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US ARMY PRISONER OF WAR DOCTRINE REPORT

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MARCH 1972

AD

ACN 15596

DOCTRINE FOR CAPTURED/DETAINED UNITED STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL (U)

(Short Title : USPOW (U))

FINAL STUDY

VOLUME II
MAIN REPORT

PART I

CHAPTER 1, INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 2, COMMUNIST PRISONER OF WAR MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER 3, NATIONAL/DOD POLICY

UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGENCY

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17-Apr-2009
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The conclusions and recommendations of this study are those of the Commanding Officer, USACDC Special Operations Agency. This study is based upon information gathered and analysis performed primarily by the US Prisoner of War Study Team at USACDCSOA. Some of the individuals having a major area of responsibility in the preparation of supporting study material are listed below:

Major John C. Carlin	Team Chief
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The members of the USPOW Study Team wish to extend their thanks for the cooperation received from personnel contacted during the course of the study and, in particular, those who contributed so freely of time and expertise at the in-process reviews. Personnel who contributed to the study are too numerous to mention herein but are listed on page ix.

Special notes of thanks are reserved for:

LTC Winfield S. Singletary - Office of the Surgeon General
LTC Bruce E. Stevenson - USACDC Judge Advocate Agency
Mr. David A. Ellis - Office of the Provost Marshal General
Dr. William Miller - Central Intelligence Agency
MAJ James R. Coker - The Judge Advocate General's School

Each of the above manifested a strong active interest in the study from inception to completion and provided knowledge and data in his area of interest that contributed immeasurably to the overall effort.

(U) SECURITY CHECKLIST

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(U) TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

VOLUME II (Cont'd)

PART 1 (Cont'd)

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

VOLUME II (Cont'd)

PART 1 (Cont'd)

(U) FIGURES

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(U) ABSTRACT

The study develops new/revised US Army doctrine and procedures for captured/detained US military personnel. It analyzes key Communist prisoner of war management principles and applicable national/DOD policy in light of their impact upon Army doctrine in three phases; pre-internment (training), internment (family assistance), and post internment (evacuation and processing). An analysis of current Army doctrine/procedures identifies voids/deficiencies in its adequacy to meet requirements generated by Communist treatment of prisoners of war and guidance from national/DOD level. Specific doctrinal recommendations are offered to correct the deficiencies and fill the voids.

SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION:

a. Origin of Study. On 8 June 1968, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSOD) issued a policy memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provided guidance relative to the processing of returned US prisoners of war and other detained military personnel.[1] This initial memorandum was followed by a supplemental policy memorandum issued by the DSOD on 18 January 1969 which provided guidance for repatriation planning by the services for the return of a relatively large group of USPW/detainees who are interned on the Southeast Asia land mass.[2] A subsequent HQ CDC review of Army doctrine on the subject of US prisoners of war revealed that doctrinal voids exist in the area of captured US personnel.[3] Further, the HQ CDC review revealed that no agency within CDC had been assigned overall proponency for captured US personnel. Accordingly, on 22 October 1969, HQ CDC tasked Special Operations Agency, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with reviewing and developing doctrine for captured US Army personnel.[4]

b. Need for Study. Exploitation of captured US military personnel by unfriendly foreign states in recent years, during both peace and war, has dictated the need for in-depth review of the adequacy of US Army doctrine to meet this situation. This exploitation of captured US Army personnel, often in violation of the Geneva Conventions, has served the cause of unfriendly foreign powers by providing a means by which political and other bargaining pressure can be brought to bear on the US. A study was needed to assess the adequacy of current doctrine and, where necessary, to develop required doctrine for US military personnel which will best support national interests and concurrently insure to the maximum extent possible the rights and dignity of the individual during and following capture.

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[1] Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 8 June 1968, Policy for Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel.

[2] Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 18 January 1969, Policy and Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel.

[3] HQ CDC Fact Sheet, 26 March 1969, Doctrine for Captured US Personnel.

[4] HQ CDC Study Directive, 22 October 1969, Doctrine for Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel.

2. PROBLEM. Many of the policies and procedures pertaining to captured US military personnel are outgrowths of the experiences of World War II and the Korean War. They are oriented mainly toward insuring that US treaty obligations of the Geneva Conventions are observed and that national security interests are protected. The Code of Conduct emphasizes both areas. Although consideration for the survival and well being of the individual soldier during captivity is reflected throughout national policy, this consideration is based mainly on the assumption that humane treatment by the US toward enemy prisoners of war will be reciprocated by unfriendly powers toward captured US military personnel. Recent experiences of US prisoners of war in North and South Vietnam and in Korea (USS Pueblo crew), however, have evidenced this assumption to be incorrect. The US policy of humane treatment toward prisoners of war has not been reciprocated by the enemy who constantly circumvents the provisions of the Geneva Conventions by use of duress and coercion. Further, experience has evidenced that under the mental and physical duress imposed by Communist captors, US prisoners of war cannot rigidly adhere to the common conception of conduct, i.e., strict adherence to name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. In fact, their survival often depended upon their knowingly violating this concept. The main problem addressed by this study is how best to reconcile doctrinally US national interests (as expressed by DOD policy guidance) with those of the individual in the light of prevailing Communist prisoner of war management principles and techniques. A secondary problem is to identify those areas requiring improvement in Army policy and doctrine (and make appropriate recommendations) where Communist management principles are not a consideration.

3. DISCUSSION:

a. Purpose.[5] The purpose of the study is to develop Army doctrine for captured US military personnel applicable to both peace and wartime situations including all levels and intensities of conflict.

b. Objective.[6] The objective of the study is to develop recommended new/revised US Army doctrine and procedures relating to captured US military personnel:

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[5] Ibid. See also 1st Indorsement (HQ CDC, 16 Feb 70) to basic letter, ISSO, undated, Doctrine for Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel, which deletes requirement to develop "joint service doctrine and procedures" from the study plan.

[6] HQ CDC Study Plan, approved 16 Feb 70, Doctrine for Captured/Detained United States Military Personnel.

(1) During the training phase and prior to internment.

(2) During internment and activities associated with release, recovery or return.

(3) Following recovery or return.

c. Assumption. US military personnel will continue to face the threat of capture/detention and possible exploitation during peacetime as well as during armed conflict.

d. Limitations:

(1) Study will be conducted based on current US national policies relating to captured US military personnel.

(2) Study will not infringe upon US Air Force escape and evasion responsibility.

e. Definition. The term "doctrine" is used in this study in its broader context and includes information contained in Army regulations, pamphlets, field manuals, subject schedules, and operational plans.

f. Methodology:

(1) Data sources were:

(a) Literature:

1. Official US Army publications.

2. Other related books/studies.

(b) Input from other sources.

(c) Input from Army Staff and Activities.

(d) Debriefings.

(e) Interviews.

(f) Questionnaires.

(2) Procedures:

(a) The above data sources were utilized to determine the following:

1. The Communist prisoner of war management principles.

2. Existing national policy.

3. Existing Army doctrine.

(b) Existing Army doctrine was then evaluated for adequacy by means of comparison against the requirements imposed on the Army by the Communist prisoner of war management principles and by national policy. This resulted in the categorizations of current doctrine as either adequate, inadequate, or needing minor improvement.

(c) In those instances where doctrine was determined to be inadequate or in need of minor improvement, a further analysis was conducted for the purpose of developing effective recommendations for either a change in existing doctrine or additions to existing doctrine. All alternatives were examined in coordination with appropriate DA staff sections and activities to insure that the recommendations would be both feasible and effective.

(d) Analysis. This study encompasses four analytical phases:

1. Historical review:

a. During this phase, the Communist prisoner of war management principles were derived from a review of the Communist treatment of PW's in World War II, Korea, and Southeast Asia.

2. Additional historical surveys were made on US national PW policy and on the repatriation procedures utilized in Korea and Southeast Asia.

a. The doctrinal requirements imposed by the Communist management principles and by national policy were derived.

b. Current Army doctrine was analyzed for those aspects which are relevant to the pre-internment, internment, and post-internment periods.

3. Existing doctrine was compared with the requirements imposed on the Army by the Communist prisoner of war principles and by national policy. The result of this comparison was that some requirements were determined to be inadequately met by existing doctrine.

4. Evaluation: That doctrine determined to be inadequate was examined for the purpose of evaluating alternatives in order to eliminate all doctrinal voids and inconsistencies.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Conclusions: Based on the study and its findings, it is concluded that:

(1) US military personnel captured by Communist countries will be subjected to PW management principles and techniques designed to further the captor's political and military goals. Individual survival of the USPW will depend in large measure upon his ability to cope with these principles and lessen their psychological and physical impact.

(2) US Army SERE training must be as current and realistic as possible, incorporating the best features of the other Services as applicable. A cornerstone principle must be that the US soldier receive such training as is commensurate with his risk of capture potential.

(3) Strict adherence to name, rank, serial number, and date of birth as the sole resistance to enemy interrogation/indoctrination is unrealistic. DA must establish positive guidelines which will assist the soldier to resist enemy manipulation to the utmost of his ability.

(4) Captured US military personnel will be faced with situations and circumstances not adequately addressed in current doctrine and training. The soldier should be given guidance as to what he may expect from his captors, what he can do for himself to aid his survival, and what the US government will be doing for him and his family.

(5) Current assistance programs adequately provide for known and anticipated needs of next of kin. To improve consistency in implementation by local commanders, additional DA guidance should be provided concerning selection of personnel for notification and assistance of next of kin. To reduce unnecessary emotional strain on the NOK, a new procedure for the delivery of personal effects should be established.

(6) Procedures relating to the evacuation and processing of returnees are adequately defined to permit implementation at the action level. Stronger emphasis in the regulations on the welfare and morale of returnees is needed, however, to insure that this remains a paramount consideration during each step of the repatriation process.

(7) Returnees will experience emotional stress after their return to freedom and families. Reunion of returnees with their

families under ideal conditions (half-way house concept), devoid of official pressure and public exposure, might lessen the shock of repatriation and facilitate their return to society.

(8) Returnees require additional guidance on what they may and may not reveal to the press in order to protect the interests of the returnee, other USPW's, and the US government.

(9) During debriefing, the use of DA prescribed material intended for conduct type investigations and the reading of Article 31, UCMJ, may cause many returnees to believe that the primary purpose of the debriefing is to investigate their conduct during captivity rather than to acquire intelligence information.

b. Recommendations. It is recommended that:

(1) DA (ACSFOR) task CONARC, in coordination with USACDC, to develop a resistance training program structured to account for varying "risk of capture potential" which incorporates practical instruction on:[7]

(a) Communist PW management principles.

(b) Psychological stresses of captivity.

(c) Evasion and escape.

(d) Code of Conduct.

(e) Resistance to interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation.

(f) Internment survival.

(g) Personal affairs and Army NOK assistance programs.

(h) Geneva and Hague Conventions.

(2) DA (ACSFOR) task CONARC, in coordination with USACDC, to revise its doctrinal/technique literature using the results of

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[7] This training program should include a film series similar to the CIA "Risk of Capture" program to insure uniform presentation of material and proper correlation between topical subjects (a) thru (h).

this study to present those subjects, tactics, and techniques, which have been identified as practical aids to the soldier in his efforts to survive the rigors of internment and to resist the manipulative efforts of his captors.

(3) As an interim measure to (1) and (2) above, DA task CONARC, in coordination with USACDC, to publish a pamphlet enumerating and explaining the Communist PW management principles and further, that CONARC and overseas commanders be tasked to use the CONARC pamphlet as source material to insure that every US Soldier is appropriately instructed in Communist PW management principles.

(4) DA (ACSFOR) revise those regulations (AR 350-30 and AR 350-225) most directly related to Code of Conduct policy so that required doctrine and training insure the individual soldier is provided positive guidance, to include practical techniques, on how to resist Communist interrogation and indoctrination to the utmost of his ability.

(5) DA recommend to DOD that a comprehensive interservice/interdepartmental review be conducted of the Code of Conduct and DOD implementing instructions to determine their current adequacy in light of Communist PW management principles and USPW experiences since the Korean War. The review should take cognizance of the fact that DOD implementing instructions do not allow the flexible response to Communist treatment that is necessary if the USPW is to preserve US national security interests and, concurrently, his own health and well being.

(6) DA (TAGO) publish explicit selection criteria for personnel to be used in the NOK notification and family assistance programs. Further, that DA (TAGO) request the Inspector General to make subject programs a matter of increased emphasis during Annual Inspections.

(7) DA (DCSLOG) direct the Office of the Chief of Support Services to review the feasibility of shipping MIA/PW personnel's personal effects to the installation nearest the primary next of kin for delivery by the FSAO.

(8) DA (TAGO) revise AR 190-25 to include:[8]

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[8] TAGO is currently (Feb 72) revising AR 190-25 based on concepts identified in this study. Other areas, identified during the early development of the study, have likewise been reviewed by the DA Staff and are consideration or actually are being implemented. (See para 8, chapter 1, volume II, part 1.)

(a) A comprehensive and detailed "concept of operations" which places proper emphasis on the returnee's welfare and morale during each step of the processing procedure.

(b) Comprehensive public information instructions which clearly delineate the desired returnee/news media relationship.

(9) DA (OTSG) examine the advisability of incorporating a "half-way house" concept as part of the rehabilitation program for returnees and, if considered feasible, make appropriate recommendations to DOD for Army implementation.

(10) DA (TJAG) publish guidance which eliminates, except for cases specifically designated by DA (ACSI/DCSPER), the necessity for any reading of Article 31, UCMJ, during the initial debriefings of returned US Army Prisoners of War when such debriefings are for intelligence purposes only and not associated with conduct investigation.

MAIN REPORT

CHAPTER 1

(U) INTRODUCTION

1. PROBLEM/PURPOSE: Exploitation of captured/detained US military personnel by unfriendly foreign states in recent years, during both peace and war, has dictated the need for a review of present US military doctrine. This exploitation, often in violation of the Geneva Conventions, has served the cause of unfriendly foreign powers by providing a means by which political and other bargaining pressure could be brought to bear on the United States. The problem involves the difficulty of implementing policy relative to training and the inadequacy of guidance to the individual concerning his actions during the pre-internment, internment, and postinternment phases. The purpose of this study is to interpret policy, and to formulate doctrine and procedures which will best support national interests while concurrently preserving the rights and dignity of the individual during and following capture/detention.

2. BACKGROUND:

a. Communist powers have exploited prisoners of war for political and propaganda purposes since the beginning of World War II. During the Korean War, the full brunt of this exploitation was brought to bear against US military personnel. The US Soldier was not trained in the methods and purposes of exploitation, and was inadequately prepared to contend with the threat which they posed. This inadequacy resulted in greater hardships for USPW's and in considerable concern to the United States. Peace petitions and propaganda broadcasts by USPW's shocked the nation and resulted in a great deal of post-war controversy. The Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States was published by Executive Order in 1955 as a behavioral standard for members of the Armed Forces. As it wasn't intended for anything other than a behavioral guide, it made no provisions for a coordinated training program for US military personnel to deal with Communist exploitative procedures. As a result, US military personnel were again inadequately prepared to deal with Communist exploitation when it reappeared in Southeast Asia.

b. During negotiations to terminate the Vietnam conflict, the release of USPW's became a critical issue. Exploitation and mistreatment of USPW's evoked a reaction in the United States. This reaction resulted in the formation of the League of Families and other civilian organizations dedicated to keeping the PW issue

before the public. These organizations have placed heavy pressure on the US government to exert whatever effort is necessary to repatriate USPW's.

c. Communist exploitation has not been the only undesirable experience that the USPW's have had to face. Several servicemen have stated that, upon return to US control, some aspects of reception and processing were inadequate. Major James Nick Rowe of the US Army Special Forces spent more than five years as a captive of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. After his escape in December 1968, he was flown back to the United States for interviews and debriefing. In Major Rowe's opinion, the treatment he received was insensitive and left much to be desired. In his book, (Five Years to Freedom, (Boston, 1971), p. 441) Major Rowe describes his reception and debriefing as follows:

> I was introduced to the group of men in the room after which there was another short period of recalling old acquaintances. Then the formalities began. I was read my rights under Article 31, UCMJ, which affords an individual the right to remain silent during questioning if he so desires. I was informed that anything I might say could be used against me in a court-martial.
>
> My first reaction was shock. My mind recoiled and the reflex action of this sudden cold pretrial procedure made me curl up within myself. "What's going on?" My mind screamed. "What have I done?" The officer continued to go through the format, informing me of my rights and asking me to sign a form indicating that I understood my rights and that I desired to make a statement, not to remain silent.
>
> The feeling of freedom was gone. Once again I was alone and these were interrogators. I looked around the table at the men. They were all watching me.
>
> I suppose my repulsion had been evident to them as I stared at the waiver of rights form, not moving to sign it. Five years of developed cynicism washed over me as I viewed the interrogation procedure

through the eyes of a prisoner and saw this debriefing as being as dogmatic as my former tormentors.

It took a moment before I could convince myself that this was a requirement placed on those men and they were only carrying out their orders.

d. The Communist exploitation of PW's, the formation of domestic quasi-political groups based on the PW issue, the mass media coverage, and the traditional need of the Army to "take care of its own" require that existing doctrine be examined to determine its adequacy for countering the threat posed by Communist prisoner of war management principles. US Army doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel is widely diffused. There is no single source of documentation which prescribes required actions at all levels of command to counter the prisoner of war management techniques employed by potential enemies of the United States. Many US Army policies and procedures are outgrowths of experiences of World War II and the Korean War. They deal largely with adhering to the Geneva Conventions and seeking of reciprocal humane treatment. The Code of Conduct has frequently been misinterpreted by training units, by individuals and, in some cases, not interpreted alike by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. The analysis herein addresses three phases: pre-internment, internment, and postinternment. It examines each phase with a view toward identifying effective countermeasures to Communist prisoner of war management principles. This study is designed to provide resource guidance to Department of the Army, DA staff officers, major commands, training and logistical units, hospitals, and the individual.

3. SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTING STUDIES. There was only one significant contributing study: "A Review of United States Policy on Treatment of Prisoners of War," published by the Office of The Provost Marshal General in December 1968. The Provost Marshal General Study provided substantial input in the nature of background history of current problems and of Communist techniques.

4. ASSUMPTIONS. The study directive contains only one assumption: US military personnel will continue to face the threat of capture or detention during peacetime as well as war.

5. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE. The study synthesizes current policies and procedures pertaining to captured/detained US military personnel at national, Department of Defense and other service levels; determines requirements for new doctrinal literature and/or modifications of

existing literature; and makes recommendations for Army and joint doctrine. Doctrine for military personnel classified as missing, or as defectors, is addressed only to the extent that these individuals are involved in a captive role and/or repatriation process. The study addresses three specific areas:

a. Training prior to internment.

b. Conduct during internment, and doctrine and policy applicable to treatment, release, recovery, or return.

c. Doctrine and policy for captured/detained US military personnel following their recovery or return.

