --- \$63 without tax.
Hotel reservations in Anchorage --- \$5.00 to \$7.00 daily.
Meals in Anchorage (average) --- \$6.00 to \$8.00 per day.

It was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This office is continuing to give this matter diligent attention.

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: February 13, 1951

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Kohn	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

Referral/Consult

PURPOSE

To advise of [redacted] concerning the Stay-Behind Agent Program and the Escape and Evasion Program in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

BACKGROUND

As you know the Bureau [redacted] responsible for the developing of a Stay-Behind Agent Program and an Escape and Evasion Program in Alaska. The Anchorage Office is presently recruiting Stay-Behind Agents to be used in the event of an invasion of Alaska. Plans for the Escape and Evasion Program are in-

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A series of conferences have been held by Supervisor Edward S. Sanders and [redacted]

ESS:lae

60 MAR 19 1951

RECORDED - 114

65-59264-76

EX-37

Referral/Consult

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/HBW
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
PSC 66A 12/1/98

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

My memorandum to you dated January 6, 1951, discussed in detail the recommendations made by the Anchorage Office concerning training for Stay-Behind Agents. Reference memorandum recommended this matter [Redacted] [Redacted] and made certain comments concerning each of the proposals of the Anchorage Office. Supervisor Sanders has discussed this suggested curriculum [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

In connection with the suggestion of the Training Division that the Bureau [Redacted] to give that portion of the training which the Bureau has agreed to furnish,

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]


The SAC at Anchorage has noted that

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult



RECOMMENDATION

Referral/Consult

The foregoing is for your information. It is noted that instructions have been given to Supervisor Sanders to place this matter on the next IIC Agenda in order that the Director can advise the other IIC members of the progress made. This matter will be closely followed and you will be kept advised of developments.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "J. B. Sanders".

SAC, Anchorage PERSONAL ATTENTION

February 27, 1951

Director, FBI

AIR MAIL

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-22-94 BY SP12 BTJ/SC
342251

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 114

65-59264-77

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

If not already done, you should
contact [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

For your information, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

A conference was held with [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

ESS:ejj:pam

65 MAR 13 1951
FEB 27 1951
COMM - FBI

Handwritten signatures and initials: LTR, CFB, W/S, VPKA, WS

You will be kept currently advised of the developments
of this program insofar as it pertains to Headquarters coordination.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: February 26, 1951

FROM : A. H. Belmont *ahb*SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASIONALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-22-94 BY SP12BJR/SP
342251

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

PURPOSE:

Referral/Consult

To advise that [redacted]

To recommend that the Bureau

interpose no objection to [redacted]

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

As you are aware [redacted] on
October 25, 1950, was advised that the Bureau agreed in principle

[redacted]

As of today, 41 individual residents of Alaska have been investigated, recommended and have agreed to act as Stay-behind Agents in the event Alaska is invaded. This ground work has been done by the Anchorage Office. The development of this phase of the program is continuing until such time as [redacted] the Bureau agrees that the coverage is adequate.

Referral/Consult

It will be necessary to train these persons in order to prepare them for operations, and the Bureau has agreed to participate in the training [redacted]. The majority of the subjects considered, because of the military nature of this undertaking, [redacted] the Bureau has agreed to furnish instruction relative to "Russian Military System of Ferreting Out Espionage Agents," "Secret Writing and Written Codes," "Deception and Security," and "Methods for Agents to Use in Selecting and Training Sub-agents and Informants." The subject matter for which the Bureau has recognized responsibility can be given in Alaska. Conferences are presently being held [redacted] through the Liaison Section as to whether the Bureau will [redacted] to handle the Bureau's subjects, or whether the Bureau will provide FBI personnel to give the instruction directly to the selected Stay-behind Agents in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

65-59264

WTB:jvs

RECORDED - 114
EX-3765-59264-77
FEB 28 1951

WFO

Referral/Consult

In the above [redacted]

Referral/Consult

The above examples are being brought to your attention so that you will be aware of the proposed action on the part of [redacted]

Referral/Consult

It has been the Bureau's position since the inception of this program, that Stay-behind Agents should be trained individually and that they should not know the identity of one another.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] the Bureau's opinion that these agents should be trained individually in order to preserve security and identity.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Bureau interpose no objection to the proposed plan of [redacted] as long as these persons are transported and instructed individually.

Referral/Consult

John J. Joyce

SAC, Anchorage

January 31, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-22-94 BY SP12 BTG/SC
342251

Referral/Consult

Bureaulet December 13, 1950 transmitting [redacted]

[redacted] It is noted that you requested that the entire matter of radio communication be studied by the radio men in the FBI Laboratory and that their comments and observations be made available to the Anchorage office.

There are transmitted herewith two copies of a blind memorandum reflecting results of the study made of this matter by the Radio and Electrical Section of the Laboratory.

Referral/Consult

Your attention is directed to Bulet to Anchorage dated November 29, 1950 wherein you were advised that [redacted]

In connection with your suggestion that discussions be held with [redacted] in order that the mobile unit can be used [redacted] this is to advise that instant matter will not be discussed [redacted] at the present time. The suggestions made by you relative to proposed radio communications for Stay-behind Agents will be [redacted] at SCG and you will be advised of the [redacted] in this regard.

Enclosures
65-59264

b7D
Referral/Consult

cc - Keay

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____

COMM-FBI
FEB 1 1951
MAILED 207 600M

RECORDED
EX-10

FEB 1 4 49 PM '51
RECEIVED TRAINING ROOM
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

SAC, Anchorage

March 6, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
CONCENTRATION IN ALASKA IN
THE EVENT OF INVASION

There are transmitted herewith two photostatic copies of an article entitled "The Russians in Alaska's History" which appeared in the February 24, 1951 issue of The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, a weekly publication prepared by The Joint Committee on Slavic Studies.

The above is submitted for your information and as of possible interest in connection with captioned program.

65-59264

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12 BTB/LS

Enclosures

WTB:mem

RECORDED - 25

INDEXED - 25

MAR 7 1951

EX-22

ENCLOSURE
25
1-22

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

MAR 16 1951

79
2/13

76
11/4
CH
11/3

The Russians in Alaska's History

THE TRUTH ABOUT ALASKA. (By G. Agranat and M. Cherenko. Literaturnaya gazeta, Jan. 9, p. 2. Complete text.) A voluminous book lies before us. Published: Stuttgart, 1950. Author: Fritz Bartz, professor at Kiel University. Theme: Alaska, past and present.

The interest in Alaska manifested in Stuttgart may appear rather strange at first glance. Really, don't the professors of Trizonia have more vital food for speculation closer at hand? But upon dipping into Bartz' book it becomes quite evident that it was made to order. The guise of a "scholarly work" conceals American propaganda's current forgery.

Distorting history with the zeal of a lackey, Bartz disputes the generally recognized priority of the Russians in the original discovery and exploration of Alaska and defames the Russian settlers. He asserts without a shade of embarrassment that, in alleged contrast to the Spaniards (?) and the Anglo-Saxons (?), the Russians left nothing in Alaska, after a rule of more than a century, except wretched huts for fur collection.

In recent years the U.S. press has reverted time and again to the subject of Alaska. Having turned Alaska into a "land aircraft carrier" and a military base for aggression against the Soviet Union and the countries of the Pacific, the American imperialists are not averse to adorning themselves in the toga of civilizers and patrons of culture.

Revising history in retrospect, the American imperialists portray matters as though the Yankees had saved Alaska from "Russian barbarism," brought it the benefits of notorious "Western civilization" and developed the Alaskan economy.

It is for this purpose that the learned lackey from Kiel University has now been enlisted.

But authentic history and the true facts are not on the side of the Yankees and their lackeys.

I. — When the Russian Grigory Shelikhov founded the first Russian settlement on Kodiak Island in Three Saints Bay at the end of the 18th century, no West European had set foot in the vast northern expanses of the American continent beyond the 140th meridian.

From the very first days of their settlement in Alaska, the Russians began to show the indigenous inhabitants the "potentialities and advantages" of agriculture and of Russian buildings, dress and food. From the Russians the Indians learned to cultivate gardens and sow grain. Shelikhov opened a school in Alaska for children of the Indians and Aleuts. "I must render this people their due for their keen intelligence," he wrote, "for their children have quite rapidly... learned to speak Russian so that they can be understood without difficulty."

Shelikhov was the first to found large civilized settlements in the American North and to develop crafts and trades. Alexander Baranov, the first governor of the Russian American possessions, succeeded in carrying out Shelikhov's plans. He founded Russian settlements in various places in Alaska and built the city of Novo-Arkhangelsk, the capital of Russian America, on Sitka Island.

The beginnings made by Shelikhov and Baranov were followed up by Kupreyanov, Wrangel, Tebenkov and other rulers of Russian American possessions.

"A considerable amount of iron ore has been found," wrote Baranov in one of his reports, "and iron has been forged as an experiment. There is thus hope of creating iron foundries useful to the fatherland." Later coal was discovered; in the middle of the 19th century more than 20,000 poods were mined monthly. Mica was found in Kenai [Cook] Inlet and copper along the Copper River. Bells cast by the Russians of Alaskan copper still hang in Cal-

fornia churches.

Numerous workshops in the Russian settlements smelted metals and forged all sorts of tools. Cloth was produced from native raw materials. Sawmills, flour mills and tanneries were in operation. Ships that sailed to Hawaii, China and the Philippines were built in the dockyards. Steamships, the first built on the entire Western coast of America, were turned out in Novo-Arkhangelsk in the 1830s. Not a single part was imported for these vessels; everything, including the engines, was produced on the spot.

The Russians tirelessly studied the country in which they lived. Fearless explorers, accompanied by Indian warriors, crossed the mountain ranges and penetrated deep into Alaska. By the middle of the 19th century the Russians had produced maps and atlases of the northwestern coast as far as San Francisco.

Pharmacies, a hospital, a theater, an extensive library and a large picture gallery existed in Novo-Arkhangelsk as early as the beginning of the 19th century. From 1841 an observatory was in operation here; the reports of its observations were published in the Annals of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences.

It is characteristic that Indians and Creoles (children of mixed marriages) studied along with the Russian children in the schools of Russian America. In addition to providing a general education, the schools gave training in crafts, trades and business. The more gifted youngsters, including Creoles, were sent to St. Petersburg for further study. It is also illuminating that Creoles occupied important positions in the service of the company, even as heads of departments (districts) and ships' captains.

Even foreign visitors, not in the least interested in singing the praises of the Russians, were obliged to write:

"I was pleasantly surprised when I saw the peace and harmony in which the Russians live amidst these uncouth children of nature. Having conquered them, the Russians exercised their influence not by instilling [in the natives] fear of their conquerors, but, on the contrary, by gaining their love through favorable treatment*** The Russians are on a quite friendly footing with all the inhabitants of this land***" (Vancouver, the British explorer of the end of the 18th century.)

Of course, there were also dark sides to the life of Russian America. The directors and the aristocratic grandees ensconced in the St. Petersburg administration wallowed in speculative operations and took little interest in the everyday life of a handful of Russians forsaken across the ocean.

There were two Russias: the Russia of the serf-owning landlords and the Russia of the people, the democratic Russia. The settlers who came to the Russian overseas possessions belonged overwhelmingly to this second Russia. Those who emigrated across the ocean came from the northern provinces, where there was no serfdom, or were Siberian peasants of soldiering folk, with a considerable number of runaway serfs among them who had suffered under serfdom and hated it fiercely. The settling of Alaska by the Russians bore a clearly marked laboring and democratic character dissimilar to the trading and plundering colonization by the Anglo-Saxons, who recruited their agents from among tramps, adventurers and criminals.

II. — Bartz is silent about the fact that by the middle of the 19th century Alaska lay athwart one of the chief routes of American expansion. The Russians were obstructing American capitalism from consolidating its positions in the Pacific. That is why the Russian possessions in America became a mote in the eye of the American states. The history of Russian Alaska is also the story of how the Yankees

drove northward to menace Russia, China and Japan from the North.

The foreign pirates and poachers, mostly British and American, incited the Indians against the Russians. Schooners were dispatched to the coasts of Russian America. There was not a single pound of grain aboard these vessels. Their cargo consisted of rum, alcohol, whiskey and guns. Foreign merchants flagrantly violated the trade agreements that pledged them to deliver food and various goods. American whalers arrogantly descended upon the banks frequented by sea animals.

The Tsarist diplomats pursued a policy of concessions with respect to Russia's overseas possessions. In 1867, taking advantage of the weakening of Russia as a consequence of Tsarism's defeat in the Crimean War, the United States bought Alaska for a paltry sum—five cents a hectare.

As far back as in 1868 Congressman R. G. Walker declared that "in the final struggle for world domination the Pacific will hold the deciding role. The acquisition of Alaska and the Aleutians brings America halfway to China and Japan. Only shortsighted individualists and pranks who wish to see the U.S. western frontier on the Ohio can object to this acquisition."

From the moment they took possession of Alaska, the Americans treated it as a conquered and occupied colony. Alaska was completely turned over to the military. Companies of whalers and trappers worked hand in hand with the military. The slaughter of whales brought mass starvation and caused the Eskimos to die off. The herd of many million fur seals in the Pribilof Islands was reduced to 125,000 by the beginning of the 20th century. The sea otter was almost entirely killed off. The manufacturing and farming enterprises created by the Russians were almost completely put out of existence. "In Sitka," writes Bancroft, "many buildings turned into ruins*** The port was likewise ruined*** The arrival and departure of the mail boat were the only events breaking the lethargy of the inhabitants of once flourishing Novo-Arkhangelsk."

The noted American historian Dole had every reason to write: "There are few who will read the history of Alaska between 1867 and 1897 without indignation."***

Even in those years Alaska interested the Americans primarily as a political-military springboard, as a base for expansion to be used against the countries of the Pacific and, above all, Russia. From Alaska, back at the end of the 19th century, smugglers, traders' agents and all manner of spies, not infrequently disguised as "Arctic explorers," carried out their marauding on Chukotka and Kamchatka. From Alaska the U.S. railway magnates, headed by the

elder Harriman, father of the notorious warmonger, early in the 20th century wished to extend a railroad trunk line into Siberia (via a tunnel under the Bering Straits) in order, first economically, then by military seizure, to detach the very rich regions of northeastern Russia. From Alaska, in the Soviet era, the American-Canadians sought to seize the Soviet island of Wrangel.

III.—Bartz devotes more than half his work to the present-day economy of Alaska. He is enthusiastic about the "friendship" between the American colonizers and the indigenous population, evidently meaning by this word "friendship" the ruthless racial discrimination and the gradual extermination of the Indians and Aleuts.

It is futile to seek in this book an answer to why Alaska's economy has been steadily degenerating since the famous "gold rush" and "copper boom." The Americans themselves note that in the past ten or 15 years gold mining has dropped 86% and the fish catch 50%. Has Alaska's natural wealth been exhausted? Or is the U.S.A. short of manpower to exploit these natural resources?

No, these are not the reasons. The riches of Alaska, in the past as today, interest the American monopolies only insofar as they can be looted unhindered and without contributing to the economic development of the land. Today the monopolists see no profit in development of Alaska's economy because the transformation of this territory into a military camp promises to be infinitely more profitable. Even before the beginning of the American adventure in Korea, according to data of the Alaska Weekly, 54% of the able-bodied population was engaged in nonproductive branches of the economy associated with military requirements.

Dozens of air bases and airfields equipped for bombers have been created in Alaska. Annual maneuvers are held in which large units of the army and navy take part.

Latterly the Americans have turned from plans for using Alaska as a base of aggression to direct action: troops and military cargo are now being shipped to Korea via airfields in Alaska and the Aleutians. According to information in the Alaskan press, more than 120 four-motored transports are engaged in these shipments.

Alaska thus has already become in fact a "land aircraft carrier," a springboard of aggression, in the gory adventure precipitated by the American fascists on the fields of Korea.

Such is the truth about Alaska, its past and present, the truth which the Yankees and their obliging lackeys strive to conceal.

SAC, Anchorage

February 28, 1951

Director, FBI

~~SECRET~~

**PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION**

There is transmitted herewith one photostatic copy of a self-explanatory communication, marked "Secret," dated [redacted] together with one photostatic copy of the enclosure referred to in that communication.

The above is forwarded as of possible interest in connection with captioned program.

Enclosure

Referral/Consult

65-59264

#TB:jpa

~~cc - 100-343044-718~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/28/98 BY SP12 BTJ/SC
342-251

7/1/99
CLASSIFIED BY SP4/bjt/tlw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
Per OGA let dated 7/20/98.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

165-59264
NOT RECORDED
144 MAR 30 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

~~SECRET~~

100-343044-718
ORIGINAL COPY

MR. A. H. BELMONT

February 28, 1951

MR. C. E. HEYRICH

MAJOR SAMUEL P. PORZILLERI

342251
2-7-51 SP-287318C

SAC Foster of Indianapolis advised me today that while he was in Washington he contacted an old friend and classmate, Major Samuel P. Borzilleri, who can be reached through Government Code 131, extension 65454, or at his home, ORdway 4543. Borzilleri, according to Foster, during World War II was in charge of an Escape and Evasion Program operating out of Italy which was active in recovering downed flyers in enemy territory, much of which is Iron Curtain country.

Referral/Consult

Borzilleri indicated to Foster that he was recently contacted [redacted]

[redacted]

Foster stated that Borzilleri is dependable, although temperamental, and some of the stories that he tells sound bizarre. Foster said, however, he does not believe Borzilleri would relate any stories which were not factually correct. He believes Borzilleri has a wealth of information regarding escape of evasion tactics; that he gained the impression that Borzilleri expects to be contacted by American Intelligence Agencies in order that the information in his possession may be utilized.

Foster stated that he indicated to Borzilleri the Bureau would probably be interested in information in his possession and stated that if an Agent contacts him that it should be specifically stated that the contact is a result of his previous conversation with Foster.

OBSERVATIONS

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

In connection with the Bureau's Stay Behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs of Alaska, and further in view of the allegations regarding [redacted]

CEH:cew

Referral/Consult

NOT RECORDED
133 APR 28 1951

[redacted] it is felt that
Borsilleri should be interviewed by a well-qualified Agent
in order to obtain from him such information as he may have.

Referral/Consult

It is noted that the Field generally is not cognizant of the Bureau's activities in the Stay Behind Agent and Escape and Evasion Programs. For this reason, it is felt that the Supervisor in the Espionage Section handling this Program should conduct the interview with Borsilleri.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Supervisor William T. Baker be authorized to contact Borsilleri and interview him without disclosing to him the fact that the Bureau is conducting a Stay Behind Agent Program in Alaska. At the same time he should obtain from him any information regarding [redacted] together with information which he mentioned to Foster regarding [redacted]
[redacted]

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(3-8-51) (u)

NR 081945

5522 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. REBURAD (FEBRUARY 20) LAST. ALL REPORTS CONTAINING PHRASES TO BE DELETED HAVE BEEN CORRECTED AND RE-SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. FIFTY-ONE PERSONS HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED TO DATE, RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. AUTHORITY HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM BUREAU ON 30 OTHERS. THESE HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED AND AGENTS PRESENTLY ON ROAD TRIP ATTEMPTING CONTACTS. IT IS NOTED A NUMBER OF THESE ARE UNAVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEWS AT THIS TIME, BEING IN THE STATES OR IN SOME ISOLATED SECTION. REPORTS ON 13 ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU AND AWAITING AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. REBULET (FEBRUARY 27) LAST. DIRECTING DISCUSSIONS WITH

MATTER WILL BE HANDLED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS RETURN.

RECEIVED

(3-8-51) (u)

5:26 PM

6-14-2000

SP3-BTS/pm

VAM

CO-1164

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 143

EX - 99

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65-59264

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(3-1-51) (u)

NR 012115

7:16 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

RE STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 49 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL
 STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. AU-
 THORITY REQUESTED TO INTERVIEW 21 ADDITIONAL PERSONS, CASES AS-
 SIGNED AND EFFORTS BEING MADE TO CONTACT AND HANDLE. PRELIMINARY
 REPORTS SUBMITTED ON 26 OTHERS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUREAU
 AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. ANCHORAGE MEMORANDUM DATED 27 INSTANT (u)
 FORWARDED SETTING OUT DATA REGARDING [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

RECEIVED:

(3-1-51) (u)

7:32 P.M.

MML

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

6/22/94
 SP3-BTS/JM
 542251

6-14-2000

SP3-BTS/JM

00-1164

RECORDED - 92

43

65-57260-82
 (u)

5-48

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
 outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
 order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

66 MAR 27 1951

(u)

65-59264

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(3-15-51)

NR 151826

2:24 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, RE STATUS REPORTS. 60 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL
 STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU.
 RESULTS OF CONFERENCE WITH [REDACTED]

RECEIVED

(3-15-51)

2:30 P.M.

LL Referral/Consult

(U)

6-14-2000

SP3-BTS/JM

per OGA LETTER 7-20-98 #00-1164

CLASSIFIED BY SP4 bjs/Hdw
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
 per OGA letter dated 7/20/98.

6-14-2000 SP3 BTS/JM 00-1164, 7/20/98, 7/20/98

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
 outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
 order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic system.

60 APR 4 1951

65-59264

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(3-22-51)

NR 230005

8:41 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 65 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS RE THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. 50 ADDITIONAL PERSONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND CASES RE THEM CLOSED AS BEING NOT QUALIFIED. 13 ADDITIONAL PERSONS REMAIN ON WHOM BUREAU HAS GIVEN AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW BUT THESE HAVE BEEN UNAVAILABLE FOR VARIOUS REASONS SUCH AS BEING IN STATES OR IN COMPLETELY ISOLATED AREAS. CONTINUED EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO CONTACT THESE. 6 ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO BUREAU AND THIS OFFICE AWAITING FURTHER AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. MATTER CONTINUES TO RECEIVE PRIORITY.

RECEIVED

(3-22-51)

8:51 P.M.

LL

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

6-14-2000

SP3-BTS/ML

00-1164

6-22-94
 Classified to SP2BTS/SC
 Declassify on: OADR 542251

MAR 29 1951

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

60 APR 4 1951

65-59264

SAC, Indianapolis

March 15, 1951

Director, FBI

MAJOR SAMUEL P. ~~FOREILLERI~~
SOURCE OF INFORMATION

There is attached a copy of a memorandum prepared at the
Seat of Government which reflects the results of an interview conducted
with the above-captioned individual. This is being furnished to you for
your information.

Enclosure

~~65-59624~~

By R. L. C. Agent (B)

WAB:jo

RECEIVED DIRECTOR
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
MAR 15 5 21 PM '51
6/22/94 SP12 BTJ/S
342251

26 85

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 2, 1951

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASIONALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-22-94 BY SP12BTR/STP

342251

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____PURPOSE:

To summarize progress being made by the Anchorage Office, and to suggest that the observations of SAC Williams relative to the necessity of implementing this program during the summer months of 1951 be brought to the attention of OSI headquarters.

BACKGROUND:

By letter dated February 13, 1951, the Anchorage Office set forth a recapitulation of the Stay-behind Agent Program as follows:

Strategic Areas

Referral/Consult

Stay-behind Agents

In considering individuals as potential Stay-behind Agents, the Anchorage Office is enlisting the assistance of persons who are in good health, loyal, and who are, according to confidential informants and contacts, reliable. Their knowledge of the territory where they reside and their ability to survive in the "back country" are taken into consideration. Where possible, those individuals who have had experience in operating short wave radios, have "ham" licenses and who either own or can fly airplanes are considered. Persons who have had experience in caching supplies, mushing dog teams, and who are experienced in handling small boats are being sought. Persons who own or have access to cabins located in secluded and strategic areas, those who live on and can observe highway and railroad traffic are likewise being considered for use in connection with the captioned matter.

Referral/Consult

A numerical goal has not been set, however the enlistment and development of Stay-behind Agents will continue in Alaska until the Anchorage Offices of FBI determine that coverage is adequate and the Bureau

50 APR 9 1951
WTB:jvs

RECORDED - 49

APR 5 1951

3

103

Forty-one Stay-behind Agents have been investigated, agreed to act and have been recommended by the Anchorage Office for use in this program. Thirty-one individuals under consideration have not been recommended due to reasons of health, personal habits, security or indications reflecting they intend to leave the territory in the event of invasion.. Authority has been given to Anchorage to contact approximately 65 additional prospects and the development of this phase of the program is continuing. The Anchorage Office has pointed out that 60 degree below-zero weather has hampered operations somewhat in effecting some contacts, and in some instances, it will be necessary to make contact with these individuals when they make their annual visit to "the city."

The Anchorage Office has recommended that during the period of training, efforts be made to fingerprint and photograph these Stay-behind Agents. This procedure appears to be sound and will be considered in connection with the training program.

Referral/Consult

Communications-Radio

As you are aware/

The Anchorage Office has pointed out that considerable time and effort will be necessary to transport radios, power units and necessary accessories to points of location in Alaska; that the summer is the only season which lends itself to this function. The Anchorage Office has further advised that almost a whole year will be lost if something is not done in this respect during the summer of 1951. SAC Williams likewise indicated that the only practicable time to carry in materials, build caches and draft maps of same is the summer season. It was stressed that if this project is not begun in the summer of 1951, it will necessarily have to be put off until 1952 with the resulting loss of approximately one year's time. SAC Williams has suggested that these matters be brought to the attention of

Caching

The Anchorage Office is in the process of compiling a dossier on the caching of supplies, arms, ammunition, gasoline, radios and other Arctic survival gear. The dossier will include the following:

1. Essential items to be cached

2. Places for caching
3. Manner of sealing cached materials
4. Mapping and Marking caches
5. Amount of caching materials .
6. Choosing cache locations and methods of transporting supplies to cache location
7. Building of caches.

Referral/Consult

SAC Williams stated that [redacted]

[redacted] nevertheless, he believes that time is of the essence and if the program in this respect is not accelerated and something done on it during the summer of 1951, it will have to be deferred until the summer of 1952 because of the weather, terrain and other evident obstacles natural to the territory of Alaska.

Life and Supply Line

Referral/Consult

The Anchorage Office is giving consideration to the establishment of a "lifeline" for the Stay-behind Agents. It is contemplated that it will be necessary to supply them from time to time with arms, ammunition, food, clothing and other necessary gear essential to their existence. The Anchorage Office is making a study of the most logical mountain passes, air routes and logical spots for landing by pontoons, skis and wheels. SAC Williams has pointed that although it is contemplated that [redacted]

[redacted] the Anchorage Office, nevertheless, is going ahead compiling data on the subject which can be utilized at a later date.

Liaison between FBI [redacted] in Alaska

1 SAC Williams has informed that [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Comment:

Referral/Consult

By Bulet to Anchorage 2-27-51. it was pointed out that



RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that through the Liaison Section, the observations of SAC Williams relative to the necessity of accelerating captioned matter in Alaska during the summer months of 1951 be brought to the attention of [redacted] to avoid the loss of a period of one year in its development and implementation.

Referral/Consult

It is likewise recommended that the observations and comments be obtained in this regard, and that inquiries be made as to



*also in this regard, see
Bulet to Anchorage 4-6-51
WS.*

Referral/Consult

SAC, Anchorage

April 5, 1951

Director, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT "ROSEY")

There are transmitted herewith two photostatic copies
of an article entitled "Russia Can't Take Alaska" written by
Father Bernard R. Hubbard, S. J., with Bill Davidson, which
article appeared in the March 31, 1951, issue of Collier's Magazine.

The enclosures are submitted for your information.

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

4/22/91 SP12878/50
342251

Attachment

65-59264

MB:emr

REC-134

EX-134

RECORDED - 134

APR 8 1951

- 88

RECEIVED

APR 5 5 11 PM '51
RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Russia Can't Take Alaska

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 17

British Columbia or the state of Washington.

The difficulty posed by an air attack would leave just one other alternative open to the enemy—to land forces on the barren coasts or in the wilderness, with the objective of advancing overland to take Anchorage and Fairbanks. And this, I contend, is absolutely impossible. Aside from the few inhabited areas, the Alaskan wilderness is so wild, so impenetrable, so deadly, that any military force would be engulfed and destroyed in it without our having to fire a single shot.

The Russians know this. The Alaskans know this. But the armchair strategists look at the map and continually discover easy avenues of invasion to the Anchorage-Fairbanks defense perimeters. Often, for instance, they hit on the undefended Alaska Peninsula which stretches invitingly toward Siberia and originates at Cook Inlet, at the head of which sits Anchorage.

This will give you some idea of what this "easy" invasion route is like:

Peninsula Expedition Fails

In the summer of 1928, I headed an expedition which tried to traverse the narrow neck of the peninsula for a distance of only 100 miles. For three months I went into training with a Swiss-American giant named Jack Koby and Santa Clara University football star Roderick Chisholm, and then we attempted to penetrate to the Valley of Ten Thousand Smokes, the site of a 1912 volcanic eruption. It had been visited by human beings only once before, when a National Geographic Society expedition broke through in 1916.

We cut inland from the Gulf of Alaska, intending to strike across the Katmai area and emerge on the Bering Sea slope of the peninsula. From the very first day, we got bogged down in a morass the like of which no modern army ever has seen.

We struggled through deserts of volcanic ash in which we sank to our knees with every step, and we nearly strangled from the constant dust in our nostrils. When we got through the ash, we fell into quicksands up to our armpits; and then we inched our way up uncharted precipices and across treacherous glaciers. We crawled through ghost forests destroyed by showers of volcanic acid, and every day we were drenched by torrential rains and flung about by sudden 100-mile-per-hour gales that rushed through the mountain passes from the Bering Sea. All this time there wasn't a trace of living game, and we existed on canned foods from the 120-pound packs we carried.

Finally we had to give up and turn back. We had spent the months of June, July, August and September on the expedition, and in all that time we had covered a grand total of 30 miles. We were three husky, well-trained men, unimpeded by extra equipment. A military force never could have penetrated beyond the first 10 miles!

Another favorite pastime of the armchair strategists is to look at the map and discover wide, flat, invasion corridors along the great east-west rivers of Alaska. They see the mighty Yukon, particularly, and wait that a mechanized enemy could land at the river mouth on the Bering Sea and roll directly up the flatlands to Fairbanks.

In 1939, I led an expedition up a similar Alaska river, the Noatak, which empties into Kotzebue Sound on the west coast and flows roughly west and south like the Yukon. The object of this expedition was to find out if the headwaters of the Noatak

originate anywhere near the Colville River which flows north to the arctic. Such a discovery would provide a pipe-line route down the two river valleys, and enable us to tap fully our potentially great oil fields at Point Barrow. This would prove invaluable to our defense, because Barrow is ice-locked 10½ months out of the year, while Kotzebue on the Bering Sea is open as a port all summer.

Again I rounded up the strongest men I could find and we started up the river in a flat-bottomed boat. This trip was pure torture. We ran aground on innumerable mud bars, and the river had so many tributaries that we never knew whether we were on the Noatak or on some dead-end branch. We turned around and hunted for the main channel time after infuriating time, and nearly every day we suffered an ice-water bath in a rapids or a whirlpool.

After six weeks of this, we made 150 miles—with the help of two trips back to the river mouth for additional gasoline and supplies. Then we set out on foot across the tundra. And this was where the real nightmare began.

The tundra or muskeg which covers about one fourth of Alaska consists of waist-deep water with long-rooted clumps of vegetation growing out of it. When you move across this swampland, you try to step from one clump of vegetation to the next, but more often than not you slip and fall into the water with your 100-pound pack.

While you are struggling along thusly at the rate of about a half mile a day, you are constantly surrounded by clouds of mosquitoes. These insects are so vicious that in the days of Russian rule in Alaska, a form of capital punishment was to stake a convicted criminal out in the wilds and allow the mosquitoes to bite him to death. There also are black gnats and tiny invisible insects, called "nosee-ums" by the Indians, which burrow into the skin around the hairline and cause violent infections.

In addition to this, the 100-mile-an-hour arctic storms hit you when you least expect them, pelting you with sleet and rain and loose rock, and knocking you flat with the fury of their blasts. In the face of all these tribulations, we made 20 miles in two months—and again the expedition had to be abandoned.

Problems That Confront an Enemy

Multiply that mileage figure by 30, and you will have some idea of the problems that would beset an enemy if he landed at the mouth of the Yukon and tried to roll up the "flat, open corridor" to Fairbanks—more than 600 miles upstream, with swamp and tundra nearly all the way.

Some armchair strategists have suggested that mechanized equipment could use the tundra like a highway when it freezes in winter. But again the map studiers are wrong. A thin coating of ice forms on the tundra with the first frost in September, but then the early snows act as insulation and the water underneath rarely freezes. As our own armed forces found out when they strayed more than a few yards from the Alcan Highway on the Operation Sweetbriar maneuvers last winter, the frozen tundra often can scarcely hold a sled, let alone a tank.

If Russian paratroopers were to land on the Kenai Peninsula and move up the Alaska Railroad to Anchorage, they would again face the tundra, plus some of the roughest mountains in the territory, with only one easily defensible route, Moose

Pass, leading through them. If they kept to the railroad tracks, they would be totally exposed to our air forces and could be bombed and strafed to destruction. The same thing would happen if they dropped on the Alcan Highway and moved toward Fairbanks from the rear. On the narrow strand of the road they would be bombed; off the road there would be the tundra and the mountains and the impenetrable forests.

They would find, moreover, that even the immediate vicinity of our cities and military bases is impassable. Just across Knik Arm from Anchorage, for example, the Susitna River marshes are as wild as the Yukon tundra, 500 miles away.

Elements Create Real Peril

In 1935, I was investigating unmapped volcanoes with an expedition just a few miles from Cold Bay in the Alaska Peninsula, now the site of a military airfield. Suddenly the sky turned pitch-black between the spires of the Aglileen Pinnacles. It was one of Alaska's terrifying, unpredictable storms, and the rains came down by the bucketful. Before we had time to think, whole mountainsides of rock and alder brush moved down on us, and the entire six-mile-wide valley where we were standing became a rushing torrent of water, 20 feet deep. We escaped because we managed to clamber onto a gravel bar, but a regiment caught in that valley would have perished—within artillery range of the airfield.

Even the long-settled Panhandle area paralleling British Columbia has terrain that is unbelievably wild, with uncharted mountains towering right down to the ocean's edge.

In 1927, for example, I was the first man to cross the Taku Glacier and discover what is now known as the Juneau Icecap, stretching all the way to Canada. This little expedition, into an area forbiddingly called "the Spirits' Home" by the Indians, took 76 hours, during which I had no sleep and lost 28 pounds. We were burned by the sun, nearly were killed a dozen times in broken-rock masses; and we finally had to be rescued by a Captain William Strong who courageously sailed up the savage Taku River to the point where he had guessed we would emerge.

The weird thing about all this is that it took place in a region just a few miles outside Juneau—in an area that was settled in the late 1700s.

It is no wonder that when the U.S. Navy set up a base on 100-mile-long Kodiak Island, it did so without fear of attack from the rear. For the interior of the island is so impenetrable that no enemy would possibly launch an attack across it.

When the Japanese occupied undefended Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands in World War II, they were still 2,500 miles from Anchorage and they got no farther, despite the fact that the territory was wide-open to any major attack.

We abandoned our air base at Nome, on the Bering Sea, recently, knowing that it would mean nothing to the Russians if they took it. With hundreds of miles of tundra and swamp between them and our Anchorage-Fairbanks fortress, they would be up a dead-end street—and they would be no more than 20 minutes' flying time beyond their own bases in Siberia.

The trouble with most American thinking about Alaska's military problems is that we consider them in terms of past wars, most of which were fought in inhabited

areas that had roads, farms and villages. From the time of Alexander the Great, armies have lived on the land as they advanced, hijacking vast quantities of food and booty from conquered populations. Even in World War II, communiqués contained lines like, "The Red Army advanced 50 kilometers in the direction of Dresden today, capturing 53 villages." It was the villages that were important—not the kilometers.

In most of Alaska, however, there are no villages to speak of, no food, and no roads—until you get to the built-up Anchorage-Fairbanks area. Alaska is about two and one half times the size of Texas; yet you could put the territory's entire population into Soldier Field, Chicago, and still have plenty of seats left over for general admission.

Alaska comprises 586,400 square miles. Scarcely 1,000 square miles, or less than one fifth of 1 per cent, are inhabited; and, according to Department of the Interior figures, only 12,000 acres, or the incredibly low total of 18 square miles, are under cultivation. Some 200,000 square miles consist almost wholly of impassable mountains, and 150,000 square miles are equally useless swamp and tundra.

Alcan Highway Construction Costly

There are only 591.1 miles of railroad in the entire vast area, and a miserly 2,926 miles of roads (compared with 195,812 miles of rural roads in Texas). Most of the roads are part of the Alcan Highway system—one of the most expensive experiments in the history of engineering. We used the best road-building equipment in the world and spent millions of dollars in constructing the Alcan, yet much of it still washes away when the arctic thaws descend on it each spring.

With all this, it is no wonder that of Alaska's 128,643 people, nearly all live within our Anchorage-Fairbanks defense perimeters, or in the Panhandle far to the southeast. Less than 1,000 Indians and 100 whites are strung out along the entire length of the Yukon River Valley in Alaska, and some 5,000 Eskimos are scattered in settlements along the Bering Sea and the Arctic Ocean coast lines.

These Eskimo communities, more than anything else, tend to prove my point. In 1938, I piled nine King Island Eskimos into a primitive walrus-skin boat called an umiak and traveled 2,000 miles in the open sea visiting every Eskimo settlement between Nome and Barter Island—to help prove scientifically that all Eskimos speak a common language.

A startling feature of this trip was that I found not a single Eskimo living more

Collier's for March 31, 1951

than 10 miles inland. After generations of experience, the natives have found that the interior of Alaska is too much of a death-trap even for them: in an area three times the size of Korea, there is not a single pound of food to be found.

And that's why I say an invading army would starve here in a week. To be sure, there might be an effort to supply it by air. But such an unprecedented air lift would be almost impossible. The supply aircraft would have to fly over 1,000 miles, through the most treacherous flying weather in the world, and it would be a simple matter for us to harass them with planes based in southeast Alaska and throughout the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

Suppose, however, that the impossible did occur, and the Communists took over Alaska and managed to subsist in a region that produces only 5 per cent of its own food. What would they do then? Presumably, their object would be to invade the United States from there, or bomb our big industrial centers. For either project, they would have to bring in military equipment in the same difficult manner. And there would be other, even more awesome, obstacles.

An invasion of the United States from Alaska could be launched over only one possible land route: the Alcan Highway—1,523 miles of exposed road winding through an impenetrable tangle of tundra and mountain, in Canada as well as Alaska. From Dawson Creek, British Columbia, the southeastern end of the Alcan Highway, there is another 470 miles before the invaders would reach the first town of any consequence—Edmonton, Alberta.

This means that for 1,993 miles—more than twice the distance from Berlin to Moscow—the invading army would be strung out over a narrow ribbon of road, exposed to air attack every foot of the way, and unable to take cover because of the tundra and mountains and forests on either side. And they still would be many miles from the heartland of North America.

It is scarcely credible that the Russians would want to use Anchorage and Fairbanks to bomb our industrial cities. A look at the map shows why. There are dozens of bases in continental Russia that are only a couple of hours farther by air from Detroit, Chicago and Seattle—with railroads and other arteries running directly from the Communist factories to the bombing planes.

It is equally incredible that the Reds would want to seize Anchorage and Fairbanks to keep us from using those bases to bomb Russia. A high-ranking Air Force general recently told me that Alaska is so difficult to supply that in the event of offensive war we would use it mainly as a rescue

station and emergency-landing base for planes returning from bombing missions. "It actually would be easier," he said, "to bomb Russia from Omaha than from Fairbanks."

This general agrees with me that the Russians are not likely to strike in Alaska. So do other authorities with whom I spoke when I was in the Territory a short time ago.

These experts are American Eskimos, who, in admirable defiance of Soviet edicts, paddled across the Bering Sea last summer to visit their relatives on the East Cape of Siberia. They told me that there are no offensive preparations at all in this area, which is immediately opposite Alaska. They saw antiaircraft batteries in the low-lying hills behind the coast, and they heard of purely defensive short-range fighter-plane airfields—with not a single major air base closer than Kamchatka, 1,000 miles away.

Moreover, their relatives told them that the Russians are afraid to build important installations in the East Cape area because it is too near large camps of slave laborers who might revolt and seize the bases in the event of war.

Why We Need Alaska

This leads to an important question: If Alaska is so worthless, why do we want it?

In the first place, it is absolutely necessary, from the purely defensive point of view, for us to maintain a solid line of outposts away from our shores. Today, our so-called Western Defense Perimeter begins at the North Pole and runs through Alaska and then down through Japan, Okinawa, Korea and Formosa. This protective belt consists of: (1) naval bases from which we can patrol our Pacific approaches against atom-bomb-carrying submarines; (2) air bases, to assist the naval patrol and provide fighter opposition against attacking enemy planes; and (3) in the case of Alaska, at least, a base for our great radar screen. The Russians don't need Alaska for their defense because they get even better protection, for their purposes, from a similar defense perimeter along the Siberian coast line.

In the second place, we must retain Alaska because of its future potentialities, which have been demonstrated so dramatically in the modern cities of Anchorage and Fairbanks and in the agricultural miracle that is the Matanuska Valley. There we now can raise almost anything that grows in New York State (with the exception of corn). In the 22-hour arctic summer daylight, moreover, the crops grow twice as fast, and huge specimens of melons and vegetables have been produced, despite the short three-month growing season.

Today, there are plans afoot that can convert several million additional acres of wasteland to this phenomenal agricultural production. I have proposed a project, for example, to dig a canal reuniting the great Kuskokwim and Yukon Rivers, which once were one stream similar to the Mississippi-Missouri river system. This would drain the surface water from the tundra and swamp of the vast Yukon basin and open up untold acres of rich bottom land, like the Mississippi delta, to the farmers. It also would stimulate settlement and road building up to the arctic mountain ranges, so that the now inaccessible mineral wealth of that region could be tapped for the first time. All these monumental plans, however, would take at least 100 years to fulfill.

The Russians, therefore, could conquer Alaska if they cared to wait until a century from now, when the territory could support a population of 15,000,000 people (and invading armies) as the result of the aforementioned projects.

Today, however, I would like nothing better than to see the entire Red Army attempt to conquer Alaska. The Russians would be swallowed up by the wilderness as surely as Almighty God caused the Egyptian army to be swallowed up by the Red Sea.

THE END



Russia CAN'T Take Alaska

By FATHER BERNARD R. HUBBARD, S.J. with BILL DAVIDSON

"The Alaskan wilderness is so wild, so impenetrable, so deadly, that any military force would be engulfed and destroyed in it without our having to fire a shot," says the famed Glacier Priest

Father Hubbard is a Santa Clara University geologist who has spent the last 25 of his 62 years exploring the unknown areas of Alaska and other polar regions. He is considered one of the world's foremost experts on the arctic. Recently he has been teaching survival techniques to armed forces personnel.

The subject of Alaska's military vulnerability is a controversial one. A great many authorities—including General Dwight Eisenhower and the Territory's Governor Ernest Gruening—feel that it is wide open to attack. Gruening last year testified in the Senate that "we could be taken by an airborne invasion of not more than two divisions."

Father Hubbard strongly opposes this view. Collier's presents his opinions here in the belief that his wide experience in the area entitles him to be heard.

16

ALASKA'S delegate to Congress, E. L. Bartlett, recently stated on a television broadcast that Russian paratroopers poised in Siberia could conquer Alaska's great air bases in 48 hours. At about the same time, there was a report from Taihoku, Formosa, that the Russians had massed 300,000 crack troops opposite Alaska, and were ready for an irresistible blitzkrieg on the territory.

This is tommyrot.

Such glorified rumors have become more and more persistent of late. Many of them are demonstrably silly.

A short time ago, an American pilot flew up the international date line in the Bering Sea along the 2 1/4-mile-wide strait separating Russian-owned Big

Diomed Island from American-owned Little Diomed. It was an exceptionally clear day and the pilot took an aerial photograph of the Soviet territory. The picture, published in Alaska's newspapers, caused international panic. For, according to the analysts, the photograph showed a military airfield across the sugar-loaf top of Big Diomed! The headlines screamed that this meant there were bombing planes and some 2,000 Russian soldiers massed just 2 1/4 miles from vital U.S. territory!

While the Big Diomed jitters were at their peak, I went to Little Diomed Island to fill in as a missionary for the famous Father Tom Cunningham, who had just been called back to service with the U.S. Army. With me was an Eskimo boy from the

Collier's for March 31, 1951

The Territory is just a jumble of lofty mountain ranges and impassable tundra, Father Hubbard declares. What appears to be an easy invasion route to Anchorage along the Alaska Peninsula is actually a volcanic morass; the "corridor" from the Bering Sea to Fairbanks is even worse; Alcan Highway is a deathtrap

mainland, a member of the Alaska Territorial Guard named Edward Magaluk. We kept staring at the bulk of Big Diomedede, and one day Magaluk said, "I smell a big fog coming. A good man could sneak across to Big Diomedede, have a look around, and get back before the fog lifts."

A half hour later, Magaluk was in his kayak, paddling silently through the pea-soup Bering Sea mists, toward the ominous humpbacked island that is Russia's closest outpost to the United States.

He hit the Big Diomedede shore and hid his kayak among the rocks. Then he scaled a 700-foot cliff and slipped between the two sentry posts we had studied through our binoculars. He cut back and forth over the grassy, three-square-mile area on top of the rocky hump of the island, and he peered into the island's sole government building, a stone hovel in which a handful of Russians were reading or working on weather reports. Just to be sure, Magaluk bisected the top of the island again, slipped into the Eskimo village on the far side of the hump, and counted the Russians in their sentry posts.

Finally, he paddled back across the narrow strait as stealthily as he had come. His report was what I had expected.

No Airstrip on Big Diomedede

"There is no airstrip on the island," he said, "and there are only 28 Russians, most of them civilian weather technicians." Later, government experts re-examined the aerial photograph and discovered that the airstrip was merely a light streak across the negative.

This incident typifies the fear complex we have built up about the Russians and Alaska. Scarcely a day goes by that someone does not claim the Soviets could walk in and take our great northern bastion at will in the event of war. I am not a military expert, but Alaska has been my scientific laboratory for 25 years—and to all of these scare stories I can only deliver a one-word answer: "Nonsense!"

For one thing, I do not think the Russians could capture Alaska if they wanted to. Secondly, I don't think the Reds are foolish enough even to want to invade the huge wasteland. For, contrary to general belief, the territory is not a land of gold and furs for the taking, but a subcontinent that is more than 99 per cent uninhabited wilderness. Gold and fur production, in fact, have declined by nearly half since their peak years earlier in the century, and the great natural resources are still untapped and undiscovered. Science unquestionably will change all this in future generations; but for the time being, Alaska as an offensive base is more a financial liability than an asset, even to us.

These statements may shock most Americans and I know they will bring down the wrath of the civilian military sages and politicians on my head—but they are opinions founded on a lifetime of exploration in a part of the world that has never even been visited by many of the armchair strategists.

My basic contention is this: our two mighty air bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks are the only Alaskan targets presently worthy of an enemy attack. Because these areas are so limited in size, Lieutenant General William E. Kepner has been able to draw all his forces into formidable, radar-protected defense perimeters around them. A direct airborne assault on either would be as suicidal as dropping paratroopers into the cone of an active volcano. The same thing holds true of bombing attacks—with the added factor that any bombed airfield normally can be put back into action in a matter of two or three days.

I firmly believe that if the Reds were strong enough in the air to attack Anchorage or Fairbanks, or the distant Juneau Panhandle region, they would be strong enough to by-pass Alaska altogether and land on the coast of (Continued on page 80)

Collier's for March 31, 1951



U.S. Little Diomedede Island (foreground) is less than three miles from Soviet Big Diomedede (rear)

PHOTO BY FATHER HUBBARD



Father Hubbard says Reds would find Alaska a liability if they did succeed in invading it

JOHN FLORES




Coast line at Tracy Arm shows problem confronting an enemy attacking by sea

PHOTO BY FATHER HUBBARD

Alaska Peninsula is tangled wilderness; 30-mile trip here once took Father Hubbard four months

U.S. ARMY PHOTO



Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(3-29-51) NR 292315

7:33 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 66 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS RE THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. 6 ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARY REPORTS BEING SUBMITTED AS SOON AS SAME CAN BE TYPED. EFFORTS CONTINUING TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW PERSONS AUTHORIZED FOR INTERVIEWS.

RECEIVED (3-29-51) 7:39 P.M.
 CORRECTED (3-29-51) 9:43 P.M.

LL

Referral/Consult

6-14-2000

SP3-BTS/JM

00-1164

RECORDED - SS

65-59264-89

APR 6

(u)

EX-123

cc: Mr. Baker

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

(u)

1-W6

APR 14 1951 (u)

65-59264


SAC, Anchorage

April 4, 1951

Director, FBI

**PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)**

A review of the following case files reflects that the Anchorage office was granted authority to contact the individuals named below in connection with this program as indicated but that no reports have been received at the Bureau indicating that the desired contacts have been made:



Bufile 62-93581

Bulet 1-17-51

" 62-93525

" 2-9-51

" 62-93527

" 1-12-51

" 62-93517

" 1-11-51

" 62-93522

" 1-11-51

Expedite these contacts and advise Bureau results immediately by submitting a report in the individual case file.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/94 BY SP11/TSP/STP
342251

✓ 65-59264

cc - 62-93581
62-93525
62-93527
62-93517
62-93522

RECORDED - 107

EX - 48

APR 7 1951

APR 11 11 25 AM '51

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

WTB:jef

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-93581-69

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI
RECEIVED READING ROOM
APR 4 3 36 PM '51

MAILED 13
APR 5 1951
COMM - FBI

b6
b7C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: March 15, 1951



~~SECRET~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Referral/Consult

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(65-59264)

34225
6122194
Declassify on: OADR

CLASSIFIED BY SP7 CIL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
DATE 5-1-89 REMAIN IN CLASSIFIED



JHW:MMA

65-298

COPIES DESTROYED

RECORDED - 121

EX-86

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

61 APR 14 1951

165-59264-97 ~~SECRET~~

MAR 30 1951

65-59264

Letter to the Director, FBI
March 15, 1951

~~P & C~~

~~SECRET~~
PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)



This matter continues to receive priority attention
in this office.

Referral/Consult

SAC, Anchorage

April 4, 1951

Director, FBI


PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Relet Anchorage to the Bureau dated 12-5-50 listing the names of the following individuals as potential Stay-behind Agents:



b6
b7C

Reference is also made to Anchorage radiogram to the Bureau dated 12-8-50 advising that the additional persons named below are being considered under this program:



b6
b7C

Expedite submission of preliminary reports on the above-named individuals.

65-59264

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/24/86 BY SP2 BTG/SC

WTB:Jef

RECORDED - 49

65-59264-92
APR 9 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

61 APR 14 1951
APR 5 1951
COMM - FBI

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
RECEIVED
APR 11 3 36 PM '51
15. MAY 3 1 14 PM '51

SAC, ANCHORAGE PERSONAL ATTENTION

April 6, 1951

DIRECTOR, FBI

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF EVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6/25/91 BY SP1A/BTS/SC

ReBulet January 2, 1951.

The proposed training program for the Stay-Behind

Agents has been

and the suggestions made in your letter of
December 5, 1950, were considered.

Referral/Consult

It is contemplated that the following training would
be given these individuals during a two-weeks' period while in
Washington at the rate of ten hours per day, six days per week:

RECORDED - 68

APR 9 1951

Total Hours

1. Radio training, codes, ciphers and
practice - 4 hours per day. (USAF)

2.

[Redacted]

Indoctrination of agents and
administrative procedures.

MAILED 10
APR 6 1951

COMM-REL

BSS:hke

65 APR 16 1951

Total Hours

Date	Time	Location	Description
10/10/2019	10:00	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	10:15	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	10:30	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	10:45	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	11:00	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	11:15	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	11:30	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	11:45	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	12:00	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	12:15	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	12:30	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	12:45	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	13:00	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	13:15	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	13:30	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	13:45	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	14:00	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	14:15	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	14:30	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	14:45	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	15:00	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	15:15	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	15:30	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	15:45	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	16:00	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	16:15	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	16:30	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	16:45	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.
10/10/2019	17:00	Barrage	Arrived at the Barrage, started the survey.
10/10/2019	17:15	Barrage	Completed the survey at the Barrage.

3. *FBI Training:*

Russian system of detection
and how to effect counter-
measures. 3

Secret writing, codes, etc. 8

Deceptive cover and security. 6

*Selection and training of
Sub-Agents and informants.* 3

Disarming methods	3
-------------------	---

Referral/Consult

It is contemplated that the above schedule should be flexible enough to adapt to the background and capabilities of the individuals involved. It is also contemplated that each individual will be available to the Bureau for training at the rate of four hours per day for one week of his two-weeks' stay in the Washington area. [REDACTED]

In connection with your suggestion for basic training in the use of a Russian dictionary, it has been determined that,

due to the difficulty of the language and the fact that invasion forces in Alaska would probably be made up of groups from the Siberian area who do not necessarily speak Russian, it is more feasible to substitute a course in the marking and identification of Soviet equipment, uniforms, etc.

Inasmuch as it is contemplated that a considerable number of Stay-behind Agents who are developed will be pulled out of Alaska in the event of an invasion to be used at a later date for special assignments in Alaska, it is considered necessary that training in parachute jumping be given to as many as possible of those individuals who will be sent back into Alaska.

Referral/Consult

The Bureau has been advised that

Your specific recommendations are desired relative to the financial aspects involved during the training phase of this program. It should be discreetly determined as to what type of short-term life and accident insurance is available in Alaska and the approximate cost involved. You should bear in mind that the maximum period of training for the Stay-behind Agents will not exceed six weeks in duration. Your comments are desired relative to the security involved in securing the insurance policies, that is, whether consideration should be given to taking out these policies in the United States or in Alaska. You should be most circumspect in making these inquiries and under no circumstances should you recommend a specific insurance company in subsequent contacts to the Stay-behind Agent.

It is likewise desired that you consider the question of remuneration and personal expenses involved for the individual Stay-behind Agent while he is receiving training. It is believed that no hard and fast rule can be set up in this regard but will depend upon the financial condition, family responsibilities, etc., of the individual involved. Transportation costs from residence in Alaska to the airport (USAF-Anchorage) and return, salary in lieu of customary earnings, personal expenses and insurance costs should be included in your study of this problem.

Referral/Consult

Advise the Bureau immediately of your observations, suggestions, and recommendations concerning the financial arrangements which you feel should be effected in this matter.

In the meantime, the administrative case files of the recommended Stay-behind Agents should be carefully reviewed to determine which individuals should first receive the necessary training, which ones will agree to come to the U. S. to receive same and which ones will be agreeable to receiving the parachute jump training. All factors should be carefully considered in this connection, especially the age, physical condition, and educational background of the individual. It is suggested in this regard that a representative number of Stay-behind Agents who are easily accessible be contacted relative to the proposed training program and efforts be made to determine their reactions relative to the proposed training in the U. S. and when they might possibly be available to receive the training. You should thereafter advise the Bureau immediately whether arrangements can be perfected by you with the Stay-behind Agents, whereby these individuals can proceed to Washington at the rate of two per week, traveling separately, beginning on or about April 25, 1951.

It is recalled that in your letter to the Bureau dated 2-7-51, information was set forth reflecting that military authorities in Alaska had informed you that the strategic areas in Alaska are Anchorage, Fairbanks, Seward, McGrath, Galena and Nome.

You are instructed to re-examine the problem of coverage in line with the recently defined strategic areas and submit your observations and recommendations to the Bureau as to whether the Stay-behind Agent coverage in the vicinities of the above named localities is adequate.

Referral/Consult

You should also prepare a list of the Stay-behind Agents who have been recommended by the Anchorage Office, contacted and agreed to act in connection with this program, said list being broken down geographically, and thereafter, discuss [redacted] the question of adequacy of coverage. The Bureau should be furnished with a copy of the list prepared in this regard [redacted] should be informed of the number of Stay-behind Agents developed to date in the strategic areas and apprised of their general qualifications. It will not be necessary to inform [redacted] concerning the identities of the individuals involved at this time; however, you should immediately inform the Bureau of your views as to when their identities should be made known to [redacted]

It is imperative that you give this matter immediate attention. A reply to this communication should reach the Bureau within six days of its receipt in the Anchorage Office, and should include your views, observations and recommendations in connection with the training program which is outlined herein.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 4/7/51

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

1-819

b6
b7C

Rebulet to Anchorage 4/4/51 entitled "Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Stay Behind Agent Program). Bureau File 65-59264.

It was determine, the correct name of this individual was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] However the case in this office has been closed. Upon receipt of reliable information that he [REDACTED] and was also hospitalized in [REDACTED] for [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

In addition it was reported he was extremely talkative, likes to impress people with his importance by talking, and it was suggested that he not be contacted regarding any confidential matter for this reason.

In view of this information no further consideration should be afforded this individual under this program.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12 BTJ/SC

66-396
SSP:HCW

RECORDED - 49

INDEXED - 49

165-59264-94
APR 11 1951

15

HANDLED BY

60 APR 18 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

RADIOGRAM

(e)(u) (u)
(APRIL 6, 1951)

(u) (u)
(CIPHER PAD CODE)

SAC, ANCHORAGE

DEFERRED (u)

STAGE. REURAD (APRIL FIVE) LAST. ADVISE DATES REPORTS AND
IDENTITIES SPECIAL AGENTS SUBMITTING SAME ON [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
SEE BULETS (MARCH TWENTY SIX) LAST RE [REDACTED]
SURAD.

b6
b7C

HOOVER

RECORDED - 66
WEB: JEM

65-59264-94

FILED BY SP3-BTS/m
OF 6-14-2010

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~

✓ C. G. Downing
D

00-1164107
20 20 7 35
061913.
cl. 7/10/50
2050-2120 (u)

APR 6 1 33 PM '51
RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
(u)

(u) (u)
Bureau Radio (4-6-51) 4:58 P.M. JSS

6/20/94
Classified by SP12-BTS/SPC
Declassify on: OADR 3/4/25/1

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

66 MAY 18 1951 (u)

C. P. S.
CHS

WFO

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

7/1/99
 CLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/HW
 DECLASSIFY ON: 1
 PER OGA letter dtd 7/20/98

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(4-5-51)

NR 052016

7:15 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

Referral/Consult

RE STAGE STATUS REPORT. SIXTY-SEVEN PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS REGARDING THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. LETTER DATED (SECOND) INSTANT WENT FORWARD OUTLINING PROGRAM OF [REDACTED] (u)

[REDACTED] REQUESTED BUREAU EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS ON WHOM PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED SO THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. [REDACTED]

RECEIVED: (4-5-51) (u) 7:53 PM

GLA

b6
b7c

SP3-BTJ/M

per OGA LETTER 7/20/98 #00-1164

RECORDED - 66

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: April 7, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT:

ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

b6
b7C

Rebulet to Anchorage dated April 4, 1951 entitled Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Stay Behind Agent Program). Bureau File 65-59264.

The case in this office has been closed and no further consideration may be given to as he is now deceased.

b6
b7C66-407
SSP:HCT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12 BTJ/RC

RECORDED - 49

INDEXED - 49

1/5-74/-95
APR 11 1951

15

60 APR 18 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 4/7/51

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

ADMINISTRATIVE - SBA PROGRAM

b6
b7C

Rebulet to Anchorage dated April 4, 1951 entitled Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Stay Behind Agent Program). Bureau File 65-59264.

The case in this matter has been closed by the Anchorage Office because of information received that [REDACTED] is the brother to [REDACTED] who is associated with [REDACTED] Anchorage File 87-185, who appears to be connected with a narcotics traffic in Fairbanks and is a known prostitute.

b6
b7C

In view of this information no further consideration should be afforded [REDACTED] under the instant program.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/91 BY SP12 BTJ/SJC

66-384
SSP:HCW

RECORDED - 49
INDEXED - 49

APR 11 1951

65-57244-96

Babik

173
APR 18 1951

98

SAC, Anchorage

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

RECORDED - 19

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Reurlet 4-11-51.

342251
SP12B TS 150
4/22/94

The suggestions and observations submitted in referenced letter have been reviewed, and based upon an analysis thereof, the following instructions are being issued:

1. The individuals residing in the strategic areas of Nome, Fairbanks and Seward, who have been recommended by the Anchorage office as Stay-Behind Agents for inclusion in this program, should be recontacted. The proposed training program should be briefly outlined and efforts made to determine when these persons will be available to receive training in the United States. It should be determined whether they will agree to participating in the parachute jump training.

The financial aspects of instant program should be explored. Although no specific offer, as such, should be made to these agents, it is suggested that their reaction be obtained concerning the following financial arrangements:

A. Remuneration of \$150.00 per week basic pay plus \$4.00 per diem for incidental expenses, if no jump training taken. This would include a period of approximately two weeks in Washington, D. C., plus air travel time from Alaska to the U. S. and return.

B. If participating in jump training, same as above for the first two weeks in Washington, D. C.

\$175.00 per week basic pay, plus same per diem as above, for the approximate 2-1/2 weeks during the jump training course.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____

6 MAY 11 1951
WFB:bjw

Referral/Consult

2. The same action as set forth above should be taken in connection with the Stay-behind Agents in Galena and McGrath, Alaska, as soon as the initial contacts have been made with these individuals.
3. Forward to the Bureau prior to May 10, 1961, a list of the reports on the Stay-behind Agents which you propose to disseminate to [redacted]. The identical dissemination will be made to [redacted]. You should personally deliver copies of the pertinent reports to [redacted] on the latter date. It is suggested in this regard that you discreetly inform [redacted] of the necessity of maintaining these reports in a safe and secure place, and that the contents of the reports be made available only to limited personnel in [redacted] which he may designate.
4. Continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents. It is not believed that a decision can be reached at this time as to whether the coverage is adequate, but will depend upon the number of agents already developed who will agree to come to the United States for training. It is quite possible that during the training some of these individuals will decline to act, either because of fear, or personal reasons. Although every effort must be made to keep this number to the minimum, it is believed such a possibility exists which would, therefore, perceptibly affect the adequacy of coverage.

For your information, arrangements are being made to photograph and fingerprint all trainees at the Bureau. The Anchorage office will be advised of the results of fingerprint checks and will be provided with copies of the photographs of the agents.

With reference to your suggestion that the Bureau consider the possibility of contacting the superiors of potential Stay-behind Agents in Government service, or in private industry, in order that requests can be made for

them to receive a leave of absence to attend training school, this is to advise that the Bureau recognizes the merit of your suggestion, however, it is believed that such procedure would possibly jeopardize the security of instant program. As you are aware, the Bureau has proceeded with this matter on the theory that the fewer people who are cognizant of the project, the better the chances are to maintain the development of this program confidential and keep the operation secure. The action suggested by you in this regard is not being approved. In the event one of the individuals selected cannot come to the U. S. for training without securing some type of clearance from his superior, the Bureau would only consider such action under unusual circumstances and in case the services of the individual are essential for the implementation of the program. Under no circumstances should a Stay-behind Agent be informed that the Bureau would intercede with his employer to secure such a desired clearance.

In the future, in submitting information reflecting contact with a Stay-behind Agent, the Bureau should be advised of the results thereof by a separate communication on every Stay-behind Agent so that all pertinent data relative to the individual will be contained in his administrative file. Information set forth in referenced letter, specifically pages 2, 3 and 4, which reflects contacts with the seven individuals mentioned therein, should be incorporated in the appropriate case files maintained in the Anchorage office. The same action is being taken at the Bureau.

You should continue to give all phases of this program your personal attention and keep the Bureau advised of all developments.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: April 11, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(65-59264)DECLASSIFIED BY SP12078/8C
ON 6/22/94
342251

Rebulet April 6, 1951.

There is set out hereinafter the information requested in referenced letter and observations concerning the training program.

It is believed that training the Agents in Washington and singly has a distinct advantage from a security angle, although it is quite possible that it will be a more expensive proposition.

With reference to caching, this office has advised the Bureau in Anchorage letter dated February 13, 1951, that we are presently compiling a dossier with reference to this operation. It will be accelerated and submitted to the Bureau at the earliest possible moment.

With reference to the short term insurance policy which the Bureau suggested in favor of each potential agent who goes into Washington for training, contact was had here with [redacted] Life and Accident and Health Department, Edward D. Corley Agency for the Continental Casualty Company and Continental Assurance Company in Anchorage. He was not, of course, advised in any way of the particulars of this program but was merely asked concerning short term insurance. He stated that it could, of course, be written but that his company as well as any other insurance company, would have to know the names of the insured, the age of the insured, as well as the risk involved. He said that his company would have to know if the insurance written was a program involving unusual risks or unusual circumstances. He said that insurance policies could be written on a confidential basis, in which event they could all be handled through one person. He continued that the shortest standard term insurance presently written by his company (and probably by other companies) is 5 years. The price of such insurance would, of course, depend on the risks involved and the age of the insured. It is suggested that insurance such as that contemplated by the Bureau, which will be of a confidential nature, could be best handled by a company in the States and probably in Washington, D. C.

COPIES DESTROYED

With regard to expenses during training, all potential Stay Behind Agents in the Anchorage area who were available were contacted and information obtained which would reflect on the cost of their training to the Government. These data are as follows:

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

JHW:MMA

65-298

Enclosure

RECORDED - 108

INDEXED - 108

APR 14 1951

15

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-59264

Letter to the Director, FBI
April 11, 1951
PFC

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

1 - FRANK B. MOORE, 621 15th Street, Anchorage

He advised that he is presently making a little over \$600 a month for a 6 day week, which days consist of 8 to 10 hours. He continued that he could go to Washington for training school consisting of 6 weeks at any time. He said that his family consists of a wife only. He owns his home here and is making payments on it. Hence, he felt that he should receive as much money for the time away from his job as he would earn if he were working. He has at the present time a \$15,000 life insurance policy. He stated that he would take parachute jump training if necessary. It is noted that he was born March 30, 1908, being 43 years of age. In addition to the remuneration noted above, he stated that he felt he should get approximately \$3 or \$4 daily for incidental expense money.

2 - [redacted] Anchorage

b6
b7C

Upon inquiry he stated that his only dependent was a wife. He said he would participate in parachute jump training if the same were included in the training program. He stated that his present income is approximately \$1000 per month. He is the proprietor and only attendant at his [redacted] and if he were called away from it he would have to [redacted] or get his wife to attend it while he was gone. If he could do this, he continued, she would have to obtain a leave of absence from her job with [redacted] to operate [redacted]. With reference to the date on which he could go to Washington, he said he could go at any time.

3 - [redacted] Anchorage

b6
b7C

[redacted] upon contact stated that his dependents are a wife and one child. He said that he could go to Washington at any time for training if he received two weeks notice. He said that he was willing to take parachute jump training but it is noted that he has a bad ankle. This probably would prevent him from participating in this training. With reference to expenses, he said that it would take \$700 per month to cover his expenses in Anchorage and his salary loss from his job as manager of [redacted].

4 - [redacted] Anchorage

[redacted] informed that his income as proprietor of [redacted] is approximately \$10,000 per year. He said his family responsibilities are a wife and 3 children. He continued that he could go to Washington at any

b6
b7C

Letter to the Director, FBI
April 11, 1951
P&C

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

time but that his expenses would vary depending upon the time of year he went. He said if he went during June, July, August or September, which he would do if the request was urgent, he would lose an income of approximately \$1500 per month. He said that if he went during the month of October he would lose an income of approximately \$500 to \$750 per month. He said that if he went during the months of December, January and other winter months he would lose an income of approximately only \$300 per month. However, as stated above, he said that he would go at any time he was called, with the loss of income quoted. [redacted] stated that he presently has a \$12,000 life insurance policy and a \$1200 life insurance policy as well as a \$5000 and a \$10,000 aviation accident policy, the \$10,000 amount to be paid if he is killed in a commercial aircraft. [redacted] also advised that he felt that a \$10,000 insurance policy should be taken out on his life if he travels by military plane. With reference to parachute jump training, [redacted] said that he would take such training but that if he has a choice he would not participate in this phase.

b6
b7C

5 - [redacted]

[redacted] advised that his income at present is approximately \$8000 to \$10,000. His family consists of a wife and 2 children who would stay here during the training period. He said he felt his personal incidental expenses would be \$3 to \$5 daily but would accept any amount which the Government felt to be fair. With reference to the date of his training, he said that he had [redacted] beginning May 15 which would last approximately two weeks and would gross him approximately \$1800. He did not desire to go during that period. It is noted the bear season is over June 20, after which he has [redacted] scheduled. With reference to parachute jump training, he said that he would jump on occasion if absolutely necessary but at this time does not desire any such training. It is noted he is employed by [redacted] and if he went into Washington for training he would either have to obtain a leave of absence without pay, in which event he would want to be paid the amount of money lost, or obtain paid leave. It is noted that he will use most of his annual leave [redacted] hence, he probably will have to obtain leave without pay.

b6
b7C

6 - [redacted] Anchorage

It is noted he has opened [redacted] in Anchorage on [redacted] and does not know what his income will be. However, he said that during 1950 he made approximately \$6500. He said that he expected to make more than

b6
b7C

Letter to the Director, FBI
April 11, 1951

~~PAC~~

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

this [redacted] He said that he would rather not go into Washington for training until he had gotten his [redacted] business on its feet and if he had a choice would wait till the latter part of 1951. His dependents are a wife and one child who would stay in Anchorage while he was in training. He stated that in addition to receiving the amount of money he would lose by being away from his business, he felt he should have approximately \$3 a day for incidental expenses. He stated he did not desire to participate in the parachute jump training.

b6
b7C

7 - [redacted]

[redacted] stated that his income at present is approximately [redacted] per year. He has a [redacted] to [redacted]

[redacted] It is noted that most of his income is made between April and November. He said he felt he could go to Washington for a period of training in October or November gratis. Although he could go during this period, it was pointed out by him that during the time he was away he could have earned approximately [redacted] a week here. With reference to parachute jump training, [redacted] commented that he was patriotic enough to jump on occasion if necessary but he did not desire such training.

b6
b7C

By way of observation concerning the above comments of the individuals contacted, it is noted that the expenses would be considerable. From these contacts, it could be noted in the case of most of the potential Stay Behind Agents that their income is derived mainly during the months between April and November of each year. The cost to the Government in replacing their incomes between November and April would be very materially decreased if the training could be had at that time.

With reference to those agents who should be the first to go, it is believed that they should be chosen for the training that they would receive in the most important phases, namely, those who would operate radios and receive radio training should be among the first. It is believed that those of sufficient youth and vigorous health should be chosen among the first. Also, of necessity, those who can get away from their businesses or jobs will necessarily have to be chosen at the time when they can most expeditiously go.

With reference to the [redacted]

Letter to the Director, FBI

April 11, 1951

P & C

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

5x8
Cards
being
retained
in Room
1539
ms.

With reference to the Bureau's direction that a list of the agents already recommended be compiled geographically and alphabetically, there are being transmitted herewith 5 x 8 cards on each of the 67 agents recommended to date. A copy of each of these cards has been maintained here for current use. As each additional agent is recommended and closing reports submitted to the Bureau, cards will be made up similar to those enclosed and forwarded for inclusion in the Bureau's file. It is suggested that the Bureau official supervising this program may desire to maintain these cards for ready reference.

Referral/Consult

[redacted] were informed during the conference on April 10, 1951, of the number of agents we have developed in each strategic area and their general qualifications but identities of the same were not divulged to them.

Referral/Consult

It is recommended that the identities of the agents who have been recommended be given to [redacted] at the same time they are given to [redacted] and that copies of the reports compiled here be given to [redacted] at that time. It is also recommended that this be done immediately.

By way of general observation concerning the training phase of this program, the following is noted:

1 - As observed above, in the polling of a cross section of the potential agents it is noted that the cost of the training would be very materially decreased if it were given during the winter months, inasmuch as is the case of most persons in the territory of Alaska, the potential agents are receiving most of their income during the months between April 1 and November 1 of each year.

Letter to the Director, FBI

April 11, 1951

~~P & C~~

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)


2 - Inspector T. E. NAUGHTEN was in attendance at the conference on April 10, 1951, as was noted above, and has thoroughly reviewed the Stay Behind Agent Program in the Anchorage Office.

3 - It is recommended that photographs and fingerprints be obtained from each trainee at the time he arrives in Washington for training.

4 - It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to consider the possibility of contacting the superiors of potential Stay Behind Agents in Government service or in private industry in order that they can receive a leave of absence in which to attend training school.

ENCLOSURE POINT BUREAU

PROPOSED PLAN FOR FUTURE AGENT COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN VIEW OF DIVISION
(MAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)





Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont ☒ _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(4-6-51) (u)

NR 070105

9:51 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

STAGE. REFERENCE YOUR RADIOGRAM APRIL 6. FOLLOWING LISTS
 TITLES. AGENT AND DATES OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY THIS OFFICE:

[REDACTED] DATED APRIL 3 LAST; [REDACTED]
 DATED APRIL 2 [REDACTED] DATED APRIL 2 LAST; [REDACTED]
 DATED APRIL 2 LAST; AND [REDACTED] DATED APRIL 2 LAST; (u)
 ALL REPORTS BY SPECIAL AGENT EDWARD A. PLEVACK.

RECEIVED

(4-6-51) (u)

10:01 PM LH

(UNDERLINED PORTION IS ACTUAL DECODE.) (u)

Classified by SP-1 BT/ST/SC

Declassify on: OADR 342251

RECORDED - 50

SP3-BIS/SM
 6-14-2000

00-1164

EX-86

COPIES DESTROYED

85-2-1107 23 1960

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

66 APR 24 1951 (u)

65-59264

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 28, 1951

~~6-13-91 SP3-BTS/SM~~
~~00-1164 PA06-1~~
(U) Inspector G. H. Bayfield ~~(S)~~

RECORDED - 63

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE IN EVENT OF WAR

(U) Reference is made to your memorandum dated (u)
March 21, 1951, Division file No. 100-11 (950), H.Q. file
No. C 11-1-131.12

For your information discussions are under way
with military authorities regarding planning for sources of
intelligence in event of war but these discussions are being
confined to the territory of Alaska and have not contemplated
any such plan in the continental United States [redacted]

b7D

Should there be any indications of discussions re-
garding possible planning involving North American areas other
than Alaska, we will, of course, notify you. We would
appreciate hearing from you in the event similar discussions
take place [redacted]

b7D

These data are solely for the information of [redacted]

b7D

CEH:gnu

cc [redacted]

REGISTERED AIR MAIL

b7D

cc - Foreign Service Desk

bn _____
l _____
sc _____
in _____
role _____
an _____
by _____
to _____
rent _____
e. hood _____
e _____
j _____

~~6/22/94~~
~~SP12318/SC~~
~~11542251~~

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (e) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(4-12-51) (e) (u)

NR 122017

5:37 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. SIXTY-EIGHT PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY-BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS RE THEM SUBMITTED TO BUREAU.

AND LETTER COVERING SAME SUBMITTED (APRIL 11TH.) (e) (u)

RECEIVED: (4-12-51) (e) (u) 5:45 PM

GLA

Referral/Consult

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6-14-2000 BY SP3-BTS/SM~~

~~6/22/94
 Classified by SP3-BTS/SM
 Declassify on: OADR 342251~~

6-14-2000 SP3-BTS/SM

00-1164 RECORDED - 118

APR 14 1951 (e) (u) - 101

5-11/8

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (e) (u)

(50 APR 24 1951) (e) (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 11, 1951

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12 BTJ/SB

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

PURPOSE:

(1) To advise that it is estimated approximately 50 individuals in Alaska will be selected to serve as Stay-behind Agents in the event that Territory is invaded; (2) to inform that the question of adequacy of coverage this regard in Alaska has not been definitely resolved and is presently being examined by the SAC at Anchorage [redacted] Referral/Consult

BACKGROUND:

You will recall that during the past few months the Anchorage Office has given top priority to the development of individuals in Alaska who will remain there and serve as Stay-behind Agents in the event that Territory might be attacked and occupied by the Russians. By memorandum from V. P. Keay to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated March 31, 1951, a plan for the training of these agents was presented for approval. In connection therewith, you inquired: "Just approximately how many such agents is it planned to have. H."

Referral/Consult

OBSERVATIONS:

As of today, the Anchorage Office has developed 66 persons who are being considered as possible agents. The development of these individuals is continuing until such time as the SAC at Anchorage and [redacted] agree that coverage is adequate and the Bureau concurs in their recommendation. From the group developed, it is estimated that approximately 50 individuals will be selected to serve as Stay-behind Agents and be afforded appropriate training [redacted] by [redacted] FBI.

As you are aware, the [redacted]

[redacted] By letter dated April 6, 1951, the SAC at Anchorage was instructed to again confer with [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Upon receipt of the results of the conference between FBI [redacted] you will be advised.

ACTION:

RECORDED - 110

Referral/Consult

This is for your information.

WTB:bjc
60 APR 20 1951

F. B. I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

DECODED COPY

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(4-19-51)

NR 192022

6:21 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. SEVENTY-TWO PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORT SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. FOURTEEN INDIVIDUALS REMAIN ON WHOM PRELIMINARY REPORTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED AND BUREAU AUTHORITY RECEIVED TO INTERVIEW. THESE ARE ASSIGNED AND EFFORT BEING MADE TO CONTACT THEM. TWO PRELIMINARY REPORTS SUBMITTED AND AWAITING BUREAU AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW. RE ANCHORAGE LET (11TH) INSTANT (u)
PAGE 5 LINE 2. GULKANA SHOULD BE GALENA. *note & correction*

RECEIVED

(4-19-51)

6:27 PM

VAM

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~

SP3-BTJ/SM
6-14-2009

00-1164

RECORDED - 50

EX-22

APR 21 1951

HAND
STOP 4/20

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

65-59264

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

(DECODED COPY) (e)(u)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(4-26-51) (e)(u)

NR 262022

4:23 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. SEVENTY-TWO PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY-BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. TWELVE ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS AUTHORIZED AND ATTEMPTS BEING MADE TO HANDLE SAME CERTAIN OF THESE PERSONS UNAVAILABLE AT PRESENT. ONE CASE PENDING AWAITING INVESTIGATION ANOTHER FIELD OFFICE. ONE CASE PENDING AWAITING AUTHORITY OF BUREAU TO INTERVIEW.

RECEIVED: (4-26-51) (e)(u) 4:57 PM

GLA

~~THIS INFORMATION IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-18-2000 BY SP3-BTJ/JM~~

b6
b7C

SP3-BTJ/JM

6-14-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 34

142
(62 MAY 5 1951) (e)(u)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (e)(u)

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : V. P. KEAY *VPK*

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

DATE: March 31, 1951

PURPOSE:

To present for approval a plan for the training of individuals to be used as Stay-Behind Agents in Alaska in the event of invasion. To submit for approval a letter to the SAC at Anchorage advising him of the plans for instant training and requesting his comments in connection therewith.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

My memorandum to you dated January 6, 1951, analyzed the suggestions of the SAC at Anchorage for the training of the individuals to be used as Stay-Behind Agents. The memorandum of January 6, 1951, also recommended that it be determined whether

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

Referral/Consult

This matter has been discussed by Special Agent Edward S. Sanders on several occasions with

Attachment

ESS:hke

RECORDED - 134

MAY 4 1951

34

5-Bak

Referral/Consult

--

It is contemplated that the following training would be given these individuals during a two-weeks' period while in Washington at the rate of ten hours per day, six days per week:

Referral/Consult

Total Hours

--

Total Hours

--	--

3. *FBI Training:*

<i>Russian system of detection and how to effect countermeasures.</i>	3
---	---

<i>Secret writing, codes, etc.</i>	8
------------------------------------	---

<i>Deceptive cover and security.</i>	6
--------------------------------------	---

<i>Selection and training of Sub-Agents and informants.</i>	3
---	---

<i>Disarming methods</i>	3
--------------------------	---

Referral/Consult

It is contemplated that the above schedule should be flexible enough to adapt to the background and capabilities of the individuals involved. It is also contemplated that each individual will be available to the Bureau for training at the rate of four hours per day for one week of his two-weeks' stay in the Washington area. He will be available to

Inasmuch as it is contemplated that a considerable number of the Stay-Behind Agents who are developed will be pulled out of Alaska in the event of an invasion to be used at a later date for special assignments in Alaska, it is considered necessary that training in parachute jumping be given to as many as possible of those individuals who will be sent back into Alaska. In this connection,

[Redacted]

EXPENSES:

Referral/Consult

As noted above [Redacted]

[Redacted]

It has been suggested that the Bureau pay, as they would on a confidential informant basis, these Stay-Behind Agents while they are receiving their training. The amount of such pay would, of course, be determined on an individual basis and considerations such as the individual's family, loss of income during training, and individual expenses should be considered and recommendations made by the SAC at Anchorage. It has also been suggested that the Bureau pay for a short-term insurance policy on each of the Stay-Behind Agents while he is in training. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

DATE OF INSTITUTION OF TRAINING PROGRAM:

[Redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

It appears that the plan outlined herein is feasible and provides a maximum of security with a minimum of expense. It is recommended that the Bureau approve this plan of training for

sent
these individuals and that the attached letter to the SAC in Anchorage advising him of these plans for training be forwarded with instructions that he immediately make available his comments concerning the plan. The attached letter also instructs that the SAC in Anchorage advise whether arrangements can be perfected for these individuals to proceed to Washington at the rate of two per week, traveling separately, beginning on or about April 25, 1951.

ADDENDUM:

Referral/Consult

Subsequent to the preparation of this memorandum, SA Edward S. Sanders again conferred with [redacted]

[redacted] It was suggested [redacted] that since the Stay-behind Agents would be [redacted]

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE
RECOMMENDATION:

April 7, 1951

On April 5, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Ladd, Clegg, Glavin, Harbo, Rosen, Quinn Tamm for Mr. Tracy, Mohr, Nease, and Belmont, considered the above program with particular reference to the training listed for the FBI and expense which will be involved in connection with a short-term insurance policy for each Stay-Behind Agent and reimbursement to these Agents for loss of money while they are away from Alaska. The Conference recommended that the Bureau proceed on the basis that we will conduct this training and will meet the necessary expenses of reimbursement and insurance, each to be on an individual basis dependent on the necessary reimbursement to the individual Agent.

AHB:tlc

memo to Director
4-11-51
WS.

*OK. Just approximately
how many such agents
is it planned to have - K.*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: April 26, 1951

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-2-94 BY SP12ST/JS/SCTolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

PURPOSE:

To set forth an analysis of the observations and suggestions of the SAC, Anchorage, relative to developments in instant program.

To submit proposals concerning the financial aspects of the training phase of this project.

To recommend that the Anchorage office be instructed to continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents and to contact agents already developed in the strategic areas of Alaska (except Anchorage) to determine when said individuals will be available for training to be given by [redacted] FBI at Washington, D.C.

BACKGROUND:

You will recall that V. P. Keay's memorandum to you dated March 31, 1951, set forth for approval a plan for the training of Stay-behind Agents. Summarily, the plan provided that [redacted]

[redacted] FBI would provide the training previously agreed upon by the Bureau. On April 5, 1951, the Executives' Conference considered this phase of the program with particular reference to the training responsibilities of the Bureau and expenses involved in connection with a short-term insurance policy for every Stay-behind Agent and reimbursement to these agents for loss of time and income during the training period. The Conference recommended that the Bureau proceed on the basis that we will conduct this training and will meet the necessary expenses of reimbursement and insurance, each to be on an individual basis. It is noted that the Director made the following comment thereon: "Ok. Just approximately how many such agents is it planned to have. H." (The latter inquiry was answered by Mr. Ladd's memorandum to the Director dated 4-11-51. It was approximated that possibly 50 agents would receive training.)

WTB:bjw

RECORDED - 53

MAY 9 1951

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

62 MAY 18 1951

COPIES DESTROYED

R584 NOV 21 1960

By letter dated 4-6-51, the SAC at Anchorage was advised of contemplated plans for instant training and his comments were requested. He was instructed to contact a representative number of individuals recommended by the Anchorage office, who were readily available, to determine their reaction to the proposal of being brought to the U. S. for training; to determine what type of short-term insurance was available which could be secured by these agents to cover their period of training; and, to explore the financial aspects of this undertaking in order to determine what reimbursement would be expected by these agents for loss of time and income during the period of training.

ANALYSIS OF SAC WILLIAMS' (ANCHORAGE) OBSERVATIONS

By letter dated 4-11-51, SAC Williams pointed out as follows:

1. The training^{of}/agents at SOG will have a distinct advantage from a security angle, although it will be a more expensive proposition.
2. A representative of the Continental Casualty Company and Continental Assurance Company in Anchorage stated that short-term insurance could be written, but it would be necessary to know the name of the insured, his age as well as the risk involved; further, that the company would have to know if the insurance written involved unusual risks or unusual circumstances. The shortest term insurance presently written by the company is 5 years.

SAC Williams suggested that the insurance, such as is contemplated by the Bureau which will be of a confidential nature, could be best handled by a company in the U. S., probably in Washington, D. C.

Referral/Consult

Comments:

It is contemplated that those agents who will agree to take

Referral/Consult

the parachute jump training [redacted]

[redacted] This undoubtedly would be considered an "undue risk" or an "unusual circumstance" as far as insurance coverage is concerned. The insurance originally considered was only to cover the risks involved in transporting the agent from Alaska to the U. S., the period of his training, and return trip to Alaska. This means a period of about 3 weeks if jump training is excluded, and 6 weeks if jump training taken.

[redacted]
Supervisor E. S. Sanders, Liaison Section, Security Division, who has been maintaining contact with [redacted]

PROPOSED ACTION (a)

Referral/Consult

[redacted]
It is further proposed that thereafter, Supervisor Sanders make discreet inquiries of reputable insurance firms in Washington in order to determine what specific coverage can be secured, and the costs involved. Sanders has indicated he has sources from whom the desired information can be obtained.

3. Seven recommended Stay-behind Agents readily available in the vicinity of Anchorage have been recontacted in order to secure their reaction to being brought to the U. S. for training, and efforts made to determine what financial arrangements could possibly be worked out in this regard. These individuals have incomes varying from \$600. to \$2,000. monthly. Besides being reimbursed for possible loss of income, everyone considered he should also receive \$3. to \$5.00 extra per day for incidental expenses. The majority of those contacted indicated they did not desire to participate in the parachute jump training but would do so if they had no choice in the matter.

It was further pointed out that some of these individuals make the most, or at least the larger part, of their income during the summer months, that is, from approximately April to October. It was stated that if these individuals could receive their training later on in the season, the cost to the government would be considerably decreased.

Comments:

It is noted these seven individuals have an average income of about \$935. monthly. Removing the two high-salaried ones, 1 of \$1000. and 1 of \$2,000. monthly, the average income is roughly \$685. monthly. This latter figure amounts to about \$160. weekly. It is not believed that the Bureau should consider reimbursing a \$10,000 or \$25,000. a year man for his loss of time and income. The cost would be prohibitive.

PROPOSED ACTION (b)

It is proposed that the Bureau consider reimbursing the Stay-behind Agents during their training period, as follows:

No jump training

\$150.00 per week basic pay plus \$4.00 per diem for incidental expenses.

If jump training included

Same as above for two weeks training in Washington, D. C., and \$175.00 per week

basic pay (plus same per diem as above) for the approximate 2-1/2 weeks extra during the jump training course.

At first glance this proposed plan of reimbursing the Stay-behind Agents might appear to be excessive. It is pointed out, however, that rates of income in the Territory of Alaska are much higher than they are in the United States. The basic proposal of remuneration being considered is to reimburse these individuals for loss of income and time while undergoing training. It is observed that the Bureau has taken into consideration the cost of living in Alaska with Bureau personnel assigned there, and that they receive a 25% differential in cost of living which is in addition to their base pay. Bearing these factors in mind, and considering that these Stay-behind Agents are being selected and trained to carry out a very important and dangerous assignment, in the event of invasion, which may even effect the security of the United States, it is not believed that the rates of pay suggested are excessive.

It is further proposed that the SAC at Anchorage be instructed to bear the above proposed payment plan in mind when recontacting the Stay-behind Agents to work out the training schedule.

4.

Referral/Consult

Comments:

It is not believed that the Bureau can completely concur in SAC Williams' recommendation that coverage is adequate in spite of the fact that, according to Anchorage radiogram 4-19-51, 72 persons have been recommended as Stay-behind Agents. The problems involved are (1) How many who have agreed to act will agree to coming to the U. S. for training purposes?; and, of those agreeing to come, How many will take the parachute jump training? Although

a large number has agreed to act, if only a representative number can be prevailed upon to take the necessary training, our coverage will decline perceptibly. In view of this, consideration should be given to continuing the development of potential Stay-behind Agents.

PROPOSED ACTION (c)

It is proposed that the SAC at Anchorage be instructed to continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents until such time as it can be more definitely determined if coverage is adequate.

5. The Anchorage office has suggested that the Stay-behind Agents be photographed and fingerprinted during the time they are in Washington, D. C.

Comment:

It is believed this is a sound suggestion.

PROPOSED ACTION (d)

It is proposed that Mr. R. C. Renneberger, Mechanical Section, Administrative Division, effect arrangements so that these agents can be photographed at the Bureau during their course of training. Six copies of each photograph will suffice.

*Noted
RKR*

It is also proposed that the Identification Division handle the mechanics involved in fingerprinting the Stay-behind Agents. It is suggested that the prints be searched through the criminal files and the Espionage Section, Security Division, be informed of the results of the search.

6. The Anchorage office has suggested that the Bureau may desire to consider the possibility of contacting the superiors of potential Stay-behind Agents in Government service or in private industry in order to request that their superiors permit them to receive a leave of absence in which to attend training school.

Comment:

Although this suggestion has considerable merit, it would possibly cause a soft-spot in the general security of the entire program. We have proceeded on the theory that the fewer people who are advised about this program, the better the chances are to maintain the project in confidence and keep the operation secure.

PROPOSED ACTION (e)

It is proposed that the Anchorage office be advised that this action is not being approved as a general procedure, but that in the event the individual selected cannot come to the U. S. for training without securing some type of clearance from his superior, that in unusual circumstances, the Bureau will consider a specific request of this nature if the SAC at Anchorage so recommends.

7. The SAC at Anchorage has suggested that the identities of the Stay-behind Agents who have been recommended be given to [redacted]

[redacted] and that copies of reports prepared on the Stay-behind Agents in Alaska be given to [redacted] at that time. He further recommended that this be done immediately.

PROPOSED ACTION (f)

It is proposed that the SAC, Anchorage, be instructed to disseminate copies of reports prepared in these cases to [redacted] further, that he submit to the Bureau prior to May 10, 1951, a list of the reports to be disseminated, and that identical dissemination be effected at SOG and in Anchorage on May 15, 1951.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that proposal (a) be approved for discussion with [redacted]

It is further recommended that [redacted] be advised [redacted] of the reaction concerning the proposed training on the part of the Stay-behind Agents in the Anchorage area as set forth above under background. It should be


pointed out [] that the Anchorage office is presently recontacting all the remaining individuals who have been recommended for use by the Anchorage office in an effort to determine their reaction to being brought to the United States; and that we are now in the process of determining by what dates the agents can arrange their personal and business affairs in order to be available for the scheduled training. It should, therefore, be brought to the attention of [] that the [] FBI [] training program will of necessity have to be temporarily delayed until definite commitments can be obtained from the Stay-behind Agents as to their availability.

It is recommended that proposal (b) be approved only as a basis for consideration by the SAC at Anchorage in making contact with the selected Stay-behind Agents to determine their reaction to being brought to the U. S. for training.

It is recommended that proposals (c), (e) and (f) be approved and that ~~the~~ Anchorage be advised accordingly.

It is recommended that proposal (d) be approved for handling at the Bureau and that this memorandum be routed to the Administrative Division for the attention of Mr. Renneberger, and to the Identification Division, for their information at this time.

If you approve of this action, the attached letter of instructions embodying the above will be forwarded to the Anchorage office.

A handwritten signature, possibly "J. Edgar Hoover", is written over a large, stylized "S" or "15".

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: May 4, 1951

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

The attached memorandum sets forth recent developments in connection with the Stay-behind Agent Program in Alaska, the background of which is familiar to you, and suggests proposals for further action re training and coverage.

The following recommendations are made therein:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12B/TSC

1. That [redacted] be contacted and requested to:

Referral/Consult

2. That [redacted] of the reaction concerning the proposed training on the part of the Stay-behind Agents in the Anchorage area and it should be pointed out [redacted] that the Anchorage office is presently recontacting all the remaining individuals who have been recommended for use by the Anchorage office in an effort to determine their reaction to being brought to the United States; further, that we are now in the process of determining by what dates the agents can arrange their personal and

Referral/Consult

COPIES DESTROYED
R584 NOV 21 1960

Attachment

JTB:mrc:jef

RECORDED - 53
INDEXED - 53
MAY 9 1951
STOP DESK

165-59264-107
MAY 9 1951

Referral/Consult

business affairs in order to be available for the scheduled training. That it be brought to [] attention that the [] FBI [] training program will of necessity have to be temporarily delayed until definite commitments can be obtained from the Stay-behind Agents as to their availability.

3. That Supervisor E. S. Sanders, Liaison Section, Security Division, make discreet inquiries of reputable insurance firms in Washington in order to determine what specific coverage can be secured, and the costs involved. (Sanders has indicated he has sources from whom the desired information can be obtained.)
4. That the Bureau consider reimbursing the Stay-behind Agents during their training period at the rate of \$150. per week for those agents not taking jump training, plus \$4. per diem; and \$175. per week for those agents taking jump training, plus \$4. per diem.
5. That Stay-behind Agents be photographed and fingerprinted during the period of their training in Washington, D. C.
6. That the SAC at Anchorage be instructed to continue the development of potential Stay-behind Agents until such time as it can be more definitely determined if coverage is adequate.
7. That the Anchorage office be instructed to disseminate copies of the investigative reports on Stay-behind Agents to [] on May 15, 1951, and that identical dissemination be made at SOG.
8. That the Anchorage office be advised that the Bureau does not approve their suggestion to obtain clearance from employers of Stay-behind Agents so they can get leaves of absence to come to Washington for training; further, that the Bureau would consider taking such action only in unusual circumstances where the individual's services would be essential for the implementation of this program.
9. That the attached letter of instructions embodying the above be forwarded to Anchorage.

Referral/Consult

ghy

15

Sent Vice Bureau radio 1⁴⁶/A Per HZ

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: May 8, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN EVENT
OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/22/94 BY SP18BJS/SC

ReBulet May 4, 1951, page 2, numeral 3.

Referral/Consult

There are transmitted herewith two copies of a list of Stay-behind agents who have been recommended for inclusion in this program and on whom closing reports have been submitted. These reports are the ones that should be disseminated on May 15, 1951.

Referral/Consult



With reference to the delivery of the reports it is noted that the closing reports contain almost all information concerning the proposed stay-behind agent and the same was obtained from him by interview. It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to deliver the closing report only inasmuch as the data contained therein is more likely to be accurate and the same is sufficient for their purposes.

Referral/Consult

With reference to page 1 of Bureau letter dated May 4, 1951, steps have been taken here to contact all recommended potential stay-behind agents to obtain from them the dates on which they can attend training; whether or not they will participate in the parachute jump training; and whether or not the proposed remuneration or some part thereof is sufficient. Likewise, these questions will be put to all proposed stay-behind agents who are interviewed in the future. The contacts with all proposed stay-behind agents to obtain this information will be given priority here, completed immediately, and passed on to the Bureau with no delay whatsoever.

Encl.

65-298

JHW:vf

RECORDED - 11565-157264
HANDLED BY
STON BUREAU
MAY 11 1951
15

COPIES DESTROYED

8584-WOV 21 J.J.H

EX-121

EX-121

AN 65-298

In this regard it should be noted, however, that some of these persons will be hard to locate in view of the fact that they will be on construction jobs far into the interior or will be engaged in fishing in the Bristol Bay area.

Referral/Consult

With reference to the training of these individuals. [redacted]

(2) [redacted]
[redacted] It is also requested that this office be advised as to the manner and time that the proposed agent's remuneration or training will be paid in order that questions concerning this may be answered. In this respect it is suggested that a portion of it be made upon his arrival at Washington and the remainder paid upon his departure from Washington.

already read (A memorandum concerning caching is presently in typing and will be submitted to the Bureau immediately upon its completion.)

This matter will continue to receive priority in this office and the Bureau kept advised of all developments.

STAY BEHIND AGENTS CONCERNING WHOM REPORTS WILL BE
DISSEMINATED AS OF 5-15-51.

NameBufileAnchorage File

62-93581
 62-93600
 62-93639

66-336
 66-395
 66-403
 66-430

62-93523
 62-93481
 62-93602
 62-93857
 62-93482
 62-93646
 62-93501
 62-93586
 62-93636
 62-93879
 62-93992

66-393
 66-420
 66-368
 66-435
 66-313
 66-405
 66-421
 66-418
 66-404
 66-446
 66-415
 66-340

DANICH, JOE

*Bu - 62-93411
 Bu - 62-93412
 Bu - 62-93505
 Bu - 62-93506*

62-93483
 62-93384
 62-93524
 62-93498
 62-93635
 62-93634
 62-93597
 77-31169
 62-93858
 62-93859
 62-93631
 62-93630
 62-93628
 62-93867
 62-93870
 62-93526

b6
 b7c

66-344
 66-316
 66-334
 66-332
 66-314
 66-331
 66-410
 66-308
 66-309
 66-429
 66-428
 66-390
 66-389
 66-327
 66-437
 66-438
 66-324
 66-343

62-93626
 62-93625
 62-93624
 62-93496
 62-93623
 62-93881
 62-93495
 62-93647

66-360
 66-411
 66-387
 66-311
 66-363
 66-445
 66-318
 66-373
 66-345
 66-385
 66-372

MOORE, FRANK BERTON

62-93622
 62-93621

*on 62-93601
 on 61-333*

ENCLOSURE

Name

Bufile

Anchorage File





RODIG. DR. HOWARD GLENMORE



SHEPTON. DR. JOSEPH HARRISON, M.D.