6. STUDY ORGANIZATION. Substantive matter of the study is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 2, "Communist Prisoner of War Management Principles," describes the treatment that USPW's will receive at the hands of Communist captors during the 1972-1975 time frame. Chapter 3 identifies the elements of national and Department of Defense policy impacting upon Army doctrine. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 examine existing doctrine for adequacy in terms of the requirements posed by Communist management principles and National/DOD policy. Chapter 7 identifies the conclusions and recommendations evolving from the study. Individually identified doctrinal requirements are analyzed in discussion/analysis APPENDIXES "H", "I", and "J".

7. DEFINITION: The term "doctrine" is used in this study in its broader context and includes information contained in Army regulations, pamphlets, field manuals, subject schedules, and operational plans.

8. ON-GOING DA ACTIVITIES. During the progress of this study, there has been continuous interaction among members of the study team and representatives of various DA staff sections. As a result, some of the early identified problem areas have become subject of immediate consideration by the DA staff and, in some cases, DA action has been initiated to resolve the problems. Due to the continuous update of programs and policies now occurring at DA, there are a number of recommendations in chapter 7 that may be completed prior to final publication of this study. Examples of such action are:

a. Revision of AR 190-25 to include expanded guidance on the need for continuing concern for the welfare and morale of the returnees throughout their processing and expanded guidance on returnee/news media relationship.

b. Publication in August 1971 of DA Pamphlet 608-33, Survivor Assistance Officer and Family Services and Assistance Officer Handbook, which details the duties (although not the selection criteria) of the Family Services and Assistance Officer.

c. Publication in January 1972 of DA Pamphlet 608-34, Handbook for Next of Kin of Army Prisoners of War/Missing Personnel, which provides information on services and assistance available to the next of kin of US Army PW/MIA personnel.

d. AR 600-10 is currently (Feb 72) under revision by the Adjutant General.

e. Deletion from USA Intelligence Command's Debriefing Operation Plan 107-71 and other pertinent regulations of referenced publications which provide interrogation techniques for counterintelligence or conduct debriefings.

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CHAPTER 2

~~(S/NF)~~ COMMUNIST PRISONER OF WAR MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES (U)

SECTION I: (U) GENERAL

1. HYPOTHESIS:

a. The existence of deliberate, time-tested, and documented prisoner of war (PW) management procedures provides a Communist State with the capability to exploit American prisoners. The opportunity for such exploitation exists in Southeast Asia as long as hostilities continue. Additional opportunities are presented by inadvertent overflights of Communist territory by U.S. aircraft and by seizures of U.S. vessels upon the high seas.

b. A review of Communist management principles used by the various Communist Powers was sufficient to indicate a thread of similarity. This thread extends from the prisons currently holding U.S. personnel in North Vietnam back to the hard labor camps in Siberia during the early days of the Soviet Union. The hypothesis was made that these procedures have been refined after application upon millions of human subjects who have undergone exploitation by Communist captors. The present level of sophistication in PW management is represented by the treatment of American captives by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). The precise identification of these procedures (or principles) would be the key to devising the steps required to combat them or at least lessen their effectiveness. Based on these assumptions, this in-depth analysis of Communist management principles was initiated.

2. METHODOLOGY:

a. In order to minutely examine the "thread" mentioned in the above hypothesis, a detailed bibliographic search was conducted. The volume and quality of the material available varied for each of the conflicts reviewed. Material directly relating to the Russian treatment of German and Japanese prisoners of war, though scarce, was specific enough for the purpose of evaluation.

b. The amount of material available for review on the Korean War and the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo was prolific. Due to the controversy which raged over the alleged misconduct of the USPW in the Chinese/North Korean prisoner of war camps, every expert in the field minutely examined the Communist procedures in an attempt

to either prove or disprove the collaboration thesis. Similarly, recent published accounts by the captain and crew of the USS Pueblo made the task of analyzing the North Korean interrogation and indoctrination techniques considerably easier than that encountered for the Soviets in World War II.

c. The preponderance of material available came from the Korean War/Pueblo. Since these two incidents represent confrontations between Communist management techniques and the USPW, greater emphasis has been placed on the data derived from these incidents than on data derived from the experiences of USPW's in German/Japanese custody during World War II.

d. The scarcity of published materials on the management principles applied by the NVA/VC is due primarily to the relative sensitivity of the material and the resultant security classification placed upon it. To overcome this problem, an examination was conducted of individual case histories (official debriefings) of the nine returnees (6 USAF, 3 USN) from North Vietnam and thirty-three (24 USA, 9 USMC) of the forty-four from South Vietnam (as of 1 September 1970). The major management techniques were reviewed, and a statistical analysis was performed. This consisted primarily of subdividing each major technique into important sub-elements; i.e., interrogation was subdivided into occurrence, frequency, purpose, technique, and facilities. Individual experience factors were then applied to obtain percentages of application. This resulted in the tentative identification of those techniques and sub-elements which are most frequently employed by the NVA/VC. Again, as in the examination of the Korean War experience and the Pueblo, the "thread" was there. Many of the techniques used in North Vietnam or in the jungles of South Vietnam originated in the Soviet Union prior to, during, and following World War II.

e. Every effort was made to retain objectivity in the analysis of the techniques. No preconceived notions were apparent at the time the investigation of Communist management techniques was undertaken. The hypothesis that these techniques have been developed and refined by Communist States over the past thirty years was proposed only after an examination of their historical background. The striking similarity of techniques utilized by the various Communist States in the conflicts examined validates this hypothesis.

f. As a final note, many of the techniques described herein as manifestations of Communist management principles were used long before the advent of Communism. Although not peculiarly Communistic

in execution, the fact that they have been adopted, refined, and applied by the Communists on a universal scale labels them as techniques of Communist doctrine for exploiting prisoners of war.

3. LIMITATIONS:

a. The principles and techniques being used by enemy forces in North and South Vietnam represent the culmination of thirty years refinement of Communist management techniques. Unfortunately, our knowledge of these present practices is incomplete since the number of PW who have escaped or been repatriated represents only a small fraction of those held. Consequently, any conclusions based on the experiences of these returnees must be regarded as only tentative.

b. Further complicating the analysis is the fact that the Communists selected those who would be released and, therefore, the sample cannot be considered random. The fact that they were selected for repatriation in no way impugns the character of those repatriated. However, it does cause speculation concerning Communist intentions. A conclusive analysis of Communist intentions will have to wait until all USPW's in Southeast Asia have been repatriated.

c. Although the small sample limits analysis, it does not nullify the value of the information extracted from the official debriefs of repatriates and/or escapees. As indicated in the discussion on methodology, the "thread" of similarity was readily apparent as the repatriates/escapees related their experiences. Their experiences varied but this was due more to the differences in the number of prisoners held than to new or unique innovations to proven procedures. The extensive use of isolation by the North Vietnamese is the most readily apparent example. The relatively small number of USPW's on hand and the ready availability of former French prisons permits the North Vietnamese to use this technique to the maximum. However, the reasons for using isolation in North Vietnam are identical to those that warranted its use in Korea in the early 1950's and in the Soviet Union in the 1940's. Due to the similarities revealed, it is possible, in spite of the limited sample, to make reasonable judgments as to the techniques currently being applied to USPW's.

d. Although the amount of reference material available on the Korean War is prolific, the majority of the data involved is focused on the investigations that took place shortly after the repatriation of the majority of the PW's during Operation Big Switch. Most

writers and analysts have confined their approaches to dividing the USPW's into three categories: resisters, collaborators, and middlemen. They proceeded from there to prove or disprove mass collaboration, limited collaboration, or in some cases, just collaboration. Consequently, the data is more concerned with USPW responses to the pressures applied than to what the Communists did to gain their objectives. The shifting and rearrangement of priorities was the first task. This was done to insure that alleged collaboration or non-collaboration of the USPW did not become an identifiable issue in the study. Objectivity was constantly sought in order to obtain an unbiased picture of Communist management principles.

4. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION:

a. The remainder of the chapter is divided into five sections. The first represents the historical development of prisoners of war treatment by Communist Powers. The discussion includes the treatment of PW's by Soviet Union during World War II, the experiences of the USPW in both Korea and Vietnam, the ordeal of the Pueblo crew at the hands of the North Koreans, and the detention of the three-man helicopter crew shot down in 1969 over North Korea.

b. The second section discusses and analyzes the individual techniques used to condition the prisoner of war and facilitate his exploitation. This discussion includes camp management, interrogation, isolation, segregation, indoctrination, and exploitation.

c. The third section presents the impact of these techniques on the prisoner of war. It summarizes the sequence of events of the PW will experience from capture to repatriation and the significance of each event to him and his survival.

d. The fourth section identifies significant US Army doctrinal requirements generated by the Communists' treatment of prisoners of war. In subsequent chapters, Army doctrine will be reviewed in depth to determine its adequacy to meet the challenges represented by these requirements.

e. The last section provides in as concise a fashion as possible the significant findings based on the analysis of Communist prisoner of war management principles.

5. SUMMARY:

a. The underlying hypothesis of this study is that there is a consistent pattern of Communist exploitation of PW's which constitutes a

threat to both the individual PW and to his country. Understanding this pattern of exploitation is the necessary prerequisite to devising means to counter its effectiveness.

b. The objective is not to prove or disprove alleged individual or group collaboration, but to identify the means by which Communist States attempt to exploit the captives they hold. Sufficient material is available to allow such an identification to take place. However, the complete picture of what is happening to USPW's in South and North Vietnam will have to await the termination of hostilities and the exchange of prisoners.

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SECTION II: (S/NF) THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

1. (C) USSR PRACTICES WORLD WAR II:

a. (C) General:

(1) (U) The pattern for Communist management of prisoners of war evolved during World War II and was displayed in the Soviet Union's handling of German, Japanese and other captives. The pattern that emerged was deeply rooted in the Soviet Union's past. Its origin can be traced to the penal experience gained in dealing with large masses of political prisoners generated by the collectivization efforts and the large purges of the 1930's. Millions were imprisoned in slave labor camps. It is estimated, based on official government figures, that 6 1/2 to 7 million people were imprisoned in 1940 - considered a comparatively low period for camp population. In the immediate post World War II period, it is estimated that this total had grown to 15-17 million with the inclusion of enemy prisoners of war, repatriated former soldiers, civilians requiring "rehabilitation," and ethnic groups punished for collaborating with the enemy.[1] Official Soviet policy recognized, at an early stage, the principle that prison labor should be exploited to benefit the state. Prison labor was accepted as a normal component of the Soviet economy. Administrative staffs of slave labor camps were required to meet production quotas and operated under an elaborate system of penalties and rewards.[2] This principle was carried over into the management of war prisoners.

(2) (U) The Soviet PW program was characterized and dominated by the political ideology of Communism. In varying degrees this central theme is the core of all PW programs devised by various Communist countries in the 20th Century. It explains Communist emphasis on indoctrination as opposed to interrogation and provides a rationale for the use of such techniques as self-criticism, repetitive in-depth personal history statements, group discussions and seminars, individual study sessions, and signed confessions.

(3) (U) Since its inception, the Soviet Union has been concerned not only with economic and political goals but with psychological goals involving the beliefs, loyalties and behavior which it sought to instill into the masses of people.[3] The individual is viewed as a productive unit who must play his allotted role in Communist society whether he be prisoner or citizen. His behavior is judged according to the contributions it makes to the state. Every effort is made to prevent the development of the

Western concept of individualism.[4] In its place, the concept of the "individual-as-a-member-of-a-collective" is substituted. Indoctrination aims at identifying personal goals with social goals; personal interest is consciously subordinated to social interest.[5] The ultimate goal of indoctrination and education in Communist society is to develop in the individual such a level of consciousness that he will perceive party goals as if they were his own. The first and most important trait of "Soviet discipline" is subordination of the individual. Initiative is defined as an "independent search for the best way to fulfill a command."[6] It is a readiness to do one's duty without waiting for an order or reminder. Captured U.S. military personnel in the hands of the Communists experienced frustration when their indoctrinators refused to accept the parroting of terms and slogans which the prisoners had been spoonfed. They preferred a response which showed that the prisoner had accepted and could put into his own words the thoughts behind the terms and slogans. The requirement for repetitive, in-depth, personal history statements on prisoners reflects Communism's notorious invasion of privacy. Every thought and act of an individual is considered the common property of the group within which he functions. Individuality is submerged to achieve "collectivism." When personal independence is expressed, the individual is publicly humiliated. This is achieved by the technique of group and self-criticism. In addition to overcoming individualism the process exposes errors and is used to instill collective norms. It also permits a changing of personality thereby assisting the individual in regaining his self-esteem and respect.

(4) (U) Another root source upon which Soviet PW management principles are based involves the concept "that the characteristics and traits of human beings can be shaped in desired directions."[7] A major goal of the Communists after seizing power in Russia was the establishment of a new, more perfect society. They therefore set themselves the task of changing people--their moral attitudes, their characters, and their intellectual viewpoints. To achieve this end, they adopted the Pavlovian condition-response principle as the guiding principle in their approach to both individual and mass indoctrination. It was the Communist view that the ideal Soviet man could not be developed until Communism had achieved world domination or until the carriers of the remnants of capitalism in human nature had died or were completely reeducated.[8] Soviet PW indoctrination techniques reflected exploitation of Pavlovian principles. In his experiments with animals, Pavlov had determined that conditioned reflex could be developed more

readily in a quiet laboratory with a minimum of disturbing stimuli. This confirmed the findings of animal trainers who had long known that isolation and patient repetition of stimuli are required to tame wild life. Pavlov formulated his findings into a general rule in which the speed of learning is positively correlated with quiet and isolation. This principle was adopted by Soviet authorities for the reeducation or indoctrination of political and other prisoners. A similar policy was followed regarding another of Pavlov's findings. Namely, that some animals learned more quickly if they were rewarded (by affection, by food, by stroking) each time they showed the right response, while others learned more quickly when the penalty for not learning was a painful stimulus. This had significance for the Soviet indoctrinator as well as for the psychology of learning. Reward or punishment were stimuli to learning, depending upon the individual involved. It became the task of the indoctrinator to determine which stimulus would prove most effective with a prospective victim. For that reason, considerable care was taken to assess a prisoner's personality. Pavlov's findings, therefore, provided the basis for careful personality assessment and for the use of such indoctrination techniques as reward, punishment, and isolation.

(5) (C) There were five distinct phases in the Soviet treatment of German PW's during and after World War II.[9] Very few prisoners were taken during the first phase which extended from the opening of hostilities to the spring of 1942. The second phase, which lasted until the Stalingrad campaign of 1943, was marked by improved PW treatment resulting from the enforcement of Red Army discipline and recognition of the value of prison labor. The third phase, extending to the end of the war, was characterized by the extensive exploitation of prisoners for propaganda and political purposes. Selected PW's were trained to form the nucleus of a Communist movement and espionage system in post-war Germany. Phase four, which lasted until the autumn of 1947, was a particularly difficult one for the PW's. There were made to suffer punishment for what was viewed as the collective guilt of the German people. Maximum use was made of prison labor and many received long sentences for "war crimes." Guilt by association was practiced. Service with a unit that at one time or another may have perpetuated a war crime was sufficient evidence for penal action regardless of whether the individual was with the unit at the time. Phase five, which lasted until the repatriation process was well underway in 1950, was marked by better treatment and an intense propaganda and indoctrination campaign as well as renewed efforts to find "war criminals." The latter provided the Russians with an excuse to detain PW's which they did not wish to repatriate.

(6) (C) Tactical intelligence was conducted by Red Army intelligence agencies; however, the State Security Police (NKVD) played the leading role in strategic interrogation and was charged with the evacuation, security, care, and utilization of PW's. The NKVD was also responsible for the political reeducation of the PW (indoctrination) and the initiation of various anti-fascist movements.[10]

(7) (C) Communist ideology strongly influenced the interrogation and indoctrination process. Soviet PW directives frequently mentioned class distinctions, and interrogators were required to establish the social origin of each prisoner. A captured Russian PW directive dated 3 October 1941 illustrates the influence of Communist ideology on the PW program:

> From the moment of his capture by the Red Army and during the entire duration of his captivity, the enemy enlisted man (Officer) must be under continuous indoctrination by political workers. The basic objectives of this indoctrination is:
>
> a. To discover, unmask, and isolate fascist elements;
> b. To arouse class consciousness and to re-educate along anti-fascist lines the soldiers who were deceived by Hitler and his henchmen;
> c. To round up soldiers of anti-fascist conviction and to give them a comprehensive political indoctrination.
>
> The political interrogation of prisoners of war is to pursue the following objectives:
>
> a. To ascertain the political and moral attitude of interrogated personnel;
> b. To ascertain the political and moral condition of the unit in which the prisoner served;
> c. To determine the type of ideological training which the soldiers had received as well as the subject matter of such training and the topics used in discussions;
> d. To obtain information on the effect of Russian propaganda and on anti-fascist activity among the enemy's frontline troops and the Army rear area.

e. To indoctrinate the prisoner morally and politically so as to unmask fascism and arouse sympathies for the Worker's Council among the elements which were socially akin;
f. To collect material and information which might be important to Russian propaganda efforts directed at the enemy's troops and population.[11]

(8) (C) Political interrogations were carried out at division, Army, and Army Group levels in the field. The interrogator followed a questionnaire designed to probe into the details of the prisoner's life, education, political attitude, and attitude toward Soviet propaganda. A copy of the interrogation report was sent with each prisoner and became an important part of the dossier kept by the NKVD. It is interesting to note that even during these early stages of interrogation questions were often related to morale, political orientation of the individual, rank relationships, and what was happening on the home front. It was the task of intelligence officers to obtain tactical order of battle information while the political section sought information concerning economic conditions, politics, morale, and discipline, prior to the NKVD's assumption of responsibility for the prisoner. A variety of interrogation techniques were utilized by the Russians. Sessions were often frequent and lengthy despite the vast number of war prisoners held in captivity. Reward and punishment was a favored principle employed. Threats and tempting offers of freedom were alternately used. A conscious effort was made to keep the prisoner off balance. It was not unusual for him to be awakened in the middle of the night and accused of some crime, omission, or falsehood. Sentences of several years were meted out for minor offenses. A conviction resulted in the loss of PW status and meant transfer to a convict labor camp. Brutality was frequently employed to obtain signed confessions and information. Often detention facilities employed during the interrogation process were so constructed that it was impossible for the prisoner to stand or lie down. This, coupled with the fact that the cells were unheated, intensified the stress experienced by the prisoner.

(9) (C) Officers and enlisted men were segregated by sending them to different camps. The officers were also segregated according to rank. The purpose of this action was to eliminate command influence and deny mature leadership. This facilitated Communist management principles of interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation.

(10) (C) The organized, concerted indoctrination program began at the permanent PW camps. All captives were forced to take part in an anti-fascist program consisting basically of evening meetings in which the PW listened to lectures and readings from books, magazines, and the camp newspaper. An attempt was made to make participation in the program voluntary. At first, the meetings were led by Soviet political officers or German Communists who had been in Russia for several years before the war. Later the program was turned over to collaborating prisoners who had been sent to specially established anti-fascist schools and occupied privileged positions in the camps. A display of resistance or apathy toward the program by the prisoner resulted in punishment or discrimination in the form of an increased work load, reduced rations, or isolation. Improved treatment and early repatriation were promised those prisoners who showed progress in their reeducation. In order to weaken group solidarity and morale, diaries and letters of dead German officers expressing defeatist attitudes were distributed to newly captured prisoners. This helped to discredit the officer class and weakened the enlisted prisoners' faith in the German hierarchy.

(11) (U) Prisoner exploitation by the Russians took various forms. German prisoners were duped into making recordings ostensibly to indicate to their friends and relatives that they were alive and well. Instead, the recordings were used as tactical propaganda directed at the German Armed Forces. The most dramatic propaganda exploitation of the German PW's involved the formation of the "National Committee for Free Germany" (NKFD). It was given the appearance of a spontaneous movement on the part of the prisoners. Its goal was to promote active opposition to the Hitler regime within Germany. High ranking German prisoners were identified with this organization, often against their wishes and without their knowledge.[12] Use of their respected names on peace petitions helped to sow confusion among the PW's resulting in divided loyalties and weakened group solidarity.

(12) (C) An indication of the manner in which German PW's were recruited for exploitation is provided by the following account:

> In mid-March 1945, the subject (German Lieutenant) was taken prisoner by the Russians in Silesia. He was escorted with two other German officers... to a village where they were interrogated by the Russians. A Captain P_____ was the interrogator....

> During the course of his interrogation, the subject was shown a propaganda leaflet written in German which he criticized as not being of the right composition to appeal to the German mentality. This appeared to interest his interrogator who later told him that he could choose between a prisoner camp or helping the Russians with their propaganda. After short consideration, subject accepted the second alternative....His first assignment was broadcasting by loudspeaker from a truck....(Subject was later sent to an anti-fascist school and became a Soviet agent in the American zone of occupation in German.[13]

(13) (U) A concerted effort was made to exploit specific groups. Of particular interest to the Russians were professional men, members of the "intelligentsia," or those who had held positions of leadership in their homeland prior to the war. By careful indoctrination and preferential treatment, the Russians sought to develop pro-Communist attitudes in a group which would assume a leadership role in post-war Germany. A description of one of the "Intelligentsia Camps" is provided in Fehling's work One Great Prison:

> Here at Krasnogorsk (camp near Moscow), there are officers and soldiers of all ages and ranks. Many staff officers, officers from headquarters still wearing broad and red stripes on their trousers, chaplains of both conversions, doctors, from the young assistant up to noted German professor, famous men of science, and especially engineers. But there are also craftsmen and laborers. All those who in any way belong to the intelligentsia are deliberately concentrated in Krasnogorsk.[14]

Professional men with needed skills were also used on high-priority projects to benefit the state. In most instances, the physical conditions of the prisoners were good. An outline of the way of life which prevailed in these "professional" prisons is provided in Solzhenitsyn's novel The First Circle.[15]

(14) (U) An idea of the general treatment accorded German prisoners of war can be gleaned from a survey conducted with 200 returnees, between 1 December 1949 and 10 February 1950. Ninety

percent of these former prisoners of the Russians stated that the treatment received had been poor. All of the prisoners stated that they were periodically beaten and mistreated. Food consisted of 400 grams of bread and 500 grams of soup (daily). Prisoners received meat of the worst quality on an average of twice a week. Sleeping facilities consisted of wooden bunks without mattresses, and each prisoner received one blanket. Heat was kept at a minimum, and wood was rationed. In most cases, room temperature did not exceed 55 degrees. Medical care and treatment was very bad and most camps lacked medical supplies. The German doctors tried their best with the equipment on hand, but many prisoners died of exhaustion, malnutrition, tuberculosis. Working conditions were deplorable. Each prisoner had a quota to meet which was practically impossible on a ten-hour-a-day schedule. Propaganda against capitalistic systems, specifically against the United States, was preached daily for one hour. Ninety percent of the prisoners stated that they were not impressed with the Communist system and were not misled by the Russian propaganda methods employed. Ten percent of the prisoners who attended "Anti-Fascist" schools stated that treatment was excellent and that housing facilities included beds, mattresses, and other comforts. Medical facilities were fair, and food was plentiful. Working conditions were also excellent.[16]

(15) (U) The number of German prisoners held by the Russians will never be precisely known, but the figure has been estimated in excess of 7 million. Of this number fewer than half returned home. One million were listed as having died in captivity while the fate of 2 1/2 million remains unknown.[17]

(16) ~~(C)~~ Approximately 1 1/2 million Japanese soldiers and civilians became prisoners of the Red Army at the close of World War II. They were interned in over 800 labor camps where the death rate was high. Their prisoner of war experience paralleled that of the Germans. The Soviets carried on an intensive indoctrination program with the general objective of extending Soviet ideology into Japan by converting prisoners to Communism before their repatriation. Prisoners were also selected and trained to perform intelligence missions following repatriation or to become the nucleus of a militant pro-Soviet movement in Japan.[18] The indoctrination program was skillfully adapted to Japanese habit and thought and progressed through three stages. The first was designed to develop a pro-Russian attitude among the prisoners. The second attempted to inculcate the prisoners with Communist ideology. The third consisted of an intense anti-American propaganda campaign.

b. (U) Summary - USSR Practices:

(1) In summary, this examination of Soviet PW programs, objectives, policies, and procedures identifies the basic principles for the Communist management of PW's. The basic objective of the overall program, as derived from this analysis, was the maximum exploitation of the prisoner. This exploitation took the following form:

(a) Economic - the prisoner was considered a productive unit and was required to meet economic objectives. Prison labor, both skilled and unskilled, was utilized to benefit the state.

(b) Political and Propaganda - to meet national objectives and influence world opinion the prisoner served as a tool of propaganda.

(c) Intelligence and Subversion - PW's were recognized as a prime source for the recruitment of agents and for spreading the Communist cause.

(2) Undergirding the Soview PW program was the political ideology of Communism which formed the base for the policies and procedures which evolved. Belief in the controlled "regeneration" of the individual led to the employment of procedures (indoctrination, isolation, questionnaires, discussions, study, and criticism) designed to change or re-form prisoner attitudes, beliefs, and personality.

(3) In pursuing their objectives the Soviets utilized many techniques some of which have already been described. They evolved and underwent change during World War II and in the immediate post-war era. Emphasis in the use of these techniques frequently shifted; however, certain procedures tended to remain constant. These included:

(a) Segregation of prisoners according to rank, class, position, skills, and political conviction.

(b) Detailed interrogation to obtain intelligence, assess personality, and gain detailed knowledge of an individual's personal history.

(c) The use of brutality and coercive tactics during interrogation.

(d) A concerted effort to isolate the personality and establish within the prisoner a feeling of dependency.

(e) Intense indoctrination to undermine personal loyalties and prepare the individual for exploitation.

(f) Deliberate use of reward and punishment as means for conditioning the prisoner.

(g) Use of misinformation and informers to destroy morale, weaken group solidarity, and enhance control.

(h) Deliberate efforts to undermine the personal integrity of the prisoner ("peace" petitions, confessions, and propaganda tapes).

(i) Location of prison camps in remote areas to reduce the need for security measures that would drain resources (exceptions to this rule included work compounds for skilled workers and privileged groups).

(j) Principle of Accountability - the performance rating of prison staffs was dependent upon meeting required production quotas and/or indoctrination objectives.

(k) Minimum allocation of resources to support the physical requirements (food, clothing, shelter, heat, and medical care) of the prisoners.

(l) The use of inducements to win cooperative behavior including, with some exceptions, early repatriation.

(m) Treatment as "war criminals" and loss of PW status for staunch resisters.

2. (C) THE KOREAN WAR:

a. (C) General:

(1) The United States first direct exposure to Communist management principles employed against prisoners of war occurred during the Korean conflict, 1950-53. The publicity given to Communist treatment of U.S. prisoners by the mass media impacted heavily on both the U.S. military and the general public. They were shocked and dismayed

not only by the high prison camp death rate but also by the claims of allegedly widespread collaboration with the enemy. Bitter controversy ensued between concerned individuals who felt that current service policy expected too much of an American PW when under Communist control and those who criticized both service policy and American society in general for so ill-equipping the individual to face the contingency of capture. This led to official and unofficial reports, surveys, books, and articles all stressing the physical aspects of Communist PW treatment. As a result, changes were recommended to service training; and a Code of Conduct was developed for members of the Armed Forces to guide their actions in the event of capture. Little attention was paid to Communist ideology which undergirded the Communist PW system or to Soviet penal experience which strongly influenced the PW policy and procedures of other Communist countries. Instead, attention was focused on "root causes" for USPW defection and/or collaboration. No real attempt was made to develop an understanding of the nature of the threat. Variation in the treatment of USPW's was interpreted as forming no general pattern, and the harshness which they encountered was often attributed to the enemy's logistical problems rather than to a deliberate application of policy. An exception to this approach was an excellent study conducted by a Joint Services Team in 1954 entitled, "US Prisoners of War in the Korean Operation," and published by the Army Security Center, Fort Meade, Maryland. It contained a detailed account of Communist management principles employed during the Korean War and, in addition, warned that in any future conflict with Communist nations the U.S. prisoner of war would continue to be a helpless victim of exploitation. Further, it accurately predicted that the handling and treatment of U.S. prisoners in Korea might be repeated in any future conflict with Asiatic Communism. The following description of the USPW treatment in Korea is largely taken from this study:

The first American PW's were captured during the month of July, 1950. They were moved North in stages to the vicinity of Mampo, North Korea (NK), where they were held until 31 October 1950. During this period, the first propaganda broadcasts were made by captured U.S. personnel and peace groups were formed. This was a clear indication that the North Koreans were following the Soviet pattern of prisoner of war management. Confinement in the PW camps of North Korea may be considered in three phases.[19] The first extended from July 1950 to the following November, at which time the Chinese Communist forces (CCF) entered the war. During this phase of the war, the North Korean Army (NKA) was in sole charge of

the prisoners and conditions were severe. Camps were mobile rather than fixed. It was during this phase that the infamous death march was made. Of the 651 USPW's who started the 9-day forced march from Manpo to Chunggang-jin, 80-100 died from exposure and fatigue.[20] The second phase began in December 1950 and extended through the spring of 1951. During this period, many Americans were captured, and the first permanent camps were established. Joint control over the prisoners was exercised by the NKA and the CCF. Conditions worsened, and the majority of deaths occurred during this time. The third phase marked the elimination of temporary camps after the spring of 1951 and extended until the end of the internment period in the summer of 1953. With the exception of "Pak's Palace" and Camp 12, the Chinese had sole control over the prisoners. Conditions improved, and the death rate declined.

(2) "PW's were segregated according to nationality, rank, race, and in some cases, on the basis of their susceptibility or resistance to indoctrination."[21] A conscious effort was made to obliterate the concept of rank. Prisoners were considered as dupes of "Wall Street" who had been drafted to fight its wars rather than as soldiers, worthy of rank and privilege. They were organized into squads, platoons, and companies under the control of the North Korean Security Police. The occupants of each hut, or room in larger huts, were considered squads and a leader was appointed by the North Koreans. The CCF command structure of a prison camp consisted of a camp commander, company commanders (controlling a company of PW's ranging in size from 60-350 men), platoon leaders, and instructors. The camp was divided along political and military lines with both functions being exercised by the camp commander. Company commanders were concerned with military administration and discipline. Their political counterpart, the company instructor, had the greatest impact on the prisoners. He acted as an interpreter, lectured, and administered punishment. He could recommend medical assistance and influence work assignments. Platoon leaders were concerned with assigning work details and keeping headcount. Platoon instructors were responsible for indoctrination at platoon level. PW squad leaders, appointed by the Chinese, were responsible for food and supply distribution, choosing prisoners for details and seeing to it that they were properly formed.

(3) Interrogation of U.S. prisoners stressed strategic rather than tactical intelligence.[22] In addition, it followed the pattern developed by the Soviet Union in World War II, emphasizing intensive questioning along personal-political lines. Both the NKA

and the CCF indicated greater interest in this field than in either tactical or strategic military interrogation.[23] North Korean prisoner of war interrogation was the responsibility of the Preliminary Investigation Section of the Military Security Bureau. It functioned directly under the North Korean Social Security Ministry. "It was an elite group composed largely of Koreans born or educated under Communist tutelage in the USSR."[24] Prisoners received their first interrogation at the hand of a nine-man team located at regimental PW collecting points. They were required to give their name, rank, serial number, identification of their units, and identity of adjacent units and boundaries. Few attempts were made to expand on this information and the whole process seldom took more than 15-30 minutes. A relatively small number of prisoners were selected for intensive questioning to gain strategic information. Many questions were directed along political and personal lines with the aim of assessing personality and political stability. Normally the prisoner was not interrogated again until he reached a permanent camp. There were exceptions to this rule. A US Army lieutenant captured in 1950 was required to complete a questionnaire containing 250 questions at the regimental PW collecting point. The questions were of a military, personal, and political nature. He was then interrogated for an hour at division level by a Soviet Army Officer dressed in the uniform of an NKA captain. Questions were non-military in nature and generally covered political subjects. Next came an interrogation lasting 5 to 6 hours at Corps. Again the theme was political. Great pains were taken to explain the basic tenets of Communist ideology. The fourth interrogation took place at Army level lasting 8 hours. It was conducted by two civilians, in the presence of two Soviet officers, and was more in the nature of an indoctrination than a questioning on military subjects. Personal history forms and repetitive autobiographical statements provided the interrogators with a wealth of statistical and personal information which was used to assess personality, a prerequisite for political and propaganda exploitation. The PW was categorized as to wealth, class, position, and educational level. Special interrogation centers were established by the North Koreans for the intensive interrogation of select prisoners, usually Air Force crew members and US Army Officers with technical backgrounds. The approach was generally informal and the interrogation was more like a topical discussion. For example, a general topic such as "bridges" would be assigned and the PW would write a paper on the topic. The next session would require him to be more specific by developing an essay on the "Bailey" Bridge. Extreme physical violence was the exception rather than the rule. During interrogation, the PW was placed in a severely uncomfortable position and was subjected to questions

designed to bring about mental stress. Brutal treatment was usually administered only for offenses more serious than merely resisting interrogation. However, physical pressure or duress was employed as a principal interrogation technique during the extraction of Bacteriological Warfare confessions.[25] PW's were frequently reminded that their captors had the power to take their lives but threats of immediate death for refusal to talk were rare. Many PW's reported such abuses as having to stand at attention for several hours, sometimes in the cold, and being slapped in the face by their interrogators. A few were thrown in "the hole," and others were deprived of food. No PW in Korea is known to have died as a direct result of resisting interrogation. CCF's interrogation resembled that of the North Koreans except that it was more thorough. The CCF carefully studied and analyzed the results of their interrogation. A captured booklet issued by the CCF, March 1951, entitled "How to Interrogate Prisoners of War," describes the thoroughness of CCF's interrogation:[26]

THE TASK OF POW INTERROGATIONS

~~Let~~ We have interrogated more than 30 American POW's since we entered the Korean War. They are officers and EM from the rank of lieutenant colonel down, and from various branches of service, such as Air Force, infantry, engineer, tank, and artillery units. Twenty-two files of systematic material have been made pertaining to this matter. The interrogation of American POW's is a new task. With our differences and our limited knowledge of their characteristics and thought, we have, so far, in the past four months, gained some experience; however, methods will be developed step-by-step according to circumstances. As for battlefield interrogation, this book only mentions it for reference.

1. The preliminary preparation.

A. Selection of subjects. If there is only one prisoner, there is no necessity for selection. If there are a few or many POW's, those with the longest service, the most experience, or with a speciality, should be selected for interrogation. It is better if the prisoner

to be interrogated has an open mind and progressive thought (generally there are very few among the officers). It is bad to select an ignorant, stupid, professional soldier. Therefore, our officers should hold a preliminary conversation with the prisoner to select the proper ones for questioning.

B. After POWs are registered and personal data obtained, draw up a plan based on the general intention and practice a situation to group the POWs under the control and guidance of the officers-in-charge and the interpreters. This should be done in accordance with the ability of the members assigned to this duty.

C. Prepare a concrete plan for the interrogation of POWs (summarized procedure and methods, et cetera) and then summon groups to conduct research and discussion in order to let everyone know his duties and how they should be done. At the same time tasks should be distributed among the groups.

2. Procedures.

A. Comprehension of the prisoners' historical and political attitudes: Establish a foundation for the interrogation and training of the POWs by understanding the practical experience they have undergone since they enlisted in the service, and their views and personal attitudes towards the Korean War.

B. Interpretation of our policy and conduct of training: Interpret our policy of treating the POWs well in order to overcome their hesitation, then explain to them in significance of such big problems as the nature of the war, et cetera, in order to reform their thoughts and combat their pride. By this process we can also secure a knowledge of their political attitudes and their personalities, which is helpful in the selection of methods or attitudes with which to approach them.

C. Questioning: The choice of a written or oral form of interrogation is to be determined by the practical situation. For instance, for information on the organization, strength and tactics used by the US Army, et cetera, the POWs should be questioned orally; while other information such as brief histories of the officers, et cetera, should be written by the POWs themselves according to the subjects prescribed for them. (This, of course, depends upon the cultural standard of the POW.)

D. Interrogation: A well-prepared (method) of interrogation is necessary for the stubborn, cunning and reactionary POWs who try to deceive and ignore us; however, we must not forget to make use of their weak points (such as fear of death, homesickness, anti-war tendencies, et cetera). Whenever a contradiction in the words of the POW is found, his tricks should be carefully uncovered by questioning with a severe attitude. However, this is not to be considered as a general method.

E. Meeting of the POW: To solve problems of contradiction and to supplement and verify the statements, we must be well-prepared beforehand, before a meeting of the POWs can be held (the preparation includes deciding upon the contradictory points to be discussed, the cultivation of active POWs, procurement of more materials, and rectifying the contradictions in the materials). During the meeting, order must be preserved (prevent the POWs from damaging the meeting place, et cetera). To save time only valuable POWs are to be summoned for the meeting.

F. Arrangements.

G. Checking, amending and supplementing: Among the above procedures, only the "comprehension of historical and political attitudes," "Conduct of training" and the "Arrangements" are imperative; other items may either be

adopted or discarded to suit the practical situation. Do not stick to the rules too rigidly.