SIMS. FOSTER RAYMOND



62-93565
62-93868
62-93517
62-93855
62-93619
62-93860
62-93648

62-93489
62-93494
62-93518
62-93603
62-93877
62-93617
62-93861
62-93869
62-93480
62-93670
62-93520
62-93994
62-93613
62-93522
62-93568
62-93672
62-93863
62-93643
77-44306
62-93644

b6
b7C

66-348
66-439
66-323
66-349
66-371
66-431
66-365
66-342
66-312
66-322
66-321
66-366
66-443
66-367
66-432
66-442
66-353
66-354
66-357
66-417
66-377
66-310
66-358
66-369
66-375
66-374
66-315
66-359

62-94204
62-460
62-93491
62-379

62-94203
62-462

SAC, Anchorage

May 7, 1951

Director, FBI

ADMINISTRATIVE-SBA PROGRAM

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Rebulet 1-11-51 granting authority to contact [redacted] for the purpose of developing him as a Stay-behind Agent, and Bulet 4-4-51 entitled "Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion" wherein you were instructed to expedite this contact and submit a report reflecting the results of this phase of the investigation.

Submit an explanation to the Bureau by return mail as to why this matter has not been handled promptly, and advise when a report may be expected at the Bureau.

As you are aware, it is essential that the recruiting phases of the Stay-behind Agent Program receive prompt and vigorous attention. You are again instructed to impress this fact upon the Special Agents engaged in the handling of instant program in Alaska and afford the supervision of same your personal attention.

62-93517

cc 65-59264

WTB:vas

cc Administrative Division

6/22/94 S2/2873/50
34225/

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Negg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Clegg _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: May 8, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (Stay-behind Agent Program)
 (Bureau file 65-59264)

Referral/Consult

ReBulet May 1, 1951.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/22/90 BY SP2 BTJ/KSC

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 11-1-1

Contact was had with [redacted] of the Robinson Studios, which establishment has the photographic contract for this office. [redacted] although not advised of the purpose of the contact, informed that Consumers' Research listed the Kodak Flash Bantam-828 as one of the most serviceable and efficient cameras in the low price range. Likewise he said it was small, compact and easy to operate.

b6
 b7C

[redacted] also stated that the Kodak Tourist-620, equipped with a F-45 lens which takes $2\frac{1}{4}$ by $3\frac{1}{4}$ exposures, was an excellent conventional type camera for all around use. It has flash attachments. This camera retails in Anchorage for \$71.00.

[redacted] knew nothing of the Stecky II.

65-298
 JHW:vf

If a conventional type camera is to be used in this program, it is believed that a 35 mm camera would be preferred. A Leica or less expensive Kodak 35

RECORDED - 93

HANDLED BY
 STOP DESK

MAY 11 1951 Referral/Consult
 15

used in most any assignment. Telephoto equipment can be used with Leica or Contax but not Kodak 35. Kodak 35 has built in flash.

5-15-51 7-1942

*File in add file
 A good amateur camera
 5-15-51*

b6
 b7C

AN 65-298

It is noted that the use of miniature cameras is so limited in the Territory of Alaska that very little is known concerning them by the experts here.

The extent of the use of the camera by stay-behind agents, of course, is not known at this time but it is felt that the same will be limited. Likewise, the use of some type of flash equipment or infra-red would be quite limited in my opinion.

From the above, it is believed that a small, simple but efficient camera similar to the described Stecky II is sufficient for the needs of any stay-behind agent who could utilize a camera.

WFO, Anchorage

May 1, 1951

Director, FBI

RECOMMENDATION FOR FACILITIES FOR CONVENTIONAL
I. ALASKA IN CONNECTION WITH
(Stay-behind Agents Program)

Referral/Consult



You are instructed to confer with [redacted]

hereafter,

you should submit your recommendations to the Bureau as to the
conventional type camera which would be most practical for the
use of stay-behind Agents in Alaska.

Referral/Consult

A reply to this communication is desired by May 9, 1951.

65-59264

WTB:mod

NOTE: [redacted]



Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 78

EX-176

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

FBI

MAY 2 3 50 PM '51

MAY 3 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: May 7, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 BTN/SC

ON 6/22/94

Rebulet April 6, 1951, and Anchorage letter April 11, 1951, specifically paragraph 4 of page 1 which makes reference to caching.

There is transmitted herewith a dossier on caching of food, radio equipment, gasoline and survival gear for possible use in the establishment of caches which will be necessary in connection with this program.

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

JHW:MMA

65-298

Enclosure

RECORDED - 135

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

MAY 11 1951

EX-24

15

5-BOH

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C. E. HENNRICH *Ch*

DATE: March 21, 1951

FROM : W. T. Baker

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Referral/Consult

C *sta, e*

B. A. B.

ACTION

g f Ward
 It is suggested that this memorandum be routed to Supervisor E. M. Gregg for possible assistance in connection with the lecture outlines he is preparing for the training program involved in the captioned matter.

Attachments

WTB:ow

65-59264

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/22/94 BY SP128TS/SC

34225

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

RECORDED - 26

INDEXED - 26

EX-72

165-5126 *WJ*
MAY 11 1951*5-WJ*

113

SP2-BTS/04

G-14-2000

6/22/94
SP2-BTS/80
3/22/51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(MAY 29, 1951) (C)

RADIOGRAM


CIPHER PAD CO.

URGENT

SAC, ANCHORAGE (u)

Referral/Consult

STAGE. REURLET (MAY ELEVEN) (C) (u) LA T. TRAINING AGENTS INSTANT PROGRAM
SCHEDULED BEGIN (JUNE ELEVEN) (C) (u) NEXT FOR TWO AGENTS PER WEEK ONE
BEGINNING (JUNE ELEVEN) (C) (u) AND OTHER (JUNE TWELVE) (C) (u)



[Redacted line]

ARRANGEMENTS SO YOU OR ASAC

CAN INTERVIEW EVERY

EXPECT
OR
RE

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

TRAINEE PRIOR LATTER DEPARTURE.

STREET SECURITY FEATURES AND BRIEF

65-59264-113

WFB:JEF

[Redacted box]

Referral/Consult

Antonia Bureau Radio (100/51) 1:12 AM.

291658
J. J. [unclear] 2100-0246
H. H. Z.

PAGE TWO

THOROUGHLY. INSURE THAT TRAINEE UTILIZES APPROPRIATE COVER STORY TO EXPLAIN ABSENCE FROM ALASKA SO TRUE PURPOSE OF TRIP TO WASHINGTON DC WILL NOT BE DIVULGED. WHEN TRAINEE INSTRUCTED WHEN SCHEDULED FOR TRAINING, SECURE NAME OF BENEFICIARY DESIGNATED BY HIM SO ACCIDENT INSURANCE POLICY CAN BE SECURED AT SOG AMPLE TIME PRIOR TO TRAVEL. TRAINEE SHOULD NOT DEPART ALASKA UNTIL INSURANCE POLICY OBTAINED AND TRAVEL AUTHORIZED BY BUREAU. DETERMINE IF FOLLOWING CAN ARRANGE BE

AT SOG BEGIN TRAINING EIGHT AM AS INDICATED [REDACTED]

(JUNE ELEVEN, [REDACTED] (u) (JUNE TWELVE, FRANK BERTON MOORE INCLUDING JUMP TRAINING (JUNE EIGHTEEN, [REDACTED] (u) (JUNE NINETEEN, DR. [REDACTED] (u)

HOWARD ROMIG (JUNE TWENTY FIVE, [REDACTED] INCLUDING JUMP TRAINING (JUNE TWENTY SIX, DR. FOSTER R. SIMS (JULY TWO, [REDACTED] (u)

[REDACTED] XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (JULY THREE, [REDACTED] (u)

[REDACTED] MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN EFFECTING ARRANGEMENTS. SURAD ON INDIVIDUAL STAGE AGENT INCLUDING IDENTITY BENEFICIARY AS SCHEDULED TRAINING DATE CONFIRMED.

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: May 11, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (BuFile 65-59264)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/22/94 BY SP12 BT/SIS

Reference Bureau letters April 6 and May 4, 1951 and Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated May 8, 1951, pertaining to training.

Bureau letter of April 6, 1951, Page 5, indicates that possibly the training of Stay Behind Agents for the captioned program would begin on or about April 25, 1951. At Bureau direction this office is soliciting all potential Stay Behind Agents to determine (1) whether they will go to Washington for two weeks training (2) whether they will go for three additional weeks parachute jump training (3) the date on which they will be able to proceed to Washington (4) a period of three months during which they can leave for two weeks at the FBI's option for the training (5) whether they are amenable to the remuneration of \$150 per week plus \$4.00 a day expenses for training in Washington, D. C., or \$175 a week and \$4.00 a day expenses for the parachute training, and other questions pertaining to their attendance.

The assignments to contact all potential Stay Behind Agents have been made and Agents in this office are presently seeking these persons out.

It is requested that the Bureau advise the date that the training will begin and the date on which the first potential Stay Behind Agents should report in order that this office can be guided in its contacts.

It is also requested that the Bureau advise the number of Agents which it desires per week so that a tentative schedule may be set up here as a basis on which to work.

Referral/Consult

65-298
 JHT:HCH

Radio gram
 to Anch.
 5-29-51
 ms.

RECORDED - 134

EX-65

MAY 14 1951

15

5-48

113
 Radio gram
 5-29-51
 ms.

[redacted]
[redacted] Referral/Consult

With particular reference to Bureau letter of April 6, 1951,
wherein it is stated on Page 3 that [redacted] mo

[redacted]
[redacted] Referral/Consult

With reference to travel, it is suggested that the potential Stay Behind Agents be directed to contact this office upon his arrival in Anchorage where he will be briefed. It is further suggested that he be met at Seattle by one of our Agents there and aided in effecting transportation to Washington, D. C. This will insure that he makes connections and does not stop-over in Seattle for any protracted period of time.

It is also suggested that upon his departure from Seattle, the Seattle Office advise the Bureau in order that he can be met in Washington and escorted to the training base.

Referral/Consult

If the Bureau concurs with these suggestions, it is requested that the Seattle Office be advised of the plans in order that they will be able to carry out their assignments upon advice from the Anchorage Office that a certain potential Stay Behind Agent will arrive there on a certain date.

In making contacts with potential Stay Behind Agents with reference to the parachute training, they have brought up the question whether such training entails one or more parachute jumps. Certain of them who were in the Army or acquainted with the Air Force training feel that some parachute jumping courses are merely for the safety of fliers and while it teaches them the rudiments of jumping, no jumps are made. It is requested that the Bureau advise this office in this regard. It is also requested that the Bureau advise this office of the physical requirements which will be necessary for the potential Stay Behind Agents to take parachute training. Certain of them have indicated

a willingness but it is obvious that from their age and physical condition they should not be allowed to do so.

The Bureau will be kept advised of all developments in this matter.

F. B. I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

DECODED COPY

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(5-3-51)

NR 032014

6:51 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 73 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. 10 ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS AUTHORIZED AND CASES ON THESE PERSONS ASSIGNED FOR HANDLING. MATERIAL RE REPORTS BEING COMPILED AND WILL BE SUBMITTED AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

RECEIVED:

(5-3-51)

6:52 PM

MAP

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/1/00 BY 1043/STP/STP~~

~~6/20/94
SP3-BTS/SM
342251~~

RECORDED - 134

EX-65

6-14-2000

SP3-BTS/SM

00-1164

MAY 5 1951

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

(50 MAY 18 1951) (u)

(u)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 21

Page 4 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 11 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 12 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 20 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 21 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 58 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 59 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 60 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 62 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 63 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 64 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 73 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 74 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 103 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 116 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 121 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 122 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 123 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 164 ~ b7D

Page 165 ~ b7D

Page 174 ~ Referral/Consult

FBI File 65-HQ-59264
FBI Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference - Section 3

SAC, ANCHORAGE

May 4, 1951

DIRECTOR, FBI

① PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION

There are enclosed two photostatic copies of an article
which appeared in the Washington Star, April 27, 1951, entitled
"The Defense of America's Back Yard," by Keyes Beech.

The above is submitted for your information.

Attachment

65-59264

WTB:gnu

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12 BTJ/SC

HANDLED BY
STOP DISK

RECORDED - 81

65-59264 115

MAY 10 1951

15

EX-24

C48

WS

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____

MAY 1 1951

F.B.I. IOG M

4-42a

(DECODED COPY)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(5-10-51)

NR 101830

4:02 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. SEVENTY-THREE PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS, CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. ALL PERSONS RECOMMENDED BEING RECONTACTED IMMEDIATELY FOR DATA RE TRAINING AS DIRECTED BUREAU LETTER (FOURTH) INSTANT. DOSSIER RE CACHING SUBMITTED TO BUREAU (SEVENTH) INSTANT.

RECEIVED:

(5-10-51)

4:16 PM

MRC

RECORDED - 37

MAY 12 1951

EX. - 25

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : H. H. Clegg

DATE: May 10, 1951

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-29-94 BY SP12BTP/K

PURPOSE:

To submit for your approval an outline of a lecture on Soviet counterintelligence, in connection with the captioned program.

DETAILS:

Reference memorandum dated April 27, 1951 from Mr. Hennrich to Mr. Belmont in which there is set forth proposals for a course of training to be given at the Bureau in connection with the captioned program. It was proposed that Supervisor J. J. Ward prepare lecture material on Soviet counterespionage organization and methods in this connection.

There is attached herewith an outline.

ACTION:

It is requested that the Training Division review the attached outline of a lecture on Soviet counterintelligence and, if approved, it is recommended that the attached copies be forwarded to SA W. T. Baker in the Espionage Section, who is correlating this program.

Attachment:

JAT:ev

RECORDED - 63

MAY 19 1951

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 61-3477-351413-1

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

A. Origin and development of Soviet Secret Police.

1. Brief account of the establishment and purposes of the extraordinary Commission (Cheka) 1917.
2. Successors to the Cheka, the United State Political Administration (OGPU) 1923, and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, (NKVD) 1934.
3. The Chief Directorate of State Security, (GUGB), a department of the NKVD. Established in 1934, and containing the intelligence and counterintelligence functions of the former OGPU.
4. Establishment of the State Security service as an independent ministry, first as NKGB in 1943 and MGB in 1946, and continuous increase in importance, until today it has assumed all security functions in the USSR except forced labor camps and work projects.

* Material: The Ministry of State Security of the USSR;
FBI, November, 1950

(S) B. Brief account of the structure of MGB, and the counterintelligence organs.

(u)

1. Chief Directorates and Directorates, with division of functions.
2. The Chief Directorate of Counterintelligence.
 - a. originated as the Special Sections of NKVD, (OO/NKVD) to insure loyalty and security in Soviet Armed Forces.
 - b. In 1941 OO/NKVD transferred from NKVD to People's Commissariat for Defense (Russian War Ministry-NKGO) becoming 3rd Chief Directorate, NKGO. Nicknamed: Smersh.
 - c. Wartime head of Smersh: Victor Semenovich Abakumov, who in 1946 became Minister of State Security. At the same time Smersh was reincorporated into the MGB as a chief directorate.

SP3-BTS/jm

7-17-2000

00-1164 117

59267

7-17-2000

ENCLOSURE

SP3-BTS/jm

6

00-1164

7-19-94

SP2-BTS/jm

00-1164 342251

~~SECRET~~

d. The Smersh organization is now Chief Directorate for Counterintelligence of MGB (GUKR/MGB)

* Material: The Ministry of State Security of the USSR; FBI, November, 1950.

C. Structure and Functions of the GUKR/MGB.

1. Chief of GUKR, Lieutenant General Korolev, Moscow Headquarters.

2. Operating units, i.e. field organization, are known as UKRs. UKRs established at every headquarters of an army, military district, naval establishment or air force headquarters. In turn, UKRs function thru:

a. UKR staff and operating sections

b. Subordinate OKRs (Counterintelligence Sections) which are attached to Army divisions, and lesser units, naval bases, Air Fields, etc. Every unit, down to the smallest, will have concealed OKR Representatives.

3. The Chief of a UKR will have equal or nearly equal rank with the highest ranking military commander: i.e. Major General or Lieutenant General. The UKR chief will answer only to GUKR in Moscow, not subordinate to military commander.

4. Function of UKR:

1. Police Soviet Armed personnel against disloyalty, subversion, defeatism, desertion, etc.

2. To protect Soviet Armed forces from penetration by foreign agents and to prevent resistance movements in a military area.

5. UKR Headquarters structure:

a. Staff, i.e. Chief, two or more deputies and Secretariat (stenographers, linguists, typists)

b. Operating Sections:

1st Section: run agent and informer networks.

2nd Section: conduct searches and make apprehensions. Location of deserters and wanted persons.

SECRET

3rd Section: Supervises operation of the subordinate OKR units scattered thru military units.

4th Section: Investigations section. Conducts interrogations and investigation of cases after Sections 1 and 2 have initiated cases and made arrests.

In addition to the foregoing numbered sections (Note: these numbers are subject to change easily and cannot be relied upon for accuracy) there are a number of administrative sections:

Administrative and Supply Section

Code and Cipher Section

Motor Pool

Finance Section

6. UKR Personnel

- (S)
(u)
- a. The deputy chiefs of UKR and chiefs of the sections outlined above will have, usually, the military rank of Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel or Major, with assistants ranking down to lieutenants junior grade. An officer staff up to 150 men may be assigned to UKR headquarters, depending on its strategic importance. These men are Russian elite from standpoint of Communist Party loyalty, education and training. They even now are referred to as "Chekists," from the old Cheka. These are the men the Soviet Government must trust to stamp out all opposition movements.
 - b. Non-Commissioned, enlisted personnel. Selected from Soviet Army and Communist Party Ranks. Politically trustworthy, and promising officer material.
 - c. Stenographic help and Translators are usually selected because of special qualifications and training. Usually uniformed enlisted personnel. Note: because translators are selected on the basis of urgent need, frequently they do not meet the standards of other UKR loyalty requirements.
 - d. Agents and Informers. Several layers and grades of these.
 - (1) Secret agent-informers in all units of Soviet armed forces. Trusted Soviet personnel.
 - (2) Secret agents recruited from civilian native population, gathering information from their sources.

SECRET

- (3) Informers in selected political, religious, educational, professional groups, in prison camps, in forced labor battallions; briefly, in every walk of life. These likewise are recruited from the native, civilian population.

7. Uniforms

Officer and enlisted personnel of the UKR will wear the regular Soviet Army uniform, with no special insignia. This personnel is authorized to wear any insignia of the Army which is suitable to its purpose; for example, engineers, artillery, etc. In the USSR, GUKR personnel wears the regular Soviet Army uniform with special trimmings: dark blue cap tops with crimson band, dark blue stripe on trousers, dark blue background on epaulets, etc. This cannot be worn outside of the Soviet Union.

8. Work Routine

UKR personnel receive the best food and living accommodations available in the occupied area. Officer and clerical personnel work from 10 AM to 4 PM, with four hours for dinner, and from 8 PM to 12 Midnight, six days a week. It is said that the officials usually remain at their desks until at least 2 AM just in case a higher official should call; therefore, interrogations and investigations are most frequently carried on during the early morning hours.

D. Operating Procedure

1. When a Soviet Army occupies an area, UKR will follow within a matter of hours. A headquarters will be established in a courthouse or other suitable public building. Quarters will be commandeered as living space for officer and enlisted personnel. The officers will have individual rooms and enlisted personnel will be housed in barracks or dormitories. Public buildings and private residences will be commandeered for this purpose. Community mess halls and recreational facilities organized for UKR personnel.
2. The UKR building or buildings will be heavily guarded by their own personnel.
3. A reign of terror will be established to cow the civilian population in the occupied area. Arrests will begin immediately and the first to be arrested will be:
 - a. Active elements of the native political parties (exclusive of course of the Communists), and local government officials.
 - b. Active elements of religious groups, clergy and lay persons.

~~SECRET~~

c. Leaders in civic, educational, professional and merchant classes. In other words, the leaders in all walks of life.

4. Those arrested will be subjected to interrogation, rigorous and violent, for the purpose of eliciting information on active or potential anti-Soviet resistance. Most of those arrested, unable to resist the rigors will tell what they know and even invent information to satisfy the UKR. Organized resistance will be unlikely to survive this treatment, since the leaders will be uncovered.

5. Agent-informer program

Following this initial dragnet the UKR will begin its program of systematically infiltrating the community with agent-informers. Each racial, religious, and social group will be penetrated. Each industrial, agricultural, mercantile and professional group will have its informers. Even the prison camps will be infiltrated with those who will report to the UKR. Past political convictions and social background will mean little. It will be a struggle for survival. Opportunists, those who have been weakened by the dread of UKR interrogation, and those driven by necessity will agree to cooperate. Urban communities especially will be susceptible to UKR penetration in all walks of life.

6. Tribunals

(S)(u)

A three man tribunal, composed of ranking UKR officials will pass judgment on these arrested. This tribunal serves only to make formal the matter of sentence. The arrested will not normally be brought before this tribunal, such proceedings being conducted on the basis of reports submitted by the interrogating and investigating officials, nor will the arrested be represented before the tribunal.

7. Certificates of Identity

Each adult will be required to obtain a certificate of identity, which will be issued by an official of UKR. Such a certificate will be essential to any sort of legal existence, and without it one will not be able to live or travel in an area policed by UKR. After such cards have been in circulation for a time it may be possible to acquire a false one, but in the beginning it will be necessary to provide an ostensibly

~~SECRET~~

valid personal history to obtain a card. It should be presumed that the UKR will acquire all local and territorial records including vital statistics, voting registers, police records, school records, tax rolls and the like, with which they will be in a position to verify statements made by applicants. (S)(U)

8. (Travel Regulations) (S)(U)

No travel will be permitted between communities without passes issued by UKR and road blocks will be established to enforce this regulation. For practical purposes normal means of conveyance will be taken over for military purposes and travel will be out of the question except by foot. (S)(U)

* Source Material: CIC Interrogation Reports from Soviet Defectors who were associated with UKR: 100-351413-8,9,11,14, Smersh; by Nicola Sineversky, Henry Holt & Co., 1950. (S)(U)

General Observations

One who intends to survive and remain free to operate in territory policed by the UKR should take these things into consideration:

1. He should have not identified himself with non-Communist political activity, local or federal government, civic, religious or educational groups. Or, having such connections, must give consideration to covering them completely and assuming a new and fool-proof identity on the UKR's arrival.
2. A member of a persecuted or oppressed race, or an oppressed worker, will have an advantage over a member of the middle or upper strata of capitalist society.
3. He should have no connection with an organized resistance movement since exposure of the leadership which is to be expected, will result in the exposure of many of the members.
4. He cannot safely disclose his confidence to anyone, no matter how devoted that person may be. In the event that person is confronted with the terrors of an interrogation by the UKR he cannot be counted upon to resist and retain the confidence.

F. B. I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

(DECODED COPY) (u)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alger _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(5-17-51) NR 171805

6:07 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 74 POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS INTERVIEWED AND AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN PROGRAM; CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED IN THESE CASES. IN CONNECTION WITH CONTACTING ALL POTENTIAL AGENTS WITH REFERENCE TO TRAINING 13 HAVE BEEN CONTACTED AMENABLE TO PROCEEDING TO WASHINGTON. MEMORANDA RE THESE CONTACTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO BUREAU. LEADS TO CONTACT ALL OTHERS ASSIGNED AND PRESENTLY BEING HANDLED.

RECEIVED

(5-17-51)

6:25 P.M.

LL

RECORDED - 37

MAY 24 1951
18

EX-30

SP3-BTS/jm
4-20-2000

00-1164

HANDLED BY
STON

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

MAY 28 1951

65-59264

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

DECODED COPY

TRANSMITTED BY SP3-BTS/m

ON 4-20-2000

00-1164

FROM ANCHORAGE (5-18-51) NR 180144

2:51 P.M. 6/20/94

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

STAGE RE BUREAU RADIOGRAM (SIXTEENTH) INSTANT. CLOSING
REPORTS IN CASES LISTED ANCHORAGE LETTER (EIGHTH) INSTANT
BEING DISSEMINATED [REDACTED] ON (EIGHTEENTH) INSTANT.

RECEIVED (5-18-51) 3:08 P.M. LL

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 122

EX-65

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Same dissemination made at SOB [REDACTED]

65-59267 (4) cc: Mr. Baker

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Alden _____
 Egan _____
 Gurnea _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Pennington _____
 Quinn Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

SP3-BTS/sm
 4-20-2000 00-1164

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE

(5-18-51)

NR 180145

2:46 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

STAGE. RE BUREAU RADIOGRAM (16TH) INSTANT. DATA RE RECONTACT OF AGENTS TO DATE FOR TRAINING HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO BUREAU IN LETTER. RESULTS OF CONTACTS FROM NOW ON WILL BE FORWARDED BY RADIO.

RECORDED 2 42

RECEIVED:

(5-18-51)

4:33 PM

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65-59264

RECORDED - 34

SAC, Seattle

May 23, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12RTS/JC

ON 6/29/94

342251

Reurtel 5-19-51.

Referral/Consult

For the information of the Seattle and Atlanta offices, this is to advise that the Bureau, [redacted] is presently engaged in the development of a group of individuals in Alaska who are being designated as "Stay-behind Agents." These persons are civilian residents of Alaska who have indicated that they intend to remain in Alaska even though that Territory may be invaded and occupied by the Russians. It is contemplated that their services will be utilized for the purpose of gathering intelligence information for the U. S. government in the event a part or all of Alaska is occupied by the enemy.

Referral/Consult

Plans have been effected to afford these Stay-behind Agents appropriate training in Washington, D. C., by [redacted] the Bureau. They will be in Washington, D. C., approximately two weeks. A representative number of these agents will proceed to Ft. Benning, Georgia, for an additional period of approximately three weeks for training in parachute jumping.

Referral/Consult

To date 74 persons have been recommended by the Anchorage office under this program. They are presently being recontacted as to when they will be available to come to Washington, D. C., for the necessary training. [redacted]

[redacted] It is contemplated that these Stay-behind Agents will be en route to Washington from Alaska every week. They will travel alone and receive training separately. They are not to know the identity of one another. Training will probably begin during June, 1951.

Attachment

cc: Atlanta (Attachment) P&C
cc: Anchorage (Attachment) P&C

COMM - FBI

MAY 24 1951

MAILED 20

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

65-59264-12
65 JUN 11 1951

It is contemplated that insurance policies will be secured by the Bureau on every Stay-behind Agent to cover the risks involved during the time he is traveling and in training.

The Anchorage office will advise the Bureau and the Seattle office by radiogram of the identity of the Stay-behind Agent and travel plans prior to the latter's departure from Alaska. The airline and flight number will be designated. The Seattle office will maintain close liaison [redacted] and will promptly advise the Bureau in the event any difficulties are encountered by the Stay-behind Agent in Seattle, and of any changes in his travel plans.

Referral/Consult

The Atlanta office will maintain liaison with [redacted] In case of any difficulties at Ft. Benning, or in the event of any accident during training, the Bureau should be promptly advised by teletype or telephone, depending upon the urgency of the situation.

Referral/Consult

The code word to be used in teletypes in this matter is "Stage."

I desire to impress upon you the necessity of maintaining this matter in confidence. The security features of this program are paramount issues and it should not be discussed outside the Bureau except [redacted]

Referral/Consult

As of possible interest, there are attached two copies of a self-explanatory communication dated [redacted]

Referral/Consult

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 19


TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Clegg	✓
Mr. Glavin	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Egan	✓
Mr. Gurnea	✓
Mr. Hendon	✓
Mr. Pennington	✓
Mr. Quinn	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Mr. Gandy	✓

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/90 BY SP12 BT/S/80

WASH 15 FROM SEATTLE VIA SAN FRAN 5-19 -51 4-27 PM

DIRECTOR *ostage* URGENT



Buckley

WHO ARE
THESE PEOPLE AND WHAT ACTION IF ANY DO YOU DESIRE ME TO TAKE.

HOLD Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 34 65-59264

MAY 29 1951

24

EX-118

CC: Mr. Tamm

65-59264

J.V.B.
b6
b7C

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

DECODED COPY

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont ☒
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(5-24-51)

NR 242000

6:02 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 77 PERSONS RECOMMENDED AS POTENTIAL STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. OF THESE, 34 HAVE BEEN RECONTACTED WITH REFERENCE TO TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED TO BUREAU. ALL RECONTACTED EXCEPT ONE AMENABLE PROCEEDING TO WASHINGTON. LEADS TO CONTACT ALL OTHERS ASSIGNED AND PRESENTLY BEING HANDLED.

RECEIVED:

(5-24-51)

6:05 PM

ME

~~6/29/94~~
~~Classified by SP3 BTJ/SM~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 3/22/51~~

CLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/SM

ON 4-20-2000

00-1164

EX - 118

RECORDED - 45

65-59264-123
(u)

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

5-24

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

6/20/94

(u)

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: May 25, 1951

FROM : MR. A. J. BELMONT

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH [REDACTED] RE
SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE
IN THE EVENT OF WARALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP2 BJE/KC
342251Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

You will recall we have previously discussed with [REDACTED] the problem with which the United States [REDACTED] will be faced, in the event of an invasion, in the securing of information of an intelligence nature in territory occupied by a potential enemy. We have been informed that [REDACTED]

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that [REDACTED] be informed that the Bureau has no objection whatever to the [REDACTED] provided [REDACTED] is not based upon a knowledge of our operations. In the event it is later desirable to do so, we can then secure clearance from the Air Force.

If you approve, [REDACTED]

SP2-BTJ/ST

7-17-2000

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS PRELIMINARY
BY DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRS)

DATE: 6-13-01 BY: SP2-BTJ/ST

CCH: LL

001/104

JUN 8 1951

HANDLED BY
FILED DESK

b7D

b7D

b7D

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Alden _____
 Belmont _____
 Laughlin _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

4-20-2000

SP3-BTS/SM

60-1164

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE

(5-31-51)

NR 311805

3:29 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. RE ANCHORAGE LETTER TO BUREAU (MAY 11) LAST. TO
 ASSIST IN INTERVIEWING STAY BEHIND AGENTS AND IN ANSWERING
 THEIR INQUIRIES. ADVICE REQUESTED AS TO DATE TRAINING DUTY
 IS TO COMMENCE.

RECEIVED:

(5-31-51)

3:58 PM

MW

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
 outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
 order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65-59264

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: June 9, 1951

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: STAGE
(Bufile 65-59264)Re Anchorage letter 6/2/51 requesting that an interview of
[redacted] be made.Please advise specifically whether you desire that such interview
be conducted by this office.

JBN:LM

AIR MAILDECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BT/SLC
ON 6/29/94
342251RECORDED - 132
INDEXED - 132JUN 11 1951
15

ce

[Handwritten: Charles L. ...]

[Handwritten: ...]

[Handwritten: ...]

[Handwritten: ...]

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BT/SLC
ON 6/29/94
342251

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 14, 1951 (u) (u)

URGENT

(u) SAC, SEATTLE

ENCLOSURE UNDERLINE

STAGE. BURELET (JUNE NINE) SEE BULET (JUNE EIGHT) CAPTIONED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADMINISTRATIVE DASH ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM. EXPEDITE INVESTIGATION. b6 b7C

HOOVER

RECORDED

MCC:DJB

965-59264 - 128

EX - 120

cc 62-

ADM - E & E Program

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~

~~Classified by SP6 BJS/SM
Declassify on: OADR 342251~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3 BJS/SM
ON 4-20-2000

00-1164

Enc 7 RC
162-5-1648
(u)

TELETYPE

JUN 14 1951

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

1-24 P.M. Pu DBD

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Alden
- Belmont
- Laughlin
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

Sent via
[REDACTED]

(u) (u)

JUN 14 10 52 AM '51
RECEIVED ROOM
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

mcc
[Signature]

62-94747-1
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

RECEIVED
JUN 7 1951

RADIOGRAM
URGENT
CIPHER PAD CODE

JUNE 7, 1951

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE. REURAD (JUNE SIX) AGREEABLE FOR YOUR OFFICE AND

TO INTEGRATE SCHEDULES WHEREBY ESCAPE AND EVASION AGENTS WILL RECEIVE
TRAINING AT SOG. SCHEDULES OF STAGE AGENTS PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED AND
APPROVED SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. IT WILL BE NECESSARY THAT

AND FOR YOU

TO FURNISH SAME TO BUREAU FOR NAME CHECKS AT OUTSET OF CONSIDERATION.

NECESSARY WASHINGTON FURNISH REPORTS
TO BUREAU IN SAME MANNER IN EFFECT AS TO STAGE AGENTS. WE MUST HAVE
EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER SECURITY ASPECTS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE
OF AGENT FOR TRAINING.

Referral/Consult

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Referral/Consult

Note: SA Sanders discussed this matter

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BIS/sm

ON 4-20-2006

00-1164

Classified by SP3-BIS/sm
Declassify on: OADR 342251

CONFIDENTIAL

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Alden
Belmont
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

JUN 13 1951

Sent Via Radio 6-8-51

1:46 AM

Per L.H.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 7, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(Bufile 65-59264)

Remylet May 8, 1951 regarding copies of reports to be disseminated [redacted]

Referral/Consult

The following is a list of reports which have not been disseminated to date and the Bureau is requested to furnish the date upon which same will be disseminated [redacted]

Bufile 62-94199	ANCH file 66-461
Bufile 62-94196	ANCH file 66-457
Bufile 62-93525	ANCH file 66-416
Bufile 62-94001	ANCH file 66-383
Bufile 62-94204	ANCH file 66-460
Bufile 62-93491	ANCH File 66-379
Bufile 62-94203	ANCH file 66-462

b6
b7C

65-298
SSP:vf

RECORDED - 34

INDEXED - 34

JUN 12 1951
15

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12BTS/50

6/29/94

342251

129

SAC, Anchorage

June 21, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STAGE

Referral/Consult

Reurlet 6-7-51.

You are authorized to disseminate copies of reports [redacted] in the following cases:

[redacted]
Bureau file 62-94196
Anchorage file 66-457

b6
b7C

[redacted]
Bureau file 62-94203
Anchorage file 66-462

Individual letters are being addressed to you with regard to the other potential SBAs listed in relet. You have been previously instructed to submit further recommendations concerning [redacted] your file 66-379.

b6
b7C

RECORDED - 135

65-59264 - 129


EX - 43

MCC:djb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 29-9-4 BY SP229TS/80

34225

olson _____
ladd _____
legg _____
lavin _____
lchols _____
psen _____
racy _____
arbo _____
liden _____
slmont _____
ughlin _____
bur _____
sle. Room _____
sane _____
andy _____



RECEIVED READING ROOM
JUN 22 10 07 AM '51

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
F.B.I.
JUN 21 10 48 AM '51

RECEIVED READING ROOM

Handwritten signature

Handwritten signature

Handwritten signature

50 AUG 1 1951

SAC, Seattle

June 9, 1951

Director, FBI

AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY
PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION

(Stay-Behind Agent Program, Escape and Evasion Program)

You have been previously advised, in part, in regard to the above program. For your further information and the information of Minneapolis and Detroit, the following is set forth.

Referral/Consult

The Bureau, [redacted] is presently engaged in a program whereby a number of civilians will be brought from Alaska to Washington for special training. These persons have indicated they intend to remain in Alaska even though that Territory be invaded and occupied by the Russians. It is contemplated that their services will be utilized for the purpose of gathering intelligence information in the event a part or all of Alaska is occupied by an enemy and will assist in the operations of underground routes for the escape of military personnel or perhaps others from Alaska to safe territory.

Referral/Consult

Plans have been effected to afford these persons appropriate training in Washington, D. C., [redacted] the Bureau. They will be in Washington, D. C., for approximately two weeks. A representative number of these persons will be given additional training in parachute jumping at Fort Benning, Georgia, for approximately three weeks.

[redacted] These individuals are not to know the identities of one another. Two persons are currently en route.

Referral/Consult

The Anchorage Office has advised that it is expected the following schedule will be adhered to in most instances:

1. Persons to begin training on Monday, June 11, 1951, on Monday, June 11, 1951, will leave Anchorage via Flight 820, Northwest Airlines, at 1 P.M. on the preceding Friday, arrive in Seattle at 3:50 P.M. the same day. They will leave Seattle on...

65-59264

cc: Anchorage (AM)
Minneapolis (AMSD)
Detroit (AMSD)

62 JUN 18 1951

MMC:dba:dar

COMM - FBI

JUN - 9 1951

MAILED 20

DECLASS
ON 6/29/98

342251

Saturday morning at 7:30 A.M., arriving in Minneapolis at 8:30 P.M., transfer to a plane which departs from Minneapolis at 8:15 P.M., arriving in Detroit at 7:30 P.M., transfer to another plane which leaves at 8:10 P.M. and arrives at Washington, D.C., at 11:40 P.M., Saturday Night.

2. Persons to begin training at 8:00 A.M. on Tuesday will leave Anchorage on Northwest Airlines Coach Flights 832 or 830, departing at 8:30 A.M. or 9:30 A.M., respectively, on the preceding Saturday, arriving in Seattle at 6:00 P.M. or 7:00 P.M., respectively. They will leave Seattle on Sunday via Northwest Airlines at 7:30 A.M. and will follow the same schedule indicated above, arriving in Washington at 11:40 P.M. on Sunday Night. All times indicated are Standard.

Referral/Consult

Each person will be instructed, prior to departure from Anchorage, that he should call Bureau offices wherever he may be, in the event he needs emergency assistance in connection with travel, accommodations and relative matters. All offices should be alert to such calls and should render every possible assistance. Upon determination of probable schedules for these persons on their return trips to Alaska, you will be advised of the details. It is possible that some of the persons will spend time in the States for personal reasons prior to return.

You are specifically instructed that the program is of the most confidential nature and is not to be discussed under any circumstances. You should, of course, brief appropriate personnel of your office to insure the handling of any problems which may arise. The Bureau should be informed of any problems which require Bureau attention.

The code word to be used in teletypes in this matter is "STAGE". Any teletype or radio communication should be encoded in such manner as to provide full security.

Minneapolis and Detroit refer to Bureau teletype of June 8, 1951, in the above connection.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 8, 1951

SAC, MINNEAPOLIS
DETROIT

(u)
URGENT
ENCODE UNDERLINED
WORDS

32

(u)

STAGE. FOR STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, BUREAU

[] PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN PROGRAM ~~URGENT~~ CONSIDERABLE NUMBER CIVILIANS BEING
BROUGHT FROM ALASKA TO WASHINGTON FOR SPECIAL TRAINING. PRESENT ITINERARY
INCLUDES PLANE STOPS SEATTLE, MINNEAPOLIS AND DETROIT. SUCH PERSONS
INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT BUREAU OFFICES FOR ANY EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE NECESSARY.
TWO PRESENTLY ENROUTE. BE ALERT TO POSSIBLE CALLS AND RENDER ALL POSSIBLE
ASSISTANCE. ADVISE BUREAU PROMPTLY OF ANY PROBLEMS. LETTER FOLLOWS.

Referral/Consult

HOOVER

MCC:bjw

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/TM
ON 4-29-2000

00-1164

ENC. M.E.
1822-1835

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~

Classified by SP3-BTS/TM
Declassify on: OADR

6/29/84

342257

RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI
JUN 9 12 32 PM '51

JUN 9 12 32 PM '51

(u)

RECORDED - 34

65-59264-133
JUN 12 1951

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Alden
Belmont
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
TELETYPE
JUN 9 1951

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 14 1951

(u)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 9, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(Bufile 65-59264)DECLASSIFIED BY SP120 TS KC
ON 6/29/94 54225/

The following information is being set forth so that the Bureau may be cognizant of the manner in which [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

The writer has indicated to [redacted] lack of concurrence in the foregoing procedure for security reasons.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

In view of the large amount of money already being spent on this program, particularly for security reasons, it is believed that [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

could nullify all the other efforts which have been and are being taken to insure the security of this program.

Possibly the Bureau may desire to call this matter to the attention of [redacted] so that specific instructions may be issued to [redacted] if the present procedure does not meet with the approval of the Bureau [redacted]

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 34
INDEXED - 34

65-298
JFD:vf

JUN 12 1951

JUL 3 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

URGENT

(JUNE 2, 1951)

(4)
RADIOGRAM
CIPHER PAD CODE (4)

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 138

SAC, ANCHORAGE

105-59264-135
STAGE. REURAD (JUNE TWO.)

INSURANCE INCLUDES

TEN THOUSAND DOLLAR ACCIDENTAL DEATH COVERAGE, FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS FOR MEDICAL ATTENTION RESULT OF ACCIDENT AND PROVISIONS PRORATED PAYMENTS FOR DISMEMBERMENT RESULT OF ACCIDENT. TERM POLICY NINETY DAYS.

IF ANY QUESTION ARISES THIS REGARD SURAD.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

HOOPER Classified by

Declassify on: OADR

65-59264

(Note: Info referred to above from

WTB:jef

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BJS/m
ON 4-20-2000

Referral/Consult

#02-2048

2 MAY 1951 PM 4:00
RECEIVED FROM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUN 21 1951

Sent Via Bureau Radio (6/2/51) 9:19 PM

SAC, Anchorage

June 7, 1951

Director, FBI

RE: BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL TO THE
(CLASSIFIED SECRET SERVICE)

INTERNAL SECURITY

The Bureau has confirmed final arrangements for the travel and training of [redacted] training to begin on June 11, 1951, and of [redacted] training to begin on June 12, 1951.

b6
b7C

The following are tentatively scheduled, pending final arrangements for insurance and definite travel schedules, for training to be in on the dates indicated:

b6
b7C

[redacted] June 19, 1951
[redacted] June 26, 1951
[redacted] July 2, 1951
[redacted] July 9, 1951

6/29/94 SP12BT5/50
342257

Certain names have been suggested for training to be in on intervening Mondays and Thursdays of each week. These persons and others suggested by you are under consideration for such dates.

Effective immediately, it will be the direct responsibility of your office, on your own initiative, to make possible arrangements with previously approved OGC Agents whereby one Agent will be available at the Seat of Government on each Monday and on each Tuesday. Every effort should be made to have the schedule called for a minimum of thirty days in advance. In each instance the Bureau should be definitely advised of the identity, beneficiary, and exact travel schedule of each person at least two weeks in advance of the date which training is to begin. Your immediate objective should be the completion of the schedule for the immediate future.

You should give due regard to obtaining adequate physical coverage as soon as possible, taking into consideration the age, individual qualifications, and convenience of persons in question. You should, if at all possible, avoid sending two persons from the same immediate area during the same week in order to give further security to the program.

RECORDED - 41

EX-130

JUN 11 1951

65-59284

MCC:dmd

COMM - FBI

JUN 8 1951

MAILED 26

RECEIVED-TOLSON
F B I
JUN 8 4 29 PM '51

HAND
1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

(X) (DECODED COPY) (u)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE (6-2-51) (u) NR 020202 3:28 AM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. REURRAD (MAY 29) LAST. [REDACTED] UNABLE
TO BE AT SOG (JUNE 11) DUE TO UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN PROFESSIONAL
[REDACTED] WILL BE AVAILABLE AFTER (AUGUST 15) ATTEMPT
BEING MADE TO SECURE SUBSTITUTE FOR (JUNE 11) AND BUREAU WILL BE
ADVISED. [REDACTED] BENEFICIARY IS [REDACTED] WIFE,
ANCHORAGE. [REDACTED] CAN BE AT SOG (JUNE 12) DESIRES TO LEAVE
ANCHORAGE BY NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. ON (JUNE 9) ARRIVING WASH-
INGTON NIGHT OF (JUNE 10). BENEFICIARY IS [REDACTED] WIFE
[REDACTED] ANCHORAGE. FRANK BERTON MOORE UNABLE TO BE
(u) AT SOG (JUNE 18) DUE TO COMMITMENTS AS HUNTING GUIDE. CAN BE AT
(u) SOG (JUNE 25). MOORE-S BENEFICIARY IS RUTH ELLEN MOORE, WIFE,
ANCHORAGE. ATTEMPT BEING MADE TO CONTACT DOCTOR HOWARD FROMIG
PRESENTLY IN KETCHIKAN, ALASKA, TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER HE CAN BE
(u) AT SOG ON (JUNE 18) AS REPLACEMENT FOR MOORE. CONTACTS CONTINUING
(u) WITH OTHERS MENTIONED IN BUREAU RADIOGRAM. RE BUREAU LETTER
(u) MAY 4) LAST, PARAGRAPH NUMBER ONE A. ADVICE REQUESTED AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT RATE OF PER DIEM FOR INCIDENTAL EXPENSES IS TO
INCLUDE MEALS AND LODGINGS. ADVICE ALSO REQUESTED AS TO AMOUNT
OF INSURANCE BEING TAKEN ON AGENTS AND TERMS OF INSURANCE. SOME
STAY BEHIND AGENTS PLAN TO SPEND ADDITIONAL TIME IN STATES ON
PERSONAL BUSINESS. ADVICE ALSO REQUESTED AS TO WHETHER
BUREAU IS TO PAY FOR COST OF TRANSPORTATION FOR STAY BEHIND
AGENTS FROM THEIR HOMES TO ANCHORAGE PRIOR TO DEPARTING FOR
SEATTLE. SUGGEST THAT TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR TRAINEES ATTEND-
ANCE IN WASHINGTON BE SET UP AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN ADVANCE IN
ORDER TO FACILITATE CONTACTING THEM HERE.

RECEIVED

(6-2-51) (u)

RECORDED - 133
4:29 AM

SP3-BTJ/sm
4-20-2000

00-1164

FIVE
Referral/Consult

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

7-17-2000

SP3-BTS/SM

00-1164

REGISTERED AIR MAIL

~~SECRET~~

Date: June 6, 1951

To:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/19/94 BY SP2 BTJ/SC

(U)

b7D

From: J. Edgar Hoover, Director - Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by SP2 BTJ/SC
Declassify on: OADR

For your confidential information, the Bureau, [redacted]

[redacted] is presently engaged in the development of a group of individuals in Alaska who are being designated as "Stay-behind Agents." These persons are civilian residents of Alaska who have indicated that they intend to remain in Alaska even though that Territory may be invaded and occupied by the Russians. It is contemplated that their services will be utilized for the purpose of gathering intelligence information for the U. S. Government in the event a part or all of Alaska is occupied by the enemy.

Referral/Consult

Plans have been effected to afford these Stay-behind Agents appropriate training in Washington, D. C., [redacted] and the Bureau. A representative number of these agents will proceed to [redacted] Georgia, for training in parachute jumping.

Referral/Consult

During March, 1951, [redacted] was informed by the Bureau that discussions were under way with military authorities regarding planning for sources of intelligence in the event of war but that these discussions were being confined to the Territory of Alaska and that we have not contemplated any such plan in the continental United States or in the contiguous areas of Canada.

b7D

b7D

65-59264

MAILED 9
JUN 8 1951
COMM - FBI

cc - Foreign Service Desk

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 6-13-01 SP3-BTS/SM
00-1164 Pmd 1,2

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

~~SECRET~~

(U)

b7D

b7D

[redacted] was informed that the Bureau has no objection whatever to the [redacted] in this regard by the [redacted] provided the introduction of such [redacted] is not based upon a knowledge of our operations. (S)

(U)

(U)

The above information is being called to your attention at this time so you will be aware of the discussions between [redacted] and [redacted] Bureau officials. (S)(U)

b7D

I desire to impress upon you the necessity of maintaining this matter in confidence.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

0-9a

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to:

RECORDED - 34

(JUNE 7, 1951)

(4) RADIOGRAM

URGENT

CIPHER PAD CODE

SAC, ANCHORAGE

137
STAGE. IMMEDIATELY CONTACT

SHOULD EXTEND TO PERSONS

DEPARTING FROM ANCHORAGE THIS WEEK. SURAD RESULTS OF CONTACT

AND ACTION TAKEN.

Referral/Consult

MCC:dba

6/29/94
SP12815150
342251
HOOVER

JUN 7 12 36 PM '51
FBI
RECEIVED READING ROOM
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

SP3-BTS/SM

4-20-2000

00-1164

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

SENT VIA

Per

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 7, 1951

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-Behind Agent Program)

PURPOSE:

(Step 1 -

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

To recommend that SAC Anchorage be instructed to contact

DETAILS:

Referral/Consult

Anchorage has questioned each prospective STAGE agent to determine whether he has disqualifying physical defects. It is believed desirable that each person selected for travel to SOG for training

As you know, we are in each case attempting to protect the Government's interest by accident insurance on each STAGE agent for the periods of travel and training.

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

Attached for approval is a radiogram to SAC, Anchorage

65-59264

MCC:dba

Attachment

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/97 BY SP12BTS/SC

34225/

RECORDED - 34

165-57217-137
JUN 15 1951
21

FIVE/CC

7116

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 11, 1951


FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: STAGE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Attached is a schedule for training of STAGE agents, effective June 11, 1951. Agent (A) will begin at 8:00 A.M. 6-11-51, Agent (B) at 8:00 A.M. on 6-12-51. The same schedule will prevail for succeeding weeks until further notice, holidays included.