3. Typical characteristics of American POWs and the attitude and methods to be adopted.

The basic characteristics of American POWs are fear of death, homesickness, and anti-war tendencies. They do not have a clear understanding of their aggressive war in Korea. They were profoundly indoctrinated with reactionary ways of thinking before being conscripted and deceived by being sent to Korea. They especially long for the American way of life. If we can make use of their fear of death, homesickness, and their unstable standpoint, and give them good living conditions, we will find that they are not stubborn, and after they understand our policy, they will generally give us information.

The POWs we have met so far are generally of the following types:

(1) Active ones: These are chiefly young enlisted men of higher quality, they accept our way of thinking, are willing and have the courage to speak and speak actively. We should do our best to encourage and train this type of POW and give them due consideration in order to make them work for us and supply us with information. We may ask them to write according to the subjects we present to them. In this way they are allowed to express themselves freely and more information can be obtained.

(2) Pretended active ones: They pretend to be very active in order to be treated with consideration or to procure certain personal benefits. However, basically speaking, they are useful in supplying information to us, although their motives in giving information

are dishonest. We should train those who are "backward," and handle those who are willing to supply information with a severe attitude without revealing that we know their true intention. This attitude can prevent them from constantly demanding better treatment, and so forth.

(3) Reactionary, fearful and homesick ones with an unstable viewpoint, but who are willing to supply information: We should make use of their weak points, handle them with a severe attitude and make them respect us. However, as long as they give information, do not spend too much time training them politically.

(4) Cowardly and hesitant ones who give only insignificant or ambiguous information: The usually try to flatter and pretend to be friendly toward us after giving a little information. For this type of POW we should seize upon their contradictory points and their basic weak points of cowardliness and fear of death and treat them roughly to force them to obey. Formal joint interrogation was adopted with effective results.

(5) Stubborn ones who simply say "I don't know," and are nevertheless still fearful and homesick: We should handle them with severity from the very beginning. Treat them roughly and then put them away for a few days to let them think it over. Meanwhile active POWs should be used to observe their reactions. Later on another man should be used to question them again. They should not be interrogated until they have changed their attitudes.

(6) Stupid ones: The thoughts of this type of POW are confused, and they know very little. From them we can obtain, at most, such information as the designation of troops, the general living condition of the troops, et cetera. We should not waste time on them, but we must be careful that we are not deceived.

4. Experience.

A. With respect to guidance, an understanding of the abilities of the cadre must be secured first. Then specific tasks should be assigned according to their individual experience. The interpreters should cooperate with the military experts.

B. With respect to the methods of guidance, the "Group-participation" method should be adopted, a democratic spirit should be highly developed and the activity of the group stimulated. Interpreters should not be considered machines; outlined procedures for POW interrogation should be presented, discussed and studied as soon as they are ready to enable the interpreters to realize the intention and be prepared for their jobs. This is very important in the performance of their duties.

C. Generally speaking, it is best to combine the process of translation with that of arrangement, because the interpreters know the practical situation best. Doing it this way, the information can be made more practical, and there is no danger of discontinuity. Therefore, the interpreters themselves should keep detailed notes of interrogation and check them at certain time of the day. These notes should be arranged for the leaders' reference and for use as a basis for the interrogation on the following day.

D. We should try to master the personalities, characteristics and political attitudes of the POWs. Different methods and attitudes of questioning should be used for different POWs, e.g., consideration for active ones should be distinguished from that for the stubborn ones; experience has proved that this way is correct.

E. The policy of good treatment of POWs should be properly carried out, giving them a good impression. Those who were well treated

or given medical care on the battlefields were often deeply moved and it became easy for us to reform their thoughts. The importance and correctness of the policy of good treatment for POWs was proven repeatedly by those facts.

F. The training of the POWs in their way of thinking has a specific effect. Although not everyone will accept the training readily, yet they must finally be more or less moved by it. It is often found that many POWs change their attitudes after the training. Therefore, the training of the POWs in their way of thinking must not be neglected.

G. The attitude towards the POWs generally should be severe, this is very natural. We should be severe, but kind, generous, not proud and imperious; only this sort of action will make the POWs more respectful of us.

(4) Chinese interrogation sessions required the prisoner to sit on a small stool in front of the interrogator who was seated behind a table. The prisoner would receive a dissertation on the "lenient" policy of the Chinese which would protect the PW if he sincerely recognized his mistakes, confessed, and cooperated with his captors. If the friendly approach failed, threats were used ranging from refusing the prisoner repatriation to death. Stress was laid on the fact that his captors regarded him as a war criminal. Interspersed with the threats were promises of early repatriation if the prisoner cooperated. A show of ignorance or a flat refusal to answer questions was not acceptable. The interrogators insisted upon a response. Some prisoners discovered that the best means of evasion was to write reams of information, even if erroneous. The writing of repetitive detailed autobiographies was a common experience. Information was requested regarding:

(a) Marital status, wife, children, parents, relatives, and friends.

(b) Property owned, work experience, and military assignments.

(c) Schooling, early history, interests, hobbies, and religion.

(d) Membership in organizations, life goals, desires, and financial status.

(5) When contradictions were discovered on personal history questionnaires or autobiographies, the prisoner was subject to more searching interrogation. A common technique of the Chinese was playing off one PW against another. The interrogator would indicate to a prisoner that another PW had revealed the information being sought and suggest that the prisoner could say at least as much. Despite the effectiveness of Communist interrogation techniques, it was the opinion of the returnees that resistance strategies could be developed which would weaken their effect. Frequently mentioned is the theme that the American fighting man must be thoroughly briefed, prior to combat, regarding enemy prisoner management techniques. Also, that orientation on Communism would strengthen resistance to interrogation. Others believed that prisoners should be allowed to divulge information that has become public knowledge, and that he should adapt his method of resistance to circumstances. The following list of recommendations by returned PW's is indicative of the variety contained in the suggestions which have been made.

(a) Once an answer is given it must never be changed; stick to the story.

(b) The PW should pretend that he cannot understand the interpreter. This will cause the interrogator to lose face and shorten the interview.

(c) Appear sincere and ponder the questions. Always give an answer, because to give no answer is an insult and will incur needless anger on the part of the interrogator.

(d) Qualify all answers by saying, "I think such and such," which leaves a way out when you are trapped.

(e) Go into detail and consume time over insignificant items.

(f) Do not try to impress the enemy with knowledge; play dumb.

(g) Do not reveal your background, experience, or education.

(h) Pass on interrogation experiences to other POWs.

(i) Never listen to the blandishments of the interrogators. A friendly approach by the interrogator is always for the purpose of making the prisoner talk.

(j) Never volunteer information. Once the POW finds himself talking on any subject, however trivial, he sooner or later becomes trapped.

(k) Never try to outwit the interrogator. It can't be done.

(l) Never tell anything that cannot be remembered later.

(m) Never hurry to give an answer. Think it over carefully.

(n) Don't lie unless the lie can be corroborated. Remember there are other POWs who are being interrogated. If the other POWs say something that contradicts your statement, someone is in trouble.

(o) Talk freely but divulge as little information as possible. If a POW remains silent, the interrogators believe he is concealing something.

(6) Maximum exploitation of the prisoner was the primary goal of the Communist PW program during the Korean conflict; indoctrination was the chief vehicle for achieving this end. Emphasis was on the achievement of political and propaganda objectives rather than on economic exploitation. Compulsory indoctrination was inaugurated in most prison camps between March and November 1951, and prisoners were subjected to a variety of indoctrinational experiences. A concerted effort was made to separate younger men from their older more experienced comrades who were in a position to refute Communist ideology or propaganda. Political lectures were often designed to pit one racial or national group against another and to play upon latent prejudices. Use of this "divide and conquer" technique facilitated control. Personal history questionnaires and autobiographical data guided instructors in their relationship with individual "progressives" or "reactionaries." Prisoners were required to take notes on lectures which usually took the whole morning. Notebooks were periodically checked and discrepancies and laxities noted. Squad monitors, selected from among the PW's, presided over discussions which

followed the lectures. The opinions expressed by each man were noted. PW's who expressed contrary opinions were subjected to re-interrogation, self-criticism, and veiled threats to show them the "error of their ways." The practice of self-criticism, employed extensively in Communist nations, was an integral part of the indoctrination program. PW's were required to devote one hour per week to confessing their shortcomings. These self-incriminations were carefully filed to be used either in indoctrination lectures as proof of capitalistic decadence or as possible supporting evidence in judicial proceedings. "Compulsory indoctrination gave way to voluntary study groups in which from 10 to 30 men would consent, under the tutelage of a political instructor, to pursue a program of independent reading and discussion."[27] Well-stocked libraries containing Communist reading material and camp newspapers supported the indoctrination program. During the spring of 1951, the Communists organized peace committees in most of the permanent camps under the supervision of a Central Peace Committee, located at Camp 12 in P'Yong Yang. This committee was similar to the "National Committee for Free Germany" organized by German PW's at the direction of the Soviets. The apparent objectives of the Central Peace Committee were:[28]

(a) To prepare peace petitions, surrender leaflets, and radio scripts for dissemination by the CCF and NK propagandists.

(b) To assist in the spread of Communist propaganda prepared by camp authorities.

(c) To aid and encourage other PW's to accept Communist indoctrination.

(d) To detect any organized or incipient resistance to the indoctrination program among the non-progressives or reactionaries.

(7) The "peace committees" eventually dissolved following transfer of PW's to CCF authority. Attempts to revive them met with failure when prisoners refused to serve on the committees. The Communists also experimented with the early release of prisoners for propaganda purposes. Between 20 December 1950 and 3 March 1951, 18 US Marines, an Army corporal, and 300 other UN PW's were subjected to 8 weeks of intense indoctrination. Early release was offered as an inducement for cooperation. The 19 Americans, carrying propaganda bundles for the purpose of inducing other troops to surrender, were released to friendly control on the 24th of May 1951. They were urged to carry the "truth" back to the people of the United States.

A by-product of the indoctrination program was the use made of personal correspondence and recordings by PW's for propaganda purposes. Letters and recordings for the purpose of easing the anxieties of family and friends were considered privileges and rewards for cooperation.

(8) In 1952 the Communists launched a world-wide propaganda campaign charging the U.S. with the employment of bacteriological warfare. To support their charges before the UN and the "court of world opinion," they sought signed testimony to that effect from captured US Air Force personnel. The methods and techniques used in obtaining these signed "confessions" deviated from normal interrogation procedures. The PW was told that he would be denied PW status and treated as a war criminal unless he signed a confession. This was usually followed by complete isolation and incessant interrogation. Intimidation, deprivation of basic needs, isolation, mental and physical torture, and the occasional soft approach were all used. The techniques varied with the response of the individual. Steadfast refusal to sign led to severe and frequent beatings, mock trials and executions, solitary confinement, and other forms of physio-psychological pressures. The prisoner underwent first a conditioning period, the objective of which was to create a state of mental confusion and sense of futility. This was followed by coercion to the point of the prisoner's complete physical collapse. It was a calculated effort to disintegrate the thinking processes of the prisoner, to distort his sense of values, to destroy his integrity, and to cause him to sign a false confession.[29] Isolation was extremely effective as a means of conditioning. Deprived of contact with fellow prisoners, cut off from news of home and family, and without any means of diversion, mental attitudes regressed rapidly from nervous anticipation to passive acceptance and finally to mental apathy. Seventy-eight U.S. airmen were subjected to pressure for the purpose of obtaining confessions. Apparently personality assessment and, in some cases, rank played a role in the selection process. Some members of the same air crew received intense biological warfare interrogation and were made to confess while others were interrogated on military matters only or were left alone. Thirty-eight airmen "confessed" although eight repudiated their confessions while in the hands of the enemy. The retractors received no greater punishment after their repudiation than they received before. A handful signed confessions after only a few days duress. At the other extreme, one officer and three airmen successfully withstood the full gamut of Communist pressure, including extreme physical torture and isolation, for over a year before confessing. Forty prisoners who experienced the same physical and psychological pressure resisted successfully.

(9) The use of informers in every camp and PW company prevented the formation of effective resistance groups among the PW's. Those that did manage to operate, until discovered, concentrated their effort on preventing collaboration and threating "progressives" with retaliation. As a means of control, the Communists strictly enforced prohibitions against communication between members of various sections of the camp, but the PW's devised many ways to communicate. Of 4,428 U.S. military personnel repatriated in operations "Big and Little Switch," only 94 participated in 46 well-documented unsuccessful escape attempts.[30] In addition to the problem of informers, factors detrimental to success included the physical stamina of the prisoners, their inability to live off the land, and the difficulty of "passing" unrecognized in the population. All successful escapes occurred shortly after capture during the confusion of post-combat when security measures were lax and search procedures often careless.

(10) American PW's during the Korean War can be grouped into five general categories.[31] So called "Reactionaries" (resisters), comprised two distinct groups. The first included those men bitterly resentful of the Communist vilification of the United States and its society. The second included those men who were by nature rebellious and resented all forms of authority. The "Progressives" can also be divided into two major groupings. The first included young, impressionable men who succumbed to Communist indoctrination, and the second was composed largely of opportunists. The most numerous category included those PW's who sought anonymity as a means of self-preservation and tended to remain apathetic to all that went on around them.

b. (U) Summary - Korean Experiences.

(1) Communist prisoner of war management principles applied during the Korean War were similar to those developed by the USSR during World War II. Although the emphasis varied somewhat, the basic objective of the Communist PW program remained the same - maximum exploitation of the PW. Economic exploitation, although it may have been considered, was not utilized in Korea. Instead, political and propaganda exploitation were emphasized. The exploitation of the prisoner for intelligence purposes was downgraded in favor of gaining converts to the Communist cause and undermining the prisoner's faith in his country. It is believed that attempts were made to recruit agents. The success of this effort remains undetermined; however, a small number (21 US Army personnel) of Americans did defect to Communist China.

(2) The Korean experience was unique in that, for the first time, Communist PW management techniques were applied to Americans on a large scale. Caught unaware and without strategies for countering the Communist effort, the American captive was effectively exploited.

(3) The basic principles and techniques developed by the Russians in World War II were, for the most part, carried over to the Korean conflict. In some respects they were modified and altered to conform with concepts emphasized or favored by the Chinese Communists. As a result, "thought reform" and "brain washing" became household words in America following the repatriation of U.S. prisoners. To avoid the unfavorable reaction of world opinion to Chinese "thought control," these terms have been rejected by the North Vietnamese who prefer that their prisoners develop "proper" attitudes, "understandings," and "sincerity" in the tradition of Soviet experience. The Chinese, in their indoctrination program, increased the emphasis on self-criticism and confession as a means of achieving political and propaganda objectives. They went to great lengths to create a controlled environment that would enhance the conditioning process. A determined effort was made to assess individual personality in order to maximize the impact of the conditioning process. This led to an intensive use of personal history forms, questionnaires, autobiographies, essays, and personal and group discussions. Emphasis on these techniques highlighted a trend which was first noticeable in World War II - a diminishing interest in combat intelligence in favor of securing personal and political information from the prisoner. While the Koreans and Chinese followed the tradition of segregating their prisoners according to rank, they were more concerned with keeping the younger, more impressionable captives separated from the older, more experienced prisoners. They also employed segregation by race in an attempt to exploit the American racial issue. The organization of the prisoners into squads, platoons, and companies headed by "instructors" provided effective control and enhanced the indoctrination process. Maximum use of informers also proved an effective control measure as did the location of prison camps in a hostile and remote environment. In order to achieve the maximum exploitation of the PW, the Communists in Korea were forced to circumvent the Geneva Convention. This was achieved by categorizing their captives "war criminals." It provided them with additional ammunition at the bargaining table, increased the stress on the individual PW, and provided them with a "legal" rationale for their actions. Classifying American PW's as war criminals laid the foundation for the implementation of the Chinese policy of "leniency," extended to "criminals" who "sincerely" regretted their actions, confessed, and sought amnesty.

The Chinese and Koreans also experimented with the early release of PW's for propaganda exploitation. Evidently the results of this action proved inconclusive since there was no repeat of this activity.

(4) As has been previously noted, most of the prisoner management principles developed by the Russian Communists during their consolidation phase and in World War II were successfully used by the North Koreans and Chinese during the Korean conflict. Key techniques used by the Communists in Korea included:

(a) Intensive use of physical abuse and brutality to achieve specific objectives (germ warfare confessions).

(b) Formal interrogation of PW's initiated at regimental level.

(c) Civilian agency responsible for the security of PW's. (North Korean Security Police had a role similar to the NKVD.)

(d) PW camp administration divided along military and political lines with political officers held accountable for meeting indoctrination objectives.

(e) Special centers established for intensive interrogation of select PW's.

(f) Special indoctrination and training programs for the most "progressive" PW's and their incorporation in the control system (squad monitors, discussion leaders, writers, etc.).

(g) Employment of reward and punishment as a means of gaining cooperative behavior from the PW (promise of early repatriation for cooperation versus treatment as a war criminal).

(h) Extensive use of isolation.

(i) Channeling PW energies in support of Korean national propaganda objectives. (Central Peace Committee's efforts in Korea were similar to those of the "National Committee for Free Germany.")

(j) Intensive indoctrination and insistance on PW response (to undermine personal loyalties and prepare the individual for exploitation).

(k) Minimum allocation of personnel and resources to support PW program (with the significant exception of skilled indoctrination personnel).

(l) Invasion of privacy (extensive use of PW correspondence, petitions, tape recordings, written statements, and articles for propaganda purposes).

3. ~~(U)~~ NORTH VIETNAM EXPERIENCE:

a. ~~(U)~~ General:

(1) (U) Information regarding Communist treatment of captured U.S. military personnel in North Vietnam, at the time of this writing, is extremely limited. The extent of current U.S. captive experience remains unclear and only partially documented at present since a complete accounting cannot be made until all USPW's are repatriated. The description of the North Vietnamese Prisoner of War program provided here is based upon the debriefing of nine releasees from North Vietnam and official publications and statements of both the United States and North Vietnam. One immediately apparent distinction between the Vietnamese conflict and USPW experiences in Korea and World War II is the difference in the numbers of PW's involved. Although North Vietnam has acknowledged the presence of 339 American military prisoners in the country, it is certain that more Americans are in enemy hands. Official prisoners of war and missing in action figures in North Vietnam totaled 781 in January 1971[32] (See Figure 1, Page 35). This number has significance when considering the use of isolation as a technique and the physical facilities required for the practical aspect of confinement. Existing penal facilities, with their provisions for isolation, can accommodate the few USPW's being held. Unlike previous experiences, the PW's held by North Vietnam today have similar backgrounds, military training, and occupations. They are overwhelmingly officers - pilots and flight crewmen. Of the nine releasees, six were USAF pilots, two were US Navy pilots, and one was a US Navy seaman.

(2) ~~(U)~~ The maximum exploitation of captured enemy personnel is the primary goal of the North Vietnamese PW program just as it was for the Communist nations in World War II and the Korean conflict. The Vietnamese program emphasizes, as was true in Korea, political and propaganda exploitation. A major policy goal of the North Vietnamese government is to establish the culpability of U.S. involvement in

COUNTRY	MISSING	CAPTURED	TOTAL
North Vietnam	403	378	781
South Vietnam	463	78	541
Laos	227	3	230
Totals:	1,093	459	1,552

STATISTICAL RECAPITULATION BY YEAR LOST

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	TOTAL
Missing	4	54	206	249	284	200	96	1,093
Captured	3	74	93	160	113	11	5	459
Totals:	7	128	299	409	397	211	101	1,552

Only nine American prisoners held in North Vietnam have been allowed repatriation by the Hanoi government. Most of these men had been prisoners for less than two years. Seventeen known prisoners have been murdered or have died in Viet Cong captivity. The physical condition of the men who have been released has been far below normal standards. (DOD Pamphlet, Commanders Digest, 16 January 1971, p. 7.)

FIGURE 1. American prisoners of war and missing in action in Southeast Asia (as of 16 January 1971)

Vietnam and influence American and world opinion to achieve the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the South. USPW's are exploited extensively in the propaganda campaign designed specifically to this end. Politically, the USPW is in the position of a hostage. He has become a pawn at the bargaining table to win concessions from the United States in return for his ultimate release and repatriation. There are some indications that economic exploitation of the PW is being seriously considered. Interrogations of captured NVA officers have disclosed that North Vietnam PW policy discussions frequently imply that the U.S. will be required to assist in the rebuilding of North Vietnam if it expects its PW's back at the end of the war.[33]

(3) ~~(C)~~ The pattern established during the Korean conflict; namely, that prisoner of war status could arbitratily be denied, permitted the captor to evade humanitarian considerations in order to further the goal of exploitation. This same pattern has emerged in North Vietnam. All returnees from North Vietnam were denied legal status as prisoners of war. The eight pilots were accorded the status of "war criminals" with the concurrent lack of privileges and Seaman Douglas Hegdahl, although occasionally treated somewhat differently than the others, was never acknowledged as a Prisoner of War in the terms of the Geneva Conventions. In July 1966, the North Vietnamese government announced that captured American flyers would be brought to trial as "war criminals." Although no further action was taken in this regard, the threat is still in force. This may have serious consequences in the future. It should be noted that many former German and Japanese prisoners of war are still serving sentences ranging from 20 to 50 years in the Soviet Union for alleged war crimes dating back to World War II. Also, it must be remembered that the alleged "criminality" on the part of U.S. detainees held by the Communists was a key issue during the Korean Truce negotiations.

(4) ~~(C)~~ The "lenient policy" approach used by the Chinese during the Korean conflict has reappeared in the form of North Vietnam's policy of "humanitarianism." North Vietnam is willing to extend "humanitarianism" toward war criminals who have sincerely confessed their guilt and resolved to mend the "errors of their ways," by actively participating in the fight for "peace" and "justice." A concerted effort is made by the North Vietnamese to have captive American pilots assume personal responsibility for the "wanton killing of innocent civilians." Their objective is to implant guilt feelings in the individual prisoner. It is impressed upon the captive that his sole chance for survival depends upon his acceptance of criminal status and of at least some degree of culpability.[34] This process not

only creates self-doubt and a feeling of guilt in the individual but also reinforces the prisoner's dependence upon the "humanitarianism" of his captors. Once again, American pilots are being pressured to sign confessions. The Bacteriological Warfare confessions of Korea have been replaced by the admission to "criminal acts" (indiscriminate bombing of innocent civilians and poisoning of food and water through defoliation). These signed confessions, statements, and tape recordings not only serve the Communists in influencing American and world public opinion but are used against the PW's themselves. Newly arrived prisoners were shown statements written by other inmates explaining that it was foolish to resist since their captors had the power to obtain any information desired and that it would be better to cooperate in order to insure good treatment. This usually had a demoralizing effect on the new arrivals. As was the case of Communist captives in previous conflicts, subterfuge is rarely used to obtain signed statements. Through the process of indoctrination, the individual is first made to believe, then to write, and finally to sign. The individual prisoner must display sincerity before his confession is acceptable. Once the prisoner has signed, admitting his complicity or guilt, he has placed himself in a vulnerable position since his captors have the power to try him as a war criminal.

(5) (S) Several major detention facilities housing U.S. captives in North Vietnam were identified by the Defense Intelligence Agency.[35] They included:

(a) Cu Loc Prison, located in the Cu Loc suburb, southwest of Hanoi, was nicknamed the "Zoo" by American prisoners. The entire compound covered 650,000 square feet and was divided into four areas. (See Figures 2 and 3, Pages 38 and 39.) There were three entrances into this compound, through steel bar gates. Area A had dimensions of 295' x 295'. The buildings were arranged around a 62' x 33' swimming pool and were enclosed by a 10-foot high wall. The detention buildings in this area were secured by six-foot walls which were one-and-a-half feet thick. Area B contained only detention buildings. The dimensions of this inner court were 175' x 220'. Again the walls were 10 feet high and two-and-one-half feet thick. There were no outside entrances, only those leading into other areas. The third area, C, had dimensions of 295' x 235'. Except for the one forming Area B, the surrounding walls were lower. Here were located the living quarters of the prison cadre. The fourth compound, Area D, was enclosed on three sides by wire fences. Irregular in shape, its dimensions were approximately 100' x 295'. It contained the administrative offices and controlled the main entrance into the camp.



FIGURE 2 - CU LOC PRISONER OF WAR CAMP



FIGURE 3 CU LOC PRISON (THE ZOO)

(b) Ha Lo Prison (see Figure 4, Page 41), which had served as the Hanoi City Jail, is located in downtown Hanoi. It is divided into two smaller installations referred to by its inmates as the "Hanoi Hilton" and "Heartbreak." The latter serves as a processing center while the former was primarily a place of detention. A third part of the prison was also used for the detention of prisoners. The entire compound covered a city block and had dimensions of 200' x 400' x 450' x 425'. The stuccoed brick wall surrounding the prison was twenty feet high and was topped with broken glass. Within Heartbreak (see Figures 5 and 6, Pages 42 and 43), were located cell blocks, interrogation rooms, and administrative offices. Judging from the comments made by the former inmates, there were at least two types of cell blocks which varied somewhat in detail. Although both contained eight cubicles, one appeared to be older in construction than the other. The more modern cells were approximately 6 1/2' x 7' and contained two immovable cement slabs that were used as pallets (see figure 7, Page 44). At the end of each slab nearest the door, were placed stocks which could be manipulated from the outside. The wooden door had a metal covered peephole through which a prisoner could be observed. The other end contained a barrel window near the ceiling. The window was equipped with shutters which could be closed from the outside. The only other contents in the room were a "honey" bucket and a bare 25-watt light bulb which hung from the ceiling. One of the cubicles was used as a wash room and contained two washbasins with faucets. The older cell block had larger cubicles, approximately 8' x 10'. However, the beds were made of three boards and two sawhorses. In place of stocks, there were shackles fastened to the walls. The doors and windows were similar, as were the rooms' contents. Again, one of the cells was a washroom but with a hole in the floor into which the pots could be emptied. All prisoners complained of unsanitary conditions, filth, and, above all, rats. It was not uncommon to have rats run across their faces and bodies while they lay on their pallets. The Hilton compound, another part of the Ha Lo Prison complex, was a maze of courtyards, cell blocks, guards' quarters, and administrative offices (see Figure 8, Page 45). It contained three sizes of cells. One was an 8' x 10', which contained two cement slab platforms (see Figure 9, Page 46). The other two were a 12' x 12', which had three-board beds spaced 18 inches apart as well as 18 inches from the walls, and a 20' x 20', containing two bunk beds (a total of four beds). Every room was equipped with one or two "honey" buckets depending upon the number of prisoners rooming together, a bare light bulb, and a loudspeaker. The latter was controlled from the outside and could not be turned off or disconnected. Some of the rooms had shackles; others did not. Although sanitation conditions were much improved over Heartbreak, rats and other vermin were still present.

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

FIGURE 4 - HA LO PRISON (HEARTBREAK/HILTON)

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

FIGURE 5 HEARTBREAK COMPLEX

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HEARTBREAK COMPLEX

1. Front gate
2. Office
3. Courtyard
4. Arcade
5. Interrogation room
6. Smaller courtyard
7. Cell
8. Guards room
9. Water tank
10. Interrogation room
11. Typing room
12. Office
13. Open room
14. Arcade
15. Cell block
16. Room
17. Interrogator's office
18. Two-story eastern wall
19. Interrogation room
20. Telephone room
21. Hallway leads possibly to Hilton
22. Office
23. Gardens elevated 2 or 3 feet above courtyard
24. Gardens elevated 2 or 3 feet above courtyard



THERE IS A SMALL OPENING 3'X 2 1/2' WITH BARS NEAR THE CEILING



FIGURE 7 CELL IN HEARTBREAK



FIGURE 8. HILTON CELLBLOCK
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17-Apr-2009
This document has
been declassified IAW
EO 12958, as amended, per
Army letter dated March 5, 2009

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

FIGURE 9 CELL IN HILTON

2-46

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(c) The Citadel, located in downtown Hanoi approximately 1 mile from the Paul Doumer Bridge, was nicknamed the "Country Club" or the "Plantation" by American prisoners (see Figures 10, 11, and 12, Pages 48, 49, and 50). This prison served as a staging area for the nine prisoners who have been released. Its perimeter covered an entire city block whose dimensions were 247 feet on the north, 342 feet on the east side, 164 feet on the south side, and 338 feet on the west side. Originally built by the French as a villa-type domicile, most of the buildings within the compound had been newly constructed. This camp was considered by the released prisoners to be the best in North Vietnam. At the Citadel, prison life was less rigid and security was minimal; and the men knew that, if they were ever released, it would be from this compound. There was a variety of buildings located within the 10-foot walls of the Country Club. The large two-story house near the entrance gate ("French House" or "Ho House"), was the hub of the camp. It contained the officers' quarters as well as the administrative offices and interrogation/indoctrination rooms. Prisoners' cells could be found in most buildings around the compound. Because of the size and shape of each structure, the size and shape of each cell varied. Some were 11 1/2' x 24'. Others were 27' square. A third had 15' square dimensions. Beds were generally made from wood slabs or bamboo strips placed on sawhorses. Most cells contained a wooden stool and table and the usual bare light, loudspeaker, and "honey" bucket. The number of men placed in each cell ranged from one to five. Normally, two or three men roomed together. However, isolation was a common occurrence. To create an isolation cell, men on either side of the proposed isolation cell were moved out, thereby preventing any noise, especially communication tapping, from penetrating the 10-inch walls. One building contained the cells of those who were to be released. When a man moved into one of these rooms, it usually meant that he was going to be repatriated.

(d) Xom Ap Lo PW Camp, located approximately 65 Kilometers west of Hanoi, was originally an ammunition storage facility. It was confirmed as an operational PW camp in 1965 but may have been temporarily abandoned in 1967. It was again reactivated in late 1968. The facility consists of three separate walled compounds (see Figure 13, Page 51); Areas A and B housing the PW's and Area C for the use of the camp cadre.

(6) (S) Additional Sites identified by DIA are:

(a) Hanoi PW Camp, MND, N-67. This facility, suspected of housing senior ranking prisoners, is located approximately 500 feet

FIGURE 10 - CITADEL PRISONER OF WAR CAMP



FIGURE II THE CITADEL (COUNTRY CLUB)

THE CITADEL (COUNTRY CLUB)

1. Guards quarters
2. Large trees
3. Three-room building
4. Cell
5. Large tree
6. Water tank
7. Outhouse building
8. Pig pens
9. Water tower
10. Garden
11. Trash dump
12. Detention rooms
13. Porch
14. Large water kettle
15. Food room
16. Supply rooms
17. Large tree
18. Two-story building (French House)
19. Interrogation rooms
20. Office area
21. Living room
22. Front gate
23. Trash burning area
24. Large tree
25. Balcony
26. Large porch
27. Clothes line
28. PW quarters
29. Food room
30. Water tank
31. Washroom
32. Urinal
33. Wash houses
34. Detention area
35. Guard tower
36. Room
37. Kitchen
38. Guards' quarters
39. Theater
40. Volleyball court
41. Trees
42. Bunker
43. Bomb shelters
44. PW rooms
45. PW rooms
46. Wall
47. Street
48. Gate
49. Walled area
50. Large building
51. Stairs
52. House
53. House
54. Garage
55. Two-story building
56. Railroad and trestle
57. Railroad and trestle
58. One-story building
59. One-story building
60. One-story building
61. Trees

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FIGURE 13. XOM AP LO PW CAMP

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North of the Country Club on PHO LY NAM DE Street. PW's have nicknamed MND the "Country Club Annex" and "Plantation West". This facility is not known to be holding any US PW's at the present time.

(b) Possible PW Camps in vicinity of Hanoi Thermal Power Plant. Analysis of all source information resulted in confirmation that USPW's are being detained close to, if not actually inside, the power plant. There are four installations in the area that could be used:

1. Hanoi Thermal Power Plant. This is a one story building fronting on Pho Pham Hong Thai (street). It appears to consist of 9 rooms/apartments each with its own entrance. An unroofed shower/toilet facility is adjacent to the west end of the building.

2. Hanoi Water Plant. Any or all of the major buildings inside this compound could be used for detention purposes.

3. Hanoi Tobacco Plant. This is a prime suspect for a detention facility. The windows in a one and one-half story building located at the west end of the compound appear to be barred.

4. Unidentified Compound Southeast of Thermal Plant. There are two 2-story buildings in this compound; either of which could be used for detention purposes.

(c) Dan Hoi Barracks and PW Camp, N-84. The Dan Hoi facility is located 7.5 NM northwest of Hanoi. It was apparently activated as a PW camp during the summer of 1970 when a major relocation of US PW's occurred. It is estimated that some 200 USPW's are currently held in this camp.

(7) ~~(8)~~ Four of the nine returnees were probably detained in a camp at Vinh (see Figure 14). The main building was constructed of bamboo and thatching material and was approximately 16' x 60'. Within this structure were two rows of cells facing onto a hall which passed through the center of the building. Each cell, and there were six on each side, was approximately four feet by seven feet. The bed was nothing more than two boards laid on the dirt floor. Because there were no windows, the men suffered greatly from the heat aggravated by a multitude of flies, vermin, and filth. Usually the men were handcuffed and shackled since other security measures were inadequate. Other bamboo huts, including one used for interrogation,

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

"BAMBOO PRISON" AT VINH



FIGURE 14 BAMBOO PRISON AT VINH

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were located in the vicinity. Latrines did not exist. Instead the men were walked to either a garden located in the middle of the village of Vinh or else to a field some distance from their cells. The guards, usually only two or three, stayed close by the main building at all times.

(8) ~~(S)~~ The staff structure of the prison compounds was organized in the Communist tradition. Two channels of command existed. The commanding officer directly supervised administrative functions and delegated responsibility for the prisoners of war to political officers. His second-in-command, or executive officer, was chief of the political section. The administrative section included guards, turnkeys, medical staff, cooks, and kitchen help. Executive officers had assigned to them interrogators, indoctrinators, and interpreters. These officers, as was the case of the political instructors in Korea, had responsibility for a specific group of prisoners, seeing to their treatment and progress. Administrative personnel lived within the compound. The number of cadre varied. At Heartbreak, the primary interrogation center, there were three interrogators, two turnkeys, and approximately 25-35 guards. It is estimated that the Country Club housed 30-40 guards, plus three political officers and three turnkeys. At Heartbreak, where security was stressed, guards were stationed at fixed posts in the corridors of the prison as well as at guard positions on the walls. Two guards were used at the Hilton for each post. At the Country Club, where security was more relaxed, there were four stationary posts which often remained unmanned. While escape may have been possible, all returnees agree that it would have been extremely difficult to evade since it was impossible to procure the clothes and papers needed by an American escapee in order to pass himself off as a visitor from a Communist nation. Outside assistance was considered essential for any successful escape attempt.

(9) ~~(S)~~ The initial capture experiences of most pilots were strikingly similar.[36] Shortly after capture, they were searched, stripped of clothes except for underwear, tied up, and marched to an initial holding area where they awaited movement to a permanent camp. Some pilots reported a less than thorough body search. At the initial detention area, the clothing was returned. Movement to the permanent camp was usually by truck with the prisoner blindfolded. Enroute, caves, bunkers, or huts would be used for stopovers. The security at these stations varied from being placed in a locked room to the additional precaution of using leg irons and placing the prisoner in such a position that he would draw the attention of the guard with the slightest movement.[37] They were provided with sufficient food.

and drink but had to be protected against physical mistreatment by civilian mobs. This pattern of mistreatment by enraged civilians is such as to strongly suggest that it was an integral and important part of prisoner conditioning. So important, in fact, that in those cases where the circumstances of capture and evacuation precluded exposure to it, recourse was made to comparable physical violence at the place of detention. The experiences of three of the returnees strongly support such a hypothesis, i.e., that some exposure to physical brutality is a mandatory prerequisite in the compliance-inducing technique. This procedure seems to be omitted only in those instances where at least an acceptable degree of compliance has been demonstrated by the prisoner or induced by other means.[38]

(10) (S) Heartbreak was the main processing center for the PW's; from here they were assigned to other prison compounds. Although some prisoners were asked to complete a questionnaire while enroute to Hanoi, it was at Heartbreak during the initial interrogation session that a detailed personnel history was completed. The returnees believed that the fate of a captive, including his release, was determined before he left Heartbreak. Following the disposition of a prisoner, he was issued clothes and personal gear and given a shave, haircut, and a chance to take a cold water shower. His clothes usually included two sets of underwear, two sets of prison uniforms (long sleeved shirts and trousers), and a pair of sandals made from rubber tires. During cold weather, he was issued a sweater. Sometimes the men were given sets of short sleeved shirts and short pants for use during the summer. As personal gear, each man received two blankets, a straw mat, mosquito net, washcloth, toothbrush, a tube of tooth paste, a bar of soap, a teapot or water jar, and a cup with a lid. Each article had to be signed for upon issue, and the prisoners were held accountable. Soap and tooth paste were to last for a specified time. However, the returnees interviewed reported that they never ran out of either. The placement of prisoners was designed to weed out the prospective troublemakers and those who might attempt to organize the other prisoners of war. Therefore, most senior officers were housed in a separate camp from which communication was virtually impossible. Nevertheless, some orders from the ranking prisoner were circulated among the various prisons. Most prisoners were in isolation or only in contact with one or two others. This doubly ensured against any chance of a strong prisoner organization being formed. As to the treatment of wounded prisoners, a uniform policy was not followed in North Vietnam. It was generally held that the Communists did attempt to treat the wounds of those captured as soon as possible after capture. However, treatment varied from man

to man. One, suffering from a back wound, received only rudimentary care. During his journey to Hanoi, his wound was tended by inexperienced personnel who had him strip and lie down on the floor while the attendant manually squeezed his wound and placed new ointment and bandages over it. Another, who suffered a broken arm, received immediate attention, which included setting the arm and giving him a shot to relieve the pain. Upon reaching Hanoi, he was sent immediately to a hospital. A third prisoner, suffering from multiple fractures of all limbs, lay on a dirt floor for 3 days before being taken to a hospital, where he awaited treatment for half a day. From these episodes, one surmises that most wounds are treated eventually but not always by competent personnel.