All personnel who will come in contact with trainees have been appropriately briefed as to the confidential nature of the program, that each person is to receive individual training and is under no circumstances to be aware of the identities of other trainees or, in fact, that other persons have been, are or will be trained. You will note the schedule is so arranged that (A) and (B) will never be in the same building simultaneously.



Referral/Consult

The Identification Division will, in accordance with arrangements made, provide personnel each Monday and Tuesday at 9:45 A.M. at Room 2334, IB, to fingerprint and photograph each STAGE agent.

Attachment
MCC:bjw

RECORDED - 34

65-59264-138

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/91 BY SP12BTP/JP

342251

FIVE

mcc

60 JUN 26 1951

Supervisor Manning C. Clements, Security Division, will handle the administration of this program. He will be in Room 1533, Justice Bldg., Ext. 2107, alternate Room 2334, IB, Ext. 2209. Other personnel concerned with the program should contact Supervisor Clements as to schedules and related matters if problems arise. A clerical employee will be trained to assist in handling such calls if Mr. Clements is temporarily absent. Names and background information concerning the persons to arrive during a forthcoming week can be obtained from Mr. Clements or the clerical employee in his absence.

TOPIC	INSTRUCTOR	LOCATION	EXTENSION	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
				A	A B	A B	A B	A B
	Mr. Clements	2334, I.B.	2209	8-10	8-10			
Deception and Security	"	"	"	10-1 10-2:30	10-1 10-2:30			
Codes and Ciphers	Mr. Newpher		"	1-6 2:30-6	1-6 2:30-6		1-6 2:30-6	1-6 2:30-6
Defensive Tactics	Mr. Meyers	Gym, DJ Bldg.	464			8-11	8-11	
Secret Writing	Mr. Magee	7407, DJ Bldg.	497			11-3	11-3	
Sub-Agent Selection and Training	Mr. Clements	2334, I.B.	2209				1-10 8-11	7-10 8-11
Soviet Methods of Counter-Intelligence	"	"	"				1-1 11-2:30	1-1 11-2:30

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/29/94 BY SP2 BJS/JSB

542255
252

62-55224-138

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *JB*

FROM : V. P. KEAY *vpk*

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-Behind Agent Program)
(Bureau File 65-59264)

DATE: June 1, 1951

Referral/Consult

Tolson ☒

Ladd ☒

Clegg ☒

Glavin ☒

Nichols ☒

Rosen ☒

Tracy ☒

Harbo ☒

Belmont ☒

Mohr ☒

INDEXED - 34

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12675/ST

It is contemplated that by Monday, June 11, 1951, the Bureau will have the individuals developed as Stay-Behind Agents scheduled for training at this school beginning on June 11, 1951.

INDEXED - 34 65-57264-139
RECORDED 24

ESS:hke

JUN 25 1951

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that [redacted] be advised that the Bureau will go over with [redacted] the outlines of the courses to be given by the Bureau in the [redacted] FBI School for the Alaskan programs. It is noted that schedules can be arranged for the convenience of all concerned and need not necessarily follow the schedule set up for the actual school, it being contemplated that to discuss the general outlines of the courses with [redacted] would require considerably less time than to give the full lectures contemplated in the school.

Referral/Consult

b6
b7C

was scheduled to take
a course but had emergency
nothing
derogatory

no derogatory
info broken in file

are

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 9, 1951

FROM : SAC, Atlanta


PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
 COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
 EVENT OF INVASION.
 (Stay-behind Agent Program)
 (BuFile 65-59264).

Referral/Consult

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Laughlin	
Mr. Nease	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

Reference Bureau let to Seattle, cc Atlanta
 and Anchorage, dated 5/23/51. Pursuant to the
 Bureau instructions, appropriate arrangements have
 been made with the



EXPEDITE PROCESSING

This matter will be followed in this office.

JCB:CM
 65-1385

cc: Seattle (P&C)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 BTB/TC
 ON 6/29/94
 342251

RECORDED 15

65-59264-140

JUN 12 1951

2

13

B-7

50

60 JUN 19 1951

HANDLED BY
 STOP DESK

SAC, Anchorage

June 29, 1951

Director, FBI

STAGE

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Reurlet 6-14-51.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/19/94 BY SP-8 BTJ/STC

1. Training Schedules

As you have been advised previously, schedules for training of SBA's and E&E agents should be integrated to permit simultaneous progression of the two programs.

While the Bureau concurs in your conclusion that completion of training of SBA's will be thus delayed, the Bureau also has responsibilities in the development of the E&E program. Although it would be desirable to bring additional trainees to SOG weekly to speed up training, the Bureau does not have the facilities or personnel available for such expansion at this time.

Consideration will, however, be given as the programs progress to possible means for expediting the training.

Referral/Consult

You have stated few SBA's will be able to proceed to SOG in September. Radiograms in individual cases have indicated a number of persons have stated they would be available at any time. It is recognized that changes of plans of these individuals will present difficulties. It is imperative, nevertheless, that the scheduling of trainees be continuous and that there be no gaps in scheduling. This should be facilitated by the integration of the training of E&E agents.

It is again pointed out that [redacted] prior to beginning actual investigations of potential agents. In this connection, refer to your letter of June 16, 1951, in which you advised that [redacted]

Separate files have been opened in the Bureau as to each of the individuals mentioned in relet and separate files should be opened in your office.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

MCC:dan

Referral/Consult

COMM - FBI

JUL 3 - 1951

MAILED 19

RECORDED JUL 12 1951

EX-62

65-15712-141

You are again reminded that every consideration must be given to the quality of agents scheduled for training. You should, of course, schedule those persons best qualified first, where it is at all possible.

2. Transportation

Referral/Consult

It is noted you have subsequently advised [redacted]

[redacted] advise promptly.

Referral/Consult

Two principal factors are involved in connection with the expressed desires of some trainees to travel by automobile to SOG. While the Bureau [redacted] are hardly in a position to positively prohibit such persons from traveling by automobile, such procedure should be diplomatically discouraged wherever possible. It is obvious that these persons would likely carry families, friends or perhaps strangers to the States and would perhaps make stops en route with relatives or others. It can be seen that the security of the program might be endangered unless every possible precaution is taken. Traveling companions and others would have natural curiosity as to the travel plans of the trainees and would perhaps have to communicate with the trainees as to return schedules, etc. Secondly, it would be essential, particularly in fall, winter and spring months, for such travel to begin well in advance of training dates. Weather conditions, in the States as well as in Alaska, would have to be considered fully. It would be necessary in each instance for the Bureau to brief various offices through whose territories these persons would travel in order to expedite their arrivals at SOG in the event of difficulties en route. As previously stated, it is positively necessary that these persons arrive as scheduled for training.

3. Salaries and Expenses

You will be advised by separate memorandum concerning your recommendations for increased per diem.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Egan _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

4. Physical Examinations

Your assumption that your office has authority to cancel the schedule of a trainee who is found to be physically unfit for air travel or to engage in normal physical activity is correct. The purpose of the examination, of course, is to determine whether the individual in question would be adversely affected by air travel, or the normal activities which would be expected during the training period. If he is unfit for such, he is obviously unfit for the entire program. You should inquire into the physical condition of an individual in detail before recommending him.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: June 14, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
 COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
 OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (Bureau file 65-59264)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/SC
ON 6/29/94

34225/

In connection with the development of the instant program, the following information is being submitted and the Bureau's advice is requested with regard to certain matters as indicated:

° Referral/Consult

1. Training Schedules

The balance of the dates in July are being filled by this office and as soon as the trainees have been contacted and the specific dates confirmed, the Bureau will be advised.

If the E & E Program is to be integrated with the training of the SBA's and only two trainees per week can be handled in Washington, D. C., considerable delay will ensue in handling those trainees already recommended in the SBA Program. It will be noted that few SBA's will be able to be in Washington during September. However, many have indicated that they are available commencing October 1, 1951. It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to arrange for the handling of additional trainees in Washington, D. C. commencing October 1, 1951.

Referral/Consult

2. Transportation

COPIES DESTROYED

6584 NOV 21 1966
 65-298
 JFD:vf

RECORDED - 119

JUN 13 1951



Some trainees have indicated that they desire to drive to Washington, D. C. in their privately-owned automobiles. It is requested that the Bureau advise as to whether or not there is any objection to this mode of travel.



3. Salaries and Expenses

Referral/Consult

The Bureau by radiogram dated June 11, 1951 advised that "schedule for remuneration and per diem approved". It is assumed that the schedule referred to is the one mentioned in Bureau letter dated May 4, 1951, namely, \$150.00 per week basic pay plus \$4.00 per diem for incidental expenses and \$175.00 per week basic pay plus same per diem as above for the approximate 2½ weeks during the jump training course.

Referral/Consult

In view of the fact that it is necessary for trainees to come to Anchorage a day or two in advance of their departure schedule to undergo physical examinations and

Bureau authorization is requested to pay them the basic weekly rate of \$150.00 commencing at the time they leave their homes, which in most instances will not be more than two days in advance of their departure date from Anchorage. Also, Bureau authorization is requested to pay the trainees \$11.00 per day per diem in Alaska, \$6.00 per day per diem for travel between Alaska and the United States, and \$9.00 per day per diem in the United States, except during the time they are in Washington, D. C. and at Fort Benning, Georgia.

The foregoing proposed schedules of payment of per diem will, of course, not include time spent by the trainees in the United States or in Alaska on personal matters.

The Bureau by radiogram dated June 11, 1951 advised that payments should be made to the trainee on his return to Anchorage and that the Bureau will advise as to the amount due. Inasmuch as

AN 65-298

some of the trainees reside at great distances from Anchorage and in sections which are difficult and expensive to reach, it is suggested that arrangements be made so that the trainees may be paid in Anchorage immediately upon their return and prior to their departure to their respective homes.

In Bureau radiogram of May 16, 1951 it is stated that "where financial status agents require advances you should secure Bureau approval". Advice is requested as to whether or not Bureau radiogram of June 11, 1951 authorizes the advance of a portion of payments prior to departure from Anchorage without previous Bureau authority. It will be noted that in most instances a request from the trainees for such advances will not be received until immediately prior to their departure and time will not permit the obtaining of authorization from the Bureau.

4. Physical Examinations

Referral/Consult

The Bureau's instructions as contained in radiogram of June 8, 1951 are being complied with. A certification signed by the examining physician is being obtained and kept in the trainee's file in this office together with the reports of laboratory examinations. However, it is not possible to have the same doctor perform all the examinations as there is [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

It is assumed that this office has authority to cancel the schedule of any trainee who is reported by the examining physician as being in such a condition that flying would be hazardous or who would not be able to engage in normal physical activity.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 16, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

~~SECRET~~
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)
(Bufile 65-59264)

Referral/Consult

Classified by ~~SP12 BTJ/KPC~~

Declassify on: OADR 342257

Inasmuch as copies of the same reports are being forwarded to [redacted] for distribution to the Bureau, no copies are being forwarded with this letter.

Referral/Consult

The only information in the files of this office identifiable with the above-named individuals concerns [redacted]. A report concerning him was submitted to the Bureau by the Anchorage Office dated June 28, 1947, entitled [redacted] Departmental Applicant, Field Deputy Marshal, Nenana, Alaska."

b6
b7C62-227
JFD:vfDECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/KPC
ON 6/29/94
342257

RECORDED - 109

INDEXED - 109 JUN 18 1951

EX. - 32

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/KPC
ON 3/25/98
PRR 06/27/97ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~SECRET~~

JUN 23 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT
 FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH
 SUBJECT: STAGE

DATE: June 9, 1951

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

ASAC Powers called from Minneapolis on the morning of June 9 and stated that [redacted]

[redacted] the Bureau were bringing certain individuals from Alaska to Washington who might land by plane in Minneapolis and that [redacted]

[redacted] Powers asked for information as to what the [redacted] inquiry was all about.

mlc
Encl. 539

You will recall that we have directed a letter to Seattle previously in this matter and, upon learning yesterday [redacted]

[redacted] we directed a letter to those offices informing them of the background of this case.

Referral/Consult

I advised Powers of the background of this matter and instructed that it should be kept on a highly confidential basis in the Minneapolis Office, and I told him that [redacted] such assistance should be given.

Referral/Consult

While talking with Acting ASAC Bradley of the Detroit Office on another matter on June 9, I also informed him of this program and told him that should [redacted]

ACTION:

For your information.

Referral/Consult

CEH:LL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/29/94 BY SP-128180

RECORDED - 110

EX. - 119

65-59264-143

HANDLED BY
 STOP DESK

62 JUN 26 1951

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

(DECODED COPY) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(6-14-51)

NR 141807

3:34 P.M.

DIRECTOR URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 79 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 64 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED TO BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED.

(u) 9 INDIVIDUALS SCHEDULED FOR DEFINITE TRAINING DATES THROUGH JULY 9. 2 TRAINEES PRESENTLY IN WASHINGTON, IN ATTENDANCE AT SCHOOL.

BY THIS OFFICE.

BALANCE OF DATES IN JULY BEING FILLED

RECEIVED

(6-14-51)

3:44 P.M.

LL

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 125

JUN 19 1951

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTS/sm

ON 4-20-2000

00-1164

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

SAC, Anchorage

June 15, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STAGE

Referral/Consult

The question of cover names to be assigned to Stay-
Behind Agents and Escape and Evasion Agents has been discussed.

[Redacted]

You should give immediate consideration to this matter
and thereafter discuss same in detail. [Redacted]
The results of your discussions should be made known to the Bureau,
together with any tentative plan or system evolved, which is
mutually acceptable in order that any plan may be jointly
approved at SOG.

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

b2
b7E

65-59264

6/25/54 SP 12 BTJ/S
342251

MCJ:jgf

RECORDED - 132

100-5724-1477
JUN 18 1951

FBI
READING ROOM

JUN 15 5 12 PM '51

100-5724-1477
JUN 16 1951
JUN 16 1951

SAC, Anchorage

June 16, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STATE

6/29/94 34225/SP12BTS/SC

While it would be premature at this time to assess the potential value of the two State agents who reported at SOG during the first week of training, initial contacts with these individuals point up the necessity for giving considerable attention to the native intelligence and educational backgrounds of persons to be selected for training.

As you are aware, training is being afforded in codes and ciphers, radio communications, and other subjects having technical aspects. A limited amount of time is available for training at SOG in the individual subjects. One of the persons in question has seemed to grasp readily the training afforded to date; mental processes of the other person appear to be considerably slower.

Training schedules will permit some flexibility whereby additional time can be spent in training on particular subjects, where warranted. You will be advised by individual memoranda of the evaluation given to persons trained at SOG, with particular reference to individual needs for further training. As previously instructed, arrangements must be effected for regular training and practice on return of trainees to Alaska.

It can be seen that a tremendous burden will be placed on the Bureau and on your office in attempting to train persons whose capacities to learn are unusually limited. It is fully realized that you cannot in all instances obtain the services of persons of good education who, at the same time, have knowledge of Alaska, experience, and equipment available to them which are considered prerequisites. You must, however, determine that a person has sufficient education, native intelligence, and ability to learn before recommending him for this program.

Personnel handling these matters in your office should be promptly instructed in the above regard in order that the qualifications in question will be fully predetermined. Inquiries should be made and practical devices used where required to determine the extent of education and ability of the individual in question to read, write, think and learn quickly and clearly. Specific statements should be made in this regard in reports of investigation. You should consider these factors. Of course, in arranging schedules for training, in order that persons of higher mentality, all other considerations being equal, will be trained first if at all possible.

65-59204

RECORDED - 132

JUN 18 1951

MTC:njf

148

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150
CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED - 90

CABLEGRAM

URGENT

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

JUNE 8, 1951

EX - 97

Transmit the following message to: ANCHORAGE

STAGE. REPRAD (JUNE SEVEN) STATING TRAINING DATES FOR NINE INDIVIDUALS CONFIRMED
BY ANCHORAGE OF WHICH FOUR CONFIRMED BY BUREAU. BUREAU RECORDS REFLECT DEFINITE
DATES FOR EIGHT PERSONS FURNISHED BY YOU AS FOLLOWS: [REDACTED] (JUNE
ELEVEN, [REDACTED] (JUNE TWELVE, [REDACTED] (JUNE EIGHTEEN, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (JUNE NINETEEN, [REDACTED] (JUNE TWENTY-SIX, FOSTER R. SIMS
(JULY TWO, [REDACTED] (JULY THREE, [REDACTED]
(JULY NINE. NOTE SCHEDULE FOR (JUNE TWENTY-FIVE) OPEN. ADVISE WHETHER R (JUNE
TWENTY-FIVE FILLED AND IF SO IDENTITY OF PERSON. ADVISE ALSO IDENTITY OF NINTH
PERSON REFERRED TO BY YOU. SCHEDULES OF ABOVE EIGHT HEREBY CONFIRMED.
INDIVIDUAL RADIOGRAMS WILL BE SENT WHEN INSURANCE ARRANGED AS TO EACH.
INSURANCE WILL BE PURCHASED ONLY LIMITED NUMBER OF DAYS PRIOR TO SCHEDULED
TRAVEL TO AVOID LAST MINUTE CHANGES IN POLICIES. LETTER EN ROUTE AUTHORIZES
YOU TO ARRANGE DEFINITE SCHEDULES ON YOUR OWN INITIATIVE AND ADVISE BUREAU
FOLLOWING WHICH BUREAU WILL ADVISE IN EACH CASE RE INSURANCE. RE PHYSICAL
EXAMINATION QUERY. [REDACTED]

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

MCC:mab
65-59264

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

HOOVER

Referral/Consult

SENT VIA

Per

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

Heinrich

SP3-BTS/sm
 4-20-2000

00-1164

FROM ANCHORAGE

(6-7-51)

NR 080155

10:55 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

Referral/Consult

STAGE. REURRAD (JUNE 7) RE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION. CONTACT MADE

RECEIVED:

(6-7-51)

11:15 PM

TAR

cc: Mr. Bagger

COPIES DESTROYED

8584 NOV 21 1980

RECORDED - 90

EX. - 97

165-51264-1
 JUN 15 1951 (u)

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

(u)

STAGE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: June 2, 1951

SUBJECT: 0 PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)
 (65-59264)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Referral/Consult

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Egan	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____
Mr. Hendon	_____
Mr. Pennington	_____
Mr. Quinn	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____



EXPEDITE PROCESSING

For the information of the Seattle Office, the Escape and Evasion Program is being set up by [redacted] in cooperation with the Bureau for the purpose of aiding military personnel, especially fliers, who might be forced down in enemy or occupied territory in the event of hostilities with a foreign power. This program is being held in the utmost confidence and no indication should be given to anyone being interviewed as to the purpose of the interview.

Referral/Consult

Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau within 3 days after receipt of this communication, the Seattle Office is requested to interview [redacted] and furnish the results promptly to the Anchorage Office in report form suitable for dissemination.

b6
b7C

The Anchorage Office will, unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, forward a copy of the report received from [redacted] immediately upon receipt in view of the fact that [redacted]

JTM:MMA
 62-227
 cc: Seattle

Let to Seattle
 6-8-51
 MCC

RECORDED - 24

JUN 5 1951

EX-120

Referral/Consult

62-59264-150
 UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-59264-1

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont ☒ _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(6-7-51) (u)

NR 071905

5:27 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 79 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORT SUBMITTED. 59 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED TO BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED. TO DATE DEFINITE TRAINING DATE FOR 9 INDIVIDUALS CONFIRMED BY ANCHORAGE OFFICE, OF WHICH 4 HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED BY BUREAU.

RECEIVED:

(6-7-51) (u)

5:54 PM

CYS

~~6/29/54~~
~~SP3-BTS/SM~~
~~4-20-2000~~

~~6/29/54~~
~~SP3-BTS/SM~~
~~342251~~

SP3-BTS/SM
 4-20-2000
 00-1164

RECORDED - 90
 EX - 97

RECORDED - 90

EX - 97

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

cc: Mr. [illegible]

SAC, Anchorage

June 18, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION


STAGE

(Your file 65-298)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12BTS/SC


Referral/Consult

Reurlet 6-5-51.




You indicated that

Referral/Consult



In this connection you,

should determine from each individual prior to his departure from Alaska, what he has told his immediate relatives, employer, or associates, as to his destination in explanation of his absence. It is noted that the first individual sent to SOG has advised that he told his relatives nothing of his destination. It has been agreed with him that he will, on his return to Alaska, represent that he visited in San Francisco. Any explanations given by such trainees should be completely logical. It is obvious that few would have a legitimate reason to travel to Washington.



In accordance with previous instructions, you should advise each person, prior to his departure, that he can and should call the nearest FBI office in the event he finds himself in difficulties with regard to transportation schedules and otherwise during his travel to and from SOG. It is, of course,

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

RECORDED

65-59264-152

MCC:djb

COMM - FBI
JUN 19 1951
MAILED 20

HANDLED BY
STOR

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: June 5, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (Bufile 65-59264)

ReBurad dated May 29, 1951.

DECLASSIFIED

ON

6/29/94

342751

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED] This matter is being called to the Bureau's attention in the event the Bureau desires to advise the Detroit Office concerning the instant program. However, it does not appear essential that the trainees be met at Detroit nor desirable from a security viewpoint. Referral/Consult

On June 4, 1951, [REDACTED] trainee, was interviewed by [REDACTED] ASAC JOHN F. DESMOND. During this interview [REDACTED] inquired as to how his mother could contact him in the event of an emergency. He stated that she would not know where he was going and would not be unduly curious about it. However, he desired that she have some means of communicating with him in the event of illness, etc. [REDACTED] was furnished with the unlisted telephone number of this office and the name of DESMOND to give to his mother to be used only in case of emergency.

EXPEDITE PROCEED

COPIES

Also on the same date, June 4, 1951, [REDACTED] was interviewed by [REDACTED] ASAC DESMOND and the question arose. At [REDACTED] suggestion, [REDACTED] is being furnished with the following address to which his wife may be reached.

RECORDED - 43

65-298
 JFD:vf

b6
 b7C
 Referral/Consult

letters or wires: [redacted]

[redacted] stated that his wife will assume that he is in the States on a business trip for his insurance company and it will not be unusual for him to give her the above address so that she can communicate with him. b6 b7C

Unless advised to the contrary, arrangements will be worked out in individual cases so that the trainees may be contacted by their families in the event of an emergency.

None of the trainees who have been contacted to date have indicated that they desire advances prior to leaving Anchorage. However, they have been advised that they will be paid in Washington, D. C.

For the Bureau's information, it is expected that the following schedule will be followed in most instances:

1. For trainees due to commence training at 8:00 A. M. on Mondays, they will leave Anchorage via Flight 820, Northwest Airlines, 1:00 P. M. on Friday, arriving in Seattle, Washington at 8:50 P. M. They will leave Seattle, Washington on Saturday morning via Northwest Airlines at 7:30 A. M., arriving at Minneapolis 3:30 P. M., transferring to another plane which departs Minneapolis at 4:15 P. M., arriving at Detroit 7:30 P. M., transferring to another plane which leaves at 8:10 P. M. and finally arriving at Washington, D. C. at 11:40 P. M. Saturday night.

2. For those trainees due to commence training at 8:00 A. M. Tuesdays, they will leave Anchorage on Northwest Airlines Coach Flights 832 or 830, departing Anchorage 8:30 A. M. or 9:30 A. M. respectively, arriving Seattle at 6:00 P. M. or 7:00 P. M. respectively. They will leave Seattle on Sunday morning via Northwest Airlines Stratocruiser Flight at 7:30 A. M. and will follow the same schedule as indicated above, arriving in Washington, D. C. 11:40 P. M. on Sunday night.

It was suggested to [redacted]

[redacted]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C. E. Hennrich

FROM : W. T. Baker

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(ESCAPE AND INVASION PROGRAM)

DATE: June 11, 1951

~~SECRET~~Classified by SP-2 BTJ/JO
Declassify on: OADR 302251

Tolson _____

Ladd _____

Clegg _____

Glavin _____

Nichols _____

Rosen _____

Tracy _____

Harbo _____

Belmont _____

Mohr _____

Tele. Room _____

Nease _____

Gandy _____

As you recall, I have contacted Major Samuel P. Borzilleri several times for the purpose of securing information from him relative to Escape and Evasion techniques. Major Borzilleri is a friend and former classmate of SAC H. G. Foster of the Indianapolis office. Major Borzilleri can be reached through Government code #131, extension 65484, or at his home, Ordway 4543. His office is located at the Moses Building, Washington, D. C. Major Borzilleri is an attorney and is attached to the Air Judge Advocate's Office of the Air Force.

A summary of the information obtained from Major Borzilleri was submitted in a memorandum dated March 12, 1951, (Hennrich to Belmont). At no time was it indicated to Major Borzilleri that the Bureau is interested in captioned matter as relates to Alaska or the Stay-behind Agent Program. The approach to Major Borzilleri was for information of a general intelligence nature which is in his possession as a result of his activities with the Air Force during World War II. He was in charge of their E. and E. Program in northern Africa and in Italy.

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 BTJ/JO
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

65-59264

RECORDED - 49

INDEXED - 49

JUN 19 1951

Referral/Consult

WTB:brg

EX-130

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

Attachment

JUN 28 1951

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

Major Borzilleri also pointed out that he had [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] Two photostatic copies of this document were made, however, and are attached. The fact that copies have been made should not be divulged outside the Bureau. It is believed that the data contained in the attachments should be brought to the attention of SAC John Williams of the Anchorage office before he leaves Washington, D. C. It is also believed that the information will be of possible value to SA [redacted] in connection with the training program of the Stay-behind Agents. b6 b7C

I took Major Borzilleri to lunch on June 7th, 1951. At that time [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] (S) - (U)

[redacted]

ACTION:

The above is for your information.

Referral/Consult

It is suggested that this memorandum be routed to SA Manning C. Clements for his information.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-Behind Agent Program - Escape
and Evasion Program)

DATE: June 7, 1951

Tolson ☒

Ladd ☒

Clegg ☒

Glavin ☒

Nichols ☒

Rosen ☒

Tracy ☒

Harbo ☒

Belmont ☒

Tele. Room ☒

Nease ☒

Gandy ☒

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/90 BY SP12BTS/ST

PURPOSE:

To advise that space has been arranged in the Department of Justice and Identification Buildings for individual training with a maximum of security. Schedule begins June 11, 1951.

DETAILS:

Training of Stay-Behind Agents will begin on June 11, 1951, to be handled by Bureau personnel at the places indicated:

TOPIC	PERSONNEL	LOCATION	TIME
Referral/Consult			
Indoctrination	SA M. C. Clements Security Division	Room 2324 IB.	Approx. 2 hrs.
Deception and Security	"	"	4 hrs.
Selection and Training of Sub-agents and informants	"	"	3 hrs.
Russian System of Ferreting Out Espionage Agents	"	"	2½ hrs.
Codes and Ciphers	SA. I. W. Newpher FBI Laboratory	"	6½ hrs.
Secret Writing	SA J. W. Magee FBI Laboratory	F.B.I. Laboratory	3 hrs.
Defensive Tactics	SA H. A. Myers Training and Inspection Division	Gymnasium	3 hrs.

The first trainee will be available on Monday, June 11, 1951; the second on Tuesday, June 12, 1951, and two per week on succeeding Mondays and Tuesdays. The schedule is devised so that individual training will be given in each subject and two trainees will not be in the same building simultaneously.

MCC:vas

RECORDED - 127

JUN 21 1951

BY
SP12BTS/ST

MCC

ACTION:

Details connected with preparation of quarters, lecture material, and schedules are proceeding on the above basis.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to be 'J. H. Smith', is written in the center of the page.

July 5, 1951

SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI

STAGE
(Your file 65-2958)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12875/SC 34225/

Reurlet 6-21-51.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] should,
Your office
however, give immediate consideration to the desirability for
establishing files on STAGE and E. and E. agents which would be
available to the principal in the event of attack. It appears such
files would also be necessary for practice under simulated operating
conditions. It would be necessary that such files be maintained in
such a manner and in such a location that they would not fall into
enemy hands and could be removed on short notice to headquarters of
the principal, wherever such headquarters might be.

Items in such files would undoubtedly include physical
description, fingerprint classification, photographs, handwriting
specimens, a recording of the individual's radio "list," cover
name, recognition signals, distress signals, copies of codes,
communication schedules, location of agent, capabilities of agent,
and equipment available to him.

Following discussions [Redacted] with regard to the above,
you should submit plans for approval by the Bureau [Redacted]

With regard to cover names to be assigned to STAGE and E.
and E. agents, the Bureau did not mean to infer that persons leaving
Alaska for training should use other than their real names en route
to Seattle. It is known, however, that

[Redacted]

- Tolson _____
- Ladd _____
- Clegg _____
- Glavin _____
- Nichols _____
- Rosen _____
- Tracy _____
- Harbo _____
- Alden _____
- Belmont _____
- Laughlin _____
- Mohr _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Nease _____
- Gandy _____

MCC:brg:jgf

RECORDED - 24

EX - 52

COMM - FBI
JUL 6 - 1951
MAILED 19

155
JUL 10 1951
RECEIVED
FBI
JUL 10 1951
JUL 10 1951
JUL 10 1951

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

b2
b7E

The question of cover names referred to in bullet dated
June 15, 1951, is [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Such cover names
should, after assignment, be suitable for use in communications
between your office and the Bureau and between [redacted]
as well as in practice communications and actual operations.*

Referral/Consult

The Bureau has noted [redacted]

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 21, 1951

FROM: SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
 COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
 EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (Bureau file 65-59264)

SP12 BTJ/SC
 6/29/51
 342251

Re Anchorage letter to the Bureau dated June 14, 1951,
 Bureau letter to Anchorage dated June 15, 1951, and Bureau letter
 to Anchorage dated June 16, 1951.

Referral/Consult

1. Transportation
2. Dissemination of Reports

Referral/Consult

3. Cover Names

Referral/Consult

In Bureau radiogram of May 29, 1951 it was stated that

In accordance with Bureau instructions contained in
 referenced letter of June 15, 1951 the question of cover names
 was discussed

This matter was previously discussed in Anchorage letter to the
 Bureau dated May 11, 1951.

RECORDED - 1

Referral/Consult

65-298
 JED:vf

COPIES DESTROYED

R 58 NOV 31 1960

AN 65-298

The Bureau's advice is requested as to whether or not the use of cover names is contemplated during the trainees' travel and training, or whether such cover names are for use after the trainees return to Alaska.

b2
b7E

With regard to the manner of supplying cover names to agents.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 23, 1951

FROM: SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
(Bufile 65-59264)

ReBulet to Anchorage dated June 18, 1951.

In the referenced letter it was suggested that Special Agents of this office working on the instant program be recommended for training at the Seat of Government.

Special Agent [redacted] is to commence In-Service training in Washington, D. C. on June 25, 1951. It is recommended that he be given appropriate training for use in developing the instant program after he completes his present In-Service class which terminates on July 7, 1951.

b6
b7C

65-298

JFD:vf

cc: 67-313

RECEIVED BY SP12 B1815
65-1029194
342251

RECORDED - 31

EX-155

JUN 26 1951
15

156

HANDLED BY

[redacted]

JUN 24 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/91 BY SP12 BTJ/SC

342257

65-59264-157

CHANGED TO

62-94809-2

5 AUG 8 1951

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(6-21-51) (u)

NR 210455

3:38 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 79 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 64 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED BUREAU. 1 PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED AND RECONTACTED, DELETED BY BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED. 4 TRAINEES PRESENTLY IN WASHINGTON IN ATTENDANCE AT SCHOOL. 2 OTHERS PREPARED TO LEAVE THIS WEEK AND TO COMMENCE TRAINING MONDAY AND TUESDAY OF NEXT WEEK. TRAINEE SCHEDULED FOR JULY 2 LEAVING TERRITORY THIS SATURDAY FOR SEATTLE AND ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR HIM TO BE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON ON THE REQUIRED DATE. (u)

RECEIVED:

(6-21-51) (u)

4:13 PM

MAP

RECORDED - 93

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

65 JUL 3 1951 (u)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: June 25, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
 COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
 OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 Bufile 65-59264) *0 (stay)*

Re Anchorage letter to Bureau dated May 8, 1951 listing
 names of Stay-behind Agents concerning whom reports were

Referral/Consult

On June 22, 1951 all of the reports listed in the referenced
 letter were

65-298
 JFD:vf

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/JC
 ON 6/29/94

Referral/Consult

34225

SPECIAL MAIL

RECORDED - 93

4-97

165-59264-160
 JUN 28 1951
 15

clear to
Imu

	Received		Forwarded	
	Date	Time	Date	Time
ROUTING				
CLASSIFYING				
SEARCHING				
NUMBERING				
RECORDING				
EXAMINING				
CONSOLIDATION				

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12 BTJ/JC

6 JUL 5 1951

FBI RADIOGRAM

4-42a

(DECODED COPY) (u)

4-20-2000 SP3-BTS/jm

00-1164 (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (5-18-51) NR 180147

2:48 P.M.

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

(u) STAGE. RE BUREAU RADIOGRAM (SIXTEENTH) INSTANT. RECOMMENDED
[REDACTED] BE INCREASED TO MEET ADVANCE
REQUESTED BY AGENTS PROCEEDING TO WASHINGTON FOR TRAINING.
ESTIMATED TOTAL BUREAU COST FOR TRAINING IN WASHINGTON PER
MONTH APPROXIMATELY THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS. ALSO ESTIMATED
APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF OF THIS AMOUNT WILL BE REQUESTED AS
ADVANCE. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT EXPENSE VOUCHER WILL LAG
AT LEAST ONE MONTH RECOMMEND [REDACTED]

RECEIVED: (5-18-51) 3:10 PM RTL

RECORDED - 93

JUN 25 1951

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

(u) 65-59264

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

DECODED COPY

(u)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alban _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(5-18-51)

NR 180149

2:54 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

STAGE. RE BUREAU RADIOGRAM (SIXTEENTH) INSTANT.

(u)

RECEIVED:

(5-18-51)

3:15 PM

ME

Referral/Consult

SP3-BTJ/JM
4-20-2000
00-1164

RECORDED - 93

JUN 23 1951

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

65 JUL 2 1951

65-59264

SAC, Anchorage

June 18, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STAGE

b2
b7E

Re Bureau radiogram dated June 9, 1951.

A check was dispatched to your office on June 9, 1951, increasing your [redacted] in accordance with your recommendation. If it is found the fund will not be sufficient to handle payments under this program, you should advise promptly and submit further recommendations for an additional increase.

In accordance with instructions in referenced radiogram, it is desired that all payments be made by you, preferably that the full amount due each trainee be paid on his return to Alaska. If the trainee so requests, you should advance a portion of the total payment. Upon the completion of training, and the departure of a trainee, you will be advised of the amount due him, based on the schedule set forth below and his travel schedule. In the event a trainee desires to stop for personal reasons while in the states, such periods will be deducted in calculating the amount due him.

Payment will be made in accordance with the following schedule:

No jump training.

\$150.00 per week base pay, beginning with the day of departure from Alaska and ending on the day of return to Alaska, plus \$4.00 per diem for incidental expenses during the same period.

If jump training taken.

Base pay will be \$175.00 per week during the period of the jump training course, per diem being calculated as above.

RECORDED - 93

65-59264

MCC:djb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-19-94 BY SP-2 BT/ST

COMM - FBI

15 JUL 9 61 AM
JUL 19 3 38 PM '51

RECEIVED
JUL 19 1951
DEPT OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED DIRECTOR
JUL 12 1951

REC'D - 1072012 OFFICE

JUN 19 5 26 PM '51

REC'D - 1072012 OFFICE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

65 JUL 3 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : V. P. KEAY *VPA*

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
EVENT OF INVASION,
STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM

DATE: May 14, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12 BTJ

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

[redacted] The details of the proposed training program have been brought to your attention previously. The program is presently awaiting a designation from the SAC in Anchorage as to the identity of the individuals and the dates on which they can begin arriving in the Washington area for training.

In connection with this program, Special Agent Edward S. Sanders has contacted [redacted] who is [redacted]

[redacted] and the matter of insurance for the Stay-Behind Agents has been discussed with [redacted]. None of the details of this plan have been discussed with [redacted] he is not aware of the fact that these individuals are in Alaska, and knows only that a number of individuals will be in the Washington area for a period of two-weeks' training and that some of them will receive an additional two and one-half or three weeks' training in parachute jumping at Fort Benning, Georgia. He has been advised that these individuals will travel by commercial airlines with the exception of their parachute training at Fort Benning, Georgia, which will utilize military aircraft.

[redacted] was advised that the Continental Insurance Company will insure these individuals on the following basis for a three-months' period.

Those Not Taking Parachute Training

\$10,000 accidental death coverage;
\$500 medical attention as a result of an accident;
Provisions for prorated payments for dismemberment
as a result of an accident;
Cost - \$21.60.

Those Whose Training Includes Parachute Training

Same coverage as above;
Cost - \$43.00.

ESS:hke

RECORDED - 93

MAY 28 1951

memo to Mr. Ladd
65 JUN 3 1951

EX-33

15-UB

b6
b7C

This insurance coverage can be obtained by the furnishing to [redacted] of the names of the individuals to be covered, their ages, and the names of their beneficiaries. The policies can be staggered as the individuals are designated for the training and they can all be given a local Washington area address.

It is contemplated that one more contact in this connection will be made by Special Agent Sanders in order to split such insurance between at least two insurance men in order that no one individual will have the names of all of the individuals to be trained. [redacted] stated, however, that, if it is so desired, the individual can be given a cover name and [redacted]

[redacted] It is noted that the insurance referred to above covers accidents only. Should a man die from natural causes, he would not be covered by this insurance.

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

The foregoing is for your information. It is recommended, however, that every effort be made to expedite the designation of these individuals by the SAC in Alaska and the dates upon which they can begin to arrive.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD

DATE: May 23, 1951

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA
IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12 BTJ/SCD
3/2251

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

PURPOSE:

To submit recommendations for the handling of the financial aspects of captioned program.

BACKGROUND:

As you recall, the Anchorage office for the last six months has been developing Stay-behind Agents in Alaska. It is contemplated that these individuals will remain in Alaska in the event that Territory is occupied by the Russians, and will furnish information of an intelligence nature to the military authorities of the United States.

It has been recommended, and approved, that the Bureau will, [redacted] train these agents so they will be able to more effectively carry out their assignments in case of hostilities and enemy occupation. [redacted]

The Bureau has agreed [redacted] to participate in the Referral/Consult training of the Stay-behind Agents while they are in Washington, D. C. [redacted]

[redacted] a schedule is presently being prepared to arrange for the individuals designated by the Anchorage office to travel to Washington, D. C., at the rate of two per week beginning during the first part of June, 1951.

Referral/Consult

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

The Anchorage Office is presently recontacting the 74 individuals who have been developed to date in connection with this program in order to determine when the individual Stay-behind

65-59264

WTB:mh

RECORDED - 93

MAY 28 1951

COPIES DESTROYED
R 584 NOV 21 1960

62 JUL 6 1951

WY

Agent will be available for training for the two week period in Washington, D. C; whether he will agree to taking the additional three weeks parachute jump training at Ft. Benning; and, what financial arrangements can be effected in order to reimburse the Stay-behind Agent for loss of time and income during the training period.

Based upon an analysis of the incomes of seven Stay-behind Agents in Anchorage, by Mr. Hennrich's memorandum to me dated April 26, 1951, it was recommended that consideration be given to reimbursing the Stay-behind Agents during their training period as follows:

No jump training

\$150.00 per week basic pay, plus \$4.00 per diem for incidental expenses.

If jump training taken

Same as above for two weeks training in Washington, D. C., and \$175.00 per week basic pay, (plus same per diem as above), for the approximate two and one half to three weeks during the jump training course.

The SAC at Anchorage by Bulet May 4, 1951 was instructed to bear the above-proposed payment plan in mind when recontacting the Stay-behind Agents to work out the training schedule. All of the 20 individuals thus far recontacted in this regard have been satisfied with the above-proposed financial arrangements.

By Bureau radiogram to Anchorage May 16, 1951, the SAC at Anchorage was instructed to effect arrangements to pay the Stay-behind Agents in Alaska, preferably upon completion of training, after first securing Bureau authorization amount to be paid agent. He was further instructed that where financial status of agent requires an advance of funds he should secure Bureau approval. He was further told to submit his recommendation as to the necessary increase of the confidential fund at Anchorage to meet expenses in connection with this program. By radiogram May 18, 1951 Anchorage requested that [redacted] to handle the financial aspects of this matter.

PROPOSED ACTION (A)

It is proposed that the Anchorage Office handle the payment of funds to the Stay-behind Agents in Alaska, and that where possible, payment be made upon the completion of training when the agent returns to Alaska; further, that all claims for reimbursement be made by blue slip.

b2
b7E

It is also proposed that all Stay-behind Agents be reimbursed for their time and loss of income during the training period on the same basis, and that the amount to be paid will be determined on whether the agent does or does not take the parachute jump training course. It is likewise proposed that the specific amounts as set forth above be approved for payment.

It is further proposed that [redacted]

[redacted] to handle commitments under this program.

INSURANCE

You will recall that consideration has been given to securing a short term insurance policy to cover possible risks to be incurred by the Stay-behind Agents during their training.

By memorandum from Mr. Keay to me dated May 14, 1951, information was set forth reflecting that [redacted] who is [redacted]

[redacted] was contacted by Supervisor E. S. Sanders of the liaison section relative to insurance costs. [redacted] represents the Continental Insurance Company and stated that said company will insure these individuals (Stay-behind Agents) on the following basis for a three-months' period:

Those not taking parachute jump training

\$10,000 accidental death coverage;
\$500 medical attention as result of accident;
Provisions for prorated payments for dismemberment
as result of accident;

COST \$21.60.

Those whose training includes parachute jump training

Same coverage as above;

COST \$43.00.

You will also recall that it has been recommended and approved that the Bureau will meet the necessary expenses for the insurance policies secured on the Stay-behind Agents.

PROPOSED ACTION (b)

It is proposed that the above insurance coverage be arranged through the Continental Insurance Company and that arrangements for payment be handled by the Security Division and effected by blue slip.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that proposed action (A) (financial payments covering salary, expenses, and advance to Anchorage Office) be approved and that this memorandum be referred to the Administrative Division for appropriate action.

It is recommended that proposed action (B) (insurance) be approved for handling by the Security Division.

OK
John
6/6/51
OK per memo to
OK

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. H. Ladd

DATE: May 10, 1951

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN
ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)PURPOSE:

To recommend that Supervisor Manning C. Clements, presently assigned to the Investigative Division, be instructed to report to the Security Division immediately in order to handle the instruction of Stay-behind Agents at SOG and to supervise the entire training program in this regard.

BACKGROUND:

As you are aware, the Anchorage office for the past several months has been developing Stay-behind Agents in Alaska whose services can possibly be utilized, in the event Alaska is occupied by the Russians, by furnishing intelligence information to representatives of the U. S. government. To date 73 individuals have agreed to act and have been recommended by the Anchorage office for this program. The captioned matter is a [redacted] operation by the Bureau [redacted] and plans for the training of these Stay-behind Agents are presently being made by FBI [redacted] [redacted] having agreed as to the division of responsibility in connection with the training program. A portion of the training will be provided by [redacted] the Bureau has agreed to handle that portion of the training which is of a security nature. Details relative to the scope of the training program were set forth in Mr. Hennrich's memorandum to me dated 5-3-51 which is attached.

Referral/Consult

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted]
[redacted] Basic training will be afforded by the Bureau [redacted] at SOG and [redacted] All training will be on an individual basis to assure the greatest degree of security possible.

Referral/Consult

OBSERVATIONS:

It is contemplated that the handling of the instruction of the Stay-behind Agents will be a full time assignment for at least one Special Agent of the Bureau for a minimum period of

Attachment

WTB: [redacted] 98 1951

RECORDED - 93

65-57264-165

W0

34257
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP-10 BJS/RS

six months. The Bureau instructor should be fully cognizant of the scope of the training [redacted] in order to properly correlate all phases of the training program. It will likewise be necessary for the instructor to become personally acquainted with these agents in order to evaluate and determine their limitations and capabilities for a probable specific assignment in the future. In this connection, it is pointed out that the program as such, as well as the training phases of same, will of necessity be of a continuing nature as it is based upon a future operation which will be instituted upon a possible occupation of Alaska by Russia.

It is believed that the instructor designated by the Bureau to handle the over-all training program for these agents should have a good background knowledge of Alaska. It is suggested that a Special Agent who has a good knowledge of Alaska and prevailing conditions in that Territory, and who is a qualified Bureau instructor, would have the qualifications necessary to successfully handle the training program to the best interests of the Bureau.

PROPOSED ACTION:

It is proposed that consideration be given to designating SA Manning C. Clements to handle the instruction of the Stay-behind Agents (Security Subjects), and to supervise the entire training program for these agents. SA Clements is presently assigned to the Investigative Division as a supervisor. He was designated ASAC in Anchorage on 2-28-46 where he remained until November, 1947. His personnel file reflects that during 1944 he was commended for the excellent manner in which he had handled an informant in an important espionage case; also, it was pointed out that he had demonstrated ability to competently develop and handle confidential informants in various walks of life. He is an approved Bureau speaker and a qualified Bureau instructor.

A brief of SA Manning's personnel file is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the above proposed action be approved, and the necessary instructions issued to SA Manning C. Clements to report to the Security Division of the Bureau immediately for the proposed assignment.

Returned to personnel file

5713 ✓

5712

OK - 2

Handwritten signature and initials.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 3, 1951

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP128 TJS/SC

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Purpose:

To briefly summarize the scope of the Bureau's participation in the training program of Stay-behind Agents.

To recommend that either SA F. A. Frohbose, SA M. C. Clements or SA George R. Fletcher be instructed to report to the Security Division of the Bureau immediately for a temporary assignment of approximately six months duration in order to handle the instruction (Security Subjects) of the Stay-behind Agents at SOG.

To recommend that Supervisor J. J. Ward, Central Research Desk, be designated to review lecture material now available to be covered by the Security Division in the Bureau's part of the training of these agents, and to assist the selected Bureau instructor in the research necessary to implement this material.

Background:

Referral/Consult

As you are aware, it is contemplated that selected Stay-behind Agents will be brought to Washington, D. C., from Alaska, [redacted] for training purposes. It is contemplated that while these individuals are at SOG, they will be available to receive the training which the Bureau has agreed to impart. It has been recommended and approved that the Stay-behind Agents should be trained individually. [redacted]

It is contemplated that Stay-behind Agents will be in Washington, D. C., for a two weeks' period. They will be available for training at the rate of ten hours per day, six days per week. During this time, they will [redacted]

Attachment
WTB:dmd

RECORDED - 93

Referral/Consult

15-57264-100
PERS. FILES

EX-33
68 JUL 25 1951
See Belmont
Memo to Ladd
dated 5/10

The FBI's training includes:	TOTAL HOURS (Approx.)
Russian System of Ferreting out Espionage Agents	3
Deception and Security	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
Selection and Training of Sub-Agents and informants	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
Secret codes, secret writing, etc.	8
Disarming Methods	3

DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING AT THE BUREAU:

b6
b7C

Upon my instructions, Supervisor W. T. Baker of the Espionage Section has conferred with [redacted] and K. R. McIntire of the Training and Inspection Division, and D. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory, concerning the over-all problems involved in this training program.

Mr. McIntire advised that the Training Division will handle the subject of Disarming Methods and details have already been worked out with Coach H. A. Meyers.

Mr. Parsons has advised that the Laboratory is ready to handle the subjects of secret writing, written codes and related matters.

Mr. McIntire stated that the subjects of a security nature should be worked out by the Security Division, and submitted to the Training Division for final review and approval.

The topic entitled "Russian System of Ferreting out Espionage Agents" has been discussed with Supervisor J. J. Ward, Central Research Desk, Internal Security Section, Security Division. Mr. Ward advised that he has the material available for the preparation of lecture material on this subject. The attached general outline on this topic will show the proposed subject matter to be covered.

Supervisor Baker has prepared rough-drafts of suggested material to be included in the topics of "Deception and Security" and "Selection and Training of Sub-agents and Informants." Copies are attached.

PROPOSED ACTION: (A)

It is proposed that Supervisor J. J. Ward be delegated to prepare lecture material on the subject of "Russian System of Ferreting out Espionage Agents."

It is likewise proposed that Supervisor Ward be designated to review the lecture material (copies attached) now available to be covered by the Security Division in the Bureau's part of the training of these agents and to assist in the research necessary to implement this material.

Referral/Consult

INSTRUCTION OF STAY-BEHIND AGENTS AT THE BUREAU:

It is contemplated that the handling of the instruction of the Stay-behind Agents will be a full time assignment for at least one Special Agent of the Bureau. It will be necessary for the Bureau instructor to be fully cognizant of the scope of the training for these agents and he will have to maintain

in order to properly correlate the training program. It is further believed that the Bureau instructor designated should become completely familiar with the training provided to the agents by the Laboratory relative to secret codes and secret writing. A plan should be worked out whereby these agents submit test messages after their return to Alaska. If this step is not taken, after a few months, they may very well become "rusty" on this technique and may possibly forget some of their basic instruction in this regard. It will likewise be necessary for the instructor to become personally acquainted with these agents in order to evaluate and determine their limitations and capabilities for a probable specific assignment in the future.

It is pointed out that the Stay-behind Agent Program in Alaska, including the training phases of same, will of necessity be of a continuing nature. These men may be called upon to start operations (in the event of invasion) within a period of a few months, or years. Until such time as it is believed that the program is no longer essential, it will be necessary to periodically keep in touch with them, and in all probability, to augment their training in Alaska at a later date.

The instructor designated by the Bureau to handle the over-all training program for these agents, it is believed, should have a good background knowledge of the Territory of Alaska. The objective of the training program is to provide the agents with the basic principles of intelligence operations in order to provide the background information which can be utilized in preparing for, and executing, future specific assignments, and is not intended as a specific and definite instruction as to how to operate in a given set of circumstances. In other words, only basic instruction can be provided at this time.

It is suggested, therefore, that a Special Agent who has a good knowledge of Alaska and prevailing conditions in that Territory, and who is a qualified Bureau instructor, would have the qualifications necessary to successfully handle the training program to the best interests of the Bureau. It is believed, nevertheless, that the amount of experience and extent of the Special Agent's knowledge of the Territory should be the determining factor in his selection.

PROPOSED ACTION: (B)

It is proposed that consideration be given to instructing either SA F. A. Frohbose, SA M. C. Clements or SA George R. Fletcher to report to the Bureau (Security Division) immediately for a temporary assignment of approximately six months duration in order to handle the instruction (Security Subjects) of the Stay-behind Agents at SOG and to be responsible for the entire training program in this regard.

SA Frederick A. Frohbose

SA Frohbose, assigned to the Honolulu office since 3-20-50, was formerly assigned to Anchorage from June, 1946 to March, 1950. He was designated ASAC at Anchorage on 7-7-48. His personnel file reflects that he is 32 years of age, a qualified firearms instructor, qualified police school instructor and lecturer, and extremely proficient in judo and disarming methods. He planned and handled instruction, according to his personnel file, in police training schools in the five major cities in the Territory of Alaska during his assignment there.

SA Manning C. Clements

SA Clements is presently assigned as a supervisor in the Investigative Division at SOG. He became a Special Agent in 1940. SA Clements is 42 years of age and single. He was designated ASAC in Anchorage on 2-28-46 where he remained until November, 1947 when transferred to Miami. His personnel file reflects that during 1944 he was commended for the excellent manner in which he had handled an informant in an important espionage case; also, it was pointed out that he had demonstrated ability to competently develop and handle confidential informants in various walks of life. His personnel file reflects that he is an approved Bureau speaker and a good lecturer. Bureau records show that he is a qualified Bureau instructor.

SA George Richard Fletcher

SA Fletcher, presently assigned to the Richmond office (senior resident agent at Roanoke) is 42 years of age, has been a Special Agent since 1940 and was assigned to the Anchorage office on 5-29-46 and designated ASAC at Anchorage on 10-25-47. He was transferred to Richmond from Anchorage during July, 1948. His personnel file reflects that he handled Communism investigations and investigations concerning Soviet activities in Alaska. Bureau records fail to reflect that he is a qualified police instructor.

Upon completion of this assignment at the Bureau, consideration might possibly be given to assigning the selected instructor to the Anchorage office and giving him the responsibility, under the direction of the SAC, of handling all continuing phases of the Stay-behind Agent Program in Alaska.

SUGGESTIONS RE SECURITY:

It is suggested that the instructors handling all phases of the training program stress the security features of this operation.

It is suggested that the Stay-behind Agents be permitted to take notes, but that all notes be collected upon the completion of the course for every individual Stay-behind Agent.

It is suggested that the Stay-behind Agents during the course of instruction be referred to as "informants", ~~"agents"~~, or "contacts", but that they not be referred to as "Stay-behind Agents" or "spies."

not as agents from 7/9/51

It is suggested that the Stay-behind Agent be cautioned (1) to divulge to no one any aspect of his training in the U. S.; (2) that he is not an employee of the FBI; (3) that a slight indiscretion on his part relative to instant matter might very easily cost him his life should Alaska be occupied by the enemy.

DEADLINE:

May 15, 1951, has been set as the tentative deadline date for having all details of the Bureau's part in the training program completed.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the above suggestions of procedure re security be approved.

It is recommended that proposal (A) be approved for appropriate attention by Supervisor J. J. Ward.

It is recommended that proposal (B) be approved, and the necessary instructions issued to either SA F. A. Frohbose, SA M. C. Clements or SA George R. Fletcher to arrange to report to the Security Division of the Bureau immediately for temporary assignment as outlined.

*I agree +
I recommend
Clements be
used as the
instructor.*

DFM

5/9.

*JK
Jed*

ROUGH DRAFT

Basic Proposed Outline
for 3 hours informal
discussion.

RUSSIAN SYSTEM OF FERRETING OUT ESPIONAGE AGENTS

- I. Background of Russian Internal Security System
- II. Background of Russian formed Espionage System
- III. Russian Military procedure in occupied territory
 - 1. Smersch
- IV. Soviet Personalities
- V. Russian system of interrogation
- VI. Suggested security precautions

342251
6/29/74 SP12 BTJ/SC

ROUGH DRAFT

Basic proposed outline for
4½ hours informal discussion

April 18, 1951

DECEPTION AND SECURITY


I. Introduction

1. Purpose of this study is to suggest how the informant may carry out his assignment so the enemy will not be aware of his true activities.
2. To stress the necessity of taking all possible security precautions to insure self-preservation and continuous operation.

II. The task of survival; and possible use of
cover stories and pretexts.


b2
b7E





b2
b7E

5. Point out that it is highly probable the Russians will place a large percentage of the civilian population in urban areas in labor camps where they will be compelled to do forced labor by the Russians and allowed no freedom of movement.




III. The informant



b2
b7E

IV. Detecting and losing surveillances


1. Define "surveillance"
 - a. A surveillance is a close watch over a person or person with a definite purpose.
2. If the enemy suspects that the informant, in an urban area, is more than a mere civilian, he may be placed under surveillance.



b2
b7E

3. Possibility of surveillance in rural area considered too remote for consideration.

V. Concealing property on the person



b2
b7E

b2
b7E

The above are set forth as possibilities where secret codes, maps, etc. may possibly be concealed where it is necessary to have them on the person.

VI. Suggestions for destroying "espionage gear" in the event of emergency to avoid capture or having it fall into enemy hands.

1. Destruction by fire (codes, ciphers, notes, documents, written material)
2. Destruction by dismantling (E & E gear, radio, etc)
3. Followed by burying or sinking in lake, river or other available water supply.
4. Destruction by explosives
5. Acts of destruction should be carried on during period of darkness to avoid detection, except by burning.

VII. General security precautions - discussion of.

VIII. Review; question and answer period.

ROUGH DRAFT

Basic Proposed Outline
for 4½ hours informal
discussion.


April 18, 1951

SELECTION AND TRAINING OF SUB-AGENTS AND ASSOCIATES

- I. It is essential that every precaution be taken to insure the security of the operation.


(Particular stress should be placed on the security features of the operation)

- II. Examination of the over-all purpose or objective of the operation
 1. To survive the initial attack by the enemy and the hazards of the first days of the subsequent occupation
 2. To know what intelligence information is desired by the U. S. military authorities
 3. To be in a position to secure the desired data through personal observation or through trustworthy associates.
 4. To transmit the information by the most expeditious means possible to the designated U. S. military headquarters.
- III. Usual methods used to secure information
 1. By personal observation
 - a. Stress necessity of being alert; self-disciplining and training to improve power of observation
 2. By interviews
 - a. That is, by informal conversations
 3. Through use of personal friends, contacts and associates
- IV. Selections of associates (as sub-agents and informants)
 1. In urban areas, associates may be developed through:



b2
b7E

2. How to maintain informants


A large rectangular box with a black border, used for redaction of content.

b2
b7E

V. Reliability

1. An unreliable person seldom furnishes information which is reliable.
2. A person well-known for his reliability, can very easily be mistaken, especially when under pressure.
3. It is essential, unless time is of the essence, to determine the reliability of person furnishing information and if possible to verify through investigation; or corroborate the information received.
4. Information received and transmitted to headquarters should reflect identity of source, and degree of reliability of informant:
 - a. Examples: reliable, reliability unknown, unreliable, etc.
5. Where possible, headquarters should be advised of the identity of all sources of information being utilized.

VI. Individuals who may possibly be in a position to furnish information and who should be considered as potential informants:

A large rectangular box with a black border, used for redaction of content.

b2
b7E

Caution:

It should always be borne in mind, that a source of information who may be in a position to assist you in your operations, is likewise in a position to help the enemy.

VII. Brief discussion of double-agent operations, and [redacted]
[redacted] in securing information of an intelligence
nature.

b2
b7E

VIII. Where to meet informants or how to make contact


1. Usually will depend on circumstances

b2
b7E

IX. What action should be taken if you are approached and requested to
act as an informant or sub-agent for some one else, believed
by you to be acting in the best interests of the United States.

b2
b7E

X. What action should be taken if you are "uncovered" by the enemy;
that is, if they strongly suspect that you are acting as an agent
for the United States and you expect your freedom of movement to
be curtailed to such an extent that your further operation will be
seriously hampered.



b2
b7E

XT. Review - discussion; question-answer period.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 9, 1951

RADIOGRAM
URGENT
CIPHER PAD CODE

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE REELET MAY FOUR, BUREAU RADIOGRAM MAY SIXTEEN AND URGENT JUNE FIVE, ALL CONCERNING ADVANCES AND PAYMENTS. SCHEDULE FOR REMUNERATION AND PER DIEM APPROVED. FUNDS FOR INCREASE OF [REDACTED] EN ROUTE. BUREAU DESIRES ALL PAYMENTS BE MADE BY YOU, PREFERABLY FULL AMOUNT ON RETURN OF TRAINEE. HOWEVER, YOU CAN ADVANCE PORTION OF PAYMENT PRIOR TO DEPARTURE IF TRAINEE SO REQUESTS. BUREAU WILL ON COMPLETION OF TRAINING AND DEPARTURE OF TRAINEE ADVISE YOU OF AMOUNT DUE BASED ON TIMES OF DEPARTURES, PERIODS OF TRAINING AT TWO POINTS, WITH TIME SPENT IN STATES FOR PERSONAL REASONS DEDUCTED.

HOOVER

65-59264

MCC:NJP

DECLASSIFIED BY SP5-BIS/jm
ON 4-20-2000

Classified by SP5-BIS/jm
Declassify on: OADR

EX-92

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alban _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Print via Bureau Radio (6/11/51)
JUL 10 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Casper _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE

(5-31-51)

NR 312100

5:57 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 77 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 49 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING WHO AGREED TO SAME AND RESULTS FURNISHED TO BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED.

RECEIVED

(5-31-51)

6:12 PM LH

RECORDED - 3

EX - 37

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

MAY 16 1960

SP3-BTJ/m

00-1164

4-20-2000

JUL 12 1951

65-59264-166

(u)

65-59264

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (e)(u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (6-28-51) NR 280750 5:07 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

(STAGE.) STATUS REPORT. 77 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED, CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 64 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED BUREAU. ONE PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED RECONTACTED, DELETED BY BUREAU AND ANOTHER VOLUNTARILY WITHDREW DESIRING NOT TO ATTEND TRAINING PROGRAM. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED. TWO TRAINEES PROCEEDING TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK TO COMMENCE TRAINING (JULY 2 AND JULY 3) FIVE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED WASHINGTON FOR TRAINING. (e)(u)

RECEIVED (6-28-51) 5:40 P.M. LL

EX-92

EX-92
 4-20-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 31

JUN 30 1951

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (e)(u)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: June 28, 1951

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (ESCAPE & EVASION PROGRAM)
 (BuFile 65-59264)

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11-11-81 BY 1043

Inasmuch as copies of these reports are being
 forwarded [redacted] for distribution to
 the Bureau, no copies are being forwarded with this letter.

Referral/Consult

The records of this office contain no information
 identifiable with the foregoing.

In Bureau letter to Anchorage dated June 18,
 1951, it is stated [redacted] should furnish to the Bureau
 all requests for name checks prior to the beginning of
 an actual investigation. This has been called to the
 attention [redacted] but as yet no requests for such name
 checks have been received in advance of investigation.

Referral/Consult

62-227
 JFD:HCW

CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 BTJ/SC
 ON 6/29/81

RECORDED - 57

JUL 2 1951

Classified by SP-2 BTJ/SC
 Declassify on: OADR 3/22/51

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 BTJ/SC
 ON 3/25/81
 PER DEC 14 2/27/81

145

JUL 20 1964
BUR

65-19264-170
CHANGED TO
62-94808-✓

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12 BTJ/SJC

342251
180

4-24

SAC, Anchorage

July 11, 1951

Director, FBI

SECRET

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Referral/Consult

Reurlet 6-26-51 concerning the question of

Referral/Consult

Unsuccessful effort was made to arrange a conference with [redacted]

You should discuss this matter [redacted] promptly in order that the Bureau may receive definite advice as to the [redacted] This will simplify the training being afforded at BOC by the Bureau.


Referral/Consult

Inasmuch as additional training will be afforded State personnel after return to Alaska, you should also arrange whereby [redacted] can be furnished to your office for practice purposes. The question of [redacted] should not be delayed.

65-59264. - 171

MCC:mem

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alton _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____



RECEIVED-MAIL ROOM
FBI
JUL 12 1951

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Alden _____
 Belmont _____
 Laughlin _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

DECODED COPY (X) (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(6-26-51)

NR 270042

9:39 PM 6/29/51

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE

SUGGEST [REDACTED] BE CONTACTED

AT [REDACTED]

RECEIVED (u)

(6-26-51)

RECORDED - 93 (u)

Referral/Consult

9:46 PM LH

The intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (X) (u)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 19, 1951

~~SECRET~~

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

FROM : Mr. C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
 IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM, ESCAPE
 AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Referral/Consult

PURPOSE:

To advise that [REDACTED]

(S)

Referral/Consult

DETAILS:

The Anchorage Office has advised that [REDACTED]

65-59264

MCC:mhf

mhf

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP7 CK
 ON 3/25/98
 PER 064 LR 2/29/97

Classified by SP2 BJS/RO
 Declassify on: OADR

RECORDED - 93

65-59264-172

mm

50 JUL 9 1951

Mr. R. T. Harbo

June 19, 1951

C.F. Downing

STAGE:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

7-18-94 BY SP12BTS/PC

34225/

b6
b7C

PURPOSE:

To set forth results of cipher training given
in the STAGE program.

DETAILS:

This individual was afforded approximately 3½ hours of cipher instruction 6/11/51 and approximately 5 hours 6/14/51 by L.W. NEWBER of the Cryptanalysis Unit. The following three cipher systems were explained and practice messages enciphered and deciphered.

1.

2.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

55 AUG 1

62-93626

65-59264

Security Division (M.C. CLEMENTS)

TWN:EDJ

NOT RECORDED

131 JUL 24 1951

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-93626-436

[redacted] was accompanied by [redacted]
[redacted] during this cipher training.

Referral/Consult

OBSERVATIONS:

The amount of training thus far given [redacted] is not adequate. He is not a very adept pupil, being handicapped by what appears to be low general intelligence and poor reading and writing capacity. It is doubtful whether this man will ever be proficient in the use of secure ciphers. It will be necessary for him to constantly review his cipher systems through supervised practice if any degree of success is to be hoped for.

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That [redacted] be afforded an additional 8 hours of training by the Cryptanalysis Unit. This is a reiteration of my recommendation to you on this individual by memorandum dated 6/13/51.

2. That [redacted] be required to practice his cipher systems under supervision, at frequent intervals, after his return to Alaska,

b6
b7C

3. That all communication sent to [redacted] be in the simplest possible language. He exhibits poor ability to piece together the plaintext of communications after the cipher has been stripped off.

b6
b7C

4. That consideration be given to using [redacted] in messages sent to him - this might help him in his reading difficulties.

b2
b7E

[redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

6. That a summary of the results of [redacted] training, as set forth above, be supplied the Bureau's Anchorage office.

b6
b7C

ADDENDUM:

In connection with recommendation #1 above, $4\frac{1}{2}$ hours additional time had been afforded [redacted] for cipher training purposes. This however alters in no way any of the other recommendations or the observations set forth above.

b6
b7C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont *AB*
 FROM : C. E. Hennrich *CH*
 SUBJECT: STAGE

DATE: June 19, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/29/94 BY SP12BTS/KS

34225
 Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Purpose:

To record the procedures which will be followed with respect to fingerprints and photographs of STAGE and Escape and Evasion Agents.

Details:

Arrangements have been made with [] Single Fingerprint Section, Identification Division, whereby a representative of Identification Division will fingerprint and photograph each STAGE and E. and E. Agent on his first day of training at SOG. This will take place in Room 2334, IB at 9:45 A. M., on each Monday and Tuesday.

b6
 b7C

Referral/Consult

non-indirect form for J. Edgar Hoover
 Fingerprints will be taken on "Personal Identification" cards. Same will be searched against criminal files and permanently filed in the Criminal Section. If no prior criminal record is located, Form 1-276 will be executed in the Identification Division and routed to the Espionage Section for inclusion in the individual case file. If a prior record is located, four copies of the transcript will be furnished to Espionage Section: One for the individual case file, copies for FBI, Anchorage [] Permanent stops will be placed in fingerprint files as to all Agents in favor of Espionage Section. The individual case file number and the word "STAGE" will identify the purpose of the stop. A notation will appear as to each stop that Espionage Section must be advised before any dissemination of the record is made to outside contributors. No record of the fingerprints taken at SOG will appear in the transcript of record furnished to outside contributors.

Referral/Consult

Three photographs of each individual will be taken: Close-up bust, close-up profile, and full length. Six copies of each photograph will be printed. One print of the close-up bust will be attached to the individual's fingerprint card, other prints being routed to the Espionage Section. Two copies of each photograph will be furnished to FBI, Anchorage, [] and remaining prints and negatives will be placed in the individual case file.

Action:

Record purposes only.

RECORDED - 111

65-59264-173
 JUN 28 1951
 5 Mac

MCC:dmd

65-59264

76 JUL 9 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: June 27, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM)
 (Bufile 65-59264)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12BTS/SC
 ON 6/30/94
 342251

b6
 b7C

ReBura dated June 25, 1951 and Bureau rad dated June 27, 1951 concerning allegations of [redacted]

Assistant Special Agent in Charge JAMES T. MORELAND and Special Agent [redacted] have advised as follows:

b6
 b7C

They were in Seward, Alaska on January 25, 1951 in connection with this program and other Bureau work and attempted to hire an automobile to proceed down the Kenai Peninsula by themselves. However, the weather was severely cold, automobiles operating were few, and none could be rented. While interviewing [redacted] on the night of January 25, 1951 at the New Seward Hotel concerning instant program, he advised the agents that he was proceeding on the following day in his personally-owned automobile to his home [redacted]. In the absence of other means of travel the agents requested [redacted] permission to accompany him [redacted] telling him that they had some work in that vicinity. [redacted] agreed to this and the trip was made the following day. At that time the agents did not know that the cabins of [redacted] and [redacted] were located [redacted]

b6
 b7C

[redacted] and learned of this for the first time on arrival [redacted]

On arrival [redacted] the agents interviewed [redacted] concerning the instant program and also interviewed [redacted] [redacted] were all interviewed privately and no one other than the two Bureau agents were present for each interview.

b6
 b7C

[redacted] standing and have identical interests since they are [redacted] Inasmuch as they [redacted] they are able to observe who [redacted] contacts one another.

b6
 b7C

The above-named Bureau agents state that while working at Seward, Alaska and other points along the Kenai Peninsula, they

65-298
 cc: 66-314
 cc: 66-313
 1 AUG 8 6 49 51
 JFD:vf

RECORDED - 51

EX - 11

165-59264-174
 JUL 2 1951
 15

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

AN 65-298

have observed that the residents of that section of Alaska are keenly interested in Civilian Defense matters since they consider themselves to be residing in a vulnerable area in the event the United States should become involved in a war. These people frequently discuss various programs and measures to be taken in connection with Civilian Defense in the event of an attack and the use of the term "Civilian Defense" would not necessarily indicate any connection with the Stay-behind Agent Program.

ASAC MORELAND and SA [] have advised that all three of the above-named Stay-behind Agents were clearly instructed at the time they were interviewed concerning the absolute necessity concerning secrecy in connection with the matter discussed and none of them were advised at any time of the identity of any other Stay-behind Agent.

b6
b7C

[] prior to departing from Anchorage, Alaska for the Seat of Government, stated that he told people in his community that he was proceeding to the States to take additional flight instruction and at no time did he indicate to personnel of this office that he had told anyone that he was proceeding to Washington, D. C. in connection with Civilian Defense matters or to contact Fish and Wildlife headquarters.

b6
b7C

In accordance with Bureau instructions, all personnel have been re-briefed as to all security aspects of the instant program.

File # 65-59264

June 23, 1951

Mr. R. T. Harbo

C. F. Downing

(C) STAGE

On June 20, 1951 [redacted] was afforded four and one-half hours additional training time in cipher, as indicated in the addendum to my memorandum to you dated June 19, 1951. This additional training period covered a review of the three cipher systems given to [redacted] plus additional instruction in deciphering messages and the use of an alternate method for [redacted] It was explained to him that some [redacted]

[redacted] has less difficulty in deciphering messages when "X"s are used between words as word separators and this procedure is recommended for all cipher messages sent to him.

62-93626

IWN:jen

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-18-94 BY SP12879180

NOT RECORDED

131 JUL 27 1951

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SAC, Anchorage

July 5, 1951

Director, FBI

STAGE

PERSONAL ATTENTION

6/29/51 512.8TS/SC
342251

It is necessary, in the light of our experience to date, to reiterate instructions heretofore issued in order to completely safeguard the security of the Stay-Behind and Escape and Evasion programs.

You should specifically instruct each employee of your office, including investigative, clerical and radio personnel, that all phases of the programs are strictly confidential. The divulging of information to unauthorized persons, careless conversation, or the slipshod handling of any detail can endanger the effectiveness of the programs and the lives of persons recruited to participate. The programs must be protected, not only from the enemy, but from the public as well. It must also be remembered that the manner in which your responsibilities are fulfilled will be subject to close scrutiny of other intelligence agencies.

You can be assured individuals who complete training at JIC will have no illusions as to personal danger involved in participation, even if all security precautions are strictly adhered to. It is certainly incumbent on Bureau personnel to handle all phases of the programs in such a manner that these persons will not be subjected to unnecessary danger. They are due every possible protection we can give them. Any indiscretions of Bureau personnel which come to their attention will undoubtedly affect their morale adversely.

You and the Special Agents participating in the planning and implementation of the programs are in position to assure full security by careful planning and the exercise of utmost discretion and good judgment. There are set forth hereinafter instructions and observations which should receive your very careful attention. You should immediately discuss with each Special Agent in detail every phase to positively insure there is no misunderstanding in your instructions. It is necessary, of course, that you implement instructions to Special Agents in the light of local conditions and circumstances which will arise in individual cases.

RECORDED - 49

65-59264

X-35

65-59264-175

JUL 9 1951

MOO:njf

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Contacts with Informants

It is noted your office has used individuals you consider reliable to obtain names and preliminary facts concerning potential SBA agents. It is unnecessary and undesirable that informants, however reliable, be informed as to any aspects of the programs. There should be no inference whatsoever that a person concerning whom inquiry is made may be contacted for purposes of recruitment. It should be relatively easy to obtain the desired information through casual conversation or by disguising the true purpose of inquiry.

The Bureau has noted that certain individuals used as informants have themselves been recruited. This procedure is obviously dangerous. Your attention has been directed to circumstances in the cases of [redacted] neither of whom has been scheduled for training at SOG to date. It is noted that [redacted] in particular, appears, on the basis of information supplied to the Bureau, to be eminently qualified to participate as an SBA, better qualified, perhaps, than the individual concerning whom he supplied information. The latter, [redacted] has been scheduled for training. Some of the individuals concerning whom [redacted] supplied information have also been scheduled.

b6
b7C
b7D

You are instructed to immediately review all files on SBA's to determine all such instances in which persons used as informants have themselves been recruited as SBA's. You should, in each instance, determine from Special Agents who have contacted such persons the exact extent of information supplied to them, the bases given, if any, for inquiries concerning other persons, and all other factors which may affect further consideration of informants and/or persons concerning whom they have been interviewed. You should advise the Bureau promptly of the results and of your recommendations in the individual cases involved.

Recruitment

It is obvious from our experience to date that quality rather than quantity must be the controlling factor in selecting SBA personnel. You must, of course, consider an individual's loyalty, trustworthiness, availability, physical condition, knowledge of the Territory, experience with planes, boats, dog teams, mountain climbing, radio, availability of equipment and similar factors. Notwithstanding that an individual may be well-qualified in the categories mentioned, it is equally essential that he be mentally equipped to absorb training, some of which is of a technical nature. You must give all due consideration to the age of the person, extent of formal education, extent of self-education, native intelligence, and other factors which will influence his ability to grasp the training quickly. All of the questions should be definitely resolved before an individual is given any information in connection with recruitment and/or scheduled for training.

It has been observed that, in some cases, further investigation has been conducted after an individual has been openly recruited. Checks of criminal records and the obtaining of other obviously desirable information must in all instances be handled prior to interview for recruitment. In short, no potential recruit should be given any information whatsoever concerning the program until all possible reasons for elimination have been explored. It is recognized that interviews with potential recruits may be desirable in order to obtain some of the necessary information and evaluate him. In such instances, suitable pretexts should be used, and no indication of the true purpose of interview with the potential recruit should be given to him until it has been definitely determined there is no reasonable basis for his elimination.

It is obvious that utmost discretion must be exercised by Special Agents in making contact with potential SBA's for recruitment purposes, for arranging schedules for training and otherwise. It is natural that residents, particularly in small communities, will attach significance

to the appearance of FBI Agents in their areas. Every effort must be made to minimize the attention given to the presence of Agents. It is undoubtedly known to most persons that the FBI conducts investigations in criminal and applicant matters. Suitable pretexts, such as investigation of fictitious persons alleged to have formerly resided in the areas involved, might well be used as means of justifying the presence of the Agents and contacts with potential recruits. In such cases, it is obvious that a number of the residents should be interviewed and that the SBA be appropriately briefed in order that he may infer to curious persons that he was interviewed in the same connection with which they were interviewed. Such precautions must be repeated for recontacts.

There are, of course, inherent dangers in the recruiting of two or more persons in a small community. There should be no action or conversation on the part of Special Agents from which one recruit might have any justification whatsoever for believing that another person has been recruited. SBA's and potential SBA's should be given no indication of immediate travel plans of Agents from which inferences might be drawn. Obviously, such persons should not be directly queried concerning other SBA's. It is elementary to state that conversations with an SBA should not be conducted in the presence of other persons, including other SBA's. It is probable that in many cases these individuals can be contacted for recruitment or for other purposes in Anchorage or at other points distant from their home communities.

There are likewise inherent dangers in the scheduling of persons from the same communities or who are known to be well acquainted. Such schedules should be so arranged that two or more SBA's under these circumstances will not be absent from their communities at the same time. The possibilities of such persons seeing each other at the departure point in Alaska or encountering one another in travel will be thus eliminated or minimized.

Briefing Persons Recruited

Persons who have arrived at SOG to date for training have indicated they were given little information prior to departure from Alaska as to the nature of the program and training to be afforded. Such procedure of furnishing these persons a minimum of information is desirable. If it is later discovered they have been indiscreet they can be eliminated from further consideration for training at SOG or other phases of the program with less danger to security. It is obvious from your experience to date, however, that persons recruited must be further impressed with the absolute necessity for complete secrecy, that they must not by word, action, written communication, telephone, or otherwise, indicate to any persons, including wives, girl friends, employers, associates in business or others, in Alaska or elsewhere, that they have been contacted by the FBI for recruitment of any nature whatsoever, have any connection with the FBI, are employed by the FBI, intend to leave the Territory at the request of the FBI, or are in any way concerned with any responsibility of the FBI. It should be specifically explained to these individuals at the time of recruitment that any violations of the confidence imposed may endanger the security of the country, their personal safety, and necessarily eliminate them from further consideration.

The precautions taken and discretion exercised by your personnel in connection with recruiting these persons, contacts for scheduling them for training and otherwise will no doubt have a direct bearing on their conduct. We can not expect them to abide by instructions if conduct of our personnel is not exemplary.

Cover Stories to Explain Absences for Training

SBA's who travel to SOG for training must have cover stories to explain to relatives, associates, friends and employers their absences from their communities and jobs.

This question should be worked out in detail with each SBA on the occasion of the interview when he is first recruited and advised of the necessity for training.

The cover story must be entirely logical and fool-proof. It is natural that individuals residing in the community of an SBA will be curious as to his absence and will ask questions both before and after his travel. The SBA must be thoroughly briefed in this respect in order that his departure, absence and return will appear entirely normal. It is undesirable that SBA's indicate they are travelling to Washington, notwithstanding ostensibly good explanations.

The supposed destination and purpose of travel of the SBA must be logical and in keeping with his status in the community, financial situation, past experience, past residences, location of relatives and friends in the States, and other considerations which might have bearing. The possibility that an SBA may encounter other Alaskan acquaintances en route must always be considered and the SBA briefed as to a suitable explanation if such is required. The possibility that relatives of an SBA in the States may disprove his cover story through correspondence with relatives and friends in Alaska must not be overlooked.

It is recognized that SBA's may desire to leave addresses through which they may be reached in the event of emergency. Each individual should be specifically questioned in this regard in order that you can provide a suitable address in the States, in keeping with the cover story, to which emergency communications might be directed. Communications, except in extreme emergency, should be discouraged because of the ramifications which are involved in arranging for forwarding. In this connection, the Bureau will accept from trainees in Washington or Fort Benning, as the case may be, letters which trainees desire to send to relatives or others in Alaska. Such letters are censored with the knowledge of the trainee and are forwarded to appropriate points, in keeping with the trainee's cover story, for posting.

Referral/Consult

Schedules for Training

Every possible precaution must be taken in connection with scheduling persons for training at S G. You should, in accordance with previous instructions, attempt where possible to schedule persons who appear to be best qualified first, giving due regard to geographical coverage. You must take all possible precautions to prevent the possibility that two trainees scheduled for departure during the same week will encounter each other while standing by for physical examinations and actual departures. Similar precautions must be taken on return of trainees from Washington.

It is evident that there are inherent dangers involved in contacts by Bureau personnel with these individuals in Anchorage. Such contacts should be held to a minimum. Although it is recognized that you are obligated to expedite the travel of these individuals it is highly undesirable for Special Agents to personally escort SBA's to and from airports and otherwise under circumstances which would make it evident to bystanders that an unusual interest exists.

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] You should continue to scrutinize [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] to insure that such practices are adequate from a security standpoint. Any insecure methods should be brought to the attention [redacted] in order that they may be corrected. The Bureau should be informed in such instances and, specifically, whether [redacted] has taken corrective action.

Referral/Consult

Future Training

SBA's are being advised they will be afforded additional training after return to Alaska. Such training will require periodic, regular contacts with these persons. You must realize the security factors which will be involved in meeting and communicating with SBA's for training and practice. Here again, the required presence of Agents in the various communities involved must be fully justified by pretext, or otherwise.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

You should, in accordance with previous instructions, give immediate attention to the question of assignment and training of sufficient personnel who can carry out the necessary training of SBA's. You should not delay long range planning in this regard. All security factors should be thoroughly understood by both Special Agents and trainees. You will be furnished, at an early date, outlines of the various courses of basic instruction which are being given at S.G.

Sub-agents and Informants

As you are aware, a course of instruction is being given at S.G. in the basic principles involved in the selection and training of sub-agents and informants. SBA's are being advised that they should give thought to the question of persons who might assist them in the event of actual operations, and under different circumstances which might obtain at the time. They are being advised that they should, in giving consideration to the question, think of potential assistants in terms of unquestioned loyalty, trustworthiness, availability, physical condition, intelligence, family situation, ability to contribute experience, knowledge of particular areas, and equipment. They are being instructed they should, after consideration of all factors and without contacting any such persons, submit names and identifying data to your office for consideration.

SBA's are being specifically instructed that they must not under any circumstances, prior to actual operations, give any person any information of whatsoever nature concerning their activities in regard to the program, contact any person for purposes of recruitment or for any other reason in connection with the program, without the specific authority of your office. It is being pointed out to them that there are persons in Alaska, possibly included among their acquaintances, who are past or present members of the Communist Party, that there may be persons actively engaged in collection of information for an enemy country, and that there must for these and other security reasons be no deviation whatever from this instruction. They are being advised that even under operating conditions it will be highly desirable to clear with the principal, if at all possible, before recruiting particular persons.

It is imperative that all Special Agent personnel be fully advised of these instructions which are being afforded to SBA's and that SBA's be rebriefed at frequent intervals in this regard.

Caching

It can be foreseen that many security problems will be involved in connection with caching of equipment and supplies. This activity will, in the absence of extreme care, attract the attention of persons not connected with the program, including Alaskan natives. It is probable that the advice and services of certain of the SBA's can be utilized in this regard.

In view of the [redacted] in this connection, it is imperative that all security factors be thoroughly [redacted]

Referral/Consult

De-briefing

It is elementary that the security and success of any intelligence operation depends largely on restricting to an absolute minimum the number of individuals who are aware of its existence. It may become necessary, as in the case of persons previously recruited who are eliminated from further consideration, or in the event of discovered leaks, to take active steps to "de-brief" individuals involved. Steps in this direction will require your utmost good judgment. You should specifically instruct all personnel they must always advise you promptly of any information they receive indicating conceivable necessity for action of this type.

It may suffice in some instances to advise an individual that the activity or project for which he was being considered has been abandoned. In other cases it may be desirable to lead persons to believe that they have formed erroneous conclusions, that some alleged remark was the product of imagination, or that the reason for some action was entirely different from that suspected. It may be desirable that certain persons be removed from the Territory in the event of emergency.

* * *

The importance of this program should be recognized by all personnel. There should be no misconception on the part of your employees that any part of the activity is child's-play. It is essential that each employee discharge his responsibilities in strict accordance with instructions and with the utmost intelligence, discretion and resourcefulness of which he is capable.

MR. R. T. HARBO

July 5, 1951

C. F. DOWNING

STAGE

ALEXANDER BOLAN

Approximately 14 hours of cipher training were afforded

a STAGE trainee, and

June 19, 22 and 27, 1951, by

P. W. NEWBURN and P. A. NATHAN of the Cryptanalysis Unit. This completes the scheduled Washington cipher training for [redacted] and [redacted]

Attached is a summary of the cipher training given and our observations, also an envelope containing two copies of [redacted]

[redacted] A copy of the attached summarized training and the two [redacted] should be forwarded to the Anchorage Office.

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

b2
b7E

1-ENCL

LYN:jg

62-93182

cc - 65-59264

cc - Security Division (Clements)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-94 BY SP12/8 TOP

56 AUG 4 1951

NOT RECORDED
131 JUL 25 1951

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

[redacted]
[redacted] as set forth in the July 2, 1951
comprehensive memorandum on STAGE cipher training, given to [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

b2
b7E

OBSERVATIONS:

[redacted] was extremely slow in operating these cipher systems and made numerous errors. He seemed to be confused at times and had considerable difficulty in reading the plaintext of deciphered messages. He has very limited capacity to work out garbles and will need extensive additional supervised practice and review if he is to be expected to remember these systems. It is doubtful whether he will ever be proficient in the use of ciphers, and any use by him of the double meaning terms will have to be seriously questioned for accurate double meaning association.

b6
b7C

[redacted] participated satisfactorily in the cipher training.

Referral/Consult

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-94 BY SP-128 TS/180

ENCLOSURE 65-57264-1

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That all messages sent to [redacted] in cipher have "X" word separators in the plaintext; and the plaintext be in the simplest (one-syllable) words.
2. That extensive and periodic supervised training be afforded [redacted] in Alaska.

b6
b7C

MR. R. T. HARBO

July 5, 1951

C. F. DOWNING

STAGE;

BYRON ABB GILLILAND

Approximately 14 hours of cipher training were afforded [redacted]
[redacted] a STAGE trainee, also [redacted]
[redacted] by I. W. NEWBORN of the Cryptanalysis Unit, June 25, June
26 and July 4, 1951. This completes the scheduled Washington cipher training
for these men.

Attached is a summary of the cipher training given and our observations.
Also an envelope containing two copies of the [redacted]

[redacted] A copy of the
attached summarized training and the [redacted] should be forwarded to the
Anchorage Office.

ENCLOSURE

IBW:jg

62-93498

cc - 65-59264

cc - Security Division (Clements)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-94 BY SP12 BTJ/SC

65-59264-1
NOT RECORDED
131 JUL 28 1951

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

b2
b7E

[redacted] as described in the July 2, 1951 comprehensive memorandum on STATE cipher training, given to [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

OBSERVATIONS:

[redacted] was a fair student during this period of cipher instruction. He is slow and seemed to be unaccustomed to tedious writing required in this type of operation. He successfully enciphered and deciphered messages but with a considerable number of errors; he has limited capacity to work out garbled messages. Continued practice under supervision is necessary for this man to retain capacity in these ciphers.

b6
b7C

[redacted] participated satisfactorily in the cipher training.

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That additional practice and training be afforded [redacted] under competent supervision, after his return to Alaska.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-94 BY SP12 BTJ/SC
34225

ENCLOSURE

65-59264-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
RADIO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 25, 1951

URGENT

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/m
ON 4-28-2000

SAC, ANCHORAGE

(CIPHER PAD CODE)

STAGE.

REPORTED AT SOG FOR TRAINING (JUNE TWENTY FIVE)

HE ALLEGES TWO FBI AGENTS, ACCOMPANIED BY

CONTACTED

HIM IN CONNECTION WITH HIS RECRUITMENT AND THEIR CONVERSATIONS

TOOK PLACE IN STATES IT WAS EVIDENT TO HIM

THAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY RECRUITED FOR THIS PROGRAM.

STATES IT IS GENERAL KNOWLEDGE IN

COMMUNITIES THAT HE,

ARE TO BE

GIVEN TRAINING OF SOME SORT OUTSIDE ALASKA AND THAT OPINION

SEEMS TO BE SUCH IS IN CONNECTION WITH CIVILIAN DEFENSE.

HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED HE TOLD PERSONS IN HIS COMMUNITY WAS COMING

TO WASHINGTON CONCERNING CIVILIAN DEFENSE MATTERS AND DESIRED TO

CONTACT FISH AND WILDLIFE HEADQUARTERS. SUBMIT IMMEDIATELY DETAILS

OF RECRUITMENT OF IDENTITIES OF PERSONS

PRESENT DURING INTERVIEWS AND FULL FACTS WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO

DETERMINE APPROPRIATE FUTURE ACTION RE THESE THREE PERSONS

BY SEPARATE MEMORANDUM FOR RECOMMENDATION ANY PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUIRED. POSITIVELY ESSENTIAL ALL PERSONNEL BE IMMEDIATELY

DEBRIEFED AS TO ALL SECURITY ASPECTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Nichols
- Tracy
- Harbo
- Allen
- Belmont
- Laughlin
- Mohr
- Tele. Room
- Nease
- Gandy

HANDLED BY
FBI

Bureau Radio (6-26-51) (u)
5:32 P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

mcc
lwt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(14)
(u)
JUNE 26, 1951
SAC, ANCHORAGE

RADIOGRAM
URGENT
CIPHER PAD CODE

STAGE. DETERMINE PROMPTLY

AND ADVISE WHETHER QUOTE

Referral/Consult

INFORMATION WILL GREATLY FACILITATE TRAINING IN

SUBJECT BY BUREAU PERSONNEL.

HOOVER

65-59264

MCC:BJC

Classified by SP2 BTJ/SC

Declassify on: OADR 5/12/25

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/m
ON 4-20-2000

00-1164

HANDLED BY
STORY DESK

EX - 33

RECORDED - 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sent Via Bureau Radio

(6/26/51) (u)

1:51 PM Per H.W.

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

To: COMMUNICATIONS

JUNE 27, 1951

URGENT

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, ANCHORAGE

RADIOGRAM
CIPHER PAD CODE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
STAGE. REBURAD CONCERNING ALLEGATIONS OF GILLILAND. EXPEDITE

SUMMARY IN RADIOGRAM AND SUBMIT DETAILED MEMORANDA BY MAIL EARLIEST
PRA
PRACTICAL TIME.

HOOVER

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~

MCC:cm

65-59264

Classified by SP-8 BTJ/SC
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-8 BTJ/PM
ON 4-20-2000

RECORDED - 3

65-59264-178

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI

Per van

Tolson
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SENT VIA Radio (1-27-51) 2:33 PM
JUL 1 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 6, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: STAGE
(Bufile 65-59264)

ReBulet to Anchorage dated June 29, 1951 concerning the authorized increase of per diem to \$5.00 per day.

In this connection it is noted that prior to receipt of instant letter only two trainees have been reimbursed, namely, [redacted] Bureau file 62-93565, and [redacted] Bureau file 62-93626, at the previous rate of \$4.00 a day. It is felt that in these two instances, the increased per diem should be made retroactive and Bureau advice is requested in this regard.

b6
b7C

It is further noted in my letter to the Bureau dated June 28, 1951 regarding [redacted] that advice was requested concerning reimbursement to him for taxi fare incurred by him in Seattle.

b6
b7C

Reference is also made to your letter of June 29, 1951 regarding [redacted]

[redacted] This matter will be held in abeyance pending receipt of information on the increase of per diem.

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult65-298
SSP:vfcc: 66-360
cc: 66-348

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BT/SL/SA

ON 6/29/94

342251

RECORDED - 49

EX - 114

JUL 10 1951
15

Letter to Anchorage
7/10/51
10/10/51

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

RECORDED - 41

SAC, Anchorage 179

July 19, 1951

Director, FBI

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

LONG, SSA
(Your file 62-360)

Reurlet July 6, 1951, captioned "SMITH",
concerning [Redacted]

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

You may adjust reimbursement to [Redacted]
[Redacted] in accordance with the revised schedule
for per diem and expenses set forth in bullet dated
June 29, 1951. While a receipt should be obtained
from [Redacted] for the full amount of the adjustment,
the money [Redacted] should be withheld and forwarded
to the Bureau.

b6
b7C

Referral/Consult

62-93626

MCC:bjw

6/29/94 SP12 BT5/5 (L)
3/22/51

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alton _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

RECEIVED
FBI
JUL 19 7 16 PM '51

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

SP3-BTS/jm
 4-20-2000 08-1164
F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (6-27-51) NR 272130 8:52 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

STAGE. REFERENCE YOUR RADIOGRAMS (JUNE 25 AND JUNE 27) INSTANT
 CONCERNING ALLEGATIONS OF [REDACTED] WAS INTERVIEWED
 ON (JANUARY 26) LAST BY ASAC JAMES T. MORELAND AND SA [REDACTED] (u)

[REDACTED] AT HIS HOME AT [REDACTED] ALASKA.
 MORELAND AND [REDACTED] ADVISE THAT ON PREVIOUS DAY THEY INTERVIEWED

[REDACTED] IN SEWARD, ALASKA AT WHICH TIME HE ADVISED WAS
 PROCEEDING ON THE FOLLOWING DAY BY AUTOMOBILE TO HIS HOME [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE AGENTS TOLD [REDACTED] THAT THEY HAD OTHER WORK
 ON THE KENAI PENINSULA AND REQUESTED PERMISSION TO ACCOMPANY
 HIM TO [REDACTED] SINCE DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS NOT POSSIBLE
 TO SECURE OTHER TRANSPORTATION. THEY DROVE WITH [REDACTED] TO

[REDACTED] ON (JANUARY 26) LAST AND LEARNED FOR THE FIRST TIME (u)
 THAT THE CABINS OF [REDACTED] WERE LOCATED

[REDACTED] WAS NOT PRESENT
 WHEN AGENTS INTERVIEWED [REDACTED] AND NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT
 OTHER THAN AGENTS DURING INTERVIEWS WITH [REDACTED]
 BOTH OF WHOM WERE RECRUITED AT THIS TIME. AGENTS RETURNED TO
 SEWARD ON SAME DAY JANUARY 26 WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INTERVIEWING AGENTS ADVISE THAT RESIDENTS OF
 THAT SECTION OF ALASKA ARE KEENLY INTERESTED IN CIVILIAN DEFENSE
 MATTERS BECAUSE OF THEIR VULNERABLE LOCATION AND CONNECTION WITH
 CIVILIAN DEFENSE WOULD NOT DISCLOSE ANYTHING CONCERNING SBA
 PROGRAM. [REDACTED] WERE INSTRUCTED WHEN INTER-
 VIEWED CONCERNING ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR SECRECY AND THE IDENTITIES
 OF OTHER STAY BEHIND AGENTS WERE NOT DISCLOSED TO ANY OF THEM.

[REDACTED] STATED THAT HE TOLD PEOPLE IN HIS COMMUNITY THAT HE WAS

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
 outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
 order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

6-29-51
 156-2107 21 1000

6-29-51
 34225

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (S) (u)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

PAGE TWO

PROCEEDING TO THE STATES TO TAKE ADDITIONAL FLIGHT TRAINING
AND AT NO TIME INDICATED THAT HE TOLD ANYBODY THAT HE WAS
PROCEEDING TO WASHINGTON CONCERNING CIVILIAN DEFENSE MATTERS OR
TO CONTACT FISH AND WILDLIFE HEADQUARTERS.

RECEIVED (6-27-51) (S) (u)

9:04 PM LH

cc: Mr. Clements

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (S) (u)

SAC, Anchorage

June 29, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

STAGE

Re Bureau radiograms June 25 and 27, and your radiogram June 27, 1951.

RECORDED - 22

181

EX. [redacted] who made his original allegations in the presence of Air Force personnel, has been reinterviewed in detail, in private. He stated in the Fall of 1950, Phil Harding, former Mayor of Seward, had approached him and others in the Kenai Lake area concerning a plan for civilian defense including caching food, supplies and firearms and the establishments of camps for civilians in the hills should they be forced to flee because of attack or invasion. Subsequently in January, 1951, SAs [redacted] and Moreland arrived at [redacted] house in the automobile of [redacted]. They were introduced to [redacted] by [redacted] as being from the FBI, and [redacted] stated the Agents had a program [redacted] might be interested in. SA [redacted] told [redacted] major facts of the program and stated he would like to have [redacted] cooperation. [redacted] was said to be present in the same room where the conversation took place. [redacted] stated the Agents knew he had previously been contacted regarding civilian defense and suggested he not proceed too far in [redacted] program which might interfere with the plan with which the Agents were concerned.


[redacted] stated he received the impression [redacted] had been recruited. It was stated by Agents that [redacted] were provided, [redacted] could be likely to be sent out on a mission for training. [redacted] allegedly questioned [redacted] at the time as to how he would like to go "outside." [redacted] replied that he would enjoy same, provided such a trip would not interfere with his means of livelihood, and [redacted] allegedly expressed the same idea. [redacted] stated he offered to prepare coffee for the Agents and he was advised by them that they were going to have dinner at the house of [redacted]. [redacted] had allegedly spent the winter at the [redacted]. The Agents were believed to have returned to Seward with [redacted]. He expressed the opinion that the incident occurred on a day when [redacted] was not working.

He stated that a few days later [redacted] an ex-Marine, had told him he understood the FBI had talked to [redacted]. [redacted] stated he told [redacted] he understood the FBI had been checking up on someone. [redacted] stated he would have liked to talk to the Agents as he had questions concerning civilian defense.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-9 BJS/KS
07 6/30/97

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alpen _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

MCC:lfb



RECEIVED - DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUL 1 1951

[redacted] stated it seemed to be the general opinion in the area that the FBI had some civilian defense plan, although knowledge of the real program was not believed to be known. He stated that a few days before he was to depart, the [redacted] persons named [redacted] who have been living with him. [redacted] were at [redacted] house. [redacted] allegedly told [redacted] that one need not worry about fixing his clothes as a woman (name not recalled), living in a trailer, had already fixed his shirts, etc. Someone allegedly inquired of [redacted] when he was leaving and he replied "about the fifteenth." [redacted] went on to say that he was required to be at the "base" for a day or so before leaving Anchorage. Some discussion ensued as to whether [redacted] would visit a relative in the States. [redacted] stated he received the impression that all present believed [redacted] had been contacted by the FBI in some matter concerning civilian defense.

b6
b7C

[redacted] stated that he does not recall overhearing statements indicating that persons in his area believed that he left Alaska for reasons of civilian defense. He stated that it was evident, however, that word had got around through some source, believed by him to be [redacted] that he was going "outside." He specifically mentioned that the [redacted] ineward had contacted him and told him that one [redacted] had asked the [redacted] to tell [redacted] to be sure and take a case of dynamite to a given location before leaving.

b6
b7C

[redacted] stated he had, during the previous winter, indicated an intention of traveling to the States for further studies in aeronautics. He stated as far as he knows people believed he went outside for that purpose. He stated a definite belief, however, that [redacted] is aware of the true purpose. He stated [redacted] had inquired of him on one occasion as to when he was leaving, and he received the definite impression that [redacted] had connected him with instant program.

b6
b7C

[redacted] went on to state that the same Agents called on him a second time, possibly in April, having arrived by an automobile presumed to be a Bureau car. He stated the Agents told him the program was shaping up and he would be advised if an appropriation was granted permitting training. He stated he had no information the Agents called on other persons on that occasion. The Agents are said to have inquired as to roads to Kenai and Homer, and indicated that they would stop back to see [redacted] if time permitted.

b6
b7C

He stated the same Agents subsequently arrived in a plane of Safeway Airways, apparently chartered out ofeward. He stated the Agents called him aside after locating him in the

company of [redacted] They told him it was desired that he be in Anchorage on the morning of June 22. He stated they inquired whether he knew if [redacted] was at home, and that he indicated he believed not as he had seen [redacted] go by in a car that morning.

b6
b7C

[redacted] stated the same Agents were back at his home on the following [redacted] in the same plane and, not finding him at home, left a note with [redacted] stating that he should advise if for any reason he could not reach Anchorage on the morning of June 22nd. He described the note as being open and not in an envelope.

b6
b7C

[redacted] stated he arrived at Anchorage on the morning of June 22nd, saw Agent [redacted] and was ushered into the office of the SAC, where a person presumed by him to be the SAC stated that the "other fellow" who was supposed to travel that day could not go, and that it was desired [redacted] proceed on that date instead. He stated SA [redacted] took him to Fort Richardson, remained with him during his physical examination and assisted him in boarding the plane.