(11) (S) Prisoners were required to live under a strict set of regulations carefully designed to ensure proper submissiveness and to maximize control over the individual captive. In the fall of 1967, U.S. troops in South Vietnam captured a list of camp regulations for Americans from an NVA political cadreman. It is published here in its original form:[39]

REGULATIONS OF THE CAMP

All US agg. captured in their piratical attacks against the DRV are criminals. During their confinement in this camp they must strictly observe the following regulations:

1. Obey any order given by the officers and guards in the camp.
2. Stand at attention and salute politely when met by the VNese officers and guards in the camp.
3. Give accurate and complete information when interrogated. Any attempt to evade answering questions will be severely punished.
4. It is strictly forbidden to write, engrave, or draw anything on the walls, floors, doors, windows etc...in the room or to damage the walls, doors, windows, floor, etc...of the room.
5. Anything which is not been provided by the camp authorities must not be put on kept in the room.
6. Keep absolute silence in the room all attempts to communicate with the criminals living in other rooms are strictly forbidden.
7. When allowed to get out of the room must go the way fixed by the guard and must not speak,

whistle or sing. In the need of asking anything, may only say in VNese "Bae cae." The guard will report it to the duty officer.

8. Always keep the room clean and in order, keep everything provided by the camp authorities carefully.

9. The care of all books or newspapers lent by the camp.

10. Go to bed and get up according to the gong sounds.

11. Any stubborn or hostile conduct, any violation of these regulations or any attempt to go out of the room without permission will be severely punished on the contrary, the criminals who observe those regulations correctly and have, by concrete acts, repented their crimes against the VNese people will be given a deserved treatment.

12. The lights must be keep on all through the night.

At the camp known as "Halo PW Camp" the PW's were expected to adhere to a set of regulations that were typed and posted on the back of their cell doors. The gist of these regulations follows:

Due to the new condition in the camp and as a result of the camp policy which has been revised and approved by other criminals, the following camp regulations are in effect:

1. Whenever a criminal is met by an officer of the camp, he will present a polite and quiet attitude and will bow in greeting.
2. All criminals will remain quiet in their rooms. Any attempts to communicate with the criminals in adjoining rooms by tapping, shouting or any other loud noise will be cause for severe punishment.
3. When guards come to take a criminal to the offices or other rooms of the camp, the criminals will dress neatly and quickly.
4. In case of an airraid, all criminals will immediately take shelter in their foxholes, or underneath their bed.
5. If any criminal wants to ask a question, he will say softly to the guard, "Bao Cao", the guard will notify the OIC.

6. If a criminal ever gets sick he will notify the guard immediately, medical attention will be given to the criminals in their room, or if necessary they will be taken to the hospital.
7. All criminals will arise in the morning and go to sleep at night in accordance with the gongs.
8. All criminals will obey all orders given by the guards and officers of the camp or be subject to severe punishment.
9. All will answer all questions and write any answers that are put to them by the camp authorities. Any deviation from this will be a manifestation of an improper attitude and will be subject to severe punishment.
10. If any criminals are inclined to report any violations of these regulations they will be rewarded, but if violations are known and not reported, they will be punished along with the violators.
11. All criminals in a room will be responsible for any violation committed by one of them.

To insure that they were to be read and understood by the inmates, prison officials required that the rules be memorized. Then, occasionally, questions were put to the prisoners to see that they had complied. Infractions meant punishment, and the rule which was considered by the prison cadre to be the most sensitive pertained to communications with other prisoners. Some of the captives were threatened with death if they attempted to communicate. Others were severely beaten. For example, beatings occurred when a guard found a hole which had been bored between cells for communication purposes. Some guards took it upon themselves to strictly enforce the rule which pertained to "a courteous and polite attitude to all officers and guards." It was a form of harassment which seemed to amuse them. At Heartbreak, they opened the peep holes in the doors every fifteen minutes which meant that the prisoner had to stand and bow. Even if asleep, the inmates were awakened by the guards to assume the "correct position of respect." Beatings were frequent regarding this rule. One prisoner forgot to bow to a guard while passing in a hall. He was put in the stocks for two nights to remind him of his disrespect. Other forms of punishment which were meted out to the prisoners involved sitting on a stool for several hours or, in the case of one officer, two days. Another form of punishment was to put a man in a darkened room by himself. One prisoner was kept this way for 38 days. Another was kept in a black-out room only 30 minutes, but he had been put in a fish net and suspended from the ceiling. To him, it

was the worst time he spent in captivity. It was important to the guards to insure that prisoners did not see each other unless authorized by the camp officials. In fact, they became distressed if, accidently, two prisoners saw each other when rounding a corner or entering into the same hallway. This policy was enforced so that the inmates of the camps would be unable to tell who or how many captives were lodged in the same compound.

(12) ~~(S)~~ Although there were some variations, in general, the daily prison routines at the camps were similar. At Ha Lo, the returnees, with one exception, had no opportunity to see other USPW's that may have been held there. When necessary they were removed individually from their cells and returned before another prisoner was taken out.[40] A conscious effort was made to maintain the isolation or semi-isolation (some prisoners had roommates) of the captives. At the Citadel, or "Country Club," prisoners picked up their food individually and were returned to their cells. The same procedure was followed when the washrooms were utilized. PW's, however, managed to communicate between their individual stalls by whispering through the drain trough. The following daily schedule was maintained at Ha Lo:[41]

a. At approximately 0500 hours a gong sounds at which time prisoners are required to get out of bed, remove the mosquito nets, and make up the bed.

b. A thirty-minute radio program by "Hanoi Hannah" was broadcast over the cell speaker.

c. After the broadcast, prisoners were taken from their cells, one cell at a time, to empty and rinse out their "night buckets."

d. Next, prisoners were taken individually by cell to the wash cubicles where they were given approximately ten minutes to wash themselves and their laundry. On Tuesdays and Fridays they were given the opportunity to shave. A small mirror and a double edged razor were placed in the wash cubicle for this purpose. The guards made certain the mirror and razor blade were left behind when the prisoner left the cubicle and returned to his cell.

e. The morning meal was served approximately an hour and half after returning from the wash cubicle. Approximately fifteen minutes were allowed for the meal. Normally, meals consisted of variations and combinations of

bread, soup, vegetables, cooked pumpkin, plain granulated sugar, salt, rice, and water. Food trays were placed outside each cell door and one at a time the cell doors were opened for the PW's to receive their trays.

f. At approximately 1200 hours the gong sounded again indicating a two hour nap period. During this time inspections were conducted to see that prisoners were lying down.

g. At 1400 hours a gong sounded and prisoners were required to rise and make their beds. No further activities were scheduled until 1630 hours when the evening meal was served.

h. After the meal, nothing was scheduled until approximately 2030 hours when the "Hanoi Hannah" radio program would come on again for 30 minutes. At 2100 hours, the gong sounded indicating time to go to bed.

The schedule was broken only for specific reasons; such as, bath time which occurred generally in the morning, individual indoctrination/interrogation sessions, or work details. The latter occurred infrequently but were expectantly awaited by the prisoners, since they afforded them physical exercise and a chance to be outside their cells. These work details consisted of limited duties and usually for short periods of time. The men were permitted to sweep the yard or halls, make coal balls out of coal dust, dig pits, water plants, or mold adobe bricks for construction purposes. In addition, men were assigned to kitchen police duties for four-day periods. They picked up the dishes outside the cells and rinsed them. Once every 4 days they washed the dishes in cold soapy water, which was also used for laundry purposes. Never were they permitted to help prepare the food. Throughout their period of captivity, the men complained bitterly of the boredom created by the daily routine and by their inability to converse with or even see other inmates. As Captain Carpenter described it:[42]

> Spent a lot of time sitting on the bed -- not doing anything but thinking, dreaming, making plans for the future, thinking about what you would do if you got back, thinking about the war -- the way it was going -- the chances of us winning -- just watch the shadow under the door and wait 'til the sun went down.

It was a time for much reflection, something which was encouraged by the North Vietnamese. For indoctrination purposes, their captives

must think about the war, their families, and their way of life. They were then prepared to engage in a dialogue which could be guided toward desired channels.

(13) (S) In general, the medical treatment provided U.S. captives was considered barely adequate by the returnees. Some captives who became ill were at the point of death before medication was administered. Methods used in treating patients indicated that there was either a lack of supplies or that the personnel were inadequately trained, or both. For example, the operation which Lieutenant Frishman underwent was performed without anesthesia. Another prisoner's broken arm was badly set, and the cast was too tight causing permanent damage to the arm. During their period of captivity, the returnees occasionally received vitamin shots and pills. They received the best care just prior to release when they were given cholera and smallpox shots, as well as vitamin pills. Dental work was performed on some internees, but was of limited scope only. Pills, iodine, and salve were distributed for various ailments which included rashes, ringworm, parasites, diarrhea, and colds. However, iodine was taken away from the men when the North Vietnamese discovered that it was being used to write notes with. Those who came down with gastro-intestinal complaints were given a special diet consisting of noodles, rice, sugar stew, or rice and meat stew. Nevertheless, as soon as the illness had been cured, the normal diet was resumed. This diet consisted of very greasy food which was high in starch content and low in protein. At each meal, the men received one and a half loaves of French bread (4 ozs.), boiled pumpkin, a soup made from a green leaf vegetable or cabbage and pork fat, and occasionally three ounces of sugar and a quart of boiled water. Rice generally supplanted bread at the Sunday evening meal. As a luxury, each man received three cigarettes a day, which were lighted for them by the guards following each meal and just prior to retiring for the night. Variations to the menu were not uncommon, yet they were not everyday occurrences. Occasionally potatoes or beans were added. Meat, however, was rarely served. Bananas in season were distributed. Peanuts sometimes supplemented the meals, while turnips became a staple when food shortages were acute. Some of the prisoners considered this diet adequate; others complained that they were suffering from malnutrition. In general, most prisoners lost weight. Captain Carpenter alone lost 20 pounds. However, the North Vietnamese tried to correct this weight deficiency just prior to release when the prisoners who were scheduled to leave Hanoi were fed omelettes or meat for breakfast; beer, meat or fish, and vegetables for lunch; and for dinner they ate quantities of native dishes. Much of the weight loss was incurred during the time of capture and incarceration at Heartbreak. During their trip to Hanoi, many of the prisoners ate nothing or else a little bread or rice.

Lieutenant Colonel Overly received small but varied foodstuffs, including a small bowl of boiled rice twice a day, and a small tin of cream cheese, supplemented sometimes with dried fish. The men who acted as dish washers evidently suffered the most when it came to food for they intimated to Captain Black that the only food they were given was what remained on the plates of their fellow prisoners. Once or twice a year the monotonous diet was broken. This happened on Christmas and Tet. On Christmas, the men ate a traditional American Christmas dinner complete with turkey, lettuce, tomatoes, and carrots. For Tet, some of the prisoners were called into the presence of the Camp Commander and given candy, cookies, and even beer.

(14) (C) North Vietnamese field interrogation of prisoners of war resembles Communist procedures used during the Korean War. NVA units below regimental level send prisoners to their regiment for preliminary interrogation and tactical debriefing. Each regiment has an interrogation team which is part of the political section at regimental headquarters.[43] As in the Korean conflict, field interrogation seeks personal and political data as well as military information. The following captured NVA interrogation questionnaire illustrates this point:[44]

ASK THE PRISONER OF WAR

1. What's your name in full? What's full name?
2. I didn't quite catch what you said?
3. Repeat you last (family) name?
4. How d'you (d'ye) spell it? Give spelling of it?
5. What state d' you come from?
   What state of America you come from?
6. Your native land (town and state)?
7. Your date of birth? (How old are you)?
   Your place of birth? (What's your age)?
   Of what descent are you?
8. When did you join the Army?
   What's the date of your enlistment in the US Army?
9. What arm or service do you belong to?
   What arm or service are you assigned to?
10. Your military unit (company, battalion, division)?
    In what state in USA (or in what country) this military unit is standing?
11. Your military grade? (rank) or when have you been promoted to this grade?

12. You are allowed to come in. Go on you are dismissised, sit down.
13. All what you said will be recorded and may be made use of against you.
14. When (at what date) did you come to VN? or what the date of your coming to VN?
15. How many battles did you fight so far? Up to now?
16. How many campaigns have you participated since your arrival in SVN? Where these campaigns are organized? What do you do and what do you eyewitness in each of these campaigns? You function in these campaigns? What do you do before falling into our hands?
17. At what airfield did your plane take off?
18. Have you been all the time in the US Air Force so far or did you belong to at any-time to any other arms?
19. Are you married?
20. Your capacity of student? Or your level of education?
21. Your profession?
22. How many times did you strafe NVN?
23. What target did you strafe and bomb in VN?
24. Which are your primary target?
25. Which cities in NVN were you assigned to particularly strafe or bomb?
26. Did you receive order to strafe or bomb VN?
27. From whom those orders are issued?
28. What objective in VN do those orders deal?
29. I must warn you if you don't talk you will be put to irons. (punish)
30. What's your army service number? Your military number?
31. Have you any document on you?
32. At what airfield have your plan to land for refuelling?
33. Had you to ask for permission to bail out?
34. Your function in VN? What are the orders and advices of your chieves before sending you to SVN?
35. Your impressions before leaving your native land to go to SVN? Do you know the aim of Wall Street's military action in SVN?

36. Date and spot of your depart? Date and spot of your arrival in SVN? By what way do you go to SVN (Tell your travel)?
37. You are sent to VN as volunteer, or as professional military, or as delayed military?
38. How many officers and soldiers were sent to SVN at one time with you? Their military unit?
39. Your military unit in VN? Equipment of this military unit? (number of guns, munitions, cars, cannons, aeroplanes, helicopters...) Where this unit and its headquarters are standing? Function and sphere of military points that you know (ports, aerodome and other military points, headquarters and dwelling places of American advisers)
40. Name and grade of your superior?
41. Your desires?
42. Your promises?
43. What's name of your father? How old he is? What's his profession? His level of education?
44. Your mother's name? Her maiden name? What is the present address of your parents?
45. How many brothers and sisters have you? Mention their name, age, and profession?
46. Are you married? What's the date of your marriage? Your wife's name? Her maiden name?
47. Are you protestant or Catholic? And your parents? Your wife?
48. Are you a Democrat or a Republican? And your father?
49. For whom did you vote in the last presidential elections? Why did you vote for him?
50. What's the living standard of your parents? What is the monthly pay of your father? Mention the various facilities in your parent's home?
51. And you? Did you live comfortably with your wife and children?
52. Did you live in your own house or in military quarters?
53. What comfort did you have at home (give details).
54. What was your pay and allowance (per month).

55. How much money could you save each month.
56. To what daily papers and magazines did you subscribe?
57. How much money did you spend each month on the ship or at the airforce base?
58. How sports and pastimes do you like? What else do you like (music, reading, movies...)
59. How many states of the Union have you visited? How many foreign countrys have you visited? In what state of the Union did you spend most of your life?
60. What was your understanding of the S.V.N.F. for L? How do you find the guerrillas in VN? Why do the American people oppose the US war in VN? Did you know that it is an unjust war of aggression? Why are 300,000 servicemen fighting for VN? Did you think they came to defend the A. Way of life?
61. How can the US gvt justify its air attacks on the D.R.V.? Did you think those air strikes are effective? Were you enthusiastic when you flew missions over NVN? Did you like to be separated from your loved ones and go to S.E.A.? For what purposes were you involved in such a war?
62. What worried you the most when you flew over NVN?
63. What did you know about the casualties suffered by US aircraft in VN?
64. What was your understanding of NVN before your capture?
65. What did you know about our airforce and air defense.....the Peoples Republic of China?
66. And about the Soviet Union? Its military strength?
67. What was your conception of communism and socialism? Did you hate communism? and why so? From what sources did you get that information? How did you find your way of life?
68. What was your opinion about the political system of the US? How did you conceive the position of Navy (orAF) officers in the American society? Did you think that young

Americans like to join the armed forces? Why so? Do you think they like to go and die in SVN? What differences did you know in the opinions of the US Navy and the USAF about the air strikes against NVN? Do you think your Government can continue its war in NVN 10 years more? What will be reaction of the American people? What was your opinion of the South Vietnamese army? How are the relations between the Navy and Air Force Officers?

69. How long did you think the war in SVN will last? In your opinion, how should the VN problem be settled? Did you know the firm determination of the VN people to fight until final victory?

70. Since your capture to now do you know it? What are your present feelings concerning your life in the camp? What are your impressions of the Christmas 1965 in the camp? What are your opinion of the voice of VN radio broadcasts? Did you enjoy listening to these broadcasts? why so?

71. What did you begin to go to school. Mention the various school you have attended (their name and place). How long did you stay in each school? When did you graduate from high school? Are you bachelor sciences (B.S.) or bachelor of Arts (B.A.) Then, what college or university did you attend? When did you graduate from university? Join the Airforce (the Navy, the Marine airforce). Where did you join it? And why did you join the airforce not the Navy? To what unit and what job were assigned after joining the US air force.

72. What flying schools did you attend? (name, base, and how long for each school) What kind of aircraft did you fly? When were you commissioned? What's your serial number? Mention the dates of your promotions to various ranks? To what squadrons were you assigned since you were commissioned?

73. What were, in order of precedence, your various jobs in the A.F.? When did you leave the US to go to South Chinese Sea?

When did you come there? To what squadrons were you assigned to? In how many air strikes against NVN have you take part? Type of your aircraft.

74. What aircraft courier (what wing) does your squadron belong to? In what circumstances was you shot down? Were you injured when you landed?
75. How were you captured? How did our people treat you? What were your impressions at the moment of your capture?
76. Did you receive special training before coming to S.E.A.? Did you receive any specific instruction in other to cope with any eventual. . . In your opinion, what were the reasons of the war in SVN? What did you know about that war? Did you think that the US would win the war SVN? In your opinion, what are the prospect of the US war in SVN?

(15) (S) Shortly after a prisoner's arrival in Hanoi, he underwent immediate and intense interrogation. The initial sessions were designed to assess the prisoner's personality, induce submissiveness, and establish a response pattern. Returnees were surprised that those sessions did not attempt to extract intelligence of an immediate tactical value although information was sought by simple questions concerning squadron, air wing, launch base and last mission. To obtain these answers, the interrogators applied primarily psychological pressures such as isolation, the denial of medical treatment, or the threat of physical punishment. If these pressures failed, the interrogators frequently resorted to harsh physical abuse. This included: harassment, standing or sitting in one position for long periods of time, beatings, the use of ropes and straps to bind the individual in an uncomfortable position or to suspend him from the ceiling, and denial of food and water. In one case, the extended application of the "rope treatment" resulted in the loss of control of bodily functions and in the temporary loss of sanity.[45] Once the prisoners began to respond, the interrogation sessions became more politically oriented. The interrogators would ask simple political questions and then "prove" their prisoner's response wrong by using known "true" statements. This created doubt in the PW's mind as to the validity of his own convictions and assisted the "softening up" process.[46] The emphasis in interrogation appeared to center on obtaining a response pattern from the PW. Returnees were shocked to discover that often their interrogator already possessed the

intelligence information being requested. The accuracy of the information provided by the PW did not seem to concern the interrogators as long as it was not obviously absurd. The key objective of the interrogation process was to induce the PW to participate in a dialogue with his captors.[47] The following experience of one returnee typifies the interrogation techniques used by the North Vietnamese.[48]

> a. Despair Approach - The prisoner was not permitted to sleep for more than 15 or 20 minutes at a time during the first five days. He became very tired physically, susceptible to fear, and mentally fatigued. The Vietnamese would continually remind him that he was a war criminal, and that he was guilty of atrocious and horrible crimes against the North Vietnamese people. He was reminded that he would be a prisoner for a long, long time, separated from his wife and children.
>
> b. Friendly Approach - the North Vietnamese would say to the prisoner, "We understand that you are here not because you wanted to fight a war. No man wants to go to war. You are here only because of the Johnson clique; the Johnson administration. Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara. They have sent you here against your wishes. You're only following military orders because you are a military man. We are not at war with the peace loving American people. And we make a distinction between the American people and the government. You're subject to our humane treatment, depending on your actions and attitude. Someday you will be returned home to your mother and to your wife and family. We hope that when the war is over, you will return home as a good American citizen.
>
> c. Threats - the North Vietnamese interrogators prefaced just about every session with threats of punishment if subject did not tell the truth. However, they never mentioned what punishment they had in mind. They never said, "We're going to beat you or put you in solitary confinement." Or, "We're going to torture you."

As a matter of fact, they took offense when the word "torture" was spoken by a PW. This word was insulting to them.

d. Political Approach - subject was advised that, as an American citizen and a man with a conscience, he would recognize his wrongdoing once the truth were known.

e. Hour of Charm - the "Hour of Charm" technique was used during holiday occasions. Usually during Christmas, New Years and TET, the North Vietnamese would arrange very innocent and informal meetings between the PW's, the Camp Commander and an interrogator. Cookies, candy and peanut brittle were usually served. The Vietnamese would wish the American PW's a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year and ask if they missed their wives, family, children and if this was their first Christmas away from home. No questions of a military nature or concerning other subjects were asked.

f. Drugs - the returnees were not aware of any drugs being used.

g. Solitary Confinement - one returnee stated that solitary confinement was definitely used and quite extensively. He himself spent approximately 45 days in solitary confinement. He heard that one of the other returnees was in solitary confinement for about 107 days. He also heard that some people had been confined to solitary from seven to 12 months.

h. Exhaustion Method - the prisoners were usually left alone from midnight to dawn, however checks were made throughout the night. One returnee was kept in his shorts and T-shirt for the first five days in his permanent prison and it was very cool during the night. He had no blanket or bed but was expected to sleep on the tile floor. He attempted to sleep on a wooden table which was in the interrogation room, but the

guards made him get off and sleep on the floor. During this period he felt that obvious attempts were made to exhaust him physically and mentally.

(16) (S) As was the case in previous conflicts, the Communists stressed the indoctriantion of prisoners of war rather than interrogation. Formal indoctrination began during the interrogation phase and continued until the releasees boarded the plane for their return journey home. From the day of his capture, a prisoner of war underwent subtle manipulation to change his values. He was made to feel humiliation and debasement as well as acquire a feeling of criminal guilt and culpability for crimes he supposedly committed in North Vietnam. The indoctrination program caused the individual to question his motivation and commitment to the war in Vietnam. He began to think twice about what was taking place in Vietnam and the results of his participation. This was usually the first stage of erosion of a prisoner's system of values. The intensive use of isolation assisted the indoctrination process. The prisoner could not receive reinforcement for his values and beliefs from other PW's. Alone, he could only communicate with his indoctrinators. Demoralization and doubt were intensified when he was confronted with anti-American tapes and statements made by other PW's and with anti-war statements of leading American politicians and commentators. Once this depressed state had been reached, reading material was sent into the cells for perusal by the prisoners. Books on the history of Vietnam by Vietnamese authors were followed by those written by Americans, such as Felix Greene. Articles by Walter Lippmann, Spock, Burdett, Senators McCarthy and Fulbright, and Bertrand Russell's war crimes trial were also distributed. All, of course, denounced the war and U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. Once a month, the inmates were sent the Vietnam Courier which was printed in Hanoi and carried articles similar to what they had been reading. Once in a while, they were given the New Runway, a paper put out by the inmates of Hilton compound. Most of it was concerned with anti-American policy statements written by the inmates themselves, a fact which did not help to raise the morale of the prisoners. Eventually, they began to take an active part in the indoctrination program. Reports were required on material they had read. These, in turn, were discussed with indoctrinators. They were given a series of pamphlets to read, entitled, by the prisoners, the "Burn All, Kill All" series, in which Americans were pictured as the scourge of the earth. They were asked to tape articles from the Vietnam Courier, which were later read over the public address system of the camp. These, incidentally, were made by many prisoners because they appeared harmless and were thought to be a part of the prison system. Later on, tapes of a different kind were requested. Generally, the topics

chosen were anti-war propaganda. The prisoners who refused to cooperate with the indoctrination program or displayed a "poor attitude" received disciplinary treatment. The most common form of punishment was isolation. It appears that the ultimate goal of indoctrination was not to transform the prisoner into a confirmed Communist, but to undermine his traditional beliefs and move him toward an acceptance of North Vietnamese concepts. Once this was achieved, it became easier to supplant his eroded value system with one more favorable to the Communist cause.

(17) (S) Although existing under the most difficult circumstances in an almost totally controlled environment, the will of the American PW to resist has not been lost. Resistance takes the form of covert communication - rappings, whispers, passed messages in order to reinforce morale and avoid mental collapse. PW's accept the directives of senior officers who communicate via "the grapevine." The prison code adopted by the PWs at the direction of the Senior Ranking Officer states:

(a) Don't let the bastards get you down.

(b) Resist up to the point of torture.

(c) Don't try to escape without outside assistance.

Prisoners have used the technique of overreacting to instructions when they were being exploited for propaganda purposes. The excessive bowing of one detainee during the production of a propaganda film effectively sabotaged the propaganda effort. That the Communists have not had it all their own way is indicated by reports that a special camp exists to house and indoctrinate the "incorrigibles."

b. (S) Summary - North Vietnam Experience.

(1) (U) It is difficult to determine the exact number of USPW's detained by North Vietnam, since that nation still refuses to release the identity of its captives. Based on MIA and confirmed captured totals, the North Vietnamese could hold close to 800 captives, although less than half this total are known captives.[49] Basing this report on the experience of only nine individuals affords too small a sample for the establishment of a statistically valid model. However, with the insight gained from a detailed examination of past conflicts (World War II and Korea), the experiences related by the returnees can be placed in proper perspective. Appropriate validation must await the final repatriation of all USPW's.

(2) (U) The current situation in North Vietnam differs radically from past conflicts involving the United States, in the sense that detained U.S. personnel are almost exclusively Navy or Air Force pilots or aircrewmen instead of from the Army. It is conceivable that these prisoners, well educated, highly trained, and possessing at least some knowledge of what to expect in captivity, pose a challenge to the North Vietnamese prisoner of war management system. Based on limited evidence, it would appear that North Vietnam has attempted to completely control the prisoners' environment. Knowledgeable individuals concerned with PW management agree that the North Vietnamese have developed a highly sophisticated approach to handling prisoners. This is not difficult to understand when it is acknowledged that:

(a) North Vietnam can draw upon 40 years of Communist penal experience.

(b) Successful techniques used against Americans during the Korean conflict can be adapted to the present situation.

(c) The nation's ideological base encourages the manipulation of the environment and the individual to obtain national objectives.

(d) The present situation is conducive to the complete control of the PW by his captors. (The small number of prisoners permits the use of extensive isolation and reduces the support requirements necessary for efficient and effective management. In addition, the unpopularity of the war in the United States has provided the North Vietnamese with an additional source of strength in the implementation of their program.)

(3) (U) At the heart of the North Vietnamese PW management system is the conditioning process. The North Vietnamese have placed great emphasis on this process. They have taken great pains to design a nearly perfect, controlled environment (to permit the full play of Pavlov's condition-response concept). This environment includes the utilization of long established prison facilities containing individual cells insuring the complete isolation of the individual. Further, the prison routine is designed to maintain the isolation effect. Prisoners in the early stages of conditioning lead solitary lives. Eating, sleeping, washing, and meeting bodily needs are all done in isolation. The system is considered to have broken down when a PW catches a mere glimpse of another prisoner. Severe punishment is certain for any attempt on the part of the prisoners to communicate. The length of an individual's isolation is dependent upon his

receptivity to indoctrination. Apparently during a later stage when it appears that the conditioning process has taken hold, semi-isolation (prisoners may have roommates) is permitted. Unauthorized communication remains prohibited. It is the environment of isolation that gives impetus to the conditioning process.

(4) (U) From the moment of capture, the individual's normal fear and uncertainity are increased by what appears to be a deliberate manipulation of the civil populace for the purpose of intimidating the prisoner. While in this state of uncertainity, he is subjected to intensive interrogation designed to obtain an early admission of wrongdoing. Also during this period, his personality and character are evaluated. Fear, shock, and doubt begin to erode his defensive mechanisms as the conditioning process moves into the indoctrination phase. Instilling a feeling of doubt and guilt is an integral part of the process. Under constant stress, alternately exposed to hope and fear, possessed of guilt feelings, denied reinforcement of his traditional value system, stripped of dignity, and forced into a posture of submissiveness and response, the stage has been set for restructuring the prisoner's personality. The objective is the creation of an individual more responsive to the North Vietnamese (i.e., Communist) view of society and world order. This does not imply that an attempt is being made to fashion hard-core Communists. It is sufficient that an attitudinal change is displayed by the detainee.

(5) (U) The effectiveness of isolation as a technique in the conditioning process has reduced the emphasis placed on other procedures and techniques that proved successful in World War II and Korea. These include group indoctrination, discussions, and classes; organization of PW's into squads, platoons, and companies; extensive use of informers and the incorporation of PW's into the management system. On the other hand, certain practices and techniques have remained constant. They include:

(a) The initial interrogation of PW's at regimental level with the stress on obtaining personal and political information.

(b) The administrative organization for the handling of PW's remains divided along political and military lines.

(c) Segregation of senior men and potential trouble makers from younger, more impressionable individuals.

(d) Continued use of personal history forms, questionnaires, autobiographies, and essays.

(e) Denial of prisoner of war status.

(f) "War crimes" admissions have replaced bacteriological warfare confessions.

(g) The North Vietnamese "humanitarian" policy is a substitute for the Chinese policy of "leniency."

(h) Extensive use of PW personal correspondence, tape recordings, and films to meet propaganda objectives.

(i) Selected but limited physical abuse and brutality to extract confessions.

(j) Early release of selected PW's.

(7) (S) Although the actual degree of success of the North Vietnamese program remains unknown, it is clear that some resistance is being offered by the PW's. Former prisoners have asserted that the Senior Ranking Officer has made his presence felt. Furthermore, the "resisters" are rumored to have been held in a separate prison (a situation similar to the Chicom segregation of the "reactionaries" in Korea). Clandestine attempts by the prisoners to communicate with one another indicate the need felt by the prisoners to break out of the total environmental control established by the North Vietnamese. The fact such attempts are being made indicates that the North Vietnamese have not been entirely successful in breaking the USPW's will to resist.

4. (S) SOUTH VIETNAM:

a. (S) General:

(1) (U) As of July 1971, there were 459 American soldiers missing in action in South Vietnam, with an additional 62 known to be captured.[50] Unlike North Vietnam, the preponderance of USPW's in South Vietnam are US Army personnel, the majority of which at the time of capture were below the grade of Staff Sergeant (E-6).

(2) (U) The basic policies which Communist management of PW's in North Vietnam are applicable to the South as well. Most variations are due to limitations of the situation and the operational environment. The more primitive facilities and the maximum use of the harsh environment to debilitate and depress the captives are the two most prominent differences. Based on this premise, the discussion

on South Vietnam will be reduced in scope. It is important, however, to keep in mind that the principles discussed in the preceding section on North Vietnam apply with equal weight to the primitive internment camps in the South. For reference purposes, a comprehensive description of the conditions in the South is provided in the book written by Major James N. Rowe, a captive of the Viet Cong for 5 years, entitled Five Years to Freedom (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).

(3) (S) Upon capture, U.S. prisoners in South Vietnam are moved as expeditiously as possible to camps in "secure" areas. To lessen the PW's capability to escape, it is a common practice of the captor to remove the boots/shoes of the prisoner.[51] The relative proximity of the camps to the contested areas requires that the PW's and the camps be moved frequently so as to insure the security of the captives. Often, the original guard personnel accompany the prisoners to their new location within the same military region. The captive population in each camp is kept small to facilitate control, and the hostile terrain eliminates the need for elaborate restraining walls and guard towers. Care is taken to camouflage the camp from air observation. The cover of trees is for concealment. A typical camp (see Figure 15, Page 76) is protected by a 3 1/2 foot wide moat and punji-stake pits to discourage escape.[52] Mines and booby traps are emplaced along trails leading into the camp. Living quarters vary. They consist of simple bamboo cages, resemble Vietnamese "hootches," or in still other instances might consist of a simple ground shelter covered with logs and dirt (see Figure 16, Page 77). A prisoner might be incarcerated individually in a hut or share a typical 12- by 24-foot structure with another captive. It is not unusual for prisoners to experience long periods of isolation, despite the fact that other prisoners are being kept within the same compound. Only limited conversation is permitted between prisoners. In some compounds, prisoners are informed of personnel with whom they might speak and those with whom conversation is prohibited.[53] It appears that there is no policy to establish separate compounds for officers and enlisted men, but the principle of segregation is maintained by restricting contact and prohibiting communication between the ranks. The purpose of such restrictions is aptly described by Major Rowe.[54]

> In depriving them (USPW's) of any interrelationship or interdependence, the cadre could work on individual anxieties and attack the loyalties which the man had formed under different circumstances. Over a period of time, loyalties, if not deeply rooted

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

FIGURE 15 TYPICAL VC CAMP

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FIGURE 16 CAGE

and well formed, can be eroded. Without unity, there is no method of maintaining the validity of ones belief while the cadre works to destroy them.

U.S. civilian captives of the Viet Cong (VC) were also kept in the same compound and received no preferential treatment because of their civilian status. In at least one instance, they shared the same captive experience as their military counterparts.[55]

(4) (U) The PW's were normally fed two or three times per day, the food being generally equivalent to captor staples. The quantity provided was less than that required to sustain life. Many survived by supplementing their diet, catching or trapping game during work or bathing periods. A number of PW's experienced the same dietary difficulty that some American captives encountered in Korea; this involved their non-acceptance of a fish and rice diet as palatable. This weakened their physical condition and exposed them to infection and disease. It is the firm conviction of at least one returnee that some PW's who died would have survived captivity had they forced themselves to eat everything that was made available to them.[56] Major Rowe observed that four USPW's who reached such a weakened state that they could no longer stomach the fish and rice diet died as a result.[57]

(5) (C) Most PW's report that required medical assistance was provided by VC/NVA corpsmen. Medical supplies, however, were limited in both quality and quantity. Those that required hospitalization state that they received fair treatment although facilities and medical supplies were inadequate.[58] Both food and medical treatment have been used when necessary as a means of reward and punishment.

(6) (C) The VC/NVA usually relied upon a whistle to signal established prison routine - reveille, lights out, meals, P.T., and work details. The latter normally consisted of cutting wood, digging ditches, milling rice, and other manual labor.

(7) (C) In some camps, radio receivers were available for the presentation of propaganda broadcasts. The guards dictated the programs and the times for listening.

(8) (C) The VC/NVA established the principle with their PW's very early that the VC/NVA are the only law in the jungle; that they are not required to abide by the Geneva Convention; and that although the "criminal captives" in their hands deserve proper punishment, the

established policy of "humanitarianism" will insure them good treatment if they sincerely repent their criminal acts.[59] Major Rowe, upon his escape, brought with him several lesson plans written by the Viet Cong. These lesson plans, written in stilted and often incorrect English, were used by VC/NVA indoctrinators in instructing USPW's. Lesson Plan II entitled "Ten Years Crimes of the US Imperialists and Lackeys in SVN" concludes with the following dialogue:[60]

> Sow wind reap whirlwind, the US army and government on the other side of the globe come here and cause our country and our people numerous mournings and sufferings.
>
> The crime of the US Johnson government, US imperialists and you [the USPW] must be seriously punished. US POW's are those who have directly covimitted bloody crimes and must bear full responsibility and pay these above bloody debts.
>
> But with the Vietnamese people's humanitarian with the SVN LNF's lenient policy, with your repetence, in examination the south Vietnamese people and the american people are not enemies, US army men as well as POWs are victims of the Johnson fascist aggressive policy. Therefore the SVNLNF the liberation forces and our Vietnamese people already forgive your past crimes if you realize your government's crimes in general and your crimes in particular in past eleven years.

(9) ~~(8)~~ "Atonement for crimes" generally took the form of derogatory statements against the United States and tape recordings. The promise of early release was held out for cooperative behavior.[61]

> - If to practise the international law, P-O-Ws cannot be released or exchanged until the end of the war. At present the war between the US imperialists and the Vietnamese people is carrying on decisely, but the front alsways is read to release US P-O-Ws, who go back home to unite with their families. Because the above P-O-W knew to

awake and repent their crimes in the past and the released P-O-W promise that they would amend and become a good citizen of U-S-A. .....
- It is the truth that the US servicemen were deceived by the US government. According to international law, the crimes of the aggressors were more worth killing than release and forgiving them. However the front declared in the above: "Our aim of resistance is to defeat US imperialism's aggression, not to kill the body of those servicement who, dropped their guns and surrendered". Therefore the release of P-O-W in SVN soon or late is guided concerned with the present situation in SVN.