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised on his arrival at SOG, that he had explained his trip by stating that he was traveling to Washington to discuss civilian defense matters and to visit the Headquarters of the Fish and Wildlife Service, the latter being a lifetime ambition. [redacted] was advised at the time that he must actually visit the Fish and Wildlife Service and Headquarters of Civilian Defense, and procure literature from both agencies and be in a position to hear out his cover story on his return to Alaska. After [redacted] gave the information indicated, [redacted] was advised that information had been received from Alaska that there had been considerable discussion in his area of the fact that he and perhaps others were to be in training of some sort in connection with civilian defense. He was told that there had been indications that the public has connected the FBI with such program and the travel of him and possibly other persons, such persons being unnamed. He was again specifically instructed and did in fact, on June 20, 1951, visit the Governmental agencies named for the purpose indicated. He has been thoroughly rebriefed as to the absolute necessity for hearing out his cover story, and dispelling any idea that might be brought to his attention that the FBI has any part in the activities in which he is interested, and that he must guard against loose conversation at all times.

b6
b7C

[redacted] will proceed to Atlanta, Georgia, and remain there for a short period prior to taking parachute training

b6
b7C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 25, 1951

FROM :MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF EVASION.
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM, ESCAPE AND
EVASION PROGRAM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/25/94 BY SP12 BJS/K

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

PURPOSE:

To advise you of allegations made by [redacted]
[redacted] indicating the security of the SBA program might
have been endangered.

DETAILS:

[redacted] who began training at SOG on this
date, has advised two agents of the Anchorage Office contacted
him at [redacted] Alaska, accompanied by [redacted]
of Seward, Alaska. It was plain to [redacted] that
[redacted] had been previously recruited himself and conversations
between the agents and [redacted] took place in [redacted] presence.
It appeared to [redacted] that the agents had used [redacted]
to assist in locating him.

This action, which part of our agent doesn't seem pertinent
[redacted] went on to state that it had become
a matter of general knowledge in the general area of his
residence and in the area of Moose Pass that [redacted]
[redacted] were to leave the
territory for some sort of "training." [redacted] expressed the
opinion that the public associated [redacted] as having
some connection with the same proposition and that it appeared
the public believes contacts by the FBI are concerned with
"civilian defense." [redacted] attributed public knowledge of
at least some of the facts alleged has resulted from talk
on the part of [redacted]

[redacted] incidentally, is now in his second week
of training at SOG, having begun on June 19, last. [redacted]
[redacted] when asked what reason he had given to persons in his
community for leaving Alaska, stated he had told the people
in his community that he was going to Washington to talk with
civilian defense authorities and that he also wanted to have
the opportunity of calling at the Headquarters of the Fish
and Wildlife Service. [redacted] indicated that he had
positively told no persons of his true purpose and indicated
the fact of his recruitment for the SBA program was not known
except to the FBI and himself.

RECORDED - 22 JUL 11 1951

EX: - 32

MCC: gmu

65-59264

MCC
by [signature]

b6
b7C

[redacted] although previously recruited, has not been definitely scheduled for training but he has indicated he would be available any time after July 20, next.

b6
b7C

It is essential that we determine full facts from the Anchorage Office in connection with the allegations of [redacted] in order that the extent of danger to the security of the program can be fully determined and appropriate steps can be taken to counteract same. It is to be noted that [redacted] statements were made in the presence of Air Force personnel.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached hereto is a radiogram to SAC Anchorage instructing full facts concerning recruitment of the three persons in question be submitted immediately, that he include recommendations as to action which may counteract any danger to the security of the program and that he submit by separate communication his recommendations as to any personnel action required.

Detached
and sent
C.L.J.
6-25-51

✓ JF
C.L.J.

get a bottom of
this promptly.

B.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: 0 PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
EVENT OF INVASION

DATE: June 22, 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/30/94 BY SP12 BJS/KSC

PURPOSE:

Referral/Consult

To advise that [REDACTED]

DETAILS:

Referral/Consult

Anchorage memorandum dated 6-14-51 advises

[REDACTED]
Anchorage suggested to [REDACTED][REDACTED] Anchorage states it is anticipated
that requests be submitted to [REDACTED][REDACTED] Anchorage is being
instructed by letter that such requests should by all means
be made.RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

That SA Sanders, Liaison Unit, bring this question
to the prompt attention of [REDACTED] in order
that he may appropriately instruct [REDACTED]

MCC:dar

56 JUL 17 1951

165-59264-182
JUL 10 1951
EX - 32 12

Adm
mcc

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 22, 1951

FROM : Mr. C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM, ESCAPE AND
EVASION PROGRAM)

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/30/94 BY SP12 BTJ/SK

Referral/Consult

PURPOSE:

To suggest that immediate discussions be had with [redacted] at the headquarters level with regard to the question of payment to Stay-Behind agents and Escape and Evasion agents in the event of actual operations.

DETAILS:

Referral/Consult

As you are aware, payment to Stay-Behind agents during the periods of travelling and training has been previously authorized. [redacted]

[redacted] it is understood arrangements have been made in that regard. Although the question of possible payments to such agents after the beginning of operations has arisen during discussions [redacted] the matter has not been fully discussed and no agreements have been reached. It is believed desirable this question be resolved at the earliest possible date, in order that potential agents selected for training and who have assured of their desire to cooperate and their definite intention to remain in Alaska can be given some assurance that their families will be provided for in the event of actual operations.

One of the persons who has already arrived for training has pointed out that he is not a man of wealth, and that his wife and children are dependent on his income solely. He also mentioned that, dependent upon circumstances, he would likely be somewhat older at the end of operations, assuming that he survived. He pointed out that while the work he would be performing as a Stay-Behind agent would perhaps be more dangerous than that of a soldier in actual combat, he, as a civilian, would enjoy none of the benefits which are attached to one who has served in the armed forces, including veteran's preference for employment. He stated that he would feel much more secure, and feels that any other persons considered for similar wartime duty would feel likewise, if he had definite assurance, and understood plans which may be in the making for persons in his category.

65-59264
MCC:djb

7-28-51.

RECORDED

AUG 24 1951

Referral/Consult

It can be seen that the question of family maintenance and the future of SBAs and E and E agents may well affect the recruitment for these programs and the morale of persons so recruited. We should be in a position, at the earliest moment, to advise these persons of the manner in which they will be cared for.

Three possibilities suggested are:

1. That consideration be given to commissioning Stay-Behind agents and Escape and Evasion agents in the Air Corps. This arrangement would allow for family maintenance, provision for allotments from pay, cheap insurance, and veteran's benefits. No administrative setup, in addition to those already in existence, would appear to be required for the execution of such plans. Further, persons so commissioned would be under military control and subject to military discipline.

2. Payment to these persons in civilian capacities from funds appropriated for the Air Corps. It appears probable that no special administrative arrangements would be necessary since the Air Corps undoubtedly has many civilians on its present payroll.

3. Payment to these persons from Bureau funds, which it appears would require additional appropriations. This plan would require a considerable amount of administrative handling at a great expense of time and money.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is urgently recommended discussions be had [redacted] [redacted] as to future plans for payment to SBAs and E and E agents in the event of actual operations in order that the question may be definitely resolved.

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *OBW*

FROM : C. E. Hennrich *CH*

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM, ESCAPE
AND EVASION PROGRAM)

DATE: June 27, 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Purpose

To recommend that the question of responsibility in affording medical attention to trainees who become ill while at SOG be definitely resolved [redacted]

Details:

It is evident from our experience to date that trainees in the captioned programs may require medical attention while at SOG for training. It can be envisioned that some may require only minor attention from nurses, that some may require services of physicians, and that some may necessarily require hospitalization.

One of the trainees was suffering from a cold when he arrived in Washington. When the circumstances came to the attention of the Bureau Supervisor on the first day of training, the trainee was promptly taken to the Health Unit at Identification Building. He received attention and has from all indications recovered. [redacted]

[redacted] In the meantime, [redacted] was ill and the Bureau Supervisor went to [redacted] and brought [redacted] to a physician downtown. No hospitalization was required. A separate memorandum has been prepared in connection with the incident.

The circumstances cited point up the necessity for resolving this problem immediately. Since the two programs are closely integrated, both being developed for the direct benefit of the military, and since the trainees

RECORDED - 65-59264-182X1

MCC: [redacted]

7-28-51

AUG 31 1951

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Bureau will, of course, continue to afford minor attention to trainees having colds, requiring first aid, etc., if attention is required while trainees are at either the Identification or Justice Buildings.

RECOMMENDATION:

That SA Sanders promptly discuss the question of responsibility in affording medical attention to trainees [REDACTED] and take the position that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

(JULY 5, 1951) (e) (u)

RADIOGRAM
URGENT
CIPHER PAT CODE

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE, REUPLET (JUNE TWENTY EIGHT) AND PREVIOUS
COMMUNICATIONS, REQUESTING NAME CHECKS OF POTENTIAL
E. AND E. AGENTS. BUREAU MAINTAINING SEPARATE FILES ON
INDIVIDUALS AND SEPARATE FILES SHOULD BE MAINTAINED BY
YOU. REQUESTS FOR NAME CHECKS SHOULD BE IN INDIVIDUAL
COMMUNICATIONS AND SHOULD INCLUDE BACKGROUND DATA SUCH AS
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, PAST AND PRESENT ADDRESSES, LENGTH
OF TIME IN ALASKA.

65-59264

MCC:NJF

HOOVER

~~6/26/94~~
~~SP12-BTS/SC~~
~~SP42251~~

(u)

(e) (u)

X

181

SP3-BTS/sm

4-20-2000

EX-32

(JUL 11 1951) (e) (u)

183

(JUL 11 1951) (e) (u)

(e) (u)

Sent via Bureau Radio (7/5/51) 1:29 PM - 85

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *EL*

FROM : C. E. Hennrich *CH*

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION (STAY-BEHIND AGENT
PROGRAM, ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

DATE: June 28, 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/30/94 BY SP12878 KSC
342251

Purpose

To recommend that per diem allowance for Stay-Behind Agents be increased from \$4.00 to \$5.00, and that they be additionally reimbursed for actual hotel expense in Alaska and Seattle while en route.

Details

Referral/Consult

You will recall that SBAs are presently reimbursed at the rate of \$150.00 per week (\$175.00 at Fort Benning if parachute training taken), plus \$4.00 per diem for incidental expenses. These allowances begin with the departure of the trainee from his home to Anchorage or other point of departure in Alaska, and end with the return of the trainee to his home. Time spent for personal reasons in any case being deducted.

At the time the \$4.00 per diem rate was recommended and approved it was considered same would cover meals, laundry, and other incidentals. It has developed that the trainee must pay \$1.00 or \$1.25 per day, dependent on the military base involved, for lodging at the BOQ in the same fashion that military personnel would have to pay. This, of course, leaves a very narrow margin for food and other expenses.

We now require that trainees be examined by military doctors in Alaska prior to departure, to insure they have no physical defects which would be adversely affected by air travel and normal physical activities involved in the training program. Trainees living in places remote from Anchorage or other point of departure in Alaska must necessarily make allowance for possible delays in travel to such points and to insure arrival in time to have the physicals before leaving for SOG. The \$4.00 per diem rate is obviously inadequate to cover hotel expense in Anchorage. Some trainees, as in the case of one already questioned, will stay with friends and avoid such expense.

Trainees must normally stay overnight in Seattle en route to Washington and, in some cases, en route from Washington back to Alaska. Here again, the \$4.00 would not cover hotel expense alone.

65-59264
MCC: :EWT

RECORDED - 141

EX - 37

JUL 13 1951

HANDLED BY
STO DESK

65-59264-184
JUL 13 1951
FIVE

TILL

Recommendations of Anchorage Office:

Anchorage has recommended a revision of the per diem schedule as follows:

1. \$11.00 per diem in Alaska en route to SOG and on return.
2. \$6.00 per diem while en route from Alaska to Seattle.
3. \$9.00 per diem from Seattle to Washington and vice versa.
4. \$4.00 per diem while at SOG and/or Fort Benning.

Comment:

- (1) above. The stand-by time a trainee spends in Anchorage or other point of departure must be held to a minimum for security reasons. Knowledge of the trainee that \$11.00 per diem was to be paid might encourage him to arrive in advance of the required time and to linger on return to Alaska. Some trainees will have no expense, as previously indicated.
- (2) above. There should be no expense involved in a non-stop flight from Anchorage to Seattle and vice versa; hence no per diem is justified.
- (3) above. There is normally no reason for expense to the trainee in traveling from Seattle to Washington or vice versa, since meals are served on the planes gratis.
- (4) above. It is believed we should increase per diem from \$4.00 to \$5.00 in order to more fairly cover the trainee's expenses, particularly since he must pay \$1.00 or \$1.25 per night for lodging. It is noted that one trainee, a doctor, has requested that he be permitted to provide his own quarters rather than be lodged at a military base. Other prospective trainees are professional men in high income brackets who will not likely want to be restricted to lodging provided by the military. They will, undoubtedly, expect to bear the additional expense, but it is nevertheless believed we must recognize their position and more nearly cover necessary expenses.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that per diem be increased to \$5.00 to cover the entire period of travel and training, less time spent en route for personal reasons, and that Anchorage be authorized to pay, in addition, the actual amount charged to individual trainees for hotel accommodations in Alaska while standing by and in Seattle, en route, up to \$6.00 per night. In the latter event, the trainee need not be advised that such expense will be borne by the Bureau until his return to Alaska. Attached is a memorandum for transmittal to Anchorage in the event the suggested revision is approved.

b.l.s.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, likely of the initials 'J.M.' or similar, written in dark ink.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AK*
 FROM : Mr. C. E. Hennrich *CH*
 SUBJECT: PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
 EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM,
 ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

DATE: June 30, 1951

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/30/94 BY SP12 BTF RC

PURPOSE:

To recommend that [redacted] be requested to give definite statement as to plans for evacuation of stage personnel in the event of emergency.

Referral/Consult

DETAILS:

It is believed highly desirable that [redacted]

[redacted] It must be recognized that the dependents of SBA personnel will, in many instances, be in remote places, or at least at considerable distances from possible evacuation points now under consideration. It is believed information as is practical to disclose at this time will be of assistance in recruiting and maintaining morale of Stage agents. Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SA Sanders, Liaison Unit, discuss [redacted] the question of evacuating the dependents of Stage personnel in detail and obtain specific information, if possible, which may be furnished to trainees.

Referral/Consult

65-59264
 MCC:djb

RECORDED

AUG 24 1951

25

Referral/Consult

SAC, Anchorage

June 29, 1951

Director, FBI

SEAGE

Reurlet June 14, 1951, in which you recommended certain increases in per diem allowances to Stage personnel while in travel and training status.

Inasmuch as it has been determined that trainees must pay for lodging at military bases in the Washington area and at Fort Benning, authorized per diem is hereby increased to \$5.00. This per diem and weekly reimbursement for loss of income, previously approved, should begin with the departure of the trainee from his home en route to Anchorage or other point of departure, and end with his return to his place of residence. It is, of course, contemplated that stand-by periods at the point of departure en route to SOG and on return of trainees to Alaska will be held to a reasonable minimum, for reasons of security and economy. Any additional time spent by a trainee on personal business in Anchorage, or elsewhere en route, must be deducted in calculating both per diem and weekly reimbursement.

In addition, you are authorized to reimburse trainees for actual expense for sleeping accommodations, up to \$6.00 per night, in Alaska and Seattle or elsewhere en route, if travel schedules are interrupted by weather or unpredictable occurrences which are not for the personal convenience of the traveller. It is noted that schedules presently used will generally require lodging at Seattle en route to Washington and, in some instances, from Washington en route to Alaska. Otherwise, there will be, normally, no other overnight stops and consequently no additional expense since meals are provided on the planes. Schedules from Fort Benning direct to Seattle are not known at this time. The fact that you will reimburse the trainee for such necessary hotel expense should not, except possibly in an unusual case, be made known to him until his return to Alaska in order that the procedure will not be abused.

Your suggestion that \$5.00 per diem be paid during the period of travel from Alaska to Seattle does not appear to have merit inasmuch as it does not appear the trainee will have any personal expense during the non-stop flight. Similarly, \$9.00 per diem for periods of travel in the Continental U. S. does not appear justified since no expense will be involved that is not otherwise provided for under the arrangements approved herein.

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Alton
Belmont
Langdon
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

RECORDED - 141

65-55201

MCC:

RECORDED - 54

342251
6/30/51 SP12BTS/JS

JUN 29 1951
JUN 29 7 22 PM '51

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 10, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)
(Bufile 65-59264)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Reference is made to Bureau radiogram dated July 5, 1951.

This office, like the Bureau, is maintaining separate files on each E & E potential agent as they are [redacted]

Referral/Consult

The request for name checks of potential E & E agents has been thoroughly discussed with [redacted] and he was requested to submit the names for checks as soon as possible. He was asked to supply us with these names prior to the time an investigation is made and certainly prior to the time that they were interviewed, in order that the security of this program can be maintained and to prevent data concerning the program falling into the hands of persons who might prove to be security risks and who might be rejected because of information located in Bureau files. This oral request has been substantiated by a formal communication [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Constant liaison is being maintained with [redacted] and this matter will be afforded continued attention. The Bureau will be kept advised.

Referral/Consult

62-227
JHW:vf

RECORDED - 5

165-5-14-185
JUL 13 1951
15

INDEXED 51281270
6/30/51

EX - 48

342251

HANDLED BY
STOP/ASK

JUL 21 1951

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

DECODED COPY

FROM ANCHORAGE (7-5-51) NR 060015 9:43 PM

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

SP3-BIS/SM
4-20-2000 00-1164

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 75 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 64 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED TO BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED. 2 TRAINEES PROCEEDING TO WASHINGTON, TO COMMENCE TRAINING (JULY 9 AND JULY 10.) 7 HAVE ALREADY REPORTED FOR TRAINING AND 3 RETURNED TO DATE.

(4) RECEIVED (7-5-51) 9:52 PM

RECORDED JUL 11 1951

EX - 48

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage

DATE: July 10, 1951

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
 COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE
 EVENT OF INVASION
 (STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM
 Bufile 65-2958)
 (ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM
 Bufile 65-59264)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

6/30/96 SP281318.0
 342251

As you will recall, on May 28, 1951 in a discussion of the Proposed Plan for Intelligence Coverage in Alaska in the Event of Invasion (Stay-behind Agent Program and Escape and Evasion Program), you directed that upon my return to Anchorage, Alaska both of these programs be reviewed, analyzed, and a communication directed to you concerning their adequacy and advise whether the Bureau's responsibilities are completely fulfilled. Your instructions were reiterated in Bureau letter dated June 18, 1951.

With reference to recruitment, this office presently has 77 persons recruited as agents in the SBA Program. Training has begun for these individuals and to date, nine persons have gone to Washington, D. C. for training. Others are being scheduled at the rate of two a week. However, this number will be reduced to one a week as soon as [redacted]

[redacted] At that time their training program will be integrated with ours and one SBA and one E & E Agent will be sent to Washington weekly for training.

Referral/Consult

With reference to recruitment, continued attention will be given this phase. It is realized that certain of the agents already recruited will not measure up, certain will be rejected for physical handicaps not now discernible, and certain of them will drop out of their own accord. This office will be alert for additional persons having special qualifications which would make them effective in the SBA Program.

Arrangements are in effect whereby the investigative reports, which include results of interviews with Stay-behind Agents, are being disseminated to [redacted] Likewise, copies are being forwarded to the Bureau for dissemination to [redacted]

Referral/Consult

COPIES DESTROYED

When potential Stay-behind Agents are scheduled for training at the Seat of Government, such schedule is set for a minimum of thirty days in advance and the Bureau is advised of details of

65-298
 62-227
 JHW:vf

RECORDED - 5

EX - 48

JUL 13 1951

- 187

AN 65-298, 62-227

travel, names of beneficiaries in order that the accident insurance can be obtained, the results of an interview with the person to be trained in order that his cover story can be obtained, the security of this matter can again be impressed upon him, and that any questions which he might have may be answered. Referral/Consult

Letter of reference reflects that the Bureau to date has received [redacted]

With reference to the name checks of potential E & E Agents, [redacted] has been requested to furnish these names to the Anchorage Office, together with background data - such as date and place of birth, present and past addresses -, length of time in Alaska, etc., in order that they may be handled expeditiously. It was pointed out to him that this method of handling the name checks would prevent [redacted] persons on whom the Bureau had derogatory information. Such procedure excludes the possibility of information concerning the E & E Program falling into the hands of those who are known to be security risks. [redacted]

[redacted] the FBI will handle any leads concerning these persons in the States. [redacted] was requested to pass such leads on to us without delay in order that this phase of the E & E Program can be handled in the least possible time. Any leads found to be in the United States will be forwarded to the appropriate office with the request that they be given special attention and that the results be placed in report form in order that they may be disseminated [redacted]

With reference to the fact that [redacted]

it has been pointed out [redacted]

Referral/Consult

All persons selected for training, both in the SBA Program and the E & E Program, will be given physical examinations by military doctors at Fort Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska.

[REDACTED]

Prior to the time that the potential Stay-behind Agent leaves Anchorage, Alaska en route to Washington for training, the details of his travel and his itinerary are obtained. He is given his physical examination and his travel tickets are furnished. Also, he is interviewed in order that the security of this matter can be again brought to his attention, his cover story for being away from his home community obtained, and any questions which he might have can be answered. These data are passed on immediately to the Bureau for its information and guidance during his training. No persons are permitted to proceed to the Seat of Government until this office has been advised that accident insurance coverage has been purchased and is in effect.

Referral/Consult

The long range aspects of both the SBA Program and the E & E Program have been fully considered. They have been discussed with Inspector VICTOR P. KEAY, who visited this office from July 5 to 9, 1951. The responsibility of this office in connection with both programs was fully explored to insure that those falling on the Bureau have been completely fulfilled. This office is completely cognizant of its responsibilities in connection with both programs and the same are being handled. The problems of security of both programs, continued training of the Stay-behind Agents who have received instruction at Washington, caching, and communications were thoroughly explored. The security of both matters have constantly been brought to the attention of all personnel in this office. The security of both matters has again been brought to the attention of [REDACTED] with the suggestion that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

It is recommended that the Bureau at Washington confer with [REDACTED] and request that immediate attention be given to the phases of [REDACTED] in order that the Stay-behind Agent returning from training may be setup to operate in case of national emergency.

[REDACTED]

Two Special Agents - [REDACTED] have been assigned to the SBA Program and E & E Program in this office. It is noted that SA [REDACTED] is presently in Washington, D. C. taking the same training which is afforded the Stay-behind Agents. Both of these men have been working on these programs and are thoroughly acquainted with them. The matter of adequacy of personnel was discussed with Inspector KEAY during his visit here and both he and I were of the opinion that additional agents should be assigned to these programs. It is believed that two additional agents would be adequate. Inspector KEAY advised me that his comments and recommendation in this regard would be brought to your attention upon his return to Washington. It is believed that the agents transferred in to Anchorage to handle these programs should be afforded the same training that is given to the Stay-behind Agents. It is also believed and recommended that [REDACTED] should be directed to proceed to Washington at the earliest possible time to be afforded this training.

b6
b7C

All phases of the SBA Program, as well as the E & E Program have been thoroughly reviewed by me. Likewise, they have been discussed in detail with Inspector VICTOR P. KEAY. The responsibilities of the Bureau in both of these programs are fixed and are being completely fulfilled by this office.

I am fully cognizant of the Bureau's commitment, obligations and responsibilities in both of these programs and you may be assured that every effort will be made by me and by all personnel of this office to fulfill them.

*Personal
Administrative
File*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage
 SUBJECT: STAGE

DATE: July 11, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Alden	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Mr. Holloman	
Mr. Gandy	

Rebulet dated June 29, 1951, concerning the

incident of [redacted]
 all of whom have been recruited as potential Stay Behind Agents.
 Each of these persons allegedly is aware that the other two have
 also been recruited.

b6
b7C

This matter was thoroughly explored with
 Inspector VICTOR P. KEAY, who was here from July 5 to 9,
 1951. Statements were obtained from the Agents having knowledge
 of the incident.

Inspector KEAY advised that his report upon his
 return to the Seat of Government would include all data con-
 cerning this incident. In view of the fact that referenced
 communication will be handled by Inspector KEAY, nothing
 further is being done here at this time.

JHW:MMA
65-298

RECORDED - 132

165-57264
JUL 14 1951
15

EX-92

HANDLED BY
STOP DESKDECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTJ/KSC
ON 6/30/94

342251

SAC, Anchorage

July 5, 1951

Director, FBI

AIR MAIL

b6
b7C

RECORDED - 46

Special Agent

The above-named Agent presently attending In-Service Training will be retained an additional two weeks for training to be used in connection with the Stay-Behind Agent Program, Escape and Evasion Program.

CC Mr. Clegg [redacted] should be instructed to report to Agent H. C. Clements, Room 1533IB for this training.

b6
b7C

Mr. McKee Room 5256

Mr. Clements - Room 1533IB

WSH:hc

RECORDED - 46

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/30/91 BY SP12BJS/81

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

COMM - FBI
JUL 5 1951
MAILED 24

65 OCT 4 1951

MR 58 10 13 AM '51

ASE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 30, 1951

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
 (Stay-Behind Agent Program, Escape
 and Evasion Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 9/30/91 BY SP12BTS/34225

Tolson
 Ladd
 Clegg
 Glavin
 Nichols
 Rosen
 Tracy
 Harbo
 Belmont
 Mohr
 Tele. Room
 Nease
 Gandy

PURPOSE:

To propose that SA Robert McKee, Anchorage Division, be held over for two weeks on termination of In-Service Training for intensive training in the captioned programs.

DETAILS:

SAC, Anchorage has recommended SA [] who will terminate In-Service Training on July 7 next, be trained in the Stage program prior to return to Alaska. The Bureau had previously instructed Anchorage to give immediate consideration to training of Special Agents who can re-brief SBA and E. and E. agents after their return to Alaska following training at SOG and supervise regular practice with codes and ciphers and secret writing.

SA [] personnel file reflects he entered on duty [] was assigned to Seattle, Omaha and Houston prior to transfer to Anchorage on 11-29-50. He is rated in GS 11 as SATISFACTORY. [] is [] years old, home address [] single, makes a good personal appearance, has mature judgment, is mentally alert and industrious. He was in the navy from [] discharged as Lt. (J.G.), has worked as a clerk and bookkeeper prior to Bureau Service, and holds the BBA degree.

It is intended the Special Agent will go through the course of training afforded by the Bureau to STAGE personnel, and will in addition receive intensive training privately so as to equip him to assist in continuous training with some degree of expertness. He will also be []

[] It is estimated he should be held over for approximately two weeks to insure adequate training.

Referral/Consult

65-59264

MCC:vas

RECORDED - 46
 18-13

JUL 18 1951

PERS. FILES

b6
 b7C

RECOMMENDATIONS:

If you approve, it is recommended this memorandum be routed to the Administrative Division for appropriate action and that SA be instructed to contact Supervisor Clements, Room 1533, prior to July 7 next for appropriate instructions concerning schedules.

b6
b7C

SM
7/7

OK
b.l.i.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

JULY 6, 1951 (u)

RADIOGRAM

URGENT

CIPHER PAD CODE (u)

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE. BUREAU RECORDS DO NOT DISCLOSE IDENTITY OF SBA OR E. AND E. AGENT
SCHEDULED TO BEGIN TRAINING (JULY SEVENTEEN NEXT. SURAD PROMPTLY UNDER
CAPTION OF INDIVIDUAL CASE WITH NAME OF BENEFICIARY AND TRAVEL SCHEDULE
IF ARRANGED.

HOOVER.

65-59264

MCC:com

6/30/94

SP2BTJ/SC
5/225/

EX - 37
RECORDED - 46

36 JUL 23 1951

SENT VIA Bureau Radio (7/5, 6:58 PM)

Per [signature]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage
 SUBJECT: STAGE
 (65-59264)

DATE: July 12, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED
 6/30/94
 342251

Rebulet July 5, 1951.

All employees of this office, including investigative personnel, radio communications officers and clerical personnel, have been briefed again concerning the security and confidential nature of the STAGE as well as the E & E Programs. It has been impressed upon them that this is one of the most important projects in this office at the present time and that all duties concerning it must be given vigorous and continued attention. Its importance to the country as well as the Bureau has been stressed. The safety of the Stay Behind Agents and the E & E Agents as well as the safety of the personnel of this office in case of an invasion can easily be imperiled by a lack of security in this matter. This likewise has been brought to the attention of all.

All matters set out in referenced letter have been again brought to the attention of all SAs working on this program and they have been told that they must plan carefully and exercise the utmost discretion and good judgment. There is no misunderstanding of instructions given concerning this program.

CONTACTS WITH INFORMANTS

The informants used to obtain preliminary facts and data concerning potential SBAs have not been apprised of the reason for such contacts. The information concerning the potential SBAs was obtained and will be obtained in the future through casual conversation without divulging the true purpose of the inquiry.

COPIES DESTROYED

R 584 N 21 380

In a few instances, persons who were contacted for the purpose of recruiting interviews suggested names of individuals known to them whom they thought would make good SBAs. In these instances the interviewee was not told that the person he suggested would be considered as an SBA. The Bureau is being advised concerning these instances by separate communications. All files are being reviewed to determine these instances and from the SAs who made the contacts information will be obtained concerning the exact extent of data supplied to the interviewee. Based on the information obtained, the Bureau will be advised promptly concerning the individuals involved in these instances.

JHW:MMA
 65-298

EX. - 37
 RECORDED - 46

191

Letter to the Director, FBI
July 12, 1951
P & C

STAGE

RECRUITMENT

With reference to recruitment, all files are being reviewed in line with the comments set out in referenced letter to determine whether any instances can be found of persons who would possibly not be mentally equipped to absorb training, would have some deficiency which would preclude his proceeding to Washington for training or in any other manner would not measure up to the standards which now appear to be necessary.

In all instances background investigation will be handled prior to recruitment and interview. Likewise, no interviews will be made until Bureau files have been checked.

In cases where recruitment interviews are being made, particularly in small communities, the Agents making the interviews will enter that section under some suitable pretext to allay the suspicion and curiosity of other persons living there. Likewise, the person interviewed will be given some pretext story to pass on to other members of the community if queried concerning the visit of an Agent.

In no instances during recruiting interviews was one potential SBA interviewed in the presence of another or some outside third person.

Every effort will be made to schedule the persons recruited for training at a time when no other recruit from the same community is proceeding to Washington for training.

BRIEFING PERSONS RECRUITED

Cover Story to Conceal Departure for Training

When a recruit comes to Anchorage en route to Washington, D. C., for training, he is interviewed at the Anchorage Office. At that time all details concerning his travel, insurance beneficiary, etc., are worked out. Also, he is asked if he has discussed this matter with anyone. He is asked if, in his opinion, anyone else is acquainted with the fact that he has been recruited under this program. He is also asked what cover story he gave members of his family and persons in his community for his absence from that community and data

Letter to the Director, FBI
July 12, 1951
P & C

STAGE

concerning his destination. In addition, he is asked what he intends to tell such persons upon his return. These and other data obtained from him will be made the subject of a communication to the Bureau for its aid and consideration while he is in training. He is impressed again during this interview with the security of this matter and with the absolute necessity of having no conversation concerning this matter with anyone at any time.

SCHEDULES FOR TRAINING

Every effort will be made to schedule those persons who appear to be eminently qualified as soon as possible. No two trainees will be scheduled from the same community at the same time. Contacts with SBAs by SAs of the Bureau while in Anchorage will be held to a minimum. It will be necessary, of course, to interview them.

In this regard, contact was had with [redacted]

[redacted]
He was advised that if this could be effected, the FBI here would have one contact with the trainee (taking him to the Fort Richardson Dispensary for a physical examination and interviewing him) and [redacted] Referral/Consult
This would cut to a minimum the possibility of persons in and around Anchorage seeing the trainee with an FBI Agent who quite possibly would be known to them. [redacted]
[redacted]

This will be followed closely and the Bureau kept advised.

FUTURE TRAINING

This office has been and is continuing to give attention to the phase of continued training to SBAs after they return to Alaska. This was discussed with [redacted] on July 11, 1951. This office will continue to train the SBAs in those subjects for which we are responsible. [redacted]
[redacted]

Referral/Consult

Letter to the Director, FBI
July 12, 1951
P & C

STAGE

Referral/Consult

[redacted] It is requested that the Bureau forward to this office sufficient material to make such continued training possible. It is also requested that contact be had with [redacted]

[redacted] It is requested that the matter of continued training be borne in mind when SAs of this office go through the SBA training school in Washington in order that they will be competent to handle the FBI's responsibility in this regard. It is suggested that [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Also with reference to the continued training, the matter of contacts with the SBAs in the Territory was discussed with [redacted]

[redacted] Steps are being taken to obtain a post office box in Anchorage to which they can address their communications. Our correspondence with them and their correspondence with us will be handled by plain envelopes and the letters will be cached in guarded language. Their communications with us will be addressed to this post office box only.

Referral/Consult

The question arises, however, concerning the handling of expenses of travel by the SBAs, the reimbursement for the expense to which they are put and the possibility of some remuneration for the time away from their vocations. It is requested that the Bureau consider such possible expenses [redacted] in order that the responsibility for payment, if made, may be fixed. In this regard, it is recommended that we pay for the transportation expenses and a fair remuneration for SBAs during continued training and that [redacted]

The above plan, if accepted, will obviate the necessity of FBI [redacted] agents making trips into the communities in which the SBAs reside, thus materially adding to the security of this program. It is noted that there would be much less suspicion attached to the fact that an SBA leaves his home community to come into Anchorage than there would be to the presence of a stranger (an FBI Agent [redacted] agent) in a small settlement.

Referral/Consult

Letter to the Director, FBI
July 12, 1951
P & C

STAGE

At the completion of a retraining period with any particular SBA, a detailed memorandum can be compiled to show his progress, the status of his covert operation and data concerning the security of this program in his community. This material may be passed on to the Bureau for the completion of its file.

DEBRIEFING

All personnel of this office have again been advised concerning the security of this program and the probability that debriefing of certain individuals will be necessary. They have specifically been instructed to advise immediately if any incident comes to their attention which indicates that the security of the program has been threatened, that any particular agent has divulged the fact that he is a part of the program or that he has indulged in any indiscretion or foolish act with reference to it. Such matters will be watched closely and any incident coming to the attention of this office will be handled immediately. The Bureau will be advised.

All of the Bureau instructions and information set out in the letter of reference was discussed by me with Inspector VICTOR P. KEAY who was in Anchorage July 5 to 9, 1951.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Allen
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: July 12, 1951

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SUBJECT: STAGE
(BuFile 65-59264)DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 BTR/SC
ON 6/30/94
342251

Rebulet July 5, 1951.

[redacted] has returned the copies of the investigative reports of Stay Behind Agents which we have forwarded to them. However, we are continuing to submit reports compiled in additional cases [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Those reports that have already been returned as well as those which will be returned in the future are being placed in the case file of the individual to whom they pertain for further possible use.

Referral/Consult

With reference to the proposition of establishing complete files on STAGE and E & E in some safe place, possibly in the United States, this matter was discussed with Inspector VICTOR P. KEAY who was here July 5 - 9, 1951. Likewise it has been discussed with [redacted] Inspector KEAY and myself are of the opinion that such files, both the investigative and administrative aspects included, should be set up and quite probably in the States, possibly at Seattle.

It was felt that these files should be segregated from the files of the field office into which they are put, if a field office is chosen. It is believed from an administrative standpoint that a field office in the States is the best repository for it. It is also believed that they should be segregated in the field office as a unit in order that they can be moved in very little time if the same becomes necessary. The establishment of such files could be done by deleting a copy of all serials from the files of the Anchorage Office and sent to Seattle. A separate index on them could be established and the files and index maintained here. Hereafter, if the Bureau approves, a copy of all communications both from the Anchorage Office to the Bureau and from the Bureau to the Anchorage Office could be designated for Seattle to be placed in the appropriate file. This matter as indicated above was [redacted]

Referral/Consult

COPIES DESTROYED

#584 NOV 21 1960

6 AUG 24 1951
JHT:HCVHANDLED BY
STOP
RECORDED - 46
INDEXED - 46JUL 17 1951
15

Referral/Consult

[redacted]

It is suggested and recommended that the Bureau discuss this matter with [redacted] looking to the establishment of a complete set of files on [redacted] and [redacted] at some spot in the system quite possibly the Seattle Referral/Consult Office. If this were done, the administration of the program could go forward without any difficulty whatsoever if the files here were destroyed.

Referral/Consult

With reference to the [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] however, this will be done if the Bureau so desires and directs.

With reference to ~~cover names~~ being given the STAGE Agents upon their return to the Territory from the training school which names are to be used in the future in all correspondence with and reference to the Agents. This project will be started. This matter was discussed with [redacted] on July 11, 1951, and [redacted] The STAGE Agents will be given names which are common and in many instances peculiar to the Territory of Alaska.

Referral/Consult

The Bureau will be advised of these cover names and the same will be placed on the master card index which has been set up here on STAGE Agents. It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to place the cover name on its card index.

When the cover names are chosen they will be made available to [redacted] It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to make the same available to [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM : SAC, ANCHORAGE
 SUBJECT: STAGE
 (BuFile 65-59264)

DATE: 7-14-51

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

REMYLET July 12, 1951.

Mail Drop

Referring to Paragraph 2 of Page 4 of referenced letter under the sub-heading of Future Training, you are advised that an attempt to obtain additional Post Office Box at Anchorage was unsuccessful.

In this connection Mr. HERB BROWN, Postmaster, advised confidentially that he would make every effort to obtain a box for our use but stated there was little or no possibility of any success until at least September 1, 1951, the beginning of the next quarter for box rentals. However, an application has been filed under the fictitious name of ALFRED BURR and Postmaster BROWN has assured me he will make a box available at the earliest possible moment.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12 BTB/SC

ON

6/30/99

342257

65-298
 CC - 62-227

SSP:HCW

RECORDED - 1

65-32267-193

INDEXED - 1

JUL 19 1951

HANDLED BY
 STOR

244 x 2
 31 JUL 30 1951

SAC, Anchorage

July 14, 1951

Director, FBI

STAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/30/94 BY SP12BTS/80

RECORDED - 83

-194

Reference is made to the statement by [redacted] that Special Agents James T. Moreland and [redacted] discussed this program with him in the presence of [redacted] who had also been recruited as a Stay-Behind Agent. From the information furnished by [redacted] it is apparent, of course, that he knows that both [redacted] and [redacted] have been recruited, and it is probable that all three of these individuals know of each other's recruitment. The Bureau has decided that [redacted] will be continued on the program unless of course there is evidence in the future that they have been indiscreet to the point where the safety of the entire program would be prejudiced. It appears from facts now available that the hazard at present is confined to the possible future safety of these three individuals. In view of this situation, it is desired that you endeavor to determine whether it is a fact that all three of them know of each other's recruitment. It is suggested this be done by pretext so as not to reveal to them anything they do not already know and that you endeavor to do it in the course of other business in the vicinity so that a special trip will not be necessary into the area for the sole purpose of contacting these individuals. If it is determined that they do know of the recruitment of each other, you should advise the Bureau of the possibility of forming them into an operating unit. It would be necessary, of course, to determine if they are mutually agreeable to such an arrangement and that if the relations among them are such that they could be relied on to operate harmoniously. Final steps will not be taken in this regard until you have submitted full facts to the Bureau and you have been advised.

It is realized that due to the gradual development of this program it has been necessary to make additional contacts from time to time with various prospective Stay-Behind Agents. It is desired, however, that in the future you endeavor to keep these contacts to an absolute minimum and that plans be made accordingly. Every effort should be made when contacts with these Agents are necessary to see them out of their home area by finding out when they will be in some town in Alaska. You should endeavor to set up a means of mail communication with them in order that arrangements can be made for contacting the Agents away from their home areas.

It is understood that you have followed the practice that where possible interviews with prospective Stay-Behind Agents are conducted by two Agents together. It is not believed that there is any

COMM - FBI

JUL 18 1951

MAILED 13

VPK:ldw

1 AUG 1951

b6
b7C

VH EK MK Q C 1/2

Reiterating prior instructions, it is urgent that this program be handled with utmost secrecy. You should make certain that all employees concerned in any way with the program recognize this necessity by appropriately instructing them.

Reiterating prior instructions, it is urgent that this program be handled with utmost secrecy. You should make certain that all employees concerned in any way with the program recognize this necessity by appropriately instructing them.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 29, 1951

FROM : C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM, ESCAPE AND
EVASION PROGRAM)

Tolson ✓
Ladd ✓
Clegg ✓
Glavin ✓
Nichols ✓
Rosen ✓
Tracy ✓
Harbo ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Nease ✓
Gandy ✓

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/30/94 BY SP12 BTJ/S

PURPOSE

To advise you that Agents of the Anchorage Office have stated [redacted] was not present during conversations at the time [redacted] was recruited for the SBA Program. A detailed memorandum is to be submitted by mail. [redacted] statements are set forth in detail herein.

BACKGROUND

In my memorandum of June 25, 1951, you were advised of allegations made by [redacted] to the effect that two Agents of the Anchorage Office had recruited him for the SBA Program in the presence of [redacted] who, it was obvious to [redacted], had been previously recruited. [redacted] had gone on to say that it had become a matter of general knowledge in the area of his residence that he, [redacted] were to leave the territory for "some sort of training," it being believed by [redacted] that while the people associated the three individuals with the same proposition, it appeared they believed contacts by the FBI were concerned with "civilian defense." [redacted] believed public knowledge to be attributed to some degree to talk on the part of [redacted] Anchorage was advised of the allegations and instructed to submit details of recruitment of the three individuals in order that future action might be determined, and that any necessary personnel action might be taken. A summary radiogram followed by detailed memoranda by mail was requested. The Director instructed that we must get to the bottom of this promptly.

Anchorage Explanation

Anchorage, in a radiogram on June 27, 1951, advised as follows:

[redacted] was interviewed on January 26, 1951 by SAs James T. Moreland and [redacted] at his home near [redacted] Alaska. These Agents had on the previous day interviewed [redacted] Alaska, concerning his recruitment in the SBA Program, and on learning [redacted] was proceeding by automobile on the following day to his home in the [redacted] area, requested they be permitted

65-59264
Attachment
MCC:LJB

Belmont
UPK
1-15-51
Let SP12
1-14-51

Handwritten signature/initials

b6
b7C

This seems most unwise
to ride in the automobile of [] as they had other work in the [] area. It was stated that weather conditions made it impossible to secure other transportation.

b6
b7C

The Agents have stated they rode with [] and learned for the first time that the cabins of [] were located []. It was stated [] were recruited separately and that no persons, [] or others, were present during such interviews. The Agents learned that [] and have []. The Agents returned to Seward on the same day, January 26, with [].

It was stated by the interviewing Agents that residents of the section of Alaska involved are keenly interested in civilian defense matters because of their vulnerable location and that any association of the Civilian Defense Program with the visit of the Agents would not disclose anything concerning the SBA Program. It was stated that the three persons named were instructed, when interviewed, as to the absolute necessity for secrecy and that the identities of other SBAs were not disclosed to any of them.

b6
b7C

Detailed Statement of []

[] who made his original allegations in the presence of Air Force personnel, has been reinterviewed in private, in detail, and has stated in substance:

b6
b7C

SAs [] and Moreland arrived at his house in January, 1951, accompanied by [] who introduced the Agents to him and stated the Agents had a program in which [] might be interested. The Agents gave [] presence meager details and enlisted [] promise of cooperation. [] stated it was evident from remarks made by [] that he, too, had been recruited and would probably go to the States for training. Agents and [] remained at [] house for about an hour, and departed saying they were to have dinner with [] at the residence of one [] with whom [] had spent the winter.

b6
b7C

What does this mean?
The same Agents contacted [] on the second occasion, probably in April, 1951, having proceeded to his home in a car presumed to be a Government automobile. They stated the program was progressing and [] would be advised when and if he was scheduled for training. Some time later, the same Agents arrived at [] house in a chartered plane and in private conversation told him it was desired he be in Anchorage on June 22. They inquired whether he knew if [] was at home. [] did not know whether any contacts were made with [] or others on this occasion. The following day the same

This was unwise, since it would obviously indicate that [] was being recruited

b6
b7C

Agents were again at [] house and, finding him away, left a note that he should advise if for any reason he could not be in Anchorage on June 22.

b6
b7C

[] proceeded to Anchorage on June 22, went to the Anchorage Office and was advised that since another individual who was scheduled to travel on that day was not going, it was desired [] proceed on the other individual's reservation. He did in fact depart from Anchorage on that date.

b6
b7C

[] advised that in the Fall of 1950, a Civilian Defense Program was organized in his area involving the possibility of food caches and camps to which civilians could flee in the event of invasion. He stated there has been considerable activity in the community in that regard in recent months. He stated some days before he left his home, [] and others who were visiting at his house discussed [] imminent departure from Alaska which, it appeared to [] was believed by other persons present to be concerned with civilian defense. He stated there was no indication that these persons or others in the community knew of the real purpose of [] trip, but that he has gained the definite impression that the public considers that he, [] are to receive some sort of training connected with civilian defense.

b6
b7C

A resume of [] statements in more complete detail is set forth in the attached memorandum to Anchorage.

Action Taken at Bureau

b6
b7C

[] who began training on June 19, advised on arrival that he had explained his absence from the territory by stating that he was coming to Washington to talk to civilian defense authorities and at the same time visit the National Headquarters of the Fish and Wildlife Service, which had been a lifetime ambition of his. [] was at that time instructed that he must actually visit the Fish and Wildlife Service and Headquarters of Civilian Defense, and procure literature from both agencies and be in a position to bear out his cover story on his return to Alaska.

b6
b7C

Following the allegations of [] was advised that information had been received indicating persons in his home area had connected him and possibly other persons as being identified with the same "civilian defense" project. He was again thoroughly briefed in the security aspects of this program and the absolute necessity for his utmost discretion in assuring that no connection

of his with the FBI and instant program could be deducted.

b6
b7C [redacted] who has explained that he had several months ago, prior to recruitment, indicated the probability that he would come to the States for additional training in aeronautics, stated that he told persons in his home area in explanation of his departure that he was coming to the States for such training. He told no one of his actual destination. [redacted] has been instructed that, since he will take parachute training at Fort Benning, he should visit flying schools in the Atlanta area, acquire literature from these schools, and be fully prepared to bear out his cover story on his return. He was appropriately rebriefed in all security aspects.

b6
b7C [redacted] has not been scheduled for training at any definite time to date. Full consideration of [redacted] status and whether he should be eliminated will be given upon receipt of detailed memoranda from Anchorage.

Conclusions

Statements of [redacted] and the Anchorage Agents are contradictory as regarding the presence of [redacted] during conversations with [redacted]. Detailed memoranda from Anchorage will throw further light on this case. On the basis of known facts, it appears the public is not aware of the true nature of the program and reasons for FBI contacts with [redacted]. It appears, however, that these three individuals are each aware of the recruitment of the other two. Recommendations for any necessary personnel action should be deferred pending receipt of further facts.

b6
b7C

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Anchorage Office be advised by attached memorandum of the detailed allegations of [redacted] and the apparent contradictions; that additional memoranda be submitted if required to explain or justify such apparent contradiction.

b6
b7C

It seems obvious that the story behind agent program is not being properly administered or supervised. I suggest Mr. Keay proceed to Alaska to get all facts and check into the program.

7-1

OK
- 2 concern of 25 of
is at once. It
is obvious this
project has been
grossly mis-
handled. I want
all funds as
to responsibility
H.

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

DECODED COPY

SP3-BTJ/jm

4-20-2006

80-1164

FROM ANCHORAGE

(7-13-51)

NR 130100

3:53 P.M.

6/30/94

DIRECTOR

URGENT

34225

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 75 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 64 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED TO BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED. 2 TRAINEES PROCEEDING WASHINGTON THIS WEEK FOR TRAINING. ONE SBA TO COMMENCE (JULY 16) AND FIRST E AND E TRAINEE TO COMMENCE (JULY 17). 9 TRAINEES HAVE ALREADY REPORTED FOR TRAINING AND 4 OF SAME HAVE RETURNED TO DATE.

(u) RECEIVED

(7-13-51)

RECORDED - 74

5:03 P.M.

57264-195

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ab*
 FROM : Mr. C. E. Hennrich *CH*
 SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
 COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
 OF INVASION
 (Stay-behind Agent Program
 Escape and Evasion Program)

DATE: June 12, 1951

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

PURPOSE:

To advise you of the specific arrangements effected whereby Stay-behind Agents will receive training at the Seat of Government, beginning June 11, 1951. Attached for approval is a letter to the SAC, Anchorage, setting forth in detail instructions as to various phases of the program, which have been discussed personally with SAC, Williams, to insure that the responsibilities of the Bureau will be completely fulfilled.

BACKGROUND:

Referral/Consult

The Anchorage Office has, to date, developed 75 potential Stay-behind Agents. Copies of investigative reports concerning these persons have been disseminated to [redacted] Anchorage is presently recontacting each individual to determine when he can proceed to SOG for training. Arrangements were effected whereby the first two trainees were available in Washington on Monday, June 11 and Tuesday, June 12, 1951, and two per week will arrive on succeeding Mondays and Tuesdays thereafter until completion of the training. Recruitment will continue until all concerned agree that coverage is entirely adequate.

Each Stay-behind Agent has been questioned as to any dis-qualifying physical defects. Military doctors will examine each person prior to departure from Anchorage for physical defects which might be adversely affected by air travel and normal training procedures. [redacted]

[redacted] The Government's interest will be further protected by accident insurance purchased by the Bureau for each trainee, coverage extending through the period of travel and training.

Referral/Consult

Each Stay-behind Agent will be given practical briefing by FBI [redacted] prior to departure, with particular reference to security.

65-59264
 Attachment
 MCC:mrc:cm

21 1951

RECORDED - 25

JUL 12 1951

EX - 39

Referral/Consult

TRAVEL AND HOUSING:

[REDACTED]

Our Anchorage and Seattle Offices have, however, been instructed to extend such cooperation as may be required and is consistent with the division of responsibility to insure travel and training schedules will be met. Atlanta has been given similar instructions as to cooperation [REDACTED] regarding persons who take parachute training at Fort Benning, Georgia. The Bureau will be informed on the departure of each Stay-behind Agent from Alaska and will in turn inform Anchorage of the departure of each agent on his return trip.

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]

TRAINING PROGRAM:

Stay-behind Agents will be trained individually for a two-week period in Washington. The FBI part of the training will be afforded by personnel listed hereafter at the locations indicated:

Referral/Consult

<u>Topic</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Location</u>
Indoctrination [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	SA Manning C. Clements, Security Division	Room 2324, Identification Building
Deception and security	"	"
Selection and training of subagents and informants	"	"
Russian system of ferreting out espionage agents	"	"
Codes and ciphers	SA I. W. Newpher FBI Laboratory	"
Secret writing	SA J. W. Magee FBI Laboratory	FBI Laboratory
Defensive tactics	SA H. A. Meyers Training and In- spection Division	Gymnasium

Security subjects included are devised to give the Stay-behind Agent basic information whereby he can accomplish missions assigned with the least possibility of detection and elimination in the event of invasion and occupation by enemy forces.

The FBI Laboratory has advised that detailed memoranda will be prepared setting forth the nature of instruction to be provided by that Division. In substance, trainees will be given basic instruction in use [redacted]

[redacted] and will be briefed in the use of [redacted]. Each agent will be instructed in two methods of secret writing. The Laboratory will make necessary recommendations for expenditures of any funds necessary to provide materials to trainees.

"Defensive tactics" will include disarming methods, means of inflicting damage to an adversary, and related matters.

[redacted]

Referral/Consult

Following completion of training [redacted] FBI [redacted] will submit memoranda reflecting observations as to the individual capabilities of trainees and individual matters for additional training.

Referral/Consult

The Bureau will reimburse Stay-behind Agents at the rate of \$150 per week, plus \$4 per diem for incidental expenses, during the training period. The base pay will increase to \$175 per week for those persons who take parachute training, during the period of the actual parachute training.

[redacted]
[redacted] Anchorage Office is giving such co-operation as is consistent with the division of responsibility.

Referral/Consult

We have agreed to conduct such investigation as [redacted]
[redacted] to potential Escape and Evasion Agents. [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] One such request for investigation at Seattle has been received and is currently receiving attention. It is believed the Bureau should interpose no objection to the procedure [redacted]

[redacted] prospective agents are almost without exception in extremely remote and inaccessible areas, and a great saving of Bureau time and funds will be effected. [redacted]
[redacted] however, that we are making an exception in these cases to the [redacted]
[redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted]
[redacted] We have previously agreed to assist in the training of these persons along the same lines as given to Stay-behind Agents. The Bureau should interpose no objection to [redacted] and the SAC, Anchorage, has been so advised. [redacted]
[redacted]

CACHING OF SUPPLIES:

Referral/Consult

[redacted]
[redacted] the Anchorage Office has been cooperating fully in research and has supplied a comprehensive dossier on the subject [redacted] We are currently awaiting [redacted]

FURTHER ADMINISTRATION:

Consideration should be given at this time to long-range aspects of the programs. The potential value of Stay-behind and Escape and Evasion Agents will greatly diminish with passage of time after original training unless definite steps are taken to effectively administer and maintain control of the program in Alaska through repeated contacts with the agents, rebriefing in security aspects, and practice with communication methods.

It is believed two SA's in the Anchorage Office should be immediately assigned, under the personal supervision of the SAC, to the program for long-range operations including recontacts and retraining, the coordination of efforts [redacted] for necessary caching of supplies and equipment and the carrying out of any and all responsibilities of the Bureau. Such agents should, of course, be thoroughly trained in all phases of the Bureau's responsibilities including training at SOG. It is believed such personnel could be rotated and implemented as necessity arises.

Referral/Consult

FBI RESPONSIBILITIES:

All phases of these programs were personally discussed with SAC, Williams in detail during the period of his In-Service Training at SOG, in accordance with specific instructions of the Director. Mr. Williams was instructed that he must be absolutely certain that any and all phases of the Bureau's responsibilities are adequately and completely handled. Confirmation of oral discussions are included in the attached letter.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Bureau interpose no objection to [redacted]

[redacted] that the Bureau continue to accept requests [redacted] for [redacted]

leads, in such investigations in the Continental United States. Instructions in this regard are included in suggested letter to Anchorage.

2. That SAC, Anchorage, be instructed to give immediate consideration to the assignment of two Special Agents in the Anchorage Office, under his immediate supervision, to handle long-range aspects of the two programs, to include recontacts, retraining, coordination for necessary caching, and in general to carry out all Bureau responsibilities. Instructions are included in the suggested letter attached.

Referral/Consult

✓ Jh
Jh

Jh

65-59264-196

SAC, Anchorage

June 18, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(Stay-behind Agent Program
Escape and Evasion Program)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/30/94 BY 2855/SC

Stage 342251

EX-39

In confirmation of discussions with you during
your period of in-service training at the Seat of Govern-
ment, the following instructions are set forth in order
that all concerned will have a clear understanding of the
Bureau's responsibilities in the captioned programs:

You will continue to recruit potential Stay-behind
Agents until such time as it is considered by all concerned
that coverage is adequate in every respect. Notwithstanding
the number of potential SBA's already approved, you should
be alert for additional persons having special qualifications
which would make them effective. You will, in accordance
with arrangements already in effect, disseminate copies of
reports [redacted] and the Bureau will in turn, fur-
nish copies of the same reports [redacted]. Your
immediate objective should be to insure that the selected
persons are available on schedule for training at SOC.
Every effort should be made to arrange schedules for a
minimum of thirty days in advance and the Bureau should
be advised of final details of travel, names of beneficiaries,
and related data a minimum of two weeks in advance of the date
an individual is to report for training.

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

You will, [redacted] integrate
training schedules whereby Escape and Evasion Agents can report
at SOC for training. Schedules already perfected should not
be disturbed. It is suggested that you may desire to arrange
whereby one Stay-behind Agent and one Escape and Evasion
Agent will report weekly. A reserve pool should be maintained
in order that any inadvertent vacancy in the schedule can be
filled on short notice.

The Bureau has, to date, received no reports from
[redacted] reflecting investigation of Escape and Evasion Agents.
It will be necessary, prior to travel of such persons, that

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Alban
Belmont
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

Referral/Consult

RECORDED
65-59264-197
JUN 19 1951

36 AUG 2 1951

61 AUG 9 1951

Referral/Consult

[redacted] to your office and to the Bureau and that all security aspects concerning the individuals be fully predetermined. [redacted] furnish to the Bureau all requests for name checks prior to beginning of actual investigation. It has been previously agreed that the Bureau, upon request, will conduct investigation concerning prospective Escape and Evasion Agents. You have advised that [redacted]

[redacted] The Bureau has no objection to this procedure. It should, however, be distinctly understood [redacted] that an exception is being made in these cases to the terms of the [redacted]

Referral/Consult

You are authorized to instruct offices in the Continental United States to conduct investigations concerning Escape and Evasion Agents when you receive requests [redacted] Individual case files should be opened in your office on such persons and correspondence concerning individual prospective agents should bear the name of the individual and the character "Administrative - Escape and Evasion Program." You should instruct, in each instance, that reports be prepared with such care that they can be disseminated without alteration, and that all phases of the program are strictly confidential. No person interviewed should be apprised of the nature of these inquiries.

Referral/Consult

In accordance with arrangements, all persons selected for training should be given physical examinations by military doctors prior to departure to insure that such persons have no physical defects which would be adversely affected by air travel or normal training procedures. It is understood that [redacted]

It should be distinctly understood that [redacted]

[redacted] You should, however, give such cooperation as is consistent with the agreed division of responsibility.

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

The Bureau should be informed as to the exact time of departure, details of travel and itinerary of each person. The Bureau, in turn, will inform you of the departure of each individual on his return trip to Alaska. Any variations in travel schedules, such as stopovers en route or on the return trip, should be known to you [redacted]

[redacted] The Bureau should be informed in detail of such variations.

In accordance with previous instructions, no persons should be permitted to proceed to SOG until you have been advised that accident insurance coverage has been purchased and is in effect. It is imperative that the Bureau be given adequate time in each instance to procure the insurance coverage in question.

Referral/Consult

After completion of training, the Bureau [redacted] will prepare memoranda reflecting observations as to the individual capabilities of each trainee. A resume of such observations will be furnished to you for your guidance in future developments.

You should give immediate consideration to the long-range aspects of these programs. The potential value of individuals given training will greatly diminish with the passage of time after original training unless definite steps are taken to effectively administer and maintain control of the programs in Alaska. Such administration should include regular contacts with persons afforded training, arrangements for regular practice communications, and rebriefing as to the security aspects. You should give due consideration to the desirability for arranging for a drop, such as a post office box, to handle communications with Stay-behind Agents and Escape and Evasion Agents. Every precaution must be taken to insure complete security. Also included should be the coordination of efforts with [redacted] for necessary caching of supplies and equipment. In short, it should be insured that the Bureau's responsibilities in whatever respect have been fully handled at any given time.

Referral/Consult

You should immediately consult with [redacted] regarding the continuation of training to be afforded to Stay-behind

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Agents and Escape and Evasion Agents. [redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted] It is obvious that training must continue in such subjects if trainees are to be of value. It is particularly important that practice in radio communications be regular.

You should immediately effect arrangements whereby persons who receive training in Washington can, on return to Alaska, be introduced by Bureau Agents to [redacted]

Referral/Consult

In connection with the above, you are instructed to give immediate consideration to the assignment of two Special Agents in your office who, under your direction and personal supervision, will be assigned to the administration and control of these programs. The Special Agents selected should be well informed as to each phase of the programs in question and should be thoroughly equipped to assist in additional training and regular practice communications. You should consider the advisability of recommending that such persons be given training at SOG, training to be coordinated with the regular in-service training. It should be understood that the assignment of personnel should be arranged in such a fashion to permit rotation in the event of transfers or other occurrences which will affect the chain of responsibility.

You should, of course, personally maintain appropriate liaison [redacted] to insure that there are no deviations from agreements as to division of responsibility and otherwise. You should keep the Bureau informed in all respects. The Bureau will in turn inform you of any new discussions, implementations of the programs, new instructions and related matters.

Referral/Consult

You must be positively certain that the Bureau's responsibilities are completely fulfilled. You should personally review each and every phase of the program in detail and advise the Bureau of your conclusions as to adequacy. Your memorandum should reach the Bureau within ten days after your return to Anchorage.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alton _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

~~X~~
(JULY 18, 1951)

SAC, ANCHORAGE

RADIOGRAM
URGENT
CIPHER PAD CODE

STAGE. BUREAU FILES DO NOT REFLECT IDENTITIES OF SBA AND E.

AND E. AGENTS SCHEDULED FOR TRAINING BEGINNING (JULY THIRTY ONE)

AND THEREAFTER. SUBMIT INDIVIDUAL RADIOGRAMS RE SUCH PERSONS

AS SOON AS PRACTICAL FOR SCHEDULES APPROXIMATELY THIRTY DAYS

IN ADVANCE.

65-59264

MCC:VJM

HOOVER

~~6/30/94
SP2 BTJ/SC
342251~~

SP3-BTJ/SM

4-20-94

00-1164

RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI
JUL 18 11 17 AM '51
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECORDED - 74

100-1164-1198

(4)

7/27

(7/18/51) (4)

sent via Bureau Radio (7/18/51) 1:11 PM Per [unclear]

SAC, Anchorage

August 1, 1951

Director, FBI

~~PERSONAL ATTENTION~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STAGE

Referral/Consult

Reurlet 7-18-51 concerning cipher pads [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] The Bureau has previously obtained pads of both sizes for instructional purposes and was awaiting advice from you as to which size would be used for actual operations. In the absence of further advice from you, it will be assumed that the "pocket size" pads will be used for actual operations.

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 29 65-59264 - 200

MCC:vas

EX-130

SP 12 B 18 130
6/30/94
34225

RECEIVED
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
Aug 1 3 56 PM '51

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage
 SUBJECT: STAGE
 E & E PROGRAM
 (65-59264)

DATE: July 18, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Rebulet July 11, 1951, concerning cipher pads.

On July 17 and 18, 1951, this matter was discussed
 with [redacted]

Referral/Consult

[redacted] It is suggested that the Bureau
 may desire to obtain a set for the examination of the FBI
 Laboratory to determine if they are entirely suitable for
 this purpose.

JHW:MMA

65-298

cc: 62-227

Referral/Consult

RECORDED - 78

EX-72

JUL 23 1951

PAN

100N EWP/HEC

2
SAC, Anchorage

July 10, 1951

Director, FBI

0
STAGE

Referral/Consult

You are authorized to furnish copies of
reports to [redacted] re the following:
[redacted]

b6
b7c

✓ 65-59264

cc - 62-94199

HCC:bjw

6/30/94 SP12BTS/8
34225/

62-94199-1

RECORDED - 124

EX - 100

65-59264-

EX-100 24 for

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

DO NOT WRITE
IN THESE SPACES
JUL 12 1951

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Anchorage

SUBJECT: OSTAGE
E & E PROGRAM
(65-59264)

Referral/Consult

DATE: July 19, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BTJ/SC

ON 6/30/94

34225

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Suber
72

ah
an

With reference to interviews of both SBAs and E & E Agents in Anchorage at the time that Agent is proceeding to Washington, D. C., for his training, [redacted] that the interviews with all Agents would be handled by an FBI Agent [redacted] This appears to be the best way to handle such interviews inasmuch as [redacted]

[redacted] The FBI Agent at this time has to obtain the trainee's cover story and take him to Fort Richardson, Alaska, for his physical examination. These interviews are

Referral/Consult

JHW:MMA
65-298
cc: 62-227

COPIES DESTROYED

R 584 NOV 21 1960

RECORDED - 78

INDEXED - 78

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

JUL 24 1951

15

65-59264-201
SM
CH

Letter to the Director, FBI
July 19, 1951
P & C

STAGE
E & E PROGRAM

Referral/Consult

presently being held in the Anchorage Office and it is believed that this is a more secure place [redacted]

[redacted] it is believed that this procedure is helpful also in pegging down the type of information which [redacted] FBI desire from the trainee.

Referral/Consult

With reference to ~~name~~ checks of potential E & E Agents, it was [redacted] the Anchorage Office would receive the potential Agent's name, his date and place of birth, his description, the names of his parents and any other identifying information available prior to the time of a complete investigation of such Agent and prior to the time he is interviewed. Such name will be checked through the files here and would be passed on to the Bureau via radio with the request that the results of the name check of the Bureau's indices be returned to the Anchorage Office by radio. The results of the name check through both of these indices would [redacted]

Referral/Consult

With reference to the retraining of both E & E and SBAs after they return from Washington, D. C., [redacted]

[redacted] This office will handle that training which is the responsibility of the FBI. However, as has been requested of the Bureau heretofore, it is believed that the material covering the retraining which is our responsibility should be forwarded to this office in order that there will be no delay on this phase of the work. It is requested that [redacted]

Upon the receipt of this material an interview will be had with [redacted] and a retraining program set up. An outline of the same will be forwarded to the Bureau for its information, criticism and guidance.

The matter of integrating the training of E & E Agents with SBAs was discussed with [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Letter to the Director, FBI
July 19, 1951
P & C

STAGE
E & E PROGRAM

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Unless advised to the contrary, this office will assume no financial obligations concerning the E & E Agents during their training period. However, as has been agreed before, we will continue to assume the payment of salary for SBAs during their period of training.

Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbor _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE (7-19-51) NR 192300 10:15 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT (u)

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 73 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 64 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED. 2 TRAINEES PROCEEDING WASHINGTON THIS WEEK FOR TRAINING, 1 TO COMMENCE (JULY 23) AND THE OTHER (JULY 24). 11 TRAINEES HAVE ALREADY REPORTED FOR TRAINING, ONE OF WHICH WAS E AND E. 6 SBAS HAVE RETURNED TO DATE.

Referral/Consult

RADIOGRAMS ON THESE AND OUR SCHEDULED DATES IN AUGUST FURNISHED BUREAU TODAY.

RECEIVED (7-19-51) 10:21 PM HL

RECORDED - 70

SP3-BTS/jm
 4-20-2000

00-1164

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 25, 1951

FROM : C. E. HENNELICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM,
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/30/94 BY SP12/BJS/KSQ

PURPOSE:

To urgently recommend that government employment not be a bar, in itself, to development of individuals as Stay-Behind Agents.

DETAILS:

Twelve persons presently on Federal and Territorial payrolls have been recruited and approved as potential STAGE agents. It is contemplated one of these will not be further considered, for the time being at least, because of his advanced age. Ten of the others have been tentatively scheduled for training at SOG and one is definitely scheduled to begin training on July 9 next. An additional individual, who was employed as a teacher for the Territorial government at the time of recruitment, was heretofore eliminated from further consideration after he became District Manager for Office of Price Stabilization in Anchorage.

Of the eleven persons in question, two are employed by Civil Aeronautics Administration, five by Alaska Road Commission, one by Alaska Game Commission, one by U. S. Geological Survey, one by Territorial Department of Conservation, one by Department of Justice as a jail guard. Only one of these persons has been in Alaska for less than ten years, several have resided there during their full life times. These men, without exception, have the very basic qualifications which would make them extremely valuable to these programs. Three are experienced radio operators, two others have operating knowledge of radio. Several have had much experience with boats, dog teams and firearms. Four are airplane pilots, one owns two planes of his own. Some have had experience as engineers and mechanics, one is an experienced [redacted] map reader, one a [redacted]. All have extensive knowledge of Alaska or specific parts thereof.

b6
b7c

The educational levels and capacities of these men to absorb training will undoubtedly be above the levels of potential STAGE agents as a whole. Two have expressed desires to take parachute training in addition to the regular courses.

MC:mh
65-59264

RECORDED - 781

JUL 19 1951

AUG 1 1951

X-31

8

Although some persons, of course, remain in the employ of government agencies for extended periods, employment in Alaska is, as a whole, quite transitory. Many persons change jobs frequently because of seasonal limitations in certain types of work, desire for adventure and better opportunities and for innumerable other reasons. The Federal and Territorial governments are by far the largest employers in Alaska. A large sector of the able-bodied, white, male population is at one time or another employed by government agencies for varying periods of time. This is true to a greater degree than elsewhere in the United States and possessions. Any persons considered for these programs may of course become Federal or Territorial employees tomorrow, and it is highly probable that some of those now so employed will leave government employment for one reason or another. Referral/Consult

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The two programs are necessarily closely integrated. There can be no doubt, based on our limited experience to date, that we will find persons who have been recruited as Stay-Behind Agents will have difficulty in learning codes and ciphers, radio and perhaps other technical subjects, but will still be of value in the Escape and Evasion program. On the other hand, it is highly probable persons recruited as E. and E. agents will be found to be better qualified as SBA's.

The number of persons who have qualifications believed desirable for these programs, who are physically and mentally able and who will definitely remain in the Territory in the event of invasion and occupation is, of course, limited, in view of the small population in the Territory. To rule out persons otherwise qualified merely because of government employment will bar the use of several of the best qualified persons. It is to be noted that none of the eleven persons mentioned above are employed by defense agencies. In the event of invasion, their agencies would be forced to cease operations altogether. The recruiting and training of individuals for these programs will not affect their continued regular employment until actual operations begin and, as previously indicated, the government employees in question have definitely indicated they will remain in Alaska, come what may.

IMMEDIATE PROBLEM:

As stated, one person has been heretofore eliminated because of his government employment and Anchorage has been so advised. Another individual, one of the eleven mentioned above, can be scheduled in the near future for training at SOG and will, in the event he can obtain


b6
b7C

time off from his employment, take parachute training as well. He is employed as [redacted] has had experience in radio building and maintenance, is an airplane pilot and owns two planes himself, is [redacted] is an experienced woodman and has become well acquainted with specific areas in Alaska during the past ten years. Several cabins are available to him in the back country. He is studying the Russian language. He is [redacted] years of age and physically robust. It appears that this individual can obtain necessary time away on annual leave for the two weeks training but must take leave without pay or arrange otherwise, on his own if he is to take the parachute training. It is desirable that we instruct the Anchorage Office as soon as possible with regard to this man in order that he may be scheduled if to be further considered.

As stated, one individual, a government employee, has been previously scheduled to begin training on July 9 next.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is urgently recommended that the fact of government employment, alone, not bar recruitment and training of Stay-Behind Agents and that authority be given to Anchorage to continue the scheduling of these individuals for training. If this procedure is approved, appropriate communications will be issued in the individual cases involved.

*I agree, providing they can
keep this recruitment confidential*


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

0-9a

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to:

(JULY 21, 1951) (u)

(14) SAC, ANCHORAGE

URGENT

STAGE. REURRAD (JULY NINETEEN.) TEMPORARY INCREASE TWO
THOUSAND DOLLARS WILL BE MAILED AMSD EARLY MORNING (JULY
TWENTYTHREE.) (u)

HOOVER

RG:del

6/30/54
SP3-BTS/SM
342251

(u)
(u)
(u)
JUL 21 1 55 PM '51
RECEIVED READING ROOM
FBI

SP3-BTS/SM

00-1164

(u)
(u)
JUL 21 2 18 PM '51
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
DIRECTOR

SENT VIA Radio (7/21/51) 3:36 P. M.

Per

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

DECODED COPY

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

7-19-51

NR 191800

5:46 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

(u) STAGE. REURRAD (JULY 17) AND ANCHORAGE RAD (JULY 16, 1951) EXPENSE VOUCHER SUBMITTED (JULY 2) BY THIS OFFICE AND RETURNED WAS CORRECTED AND RESUBMITTED (JULY 17). A SECOND VOUCHER ALSO SUBMITTED ON (JULY 17). [REDACTED] ASSIGNED THIS OFFICE. [REDACTED] (u)

TWO PERSONS DUE FROM TRAINING SCHOOL WEEKEND OF (JULY 21) TO BE PAID. APPROXIMATELY FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS A PIECE DUE THEM. [REDACTED] (u)

NOW IN PARACHUTE TRAINING SCHOOL, DUE BACK APPROXIMATELY (JULY 26). PAYMENTS TO HIM WILL BE IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS. (u)

THIS OFFICE WILL HAVE INSUFFICIENT FUNDS TO COVER THESE OBLIGATIONS UNLESS EXPENSE VOUCHER CLEARED AND PAID WITHIN A FEW DAYS OR THE ADDITIONAL TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS REQUESTED BY ANCHORAGE RAD (JULY 16) GRANTED.

RECEIVED:

7-19-51

5:53 PM

MRC

SP3-BTS/SM

4-20-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 78

EX - 31

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems. (u)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AB*
 FROM : Mr. C. E. Hennrich *CH*
 SUBJECT: STAGE

DATE: July 2, 1951

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

PURPOSE:

To advise that it will be necessary for Bureau personnel to handle training schedules on Wednesday, July 4.

DETAILS:Referral/Consult *my file*

Stay-behind Agents are scheduled for training on July 4, it having been agreed with such is necessary to complete training of individuals involved on schedule. The services of the following personnel will be required during the hours indicated:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
204 H. A. Meyers (or alternate)	Training & Inspection	8 a.m.-11 a.m.
705 I. W. Newpher (or alternate)	Laboratory	8 a.m.-12 noon
704 J. W. Magee (or alternate)	Laboratory	11 a.m.-3 p.m.
601 M. C. Clements	Security	9 a.m.-5:30 p.m.

RECOMMENDATION:

That personnel named above be authorized to work as indicated on July 4, next, a holiday.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 9/30/94 BY SP/2B TS/SO

165-59264
 JUL 25 1951

65-59264

MCC:bjc 236

65 OCT 10 1951

3-178
7110

SAC, Anchorage

July 19, 1951

Director, FBI

STAGE

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Rebulet June 29, 1951, by which increases in per diem and allowances for hotel expense of trainees were authorized.

Adjustments should be made as to those trainees who have been previously paid on the basis of the former schedule. Such adjustments can be made at the times of next required contacts with individuals involved.

65-59264

MC:bjw

34225
6/30/51 SP-2 BT8 150

RECEIVED
JUL 20 1951
FBI
ANCHORAGE

65-59264-1205
RECORDED - 78
EX - 31

FBI
RECEIVED
JUL 20 1951
ANCHORAGE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

Mr. Belmont
Mr. Keay
Mr. Sanders

SAC, Anchorage

July 23, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STAGE

It is positively essential that each SBA who receives training at SOG be equipped at the earliest possible time to begin operations in the event of national emergency.

You should direct your immediate efforts toward the end that the SBA can, immediately on his return to Alaska and while available in Anchorage, be given specific instructions as to the action he should take in the event of emergency involving imminent or actual attack, invasion and occupation. The SBA should be given specific instructions as to the exact missions he would be expected to handle on both immediate and long range bases. He must be promptly and fully equipped, through caches and otherwise, whereby he can, in accordance with his instructions, proceed to a specified location and be expected to function efficiently and with security. While it is recognized that plans for an individual may be changed as time passes and the network is perfected, he must be placed in a position whereby he could operate and be of value immediately.

Referral/Consult

It is recognized that the responsibility for equipping the SBA to function promptly is [redacted]. You must, therefore, [redacted] as to each phase to insure that the individual responsibilities are coordinated and each phase can move forward without delay due to a delinquency in the handling of some other phase. The Bureau will, at the same time, [redacted].

The action the SBA will take in the event of an emergency will necessarily depend on his location, the nature and extent of the emergency, equipment and facilities

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/14/00 BY SP12/BJ/SC

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Aiken
Belmont
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

50 AUG 1

COMM-FBI
JUL 24 1951
MAILED 19

RECORDED 65-59264-206
JUL 26 1951
80

Handwritten signatures and initials, including "MCC", "JUL 26 1951", and "80".

available to him and the particular missions he will be expected to handle. His individual qualifications must be considered. Alternate instructions may be necessary, and if so, should be distinctly understood by the SBA. Each SBA should be considered in the light of the over-all plan and made to fill the need for coverage in a particular area. All specific instructions should be recorded in order that they will be available to the principal. Any subsequent changes in plans and instructions to him must likewise be recorded.

The SBA should immediately on his return to Alaska and upon determination of his particular place in the network be questioned concerning, and participate in, the establishment of his caches. Once plans for a location of a cache are fixed it should be established without delay. Factors as to location of caches and hideouts must necessarily include security, availability, equipment needed on a long range basis, considerations of radio transmission and reception. The procuring of equipment for caches must positively go forward without further delay.

You should be in a position, on the return of each trainee, to arrange specifically whereby he can receive additional training and practice. Some individuals are or will be, on completion of training at SOG, sufficiently equipped to transmit and receive radio communications. Nonetheless, you should insure that they are thoroughly versed in the exact procedures desired. They must be furnished call letters, frequencies and schedules. Some individuals will be further advanced in the use of codes and ciphers than others. The individual needs of each for further training must be considered. You should, if such has not already been done, give immediate consideration to acquiring a post office box in Anchorage to be used as a drop for practice in codes and ciphers and in secret writing, as well as for other correspondence with trainees which may be securely handled in this fashion. Arrangements should be made with each trainee whereby the messages could be sent by mail in a secure manner. You will undoubtedly discover

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alben _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

additional devices for simplifying and expediting retraining. It should be realized that 10 well-equipped SRAs would be of more value than 50 only half trained. The service of Special Agents who receive intensive training at SAC in this program must be utilized to the fullest extent, giving consideration to saving in time and travel.

I desire to reiterate that you must concentrate at this time on seeing that each individual will be equipped at the earliest possible time whereby he can function. It is desired that you confer on each point promptly and advise the Bureau of the results of this conference immediately following same.

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 23, 1951

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNEIGH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE
IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT OF INVASION
(Stay-Behind Agent Program,
Escape and Evasion Program)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/30/94 BY SP12 BJS/STP
3/22/51Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

I talked with Special Agent Robert McKee of the Anchorage Division on July 20. He had completed the Bureau's training program. I went over with him the various phases of the program in order that there would be no misunderstanding on his part as to any of these phases.

Referral/Consult

I particularly pointed out to Mr. McKee the absolute importance of seeing to it that each of the Stay-Behind Agents, as he completes his training and returns to Alaska, is immediately contacted by the Anchorage Office and that definite and final plans are worked out for making him operational at once. It was emphasized that in order to do this these individual Agents will have to be given intelligence objectives, communication plans will have to be worked out, material to be included in a cache will have to be determined, and, [redacted] it will be necessary for the Anchorage Office to place a cache where it will be available to the individual Stay-Behind Agent. It was emphasized that the Bureau must insure that the program is operational, even though [redacted] that, if necessary, we must [redacted]

[redacted] One phase of this program which must be handled immediately, of course, is the determination of the items to be placed in caches, the actual determination of the spot where the cache will be located, and the physical placement of the material in the cache so it will be immediately available to the Stay-Behind Agent.

It was also emphasized that as soon as the above has been accomplished, trial runs will, of necessity, have to be made in order to "test" the Stay-Behind Agents' ability to function; that after this has been done, continual contact, interviews, and conversations, together with additional test runs, will have to be made in order to keep the Stay-Behind Agent operational so he can function efficiently in the event of invasion.

RECORDED - 85 65-59264-207
JUL 26 1951

EX. - 100

GEH:LL

50 AUG 1 1951

Henneigh

It was pointed out that because of the type of terrain in Alaska, the intelligence objectives which the Air Force may change from time to time, and changes in the personnel status of the individual Stay-Behind Agents, it must of necessity be a primary function of the Anchorage Division to stay on top of individual assignments and insure that each Stay-Behind Agent can function and that collectively the assignments of the individual Agents will attain the over-all coverage necessary for the program. I emphasized that imagination and ingenuity must be used by the Special Agents supervising the program and that sufficient initiative must be exercised in order to insure that thinking originates in the field which will plug up any loopholes which exist in the program and elaborate upon the basic training and planning which have been done at the SOG.

Action:

For your information.

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

JULY 13, 1951

SAC, ANCHORAGE

(u) RADIOGRAM
URGENT
CIPHER PAD CODE

(u)

(u)

STAGE. REURAD (JULY TWELVE) CAPTIONED [REDACTED]

E. AND E. AND REURAD (JULY SEVEN) RE [REDACTED]

E. AND E.

[REDACTED] BUREAU
HAS PASSED INFORMATION RE TWO PERSONS MENTIONED [REDACTED] NO TRAINING
DATE RE [REDACTED] HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY BUREAU.

HOOVER

65-59264

MCC:VJM

~~6/30/54~~
~~SP3-BTJ/SM~~
~~342251~~

(NR 132225)

(u)

SP3-BTJ/SM
4-20-2000

RECORDED-87
EX-106

-208

(u)

(u)

(u)

Sent via Radio (7/13/51) 1:44 P.M. [REDACTED]

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

Transmit the following message to: JULY 17, 1951

URGENT

MAC, ANCHORAGE

STAGE, REURRADIOGRAM JULY SIXTEENTH. CHECK IN THE AMOUNT
OF [REDACTED] FORWARDED JUNE EIGHTH

LAST. EXPENSE VOUCHER SUBMITTED JULY SECOND BY YOUR OFFICE
RETURNED AS IMPROPERLY EXECUTED. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO
EXPEDITE THE SUBMISSION OF EXPENSE VOUCHERS CONCERNING
THIS MATTER.

HOOVER

PCT:mle

Classified by SP3 BTJ/SM
Declassify on: OADR 8/22/51

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BTJ/SM
ON 4-20-2000

00-1164

RECEIVED READING ROOM
JUL 17 2 58 PM '51
F B I
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

RECORDED

EX: 105

JUL 24 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

JUL 30 1951

Burran Radio (7-17-51)

Per

MR. R. T. HARBO

July 12, 1951

C. F. DOWNING

STAGE

DR. FOSTER R. SIMS

Referral/Consult

Approximately 14 hours of cipher training were afforded
Dr. SIMS, a STAGE trainee, and [redacted]
[redacted] July 2, 5, 11, 1951 by L. W. BEAUFIELD
of the Cryptanalysis Unit. This completes the scheduled Washington
cipher training for these men.

Attached is a summary of this cipher training and our
observations, also an envelope containing two copies of [redacted]
[redacted] A copy of the
attached summarized training and the two [redacted] should be forwarded
to the Anchorage office.

b2
b7E

1-ENCL.

ITW:JO

62-93603

65-59264

cc-Security Division (Clements)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-90 BY SP12678/CO

65-59264-210

NOT RECORDED

131 JUL 20 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-1-9264

b2
b7E

[redacted] as described in
July 2, 1951 comprehensive memorandum on STAGE cipher training, given
to Mr. STUE.

b2
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-94 BY SP2 BTG/80

ENCLOSURE

65. 54264-210

OBSERVATIONS:

Dr. SIMS was a good cipher trainee. He successfully enciphered and deciphered messages in the three systems explained to him. He should periodically practice these cipher systems, preferably under supervision.

[redacted] participated satisfactorily in these cipher training sessions.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Dr. SIMS periodically practice these ciphers under supervision after he returns to Alaska.

Referral/Consult

Amo

MR. R. T. HARBO

July 5, 1951

C. F. ROHMING

STAGE

b6
b7C

Approximately 14 hours of cipher training were afforded
[redacted] a STAGE trainee, and [redacted]
[redacted] by I. F. NEWCOMB and P. A. NAPIER of the crypt-
analysis unit, June 18, 21, and 27, 1951. This completes the scheduled
Washington cipher training for [redacted] and TERRY.

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

Attached is a summary of the cipher training given these men
and our observations. There is also attached an envelope containing two
copies of the [redacted]

b2
b7E

[redacted] a copy of the attached summarized training
and the two [redacted] should be forwarded to the Anchorage Office.

1-ENCLOSURE

IRF:JR

62-93501

cc- 65-59261

cc- Security Division (Clements)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-94 BY SP1218 TJS/RC

65-57264-211
NOT RECORDED
131 JUL 28 1951

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 65-57264-211

256
56 AUG 1 1951

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] as set forth in the July 2, 1951 memorandum on STAGE cipher training, given to [redacted]

b2
b7E

OBSERVATIONS:

[redacted] was a fair student in this cipher training considering his age and background. He is very slow in enciphering and deciphering messages and cannot be expected to be proficient in deciphering garbled messages. He needs continued practice under supervision.

[redacted] participated satisfactorily in the cipher training.

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That all messages sent to [redacted] be kept in simple language, and using "X" word separators.
2. That periodic supervised training be afforded [redacted] in Alaska.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-18-94 BY SP12BTS/PC

ENCLOSURE

34225/
65-59264-211

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(14)
(2)
JULY 23, 1951

RADIOGRAM

URGENT

(CIPHER PAD CODE)

SAC, ANCHORAGE

PERSONAL AND

CONFIDENTIAL

STAGE. REURLET (JULY TEN) RE ASSIGNMENT SPECIAL AGENT []

[] TO STAGE PROGRAM. SINCE [] WAS ONLY RECENTLY REMOVED

FROM LIMITED DUTY STATUS AND SINCE RETRAINING AND OTHER PHASES

WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE TRAVEL UNDER ARDUOUS CONDITIONS, YOU

ARE INSTRUCTED TO ASSIGN ANOTHER SPECIAL AGENT INSTEAD OF []

SURAD IDENTITY IN ORDER CONSIDERATION CAN BE GIVEN TO BRINGING

AGENT TO WASHINGTON TO RECEIVE INTENSIVE TRAINING BEGINNING

(JULY THIRTY) NEXT.

HOOVER

65-59264

MCC:BJW

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3-BJS/PM

ON 4-20-2000

00-1164

(NR 241850) (14)

(14)
Enc-275
1900-1936
C-27-1955

6/30/84

Classified by SP3-BJS/PM
Declassify on: 3/22/51

RECEIVED READING ROOM
F B I
JUL 24 2 11 PM '51

RECORDED - 3

EX-62
JUL 27 1951

EX-62
JUL 27 1951

EX-62
JUL 27 1951

PERS. FILES

Sent Via Bureau Radio (7/24/51) 4:22 PM - cjs

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alven _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

SAC, Anchorage

July 18, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STAGE

Each SBA who receives training at SOG and receives compensation in this regard or otherwise in connection with the program must be specifically advised that such compensation is taxable under the Federal income tax laws. You should examine the situation as regards Territorial income tax and give appropriate instructions to SBA's in that regard.


In the above connection refer to Section 9 A (n), Manual of Rules and Regulations. You will note that if an individual must file a Federal return to report income from another regular source, income from the Bureau can be shown under Schedule D of page 2 of the return as income received from other sources "for personal services rendered." It appears probable that all SBA's will fall in this category. However, you should determine the facts in each instance and instruct all SBA's appropriately to insure that full security is afforded in this regard. If a return is necessary merely to report income from the Bureau, it is obvious that a source must be shown. You should give appropriate consideration in each instance to insure full security in accordance with instructions appearing in the manual section cited above.

You should examine forms for Territorial income tax returns to determine whether a source of income must be shown. If so, you should instruct SBA's as to a secure procedure to be followed in showing such source. It appears that the name of a Special Agent and his home address, without identification as to his official capacity, may be used as the source in the same manner as specified with respect to Federal returns.

If it appears a number of persons must show a source for income received from the Bureau, the security hazards are of course increased, particularly if returns must in such cases, be filed at the same point or with the same collector. You must take appropriate steps, in such event, to offset the additional dangers to security.

Trainees who have already returned to Alaska should be promptly instructed if they have not already been advised as to tax responsibility. You should set up procedures in handling these persons to insure this matter will not be overlooked.

65-59264



33:jer

AUG 2 1951

34225-15643
6/30/54 SP12878150

213

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : *W* SAC, ANCHORAGE

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR SBA'S IN THE
EVENT OF INVASION
 (E & E PROGRAM)
 (BuFile 65-59264)

DATE: July 12, 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Alden
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Laughlin
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Rebulet June 29, 1951, in the matter entitled
 "STAGE."

Referral/Consult

With reference to the Bureau's comments in the fourth paragraph of referenced letter which has to do with name checks of potential E and E Agents submitted by [redacted] this matter was discussed with [redacted] on July 11, 1951. He was requested that the full name, the date and place of birth, the description, and anyother possible identifying information of a particular agent be furnished to this office prior to the time the potential E & E Agent had been contacted and interviewed. He was requested to submit this data by the most expeditious means. It was pointed out to him that if he waited until the man had been investigated and interviewed and his report submitted it may be found that the Anchorage files or the Bureau files will contain information indicating that the man is a member of the Communist Party, has indulged in activities which appear to be inimical to the best interests of the United States or has proclivities which appear to be a security risk. It was pointed out to him that the data he furnished us concerning each individual potential Agent would be searched through our files here and passed on to the Bureau by radio with the request that any information found be returned by radio and the same would be passed back to him without any delay whatsoever.

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

After the results of the file check have been furnished to [redacted] if nothing derogatory is found, the potential Agent will be interviewed. [redacted]

A file will be opened here in the administrative classification (66) on the reports furnished to us.

It is believed that the above procedure will take care of this particular matter.

JH:HC
 65-298

HANDLED BY
 [redacted]

RECORDED - 113

JUL 17 1951

15 26

65-59264
 1572-214
 True

EXPEDITIOUS PROCESSING

JUL 17 1951

Handers

Seehs
 65-59264
 JUL 17 1951
 DECL. ON

, 1951

TO:

Director

Mr. Tolson

Mr. Clegg

Mr. Glavin

Mr. Harbo

Mr. Nichols

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Tracy

Mr. Q. Tamm

Mr. Mohr

Miss Gandy

Mr. Nease

Mr. Pennington

Mr. Winterrowd

Mr. J. A. Sizoo

Mr. Alden

Mr. Price

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Laughlin

Mr. Hennrich

Mr. Tolson

Mr. Clegg

Mr. Glavin

Mr. Nichols

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Tracy

Mr. Harbo

Mr. Alden

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Laughlin

Mr. Mohr

Tele. Room

Mr. Nease

Miss Gandy

Mr. Baumgardner

Mr. Keay

Mr. Stanley

Mr. Ferris

Foreign Service Desk

Mr. Callan

See Me

Call Me

Appropriate action

Note & return

Send file

Bring up-to-date

Correct

Re-date

Please initial & return

Place on record & return

Place on record

Per conversation

Advise status

Deferred Recording

Chief Clerk's Off.

Records Section

Personnel Files

Mechanical Sec.

Ident. Division

Technical Lab.

Reading Room

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 8/30/90 BY SP128

D. M. Ladd - Rm. 5736

Telephone Ext. 555

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 19, 1951

FROM : MR. LADD

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE IN ALASKA IN THE EVENT
OF INVASION
(STAY-BEHIND AGENT PROGRAM;
ESCAPE AND EVASION PROGRAM)

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/30/96 BY SP12BTS/JS
342251

PURPOSE:

To advise that SAC Williams, Anchorage, has stated that he has, in accordance with the specific instructions of the Director, thoroughly reviewed each phase of the Stay-Behind Agent Program and Escape and Evasion Program, and that the responsibilities of the Bureau are being completely fulfilled by his office.

BACKGROUND:

On May 28, 1951, SAC Williams was asked by you in personal conference whether all phases of the Bureau's responsibilities were being completely handled. SAC Williams stated he "believed" all such responsibilities were being handled. You instructed that "believing" was not sufficient, that he must be positively certain. You instructed that each phase of the Bureau's responsibilities be discussed in detail with SAC Williams during the period of his In-Service Training.

All phases of the programs and the responsibilities of the Bureau in connection therewith were discussed with Mr. Williams by representatives of the Espionage Section and oral discussions were confirmed by letter to SAC, Anchorage. Mr. Williams was instructed that he should on his return to Alaska personally examine each phase in detail and advise the Bureau of his conclusions as to the adequacy of the manner in which the Bureau's responsibilities are being fulfilled.

MCC:de

RECORDED - 55

HANDLED BY
STOR. DESK
7/31/51

165-59264-215

JUL 30 1951
18

COPIES DESTROYED

584 NOV 21 1960
65-59264-249
EC AUG 14 1951

EX-141

EX-141

W
L
2-M

ADEQUACY

SAC Williams has submitted a memorandum setting forth the results of his examination and has stated that all phases of the programs have been thoroughly reviewed by him, and were likewise discussed with Inspector Keay during the latter's recent inspection of the programs in Alaska.

Mr. Williams stated that the responsibilities of the Bureau in both programs are fixed and are being completely fulfilled by his office. He stated he is fully cognizant of the Bureau's commitments, obligations and responsibilities and that you may be assured every effort will be made by him and by personnel of his office to insure continued and complete fulfillment.

ACTION BEING TAKEN

The report of Inspector Keay is presently in preparation and will reflect the Inspector's observations and recommendations in connection with various phases of the programs. Appropriate and immediate action will be taken to insure complete fulfillment of the Bureau's responsibilities in the planning and execution.

Memo to Belmont
July 24, 1951

WPK

Expedite this as we must promptly determine if we have met our responsibilities properly in Alaska & if Williams is now to be back there.

SAC, Anchorage

Director, FBI

July 27, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

STAGE

SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT MC KEE

Special Agent Robert Mc Kee of your office was afforded intensive training at SOG during the period July 9 - 20, 1951, inclusive, in connection with the Stay-Behind and Escape and Evasion Agent Program, your file 65-298.

The training was designed to instruct Special Agent Mc Kee whereby he can function effectively in the retraining of Stage personnel in Alaska in those subjects for which the Bureau has responsibility. In addition, Special Agent Mc Kee

[Redacted]

Referral/Consult

Special Agent Mc Kee received intensive individual instruction as to all security aspects of the program and attended two lectures afforded to Stage personnel in each of the following subjects: "Deception and Security," "Selection and Training of Sub-agents and Informants," and "Soviet Methods of Counter-Intelligence." He was attentive throughout, participated intelligently in discussions, and appeared to fully understand the significance of all discussions. He should be required to review the file of your office intensively and keep abreast of all instructions and policies relative to the program.

Special Agent Mc Kee received approximately 45 hours of instruction in the Cryptanalysis Unit. In addition to individual instruction, Special Agent Mc Kee followed through the complete training of two Stage trainees and thereafter participated in the training of two additional persons. After completion of the training, Special Agent Mc Kee appeared to be thoroughly familiar with the three cipher systems being used. It will be necessary that he maintain his proficiency by periodic study and review.

EX - 63 RECORDED - 25 JUL 31 1951

Special Agent Mc Kee received intensive instruction in the preparation of messages in the two secret writing methods being used in this program. He followed through the complete training afforded to two Stage trainees and gave evidence that he can satisfactorily prepare messages. In addition, he was instructed in the length as to procedures to be followed and equipment for development of secret writing using the

65-59264

COMM. FBI
JUL 28 1951
MAILED 24

cc - Personnel Files

65 OCT 10 1951

b2
b7E

RECEIVED - NY 1000

SAC, Anchorage

July 26, 1951

Director, FBI

STAGE

For your information [redacted]
scheduled for training at SOG beginning July 24, 1951,
was delayed en route at Minneapolis, as a result of
which he arrived in Washington, D. C. at about 11 a.m.,
July 23, 1951, instead of at 12:40 a.m., the time at
which he would have ordinarily arrived. [redacted]
called the Washington Field Office upon his arrival,
and [redacted]

b6
b7C

Referral/Consult

65-59204

MCC:amk *amb*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/30/94 BY SP12 BTG/JS

RECORDED - 25
JUL 31 1951
65-59204-217
FBI EX-63
RECEIVED-MAIL ROOM

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

COMM - FBI
JUL 27 1951
MAILED 120
AUG 1 1951

156-14658-12
JUL 27 1951
I & J
WOL
me

Special Agent Mc Kee received approximately six hours of instruction in "Defensive Tactics" the instruction being limited to those techniques in which Stage personnel are being instructed. Special Agent Mc Kee was attentive and grasped the material in a satisfactory manner. He was found to possess reasonably good physical qualities but will need considerable practice to develop the desired proficiency necessary to afford retraining to Stage personnel.

At the conclusion of his training, Special Agent Mc Kee was interviewed at length by an Inspector in the Security Division as to all phases of the program. Security factors were stressed and the necessity for thorough and speedy action to prepare Stage personnel through training and equipment whereby they can function effectively at the earliest possible time was stressed. Special Agent Mc Kee was instructed that he should exercise imagination and ingenuity, under your supervision to insure that all phases of the program will progress rapidly and entirely satisfactorily.

It is concluded that Special Agent Mc Kee can, as a result of the intensive training afforded to him and by serious and intelligent application function efficiently in the retraining program. You should take such steps as are necessary to insure that Special Agent Mc Kee's services are utilized to the fullest extent and that he is at all times conversant with the existing instructions and policies.

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

(DECODED COPY) (u)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(7-26-51) (u)

10:11 P.M. NR 262350

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

STAGE, STATUS REPORT. 73 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING REPORTS SUBMITTED. 65 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS FURNISHED BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED. TWO TRAINEES PROCEEDING WASHINGTON THIS WEEK FOR TRAINING. ONE TO COMMENCE (JULY 30) AND THE OTHER (JULY 31) 13 TRAINEES (u) HAVE ALREADY REPORTED FOR TRAINING INCLUDING ONE E. AND (u) 8 SBAS HAVE RETURNED TO DATE. (AUGUST 6 AND AUGUST 20) SCHEDULES WILL BE COMPLETED SHORTLY AND IDENTITIES FURNISHED TO BUREAU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. (u)

RECEIVED

(7-26-51) (u)

10:19 P.M.

LL

CORRECTED

(7-27-51)

9:02 A.M.

RECORDED - 53

EX. - 63

SP3-BTS/SM
4-20-2000

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

SAC, Anchorage

August 1, 1951

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STAGE

Referral/Consult

You are authorized to disseminate copies of reports
re:

b6
b7C

65-59264

cc - 62-93491

6/30/99
342251

MCC:VJM

RECORDED - 18

AUG 6 1951

EX - 52

AUG 29 57 AM '51


U S DEPT OF JUSTICE

FBI

RECEIVED

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-59264-219

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____



~~SECRET~~

(u) RADIOGRAM

JULY 20, 1951

URGENT
CIPHER PAD CODE

SAC, ANCHORAGE

(u)

STAGE. SURAD IDENTITY SBA OR E. AND E. SCHEDULED TO BEGIN TRAINING
JULY THIRTY FIRST NEXT. (u)

65-59264

MCC:JEF

#202145

ENC. 111E-
2204-2212
(u)

DECLASSIFIED BY: SP3-BTJ/SM
ON: 4-20-2000
00-1164

RECEIVED READING ROOM
JUL 20 4 47 PM '51
FBI

6/30/94
Classified by SP12818
Declassify on: OADR 5/22/51

RECORDED - 71
EX-155W
65-59264-224
AUG 3 1951 (u)

62 AUG 13 1951 (u) (u)

Sent via Radio (7/20/51) 6:58 P.M. PW L2

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MR. R.T. HARBO

July 27, 1951

C.P. DOWNING

STAGE

b6
b7C

7B
Approximately 14 hours of cipher training were afforded [redacted]
a STAGE trainee, and [redacted]
[redacted] July 17, 20 and 25, 1951 by I.W. NEWPIER and P.A. HAPIER of the
Cryptanalysis Unit. This completes the scheduled Washington training for
these men.

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

Attached is a summary of this cipher training and our observations
also an envelope containing two copies of [redacted]
[redacted] A copy of the attached
training summary and the two [redacted] should be forwarded to the Anchorage Of-
fice.

b2
b7E

Attachment -
62-94008

✓cc- 65-59264

cc- Security Division (M.C. Clementis)

PAN:EDJ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-90 BY 34225/1
62-94008-180

Br
ENC.

165-54244R ✓
NOT RECORDED
71 AUG 23 1951

ORIGINAL FILE IN 62-94008-1

[redacted]
[redacted]

as
described in the July 2, 1951, comprehensive memorandum on STATE
cipher training, given to [redacted]

[redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

b2
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-94 BY SP8 BTG/ML
342257 ENCLOSURE

OBSERVATIONS:

[] experienced some difficulty in learning the above cipher systems and consequently it will be necessary for him to continue practicing the use of these systems if he is to be expected to become proficient therein.

[] participated satisfactorily in the training.

RECOMMENDATION:

That [] periodically practice these three cipher systems under supervision after he returns to Alaska.

b6
b7C

Referral/Consult

b6
b7C

MR. R. T. HARBO

July 27, 1951

C. F. DOWNING

STAGE

Approximately 1 1/2 hours of cipher training were afforded [redacted] a STAGE trainee, and [redacted] July 16, 19, and 25, 1951, by L.B. NEWFAM and P.A. MARIN of the Cryptanalytic Unit. This completes the scheduled Washington cipher training for these men.

Attached is a summary of this cipher training and our observations, as well as an envelope containing two copies of [redacted] [redacted] a copy of the attached training summary and the two [redacted] should be forwarded to the Anchorage Office.

Attachment -

62-93613

cc- 65-59264

cc- Security Division (M. C. Clements)

PAN:EDJ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-94 BY SP12878180

165-59264-✓
NOT RECORDED
71 AUG 24 1951

ORIGINAL FILE IN 62-93613-13

b6
b7C

b6
b7C
Referral/Consult

b2
b7E

Mr. Harbo

July 19, 1951

C.F. Downing

R
(STAGE)

FRANK BERTON MOORE

Approximately 14 hours of cipher training were afforded Mr. MOORE, a STAGE trainee, and [redacted] MOORE, July 10, 11, 18, 1951, by I.W. NEWPARK of the Cryptanalysis Unit. This completes the scheduled Washington cipher training for these men.

Attached is a summary of this cipher training and our observations, also an envelope containing two copies of [redacted]. A copy of the attached summarized training and the two [redacted] should be forwarded to the Anchorage Office.

Attachment -

62-93515

cc - 65-59264

cc - Security Division (Mr. Clements)

INW:EDJ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-94 BY SP12 BTJ/18

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

5924
ENCLOSURE

165-59264-✓
NOT RECORDED
56 AUG 27 1951

INITIALS: REGIONAL


51 AUG 30 1951


Referral/Consult

b2
b7E

ORIGINAL FILED IN 67-9545-12

b2
b7E

 as
described in the July 2, 1951 comprehensive memorandum on STAGE
cipher training, given to MOORE.



b2
b7E

251
815C

ENCLOSURE

OBSERVATION:

Mr. MOORE was a good cipher trainee. Although obviously not accustomed to pencil work he applied himself very earnestly and appeared to have a thorough knowledge of the three systems taught him. It will be necessary, however, for him to continue practicing the use of these systems if he is to retain the proficiency he exhibited at the close of his Washington training.

[redacted] participated satisfactorily in these training sessions.

Referral/Consult

RECOMMENDATION:

That MOORE periodically practice these three cipher systems under supervision after he returns to Alaska.

MR. HARBO

July 19, 1951

MR. DOWNING

b6
b7C

STAGE:

[REDACTED]

Approximately 14 hours of cipher training were afforded [REDACTED]
a STAGE trainee, and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] July 9, 12, 10, 1951, by P.A. NAPIER and I.W. NEWPHER of the Crypt-
analysis Unit. This completes the scheduled Washington cipher training
these men.

b6
b7C

Referral/Consult

Attached is a summary of this cipher training and our observations,
also an envelope containing two copies of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A copy of the attached summarized training and the
[REDACTED] should be forwarded to the Anchorage Office.

Attachment -

62-93672

✓cc - 65-59264

cc - Security Division (Mr. Clements)

IWN:EDJ

342251
7-B-94 SP12 BTJ/SC
b2
b7E

65-57264-4
NOT RECORDED
136 AUG 13 1951

2 ENCL

ORIGINALS ON ORIGINAL - 1

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

b2
b7E

[REDACTED]
given as described in July 2, 1951 comprehensive memorandum on
PAGE cipher training.

b2
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-94 BY SP128T8150

34225

ENCLOSURE
~~ENCLOSURE~~

65-51264

TRAINING:

b6
b7C

[redacted] was a fair cipher trainer. He enciphered and deciphered practice messages successfully in the three systems explained to him. This training should be considered as an introduction to the cipher systems with a need for additional practice in order to finally fix these procedures in the trainee's mind.

[redacted] participated satisfactorily in the cipher training sessions.

RECOMMENDATION:

Referral/Consult

That [redacted] periodically practice these ciphers under supervision after he returns to Alaska.

b6
b7C

Mr. R. T. HARBO

July 12, 1951

C. F. BOWLING

[REDACTED]

Approximately 14 hours of cipher training were afforded
a STAC trainee, also [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] by L. A. WAPNER and L. W. BENTLER
of the Cryptanalysis Unit, July 3, 6, and 11, 1951. This completes
the scheduled Washington cipher training for these men.

Attached is a summary of the cipher training given and
our observations, also an envelope containing two copies of the
[REDACTED]

A copy of the attached summarized training and the two [REDACTED] should
be forwarded to the Anchorage office.

RMH:55

62-93526

cc-65-59264

cc-Security Division (Clements)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-18-94 BY SP2 BTB/STP

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-93526-16

65-59264-✓

NOT RECORDED

136 AUG 13 1951

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

AUG 27 1951

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] as described in
July 2, 1951 comprehensive memorandum on STATE cipher training, given
to [redacted]

b2
b7E

OBSERVATIONS: [redacted] was a fair student in cipher training. He was extremely cooperative and applied himself diligently but was limited in his capacity to absorb the training. He was slow and unaccustomed to this type of learning. He enciphered and deciphered sample messages satisfactorily but has a limited capacity to work out garbled messages. He needs continued practice under supervision.

b6
b7C

[redacted] participated satisfactorily in the cipher training sessions.

RECOMMENDATION:

That additional practice and training be afforded [redacted] periodically, under supervision, after his return to Alaska.

b6

b7C

August 3, 1951

SAC, Anchorage

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

JB
O
Director, FBI

(STAGE)

Certain trainees have mentioned the hazard to security which would be occasioned by smoke from fires at or near hideouts. It has been further stated that heat vapors can be detected by planes in the air from a considerable distance.

It is suggested you discuss this matter [redacted] to determine to what extent, if any, the hazards mentioned have been considered and whether any experiments have been conducted in an effort to minimize the problem. It appears that consideration should be given to the problem in the procurement of fuel for caches.

Referral/Consult

65-59264

MCC:mhf

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-1 BTJ/SC
ON 8/30/94
042251

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alson _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

RECORDED - 78
EX-155

165-59264-222
AUG 7 1951
80

COMO-191
AUG 8 - 1951
MAILED 10

CN/az
Mcc

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

DECODED COPY (u)

FROM ANCHORAGE

(7-25-51)

NR 250635

3:57 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Alben	_____
Belmont	_____
Laughlin	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

STAGE. REFERENCE YOUR RADIOGRAM (JULY 24.) SUGGEST SA EDWARD A. PLEVACK BE CONSIDERED FOR INTENSIVE TRAINING IN E AND E AND STAGE TRAINING SCHOOL, WASHINGTON, INSTEAD OF SA [REDACTED] WHO WAS RECOMMENDED IN ANCHORAGE LETTER TO BUREAU (JULY 10.) IT IS SUGGESTED AND RECOMMENDED THAT SA PLEVACK NOT BE ORDERED TO WASHINGTON FOR SUCH TRAINING UNTIL SA ROBERT MCKEE WHO IS THERE AND SCHEDULED TO RETURN THIS DIVISION APPROXIMATELY (AUGUST 15) IN VIEW OF EXTREME NEED FOR ALL SA PERSONNEL ASSIGNED HERE. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO TRAINING OTHER AGENTS TRANSFERRED TO ANCHORAGE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

RECEIVED:

(7-25-51)

4:08 PM

MSC

SP3-BTJ/JM
4-20-2000

00-1164

RECORDED - 78

EX-155

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

SEP 27 1951

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

DECODED COPY

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

7-23-51

NR 232330

9:47 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

STAGE RE ANCHORAGE RAD (JULY 16, 1951) CONCERNING

CONTACT [REDACTED] IN EFFORT TO EXPEDITE SUCH LETTER OF AUTHORITY
IN ORDER THAT ADDITIONAL TRAINEES CAN PROCEED TO WASHINGTON
FOR TRAINING.

Referral/Consult

RECEIVED:

7-23-51

10:09 PM

JGS

RECORDED - 78

EX-155

Referral/Consult

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

(DECODED COPY) (u)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(8-2-51) (u)

NR 022000

7:33 P.M.

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

STAGE. STATUS REPORT. 73 INDIVIDUALS RECOMMENDED AND CLOSING
REPORTS SUBMITTED. 65 RECONTACTED ON TRAINING AND RESULTS
FURNISHED BUREAU. LEADS TO RECONTACT OTHERS BEING HANDLED.
2 TRAINEES PROCEEDED TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK FOR TRAINING -
SBA TO COMMENCE (AUGUST 6) AND E AND E ON (AUGUST 7) 15 TRAINEES (u)
HAVE ALREADY REPORTED FOR TRAINING INCLUDING 1 E AND E. 9
SBAS HAVE RETURNED TO DATE.

(u) [REDACTED] BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IDENTITY
OF SBA TO COMMENCE (AUGUST 28.) (u)

Referral/Consult

RECEIVED:

(8-2-51) (u)

7:36 PM

MLM

RECORDED - 78

AUG 2 1951

EX-155

(u) AUG 1 1951 (u) EX-155
If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated
outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in
order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems (u)

F.B.I. RADIOGRAM

4-42a

DECODED COPY

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Alden _____
Belmont _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____
Gandy _____

FROM ANCHORAGE

(7-30-51)

NR 310030

10:40 PM

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

STAGE. RE

REFERENCE YOUR RADIOGRAM (JULY 21)

LAST. RE TEMPORARY INCREASE OF WHICH

HAS BEEN RECEIVED. REFERENCE MY RADIOGRAM (JULY 18) LAST. RE

EXPENSE VOUCHERS ORIGINALLY SUBMITTED (JULY 2) AND RE-SUBMITTED

(JULY 17) TOGETHER WITH A SECOND VOUCHER ALSO SUBMITTED (JULY 17).

PRESENT BALANCE OF FUNDS ABOUT

TO RETURN THIS WEEK AND WILL BE PAID ABOUT ONE THOUSAND

DOLLARS. IN ADDITION TWO TRAINEES DUE FROM TRAINING WEEKEND

OF AUGUST 4 TO BE PAID APPROXIMATELY FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS EACH.

THEREFORE THIS OFFICE WILL HAVE

IN ADDITION

TWO OTHER TRAINEES ARE IN WASHINGTON AND DUE BACK ABOUT (AUGUST

11) TO WHOM ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS EACH WILL ALSO BE DUE.

RECEIVED:

(7-30-51)

11:06 PM

TAR

Vouchers were in the amount

of:

Sent via Pouch (8-1-51)

Sent via Pouch (7-31-51)

RECORDED - 78

EX-155

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. CLEGG *WAC*

DATE: JULY 18, 1951

FROM : H. A. MEYERS *HAM*SUBJECT: STAGE PROGRAM
File #65-59264
DEFENSIVE TACTICS *(y)*

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

Attached hereto is an outline of the course in Defensive Tactics that is presently afforded the individuals brought to Washington, D. C., from Alaska for the STAGE Program.

It is suggested that this memorandum be routed to the Security Division for record purposes and also for possible use by the Anchorage Office in the follow-up program in connection with STAGE.

HAM:pm

RECORDED - 102

INDEXED - 102

AUG 8 1951

13

EX. - 31

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 6/30/94 BY SP12BTS

34225

~~"STAGE" Program~~
~~Defensive Tactics~~
~~(3 Hrs.)~~

I. ~~Disarming Methods (2 1/2 hrs.)~~
(All page references are to Bureau pamphlet entitled "Disarming Methods.")

A. Introduction (pp. 1-4)

B. Methods

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/30/94 BY SP12 BTJ/S/SC
3/2251

1. Revolver and Automatic

- a. Preliminary movement: Push gun off body - retain grasp - twist body (p. 5)
- b. On wrist - up toward shoulder - twist (p. 6)
- c. On gun - step across body (p. 7)
- d. Sling across body (p. 8)
- e. Trap gun under left arm (p. 9)
- f. Right turn - strike gun or arm forcefully (p. 11)
- g. Left turn - trap gun under left arm (p. 13)
- h. Against gun held close to hip
 - (1) Push gun into body (See "Note" p. 7)
 - (2) Back over trigger finger (p. 7)
- i. Jamming an automatic (p. 16 and paragraph 3, p. 4)
(Demonstration only)
Note: It is to be noted that the automatic (caliber 7.62 mm) used by the Russians in World War II is similar in appearance and operates mechanically the same as the Colt .45.

2. Long Barreled Weapons

- a. Left hand on barrel - right hand on stock - twist (p. 17)
- b. Right hand on barrel - trap gun under left arm (p. 19)

COPIES DESTROYED

8584 NOV 23 1960

ATTN: [illegible]

15-59214-200

ENCLOSURE

- c. Left turn - trap gun under left arm (p. 19)
Note: It is to be noted that the machine pistol (9 or 7.62 mm - over-all length 30 inches) that was used by Russian sentries during World War II is more difficult to disarm than a regulation rifle. However, above methods should be effective if executed correctly with at least average speed.

II. Suggestions on Use of Knife (~~10 min.~~)

A. How to hold

1. Blade protruding from thumb side of hand
2. Blade protruding from little finger side of hand

B. How to strike

1. Straight-in thrust
2. Downward thrust
3. Upward thrust
4. Sideward thrust

Note: See "Defenses against Knife," Law Enforcement Bulletins, Feb. 1949, pp. 9 through 12; March 1949, pp. 16 and 17; and April 1949, p. 13.

C. Where to strike (Large arteries and vital organs)

1. From the rear

- a. Carotid artery and jugular vein (side of neck - grasp victim's head, twist to side) - sideward thrust
- b. Area at base of throat (cuts windpipe and prevents outcry) - same as a. above
- c. Kidney (one on either side of spinal column, directly above waist - throw arm around victim's throat) - upward thrust
- d. Liver (on right side behind lower ribs) - same as c. above
- e. Spleen (on left side, behind lower ribs) - same as c. above.

2. From the front

- a. Area at base of throat - downward thrust
- b. Subclavian artery (behind collar bone at side of neck) - downward thrust
- c. Carotid artery and jugular vein - sideward thrust
- d. Under chin behind point of jaw - upward thrust
- e. Stomach - straight-in or upward thrust
- f. Groin - straight-in or upward thrust
- g. Femoral artery (inside of thigh) - slice or jab
- h. Brachial artery (inside of upper arm) - slice or jab
- i. Radial artery (front of wrist) - slice or jab

Note: The heart, while a vital organ, is very well protected and the knife may strike a rib or become stuck between the ribs, resulting in little or no damage to adversary. However, if knife has a narrow, sharp-pointed blade, it could be used against the heart and also the eyes.

III. Strangle Holds (~~10 min.~~)

A. From the rear

- 1. Rear strangle lock - Place your right arm around victim's throat as you strike a sharp blow in the region of his lower back with the heel of your left hand. Immediately step toward the left with your right foot as you grasp your right wrist with your left hand and pull victim backward over your right hip. (Also show "rear strangle lock" using rope or wire)

B. From the front

- 1. Thumb pressure on carotid arteries (side of neck to the front) directly under jaw - hands around back of neck.

2. Cross thumbs - Cross thumbs at second joint. Grasp and apply pressure as in 1. above.
3. Clothing strangle - Cross arms in front of victim's throat seize clothing and press forearms into throat by pulling tight.

IV. Personal Weapons and Vulnerable Areas ~~(10 min.)~~

- A. Temples (kick)
- B. Eyes (finger jab or thumb gouge)
- C. Bridge of nose (edge of hand blow)
- D. Base of nose (edge of hand blow)
- E. Chin (fist blow)
- F. Adam's apple area (edge of hand or finger jab)
- G. Pit of stomach (fist blow or kick)
- H. Groin (strike, kick, or grasp)
- I. Tail bone and spine (kick)
- J. Kidneys (edge of hand, edge of fist, or kick)
- K. Liver (same as J.)
- L. Side of neck - directly under line of jaw (edge of hand)
- M. Back of neck (edge of hand or edge of fist)
- N. Ears (cupped hand blow or bite)

Note: See "Personal Weapons" (Chart 1) and "Vulnerable Areas" (Chart 2), Law Enforcement Bulletin, Jan. 1948, pp. 9 and 10.

August 6, 1951

SAC, Anchorage

Director, FBI

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

STAGE

Ten copies of outlines in each of the following subjects are attached:

"Deception and Security," "Selection and Training of Subagents and Informants," and "Defensive Tactics." Copies of the Bureau pamphlet "Disarming Methods" are attached to copies of outlines in the last-mentioned subject.

You may desire to give consideration to the preparation of training folders to be used by personnel who will be regularly contacting SBA's and E & E Agents for purposes of retraining. The material must be considered strictly confidential and maintained securely at all times. Personnel of your office must be held strictly accountable for copies of lecture outlines and other materials used for training purposes. Special Agents who will be engaged in these activities must be thoroughly acquainted with all of the instructions set forth.

You should discuss in detail with [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Effort will be made to obtain from [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Same

will be furnished to you when available.

RECORDED - 102 65-59264-227

EX. 31

Attachments

MCC:mrc

Tolson

Ladd

Clegg

Glavin

Nichols

Roos

Tracy

Harbo

Alden

Belmont


Laughlin

Mohr

Tele. Room

Nease

Gandy



DECLASSIFIED BY 5028 BPR/AN

ON 6/30/94

042251

35 AUG 14 1951

DECEPTION AND SECURITY

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

- (1) to provide instruction as to conduct and precautions which should be taken to prevent disclosure to unauthorized persons of the facts of recruitment, training, and planning in covert operations
- (2) to instruct in the basic principles of security through appropriate cover and otherwise to insure self-preservation and continuous operation

II. CONDUCT AND PRECAUTIONS PRIOR TO OPERATIONS

- (1) necessity for complete secrecy as to recruitment and contacts with principal
- (2) confidential nature of instructions and training
- (3) discussions with wives, close relatives and associates
- (4) explanations as to absences during travel and training
- (5) communications during absences
- (6) activities on return to home areas
 - (a) relations with family and friends
 - (b) relations with employers, employees and fellow-employees
 - (c) contacts and communications with principal
 - (1) use of drops for communications
 - (2) disclosure of confidential matters in written communications
 - (3) use of telephone
- (7) possible efforts of other agencies to recruit for intelligence purposes or otherwise
- (8) question and answer period

III. ACTION IN EVENT OF IMMINENT INVASION, ACTUAL INVASION AND OCCUPATION

- (1) immediate action dependent on specific instructions of principal which
 - (a) may be governed by extent of invasion and/or occupation
 - (b) by location of agent
 - (c) by equipment and facilities available to agent
 - (d) by particular operations principal may have in mind

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/30/94 BY SP12BTS/KPC
342251

File copy 65-59214-227

- (2) principal may instruct agent to
 - (a) remain in populated area
 - (b) go to another populated area
 - (c) repair to pre-established hideout
 - (d) proceed to evacuation point
- (3) question and answer period

IV. COVER

- (1) purpose of cover
 - (a) to justify presence in particular area
 - (b) to conceal true nature of activities
 - (c) to show means of livelihood
 - (d) to gain particular objective
 - (e) examples
- (2) choice of cover
 - (a) to be governed by instructions of principal, if instructions given
 - (b) will depend on nature of area in which to be used
 - (c) must be in keeping with capabilities and experience of agent
 - (d) may depend on nature of mission to be accomplished
 - (e) should provide for mobility
 - (f) depends on purpose
 - (g) examples of good and bad choice of covers
- (3) carrying out cover
 - (a) agent must be equipped
 - (1) identification papers if required
 - (2) tools of trade
 - (3) examples
 - (b) details thought out in advance
 - (1) justification for contacts
 - (2) justification for movements
 - (3) emergency situations requiring quick thinking
 - (4) changes in plans
 - (c) avoiding drawing suspicion
 - (1) naturalness
 - (2) compliance with regulations if in occupied zone
- (4) question and answer period

V. SURVEILLANCES

- (1) purpose
 - (a) to observe the movements, habits and contacts of another person
 - (b) to observe activities at a particular location
 - (c) examples
- (2) conduct of surveillance
 - (a) natural actions
 - (b) anticipating movements
 - (c) alertness to counter-surveillance
 - (d) mobile and stationary surveillances
- (3) shaking a surveillance
 - (a) abandon plans for contacts with informants, etc., if surveillance detected
 - (b) steps taken should be plausible and not arouse suspicion
- (4) detecting a surveillance
 - (a) observation of persons and areas before movements
 - (b) backtracking
- (5) surveillances in woods and mountains
- (6) surveillance equipment
- (7) examples of good and bad surveillances
- (8) question and answer period

VI. SECURITY OF PERSON

- (1) clothing
 - (a) laundry marks which belie a cover identity
 - (b) labels
- (2) avoiding carrying incriminating evidence where possible
- (3) concealing property
 - (a) in clothing
 - (b) on various parts of body
 - (c) in other commonplace articles normally carried
- (4) use of firearms and other weapons

- (a) to deactivate
- (b) to eliminate
- (5) other defensive and offensive tactics
- (6) question and answer period

VII. SECURITY OF PROPERTY AND EQUIPMENT

- (1) caching of gear and supplies
 - (a) man-made caches
 - (b) in ground, lakes, rivers, snow
 - (c) variations in caches to prevent discovery of all items when one found
- (2) avoiding possession of unneeded articles which may arouse suspicion
- (3) destruction of property to avoid detection or seizure
 - (a) by fire
 - (b) by dismantling
 - (c) by explosion
 - (d) burying
 - (e) sinking in water
- (4) security of codes
- (5) question and answer period

VIII. CONTACTS BY PERSONS SEEKING TO RECRUIT AGENT

- (1) if agent approached by person believed acting for same principal
 - (a) give noncommittal answer
 - (b) contact principal for advice
- (2) be alert for possible attempt to compromise

IX. CONCLUSION

- (1) review
- (2) general security precautions
- (3) question and answer period

SELECTION AND TRAINING OF SUB-AGENTS AND INFORMANTS

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

- (1) to provide instruction in the basic principles involved in the selection and training of sub-agents and informants to assist in an intelligence net
- (2) to instruct as to effective use of such persons and the precautions which must be taken to protect them, in self-preservation, and to accomplish assigned missions.

II. SELECTION

- (1) availability of personnel who can be immediately considered
 - (a) agent must first give serious, personal and private study to matter
 - (b) know locations of residences of persons in area
 - (c) study individual capabilities
 - (1) trustworthiness and intelligence
 - (2) loyalty, in opinion of agent
(no investigation)
 - (3) physical condition
 - (4) family situation
 - (5) what can each person under consideration contribute
 - (a) can he pilot a plane?
 - (b) does he own a plane? boat? dog team? cabins?
 - (c) does he have radio equipment? can he operate it?
 - (d) is he well acquainted with area? know the rivers, lakes, mountains, passes?
 - (e) what languages can he speak? write?
 - (6) limited pretext conversations, if required, to determine
- (2) clearance
 - (a) agent should supply names to principal for clearance
 - (b) positively no approach pending clearance
 - (c) principal may rule persons cannot under any conditions be approached.
 - (d) principal may not, for security reasons or otherwise, give reasons for non-clearance

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/30/94 BY SP12 BTJ/S

ENCLOSURE

(3) approach

(a) principal may

(1) authorize pretext interview with prospect to determine intentions in event of invasion and/or occupation

(2) to determine other facts considered important

(b) agent should never give indication of his own intentions in absence of specific authority of principal

(c) agent should give full facts to principal as to results of approach

(4) question and answer period

III. RECRUITING

(1) recruitment prior to actual operations

(a) agent can never recruit any person prior to actual operations without specific authority of principal

(b) only such information as principal authorizes can be given to person who is to be approached with recruitment in mind

(c) recruitment should be for definite objective

(d) all security factors must be considered carefully

(e) recruit must be impressed with confidential nature

(2) recruitment during operations

(a) agent has benefit of names previously cleared

(b) all security factors should be considered carefully

(c) if principal available can be consulted

(d) there should be definite objective in mind

(e) consider quality and ability of prospect for assistance in particular mission

(f) consider whether prospective recruit can be used regularly or for only particular objectives

(g) give specific instructions as to confidence imposed

(h) give only such information as is necessary

(i) no person should be advised of identities of other recruits, unless specific mission requires joint action. Even then, identities of assistants should be concealed until most advantageous moment

(3) question and answer period

IV. TRAINING

- (1) purpose of instruction
 - (a) self-preservation
 - (b) to protect recruit
 - (c) to accomplish mission
- (2) nature and scope of instruction
 - (a) limit information re mission to what sub-agent requires
 - (b) instruct him fully in security factors involved in attaining objective
 - (c) surveillance possibilities
 - (d) instruct as to cover, if cover required
 - (e) security of person
 - (f) security of property or equipment entrusted to him
 - (g) action to be taken in destroying property
 - (h) action to be taken in event of detection
 - (i) simple secret writing method if required
 - (j) other instruction agent may feel required, with due regard to purposes of instruction (above)
- (3) question and answer period


V. CONTACTING SUB-AGENTS AND INFORMANTS

- (1) meeting sub-agents and informants
 - (a) plans in advance, mutually agreed and understood
 - (b) safety factors must be considered



b2
b7E

(2) other means of communicating



b2
b7E

(j) examples

(3) codes provided to agent for communication with
principal must be preserved for that purpose alone

VI. REVIEW

DEFENSIVE TACTICS

I. Disarming Methods

(All page references are to Bureau pamphlet entitled "Disarming Methods.")

A. Introduction (pp. 1-4)

B. Methods

1. Revolver and Automatic

- a. Preliminary movement: Push gun off body - retain grasp - twist body (p. 5)
- b. On wrist - up toward shoulder - twist (p. 6)
- c. On gun - step across body (p. 7)
- d. Sling across body (p. 8)
- e. Trap gun under left arm (p. 9)
- f. Right turn - strike gun or arm forcefully (p. 11)
- g. Left turn - trap gun under left arm (p. 13)
- h. Against gun held close to hip
 - (1) Push gun into body (See "Note" p. 7)
 - (2) Back over trigger finger (p. 7)
- i. Jamming an automatic (p. 16 and paragraph 3, p. 4)
(Demonstration only)
Note: It is to be noted that the automatic (caliber 7.62 mm) used by the Russians in World War II is similar in appearance and operates mechanically the same as the Colt .45.

2. Long Barreled Weapons

- a. Left hand on barrel - right hand on stock - twist (p. 17)
- b. Right hand on barrel - trap gun under left arm (p. 19)

Attachment

File Copy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/30/91 BY SP123 TS/SC

65-59264-2-1
ENCLOSURE

- c. Left turn - trap gun under left arm (p. 19)
Note: It is to be noted that the machine pistol (9 or 7.62 mm - over-all length 30 inches) that was used by Russian sentries during World War II is more difficult to disarm than a regulation rifle. However, above methods should be effective if executed correctly with at least average speed.

II. Suggestions on Use of Knife

A. How to hold

- 1. Blade protruding from thumb side of hand
- 2. Blade protruding from little finger side of hand

B. How to strike

- 1. Straight-in thrust
- 2. Downward thrust
- 3. Upward thrust
- 4. Sideward thrust

Note: See "Defenses against Knife," Law Enforcement Bulletins, Feb. 1949, pp. 9 through 12; March 1949, pp. 16 and 17; and April 1949, p. 13.

C. Where to strike (large arteries and vital organs)

1. From the rear

- a. Carotid artery and jugular vein (side of neck - grasp victim's head, twist to side) - sideward thrust
- b. Area at base of throat (cuts windpipe and prevents outcry) - same as a. above
- c. Kidney (one on either side of spinal column, directly above waist - throw arm around victim's throat) - upward thrust
- d. Liver (on right side behind lower ribs) - same as c. above
- e. Spleen (on left side, behind lower ribs) - same as c. above.

2. From the front

- a. Area at base of throat - downward thrust
- b. Subclavian artery (behind collar bone at side of neck) - downward thrust
- c. Carotid artery and jugular vein - sideward thrust
- d. Under chin behind point of jaw - upward thrust
- e. Stomach - straight-in or upward thrust
- f. Groin - straight-in or upward thrust
- g. Femoral artery (inside of thigh) - slice or jab
- h. Brachial artery (inside of upper arm) - slice or jab
- i. Radial artery (front of wrist) - slice or jab

Note: The heart, while a vital organ, is very well protected and the knife may strike a rib or become stuck between the ribs, resulting in little or no damage to adversary. However, if knife has a narrow, sharp-pointed blade, it could be used against the heart and also the eyes.

III. Strangle Holds

A. From the rear

1. Rear strangle lock - Place your right arm around victim's throat as you strike a sharp blow in the region of his lower back with the heel of your left hand. Immediately step toward the left with your right foot as you grasp your right wrist with your left hand and pull victim backward over your right hip. (Also show "rear strangle lock" using rope or wire)

B. From the front

1. Thumb pressure on carotid arteries (side of neck to the front) directly under jaw - hands around back of neck.

2. Cross thumbs - Cross thumbs at second joint. Grasp and apply pressure as in 1. above.
3. Clothing strangle - Cross arms in front of victim's throat, seize clothing and press forearms into throat by pulling tight.

IV. Personal Weapons and Vulnerable Areas

- A. Temples (kick)
- B. Eyes (finger jab or thumb grasp)
- C. Bridge of nose (edge of hand blow)
- D. Base of nose (edge of hand blow)
- E. Chin (fist blow)
- F. Adam's apple area (edge of hand or finger jab)
- G. Pit of stomach (fist blow or kick)
- H. Groin (strike, kick, or grasp)
- I. Tail bone and spine (kick)
- J. Kidneys (edge of hand, edge of fist, or kick)
- K. Liver (same as J.)
- L. Side of neck - directly under line of jaw (edge of hand)
- M. Back of neck (edge of hand or edge of fist)
- N. Ears (cupped hand blow or bite)

Note: See "Personal Weapons" (Chart 1) and "Vulnerable Areas" (Chart 2), Law Enforcement Bulletin, Jan. 1948, pp. 9 and 10.

SAC, Anchorage

August 17, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL & ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STAGE

Reurlet 8-2-51 in which you discussed at length the problem of radio communication.

Referral/Consult

The Radio Section of the FBI Laboratory is presently considering the question of procurement of emergency equipment for issuance to Stage personnel to make them operable pending [redacted] as you have been previously advised.

The Radio Section is presently making a detailed study of ways and means whereby chances for detection by triangulation or otherwise, of clandestine radio operations can be minimized. The suggestions set forth in your memorandum and in the attachment thereto will be considered in this connection.

Referral/Consult

It should be distinctly understood that the [redacted]


The Bureau will continue its efforts to have [redacted]

The services of Chief Radio Communications Officer, [redacted] may be utilized by your office in connection with your efforts to make a selected number of Stage personnel immediately operable.

b6
b7C

For your information, the Bureau has ascertained from FCC that a new type of amateur license is now available. This is referred to as a "novice" license. Attached hereto is "Amendment #12-12" to "Part 12 — Rules Governing Amateur Radio Service" issued by FCC. Also attached is a bulletin referred to as a "Fact Sheet" number 29313 issued by the FCC Information Office and dated 12-1-48, which concerns "Amateur Radio." FCC bulletin 62065 attached is a list of study questions for individuals taking amateur novice class licenses.

11-11-11
CORDED - 82
EX - 3
65-59264-228
MCC:brg
SEP 17 1951



Handwritten signature/initials

CH 5

It is suggested that you may desire to have a selected number of SBA's, who appear to be reasonably proficient in radio at this time, seek to obtain "novice" or other types of amateur licenses. It appears probable that some of the individuals may have access to radio equipment with which they could practice on "ham" bands. Through obtaining such licenses, the SBA's would have a strictly legitimate cover for practicing radio communication. Any steps taken should be fully examined as to all security factors. Before taking the action suggested, it would be necessary that you determine the extent to which FCC examines applicants, how much information FCC requires, and whether the background information remains in Alaska or is forwarded to FCC headquarters. It appears that radio personnel of your office may be equipped to practice with selected Stage personnel on "ham" bands.

You will be advised promptly when further information is available concerning [REDACTED]

Referral/Consult

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Anchorage
 SUBJECT: STAGE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP12B YS/SP DATE 6/30/94
 34225 PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

August 2, 1951

ReBulet July 23, 1951, specifically, Bureau direction that SBAs returning from training school be equipped as soon as possible to handle radio communications.

Referral/Consult

A conference was had with [redacted]

Referral/Consult

Referral/Consult

It is requested and recommended that the Bureau [redacted] to effect arrangements whereby shortwave radios, both transmitters and receivers, can be furnished this office to be set up immediately in order that continued training with the SBAs can be had so that they will be entirely familiar with this means of communication.

Referral/Consult

While the subject of radios has been discussed on numerous occasions, it does not appear that the use of any specific radio has been decided. It is recommended that [redacted] the decision concerning the use of a particular radio be arrived at and the same procured and a limited number of approximately twelve be forwarded to this office for installation in the proximity of the strategic areas named in this program. These radios should consist of a 25 to 30 watt transmitter and a receiver competent to work efficiently. It will also be necessary to furnish generators in almost all instances in order that power will be assured. It is believed that 250 watt generators will suffice. One should be furnished with each radio. The transmitters should be capable of transmitting on 3.5 to 15 mc. This equipment should, of course, be as small in bulk as possible and as light in weight as possible in order that it could be easily hidden and can be moved readily by one or two men.

COPIES DESTROYED

584-NOV 23 1950 In addition to the radios referred to above, it is recommended that a sufficient number of practice keys be supplied this office to be given to the SBAs who have returned from training school in order that they can practice what they have

Encl.
 58-298
 JHW:vf

RECORDED - 78
 HANDLED BY
 STOP DEK 155

AUG 7 1951
 15

AN 65-298

learned and can improve their technique in sending the International Morse Code. In this regard, it is noted that the agents, upon their return from training school, have uniformly exhibited keen interest in this program and in obtaining a high degree of proficiency in radio communications. They should receive these keys as soon as possible in order that the basic information they have learned will not be lost but can be improved upon.

Referral/Consult

It is also felt that [redacted]

[redacted] be furnished this office in order that they can be supplied to the SBAs to aid them in self-education in radio communications. The returned agents have advised that [redacted]

Referral/Consult

It is believed that the radios, when received here, should be installed in the various localities in which the SBA will ultimately work (quite possibly in or around his home). In this way, a peace time program of communication, which will do more to train the agent than any other means, may be set up. In this regard, expert aid and advice will be necessary to establish and maintain these radios until such time that the agent is sufficiently trained to maintain them. It is my understanding and likewise that of [redacted]

The lack of an expert for any protracted period of time will, of course, very materially delay the installations of the radios. It is suggested that the Bureau may be amenable to the use of Chief Radio Communications Officer [redacted] who is presently assigned to this office. He appears to be fully competent in this field and could lend material aid to this program.

b6
b7C

In reply to the Bureau's direction that each SBA, upon his return from training school, be furnished with call letters, frequencies and schedules, the material necessary for one Agent has been compiled here with the aid of Chief Radio Communications Officer [redacted]. These data are set forth in the attached memorandum entitled, "Radio Operations Instructions". The peace time

b6
b7C

AN 65-298

calling and operating frequencies have been selected at random as near as practical to the "ham" bands, which give excellent coverage in Alaska. Since these frequencies may be assigned to some other frequency in Alaska, it may be necessary to change them. Possibly the radio experts in the FBI Laboratory may be able to obtain this information through FCC or in some other manner in Washington. Any frequency in the same general range will suffice.

With reference to procedure, no attempts have been made to compile a complete operating manual at this time. Only a basic outline is set out. This will enable an agent to go on the air and send or receive traffic immediately. It is suggested that if the Bureau approves of this type of procedure, as well as the data set out in the attached memorandum, agents can be briefed upon their return to Alaska from Washington and furnished a similar memorandum compiled for their individual operation. Other detail and fine points of operation which necessarily will come up can be covered with the agents individually when they are brought into Anchorage for re-training.

Most of the frequencies noted in the attached memorandum are based on 3.5 mc. crystals utilizing the harmonics to gain a higher frequency. This was done in order to cut down the number of crystals to be furnished each SBA. If the Bureau feels the security of this procedure is not great enough, each SBA must necessarily be furnished with more crystals to obtain full coverage of the spectrum. Peace and war time control station frequencies will be furnished each of the SBA stations, along with the traffic frequencies of the control station.

It is noted that no schedules are set out in the attached memorandum. Such schedules could not be made up inasmuch as it was not known what specific time would be amenable to the agent himself. These can be established and agreed upon with the agent when a specific station is put in.

It is felt that at this time twenty-five memoranda similar to the type attached should be compiled to adequately take care of all stations which would be established in the near future.

AN 65-298

It is recommended that the attached memorandum be placed at the disposal of the radio experts in the FBI Laboratory for their study, suggestions, and criticism. It is believed that with their extensive experience in the field of clandestine radios, they will be able to very materially improve the procedures and instructions set out therein. If changes are made or the attached memorandum does not appear to adequately cover a clandestine operation, it is requested that the Laboratory experts draw up a similar memorandum which can be forwarded to the Anchorage Division to be used as a guide for those compiled in the future.

RADIO OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

CALL LETTERS

ABA	BNV
DCA	WEL
ALP	COP
PXE	JHK
ETO	OKN
QOR	ZPI
RUN	AAA
MOX	SDQ
XET	MID
FLA	XCC
SOM	PIZ
OQT	OTN
YAW	UMN
BOX	MCR
CLO	CVB
IBF	ZXC
CXA	QQI
VOA	IVV
QWE	OMN
YTR	CQT
POI	RFV
IPE	CHS
JJJ	PAT
KLO	WTM
DGH	NBK
ADG	ZAQ

1. 10000000000000000000
6/30/94 SP12 BTPIU
342257

The call letters set out above are to be used in the following manner:

The first call on the list "ABA" is to be used during the first week of operation and will end at midnight on the first Sunday of operation. Thereafter the call letters will be selected in order, one per week, changing at midnight each Sunday. In order that there may be no re-use of the call, it should be marked off the list when the week ends and a new call is taken. The call letters are to be used during the entire week if it becomes necessary to make more than one contact.

The control station will use the same list to select his call letters in answering. The difference being the control station will select his call from the bottom first and then go in order to the top, reversing the letters of the call. Thus, on the first day of operation, the control station will use "QAZ" when he makes contact. He will also change calls at midnight on the first Sunday and every Sunday thereafter.

A calendar will be furnished with these instructions.

PROCEDURE

Set out below is the procedure to be followed in establishing contact between the headquarters station and yourself:

1. At schedule time, set your receiver on the frequency which headquarters station will use. Headquarters station will send a series of Vs followed by his call for the day for about one minute. Example: VVV VVV VVV ABC ABC ABC K (repeated for about one minute).
2. You will answer on your schedule frequency by sending a series of Vs followed by your call and give the headquarters station a signal report which will be determined by the following chart:

QSA 1 Unreadable
QSA 2 Barely readable
QSA 3 Readable with difficulty
QSA 4 Readable with no difficulty
QSA 5 Perfectly readable

You will also send in your answer either QRU (I have no traffic) or QTC (I have traffic). Example:

VVV VVV VVV DEF DEF DEF QSA 4 QRU K (You are readable with no difficulty, I have no traffic).

OR

VVV VVV VVV DEF DEF DEF QSA 3 QTC K (You are readable with difficulty, I have a message for you).

3. Headquarters station will reply with a signal report and a "K" if you have traffic. ("K" means go ahead).
Example: QSA 4 K

Headquarters station will reply with a signal report and "SK" if you have no traffic. ("SK" means end of contact)
Example: QSA 4 SK. Note: Once contact is established, call letters and Vs are dropped.

4. If you have indicated you have traffic and the headquarters station has given you QSA 4 K as in part 3, you will answer with QSY 12 (I will change to transmit on frequency 12).
Example: QSY 12 HR.
You will then immediately shift to frequency 12 and send a series of Vs so that the headquarters station may tune you in. Example: VVV VVV VVV DEF DEF DEF K (This transmission should not last over one minute).
5. Headquarters station will then answer with a signal report for this frequency and QRV (I am ready to copy your traffic).
Example: QSA 4 QRV K.
6. You will now send your traffic: Example:
HR NR 1 BT ABCDEF GHIJ LMNOP QRSTU VYXYZ BT K.
In the above example, HR means "here", NR means "number", 1 is the number of the message. You should keep a chart and place a number on each message sent, beginning with the number 1 and taking them in order, BT means "dash" and is used to separate parts of the message.
7. If the headquarters station copies the message complete he will answer with QSL (I receipt for your message.) and SK. Example: QSL SK.
If headquarters station missed a group, he would request it as follows: Example IMI (Question) GR 3 (GR meaning group).
8. If headquarters station sends you QSL SK as in paragraph 7, you will answer with SK (end of contact). If headquarters sent you IMI GR 3 in paragraph 7, you will give him group 3, Example: GR 3 LMNOP.

9. Headquarters station will then acknowledge by saying R (I received it) QSL SK. Contact ends here. If the headquarters station had traffic the procedure would remain the same except that the headquarters station would shift frequency to send the traffic. If both have traffic, both stations will shift frequency to send it.

Should you wish to call the headquarters station at a time other than schedule time, you should select the proper frequency for the time of day and send a series of Vs followed by your call for that week, you should listen for an answer on the corresponding calling frequency of the headquarters station. For example, if you call on a 3.5 mc frequency you should listen on the headquarters 3.5 mc calling frequency, if you call on the 7 mc frequency you should listen on the headquarters station 7 mc frequency. The procedure then is just the same as if the contact were scheduled.

It is imperative that you learn your procedure thoroughly in order that you spend as little time on the air as possible. A QRU contact (No traffic either station) should take no more than one minute to complete when you are familiar with the procedure. All transmissions must be kept to an absolute minimum in order that a fix cannot be made on your station, thus disclosing your location and endangering your life.

PROCEDURE SIGNS

QRU..I have no traffic
QRV..I am ready
QSA..Signal strength 1,2,3,4,5
QSL..I receipt for message
K....Go ahead
HR...Here
NR...Number
IMI..Interrogation, used with Q signals makes them a question
GR...Group
SK...End of contact
R....I received you all right

FREQUENCIES

Crystals for the radio transmitter for use on the following frequencies have been furnished to you.

PEACE TIME CALLING FREQUENCIES

4073 kcs 7398 kcs 14403 kcs

WAR TIME CALLING FREQUENCIES

3569 kcs 7138 kcs 14420 kcs

Note: The peace time calling frequencies shall be used both for calling and for handling traffic. The control station shall be in charge of requesting other stations to stand by in the event more than one station should call at the same time.

The war time frequencies are to be used only in the event of hostilities and are to be used for calling only. NO TRAFFIC IS TO BE HANDLED ON THE WAR TIME CALLING FREQUENCIES. (Further instructions under Procedure.)

TRAFFIC FREQUENCIES (To be used in event of hostilities only):
(Crystals have been furnished to you).

3523 kcs (1)	7046 kcs (15)	14092 kcs (12)
3584 kcs (3)	7168 kcs (5)	14336 kcs (20)
3592 kcs (22)	7184 kcs (11)	14368 kcs (31)
3601 kcs (10)	7202 kcs (4)	14404 kcs (9)

The figures in parenthesis denote the code number of the frequency. This number is to be used on the air when requesting a change of frequency. THE EXACT FREQUENCY SHOULD NEVER BE TRANSMITTED ON THE AIR. ALWAYS USE THE CODE NUMBER.

HDQTRS STATION FREQUENCIES

PEACE TIME CALLING FREQUENCIES

4042 kcs 7340 kcs 14432 kcs

WAR TIME CALLING FREQUENCIES

3535 kcs

7070 kcs

14140 kcs

Note: Control station peace time calling frequencies shall be used both for calling and handling traffic.

The control station war time calling frequencies are to be used only in event of hostilities and for calling purposes only. (Further instructions will be given under Procedure).

CONTROL STATION TRAFFIC FREQUENCIES (To be used in event of hostilities only)

3520 kcs (13)

7040 kcs (7)

14080 kcs (14)

3548 kcs (21)

7096 kcs (12)

14182 kcs (4)

3577 kcs (34)

7154 kcs (9)

14208 kcs (8)

3622 kcs (2)

7244 kcs (6)

14488 kcs (1)

Figures in parenthesis denote code number of frequency.

YOU ARE NOT TO USE WAR TIME FREQUENCIES UNLESS ADVISED BY THE HEADQUARTERS STATION BY A MESSAGE.

In choosing a calling frequency you must take into consideration the time of day and/or night. This will greatly affect radio transmission. Generally speaking, use the higher frequencies during the daylight hours and the lower frequencies during the dark hours. Due to the uncertain radio conditions in Alaska, no hard fast rule may be set. If you have emergency traffic, you should try all of your calling frequencies until contact is established with headquarters. It is repeated again all transmissions must be kept short. If a regular schedule is missed then you should try the following day at the same time using the same frequencies. You should not stay on the air for any great length of time trying to make contact unless you have important traffic to transmit.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 44

Page 18 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 20 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 21 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 22 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 25 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 34 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 48 ~ b6, b7C

Page 49 ~ b6, b7C

Page 60 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 61 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 69 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 72 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 73 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 74 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 75 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 76 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 77 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 78 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 79 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 80 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 81 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 82 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 83 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 84 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 85 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 86 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 87 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 88 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 89 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 90 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 91 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 92 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 93 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 94 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 95 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 96 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 97 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 108 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 109 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 111 ~ Referral/Consult

Page 149 ~ b2, b6, b7C, b7E

Page 199 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 200 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 268 ~ b7D