(10) (C) Physical abuse, in general, was limited. However, three "hard core" resisters - SGT Bennett, SGT Roraback, and CPT Versace - were executed by the VC in retaliation for the GVN's execution of two VC personnel during October and November 1965. Arrogant behavior, however, was generally rewarded with brutal beatings. Although rare, death threats, reduction of rations, withholding of medical supplies, confinement in the "hole," and long periods of isolation were the major forms of physical abuse by the VC. This "lack of torture" is perhaps best stated by MAJ Rowe, their former prisoner: "...It is true I was not physically tortured or beaten during the period of captivity as such. To add this to the living conditions would insure death. The living conditions are such that it is a daily struggle - a twenty-four-hour-a-day struggle to stay alive."[62]

(11) (C) The intensity and frequency of interrogation varied. SGT Pitzer experienced two series of interrogation, widely spaced, during his 4 years of captivity. The first series occurred 3 months after capture and involved daily sessions, 2 hours per day for 2 weeks. The second series occurred 17 months later and lasted 2 hours per day for 1 week.[63] Initial interrogation generally occurred on the way to the prison camp and was occasionally conducted by a commissioner of the National Liberation Front (NLF) as opposed to a military interrogator. In keeping with the Communist theme, the interrogation pattern emphasized personal and political information more than tactical intelligence. Upon arriving at the camp, a more detailed personal history from was completed as well as questionnaires concerned with political and military information. An immediate objective was to have the PW acknowledge the validity of the VC's

political position and the "criminalty" of the U.S. presence in Vietnam. As part of the conditioning process, the prisoners were exposed, in some instances, to propaganda themes written on walls, such as:[64]

(a) "Repatriation for friends of the Front."

(b) "U.S. aggressors are committing crimes in South Vietnam."

(c) "South Vietnamese people should be left alone to settle their own affairs."

(d) "Colored army man, you are committing the same crimes as the K.K.K."

(12) ~~(C)~~ Sessions usually began with friendly small talk concerned with personal experiences and this would be skillfully correlated with certain aspects of the Vietnam situation, leading to the questioning phase. Leading questions required an admission that the VC were right on certain minor issues. Next came questions of greater import tied to previous minor points admitted to be true by the detainee, forcing him to concur with the interrogator's statement or admit to lying previously. These questions required admission or denouncement and if it was not forthcoming, the process would be repeated. As indoctrination gradually replaced interrogation, again there was no set duration or frequency for the sessions, and they generally involved individual rather than group processes. SGT Pitzer, for example, experienced 2 hours per week 5 weeks at one camp and 2 hours per night twice a week from May 1967 through July 1967. He was also required to attend formal lectures.[65] Although oral indoctrination was emphasized, the prisoners received large amounts of written propaganda and were exposed to propaganda broadcasts. The anti-war movement in the United States was of major importance to the Cadre's lesson plans as was the racial theme when dealing with black prisoners.[66] Lengthy written statements of essays were frequently required of the PW's and were used for propaganda exploitation. Major Rowe was constantly harried to put down on paper his understanding of the "truth;" i.e., the "just cause of the (NLF) revolution" and the "unjust US war of aggression."[67] Some PW's were required to learn and sing the VC anthem as a sign of cooperative behavior. The indoctrinators, as a rule, were not organic to the camp and appeared at irregular intervals. The central theme throughout was that "sincere" recognition of the "truth" would lead to repatriation.[68]

(13) ~~(C)~~ Despite the extremely adverse conditions, the returnees report that resistance was practiced by most PW's. A

number of PW's maintained their morale by constantly harassing the VC/NVA. This took the form of complaints regarding the prison diet, medical care, and work assignments.[69] Prima facie evidence of the ability of USPW's to continue resistance under the most primitive of conditions is illustrated by the fact that as of February 1970, 11 US Army personnel had managed to escape from Viet Cong control. (Those who did escape generally exercised care not to kill or injure guards during escape to protect remaining captives against retaliation.)

(14) (U) A primary difference between captivity in the North and the South is worth noting here. There have been no successful escapes from prisons in North Vietnam. Should a USPW attempt escape from North Vietnam, he would have to evade capture over a distance of hundreds of miles through hostile terrain and population. In the South, the USPW who manages to escape has a fair chance of evading his pursuers in the forest environment and signaling friendly aircraft overhead or working his way back to friendly controlled areas. His primary tasks are avoiding unknown indigenous personnel and surviving off the land.

(15) ~~(C)~~ Men of senior rank in the VC/NVA prison camps attempted to form guidelines for resistance and by their leadership set the example for other PW's. This guidance varied from recognizing that cooperation was necessary to pacify interrogators (the extent of cooperation being dependent upon the discretion of each individual) to disapproval of actions which resulted in signed statements and tape recordings. Major Rowe, the senior PW in his camp (in which at one time there were three other PW's), endured much hardship and isolation setting the example for resistance. He was severely punished for an escape attempt which failed.[70] This punishment did not deter him from attempting two more escapes, the last one being successful. Other returnees have stated that they were not punished after unsuccessful escape attempts.

(16) ~~(C)~~ The early release of select prisoners by the VC/NVA has been a key feature of their PW exploitation policy. The fact that they have released 22 USPW's gives credence to their "lenient" or "humanitarian" policy during indoctrination sessions. Remaining USPW's are instructed on the proper attitude they must attain if they (the USPW's) all wish to be repatriated.[71] That such releases are considered beneficial to the Communist cause is exemplified by the following statement extracted from a captured VC document:[72]

> Recent free of two US captives greatly influenced world public opinion; more

US captives are needed for propaganda purposes. Units are encouraged to capture as many US and Free World Military Assistance Force captives as possible.

b. (U) Summary - South Vietnam.

(1) US Army personnel of primarily the lower ranks make up the preponderance of USPW's held in the South. Living conditions are considerably different for the prisoner in the South as opposed to his counterpart held in the North. The hostile natural environment and the proximity to the battlefield make the day-to-day struggle for survival excessively harsh without regard to the added psychological and physiological pressures of being a prisoner of war.

(2) The management principles used by the Viet Cong (or NVA in the South) do not differ significantly from those employed by the North Vietnamese (in the North). What variations do exist are again products of the environment under which they are being employed. Interrogation, indoctrination, and ultimate exploitation, primarily in the form of repatriation through the media of anti-war U.S. peace groups and letters expressing antiwar sentiments, are the terms of reference for the captive state.

(3) Outright brutality is rare and applied only against the arrogant resister. Punishment for "improper attitude or behavior" range from naked exposure to the elements to protracted periods of immobility. Leg and/or arm irons are used and represent a constant threat to the health and ultimate survival of the PW. Executions are the exception rather than the rule. This is in keeping with established North Vietnamese policy. Up to this writing, only seven USPW's are known to have been executed. Three of these were made to suffer this fate in retaliation for the execution of VC terrorists by the Government of South Vietnam. The VC/NVA, like the Northern Communists, consider the USPW to be far too important a political pawn to waste by execution. However, their desire to exploit the USPW is not always matched by their efforts to sustain life. The survival of the USPW has often been dependent on the ingenuity of that individual to obtain additional and varied food, inasmuch as that provided by the VC often barely sustains life. Reports of USPW deaths due to malnutrition are not uncommon.

(4) The attempted use of isolation as a means of control is also being practiced on American PW's in South Vietnam. However, the nature of the war in the South and the primitive conditions under

which the PW's are held precludes total visual isolation. Rather, the PW is isolated by controls on communication with his fellow PW's in the camp. The small population of prison compounds aids security and facilitates control. There is, however, an element in favor of the USPW in the South that is not available in the North. The tropical forest does permit evasion if an escape attempt is executed successfully. This is borne out by the fact that as of February 1970, 11 Army USPW's escaped from the control of their captors. The USPW in the North, as was explained in the previous section, must evade capture through hundreds of miles and a hostile population.

(5) The vast majority of returnee debriefings indicate that despite VC/NVA efforts, the American captive maintains a spirit of resistance. This is especially true when the senior USPW sets the example. Escapes are planned, made, and occasionally succeed. Prisoners generally exercise care not to kill or injure guards during escape to protect remaining captives from retaliation.

(6) The central theme of indoctrination leveled against the USPW in the South is that of the "righteousness of the NLF revolution" and the "unjust US war of aggression." USPW's are informed that their survival is dependent on the "lenient policy" of the National Liberation Front and that repatriation will come only upon the USPW's sincere recognition of the "truth." The prisoner of war management techniques, though applied in a less sophisticated manner than in the North, are nevertheless effective. This fact is substantiated by the signed statements and tape recordings from USPW's held by the Viet Cong.

(7) The primary lesson from the South Vietnam experience is that the Viet Cong seek to exploit USPW's for two purposes. First, they repatriate USPW's through the media of American anti-war peace groups in order to show the humanitarianism of the National Liberation Front and to promote the image of the Peace Groups. Second, they release only those PW's whom they believe to be cooperative and sufficiently repentant to actively promote sympathy in the United States for the NLF cause. The exploitation through controlled repatriation has been highly successful. Peace groups have benefited from this exposure. In the latter case, the success has been nil. None of the repatriated prisoners felt they had been unduly influenced by the conditioning process of the Communists, and none has acted as a spokesman for the NLF upon his return to CONUS. The only reason for willingly making derogatory statements and tape recordings about the United States while prisoners of war was initially the death threats of their captors and later, the hope

of early release through cooperative behavior. In their case, their "cooperation" was successful.

5. (S) NORTH KOREA - (1968-69):

a. (U) General.

(1) (U) Two recent events, the seizure of the US Naval vessel Pueblo on 23 January 1968 and the shooting down of an American helicopter on 17 August 1969, dramatically portray North Korea's present approach to the detention of American military personnel. It should be noted that since a state of war did not exist between the United States and North Korea, the personnel detained were not considered prisoners of war by their captors. In typical Communist fashion, members of both crews were treated as "criminals" who had violated international law.[74] In both instances, the North Koreans demonstrated that they had learned their lessons well from the Korean War and had lost none of their expertise in extracting confessions. Little time was wasted in developing a subtle approach to interrogation.

(2) (U) In the case of the three-man helicopter crew, all required medical treatment while undergoing intensive interrogation. One reported good treatment and no coercion although he admitted to a navigational error which caused him to commit a "criminal" act (violating air space of North Korea). The other two were continually harassed and beaten by their guards.[75] They were required to sign statements pledging never to participate in aggression against other countries, live a "conscientious" life, and to work for peace. Maximum propaganda exploitation was obtained from the incident when the U.S. wrote a 350-word apology admitting to its criminal act in order to obtain the release of the detainees. The period of detention lasted less than 4 months.

(3) (U) In the case of the Pueblo incident, which preceded the downing of the helicopter, crew members were detained for approximately 11 months. The ship's seizure and detention of the crew members resulted in U.S. exposure to political blackmail, public acknowledgement of guilt, and embarassment. Although the basic objective of the North Koreans was maximum political and propaganda exploitation of the incident and the crew members, they did not miss an opportunity to politically indoctrinate their captives and extract critical intelligence information from them.

(4) (S) Except for the excessive use of brutality, the procedures directed against the Pueblo crew were consistent with Communist prisoner of war management principles. The need for quick

exploitation to deter American counteraction and establish credibility in the eyes of the world required an occasional modification of the established approach. Brutal treatment was instituted immediately upon capture. It took the form of beatings - kicking, slapping, and punching - designed for shock effect and for speeding compliance. As in the case of North Vietnam, there was a calculated use of the civil population for the intimidation of prisoners to increase fear and shock and to stimulate a feeling of dependency. When the detainees were taken to Wonsan, they were greeted by a yelling mob of civilians. Shouts of "kill the yankees," were heard; and the populace joined in kicking, shoving, and hitting the detainees.[76]

(5) ~~(S)~~ The men were transported by bus and rail to a temporary detention site in Pyongyang for interrogation. They were housed in barracks-like structures. Officers were segregated from the rest of the crew and placed in individual rooms with the exception of the Executive Officer and Research Officer whose identity had not been established. This was later corrected, and the two officers were also assigned separate rooms. The rest of the crew received random room assignments with four or ten men to a room. The rooms contained bunks, a thin mattress, sheets, one blanket, a table, a bucket, and a bare ceiling light always lit. One latrine, which was filthy, served the needs of the 82 crewmen. The detainees were required to exchange their clothing for warm underwear, sweat shirts, and standard padded suits. They were provided with a towel, toothbrush and paste, a soap with container, and a package of cigarettes. Biweekly bathing was permitted at a location some distance from their place of detention. The quality of the food served was considered inferior by U.S. standards and consisted mainly of dry bread, soup made from a turnip-like vegetable; or cabbage, rice, and water. Occasionally, a poor quality of pork or fish was added to the soup. Most men experienced weight loss and malnutrition. The daily routine was: reveille at 0630; cleaning of quarters; personel hygiene; breakfast; a study period; interrogation; noon meal; an hour rest period; and then more indoctrination or interrogation, sometimes lasting until after midnight (although 2230 hours normally brought a halt to all activities). The routine at the second confinement site differed somewhat. The detainees were provided with a 15-minute exercise period in the moring and were allotted an hour in the afternoon for sports. Chess and card games were permitted free time in the evening and lights were put out fairly regularly at 2000 hours.

(6) ~~(S)~~ The Pueblo's crew was heavily guarded at the first detention site. Weapons-carrying guards were present on all floors occupied by the detainees. At the second site, security measures were more relaxed although it has been estimated that the total staff

of the prison compound included 100-120 military personnel. Windows and doors of the barracks were not barred nor were barbed wire and security devices employed. Their absence was judged to be due to lack of need rather than lack of equipment.[77] To enhance control, twelve "Rules of Life" were posted in each room at the second site of detention. The most trivial violations of these rules resulted in severe beatings. They were as follows:[78]

1. We must obey all orders given to us.
2. We must show respect to all people in charge of us.
3. We must not sing in the rooms.
4. We must not lie on the floors.
5. We must not lie on the bed with our clothes on.
6. We must not resist interrogation.
7. We must not encourage others to resist interrogation.
8. We must not communicate between rooms.
9. We must not write anything except what is authorized.
10. We must keep ourselves clean.
11. We must take good care of public property.
12. We must observe public morality.

An additional control measure involved the incorporation of select crew members in the prison system. The senior detainee in each room was responsible for the actions of the rest of the men and a senior man was responsible for each floor with the commanding officer of the Pueblo having overall responsibility. The North Koreans made arbitrary changes when it appeared that a selected individual was either incompetent or uncooperative. Selected North Korean officers were assigned each room occupied by the captives and performed a role similar to the company and platoon "instructors" of the Korean War. They were referred to as "room daddies" by the prisoners.

(7) ~~(U)~~ The initial interrogation of the Pueblo's crew occurred on the train enroute from Wonsan to Pyongyang but was mild and restricted to questions of basic military interest. Crew members limited their replies to those required by the Geneva Convention. Within an hour of their arrival at Pyongyang, intensive brutal interrogation began. Commander Bucher was accused of spying for the CIA and transporting South Korean espionage agents to North Korea. He was repeatedly threatened with death, suffered much physical abuse, and was permitted no rest for 24 hours. He was promised the full

release of his crew in return for his "cooperation." When threatened with the death of his youngest crew member, Commander Bucher capitulated and signed his first confession. Crewmen were required to fill out a personal history form which included "everything from birth to present."[79] Refusal to give any information except that required by the Geneva Convention resulted in hard physical abuse and the charge that the men were not protected by the Convention since they were spies. Their commander's "confession" and evidence that the North Koreans had access to personnel records influenced the crew to provide the data requested. As the interrogations proceeded, the detainees became aware that their interrogators were more interested in obtaining a response pattern than they were in the information provided. As was the case during the Korean War, certain detainees received a more intense interrogation than others. In this category were the officers and the Naval Security Group (NSG) personnel. They were questioned on the mission of the ship, their specific responsibility, equipment, NSG facilities, and operations. After intense interrogation, the individual was required to prepare a "confession." Interrogations were normally conducted by one to three interrogators, with an interpreter and guard personnel in the room. Their most effective technique was the use of threats and brutality. In addition to, or in lieu of, beatings, the detainees were required to walk the floor on their knees, hold chairs up over their heads or assume uncomfortable positions for long periods of time. The mass of individual information available to the North Koreans also gave them a psychological advantage over the prisoners who chose to provide correct answers rather than be beaten for information their captors already had.[80]

(8) ~~(U)~~ An early aspect of the conditioning process for the Pueblo crew was the generation of guilt feelings and the development of a sense of futility in each prisoner. As interrogation phased into indoctrination, crew members were required to read and memorize propaganda facts that disparaged the United States. The effort here was designed to sow doubt and confusion. It was a deliberate attack on the established beliefs and attitudes of the individual prisoner. Indoctrination was intensified at the second detention site. The emphasis shifted from breaking down established values and beliefs to providing the personality with new "inputs" whose theme was the superiority of Communism over capitalism. Political officer instructors led group discussions and lectures. Prisoners were required to comment, debate issues, and engage in self-criticism. Discussions highlighted American racial issues, antiwar demonstrations, the American economy, and social issues. Group discussions and lectures occurred twice a week and lasted two to three hours. Propaganda movies were shown every Friday, and the crew was exposed to select

radio broadcasts. The North Korean indoctrination effort was not considered to have been very effective by the detainees. This is attributed to a tactical error which was the failure to separate younger impressionable individuals from the influence of their seniors who were more knowledgeable regarding propaganda. In addition, group living permitted reinforcement of the individuals basic value system.

(9) (S) This weakness in the Communist conditioning process came dramatically into focus when it was discovered that certain detainees were making obscene gestures in propaganda photographs which had received worldwide distribution.[81] Suffering a severe loss of face, the North Koreans reacted with a vengeance. Severe brutal beatings were once again the order of the day. This period was called "Hell Week" by the detainees. The object was to identify and eliminate all resistance. This phase ended only when it appeared that the U.S. and North Korea had finally agreed on terms for the release of the detainees.[82]

(10) (S) The medical treatment provided both the injured helicopter crewmen and the sailors of the Pueblo would be considered inadequate by American standards. There is evidence that medical treatment was manipulated by the North Koreans to induce cooperation by their prisoners. W. O. Loepke of the downed helicopter had his wounds stuffed with a T-shirt and suffered probes without the use of anesthesia. The pilot, CPT Crawford, was threatened with a cessation of medical treatment. Wounded personnel from the Pueblo crew received no treatment enroute to Wonson and their corpsman was prohibited from caring for his comrades. Although a clinic was available to the Pueblo crew and a doctor and nurse were on 24-hour call, detainees could report only at specified times. Often individuals were kept waiting for hours before receiving treatment. The corpsman described the clinic as unsanitary. It should be noted that needed surgery was performed, though without anesthesia, and a serious case of hepatitis was isolated and continually cared for.

b. (S) Summary - North Korea (1968-69).

(1) North Korean peacetime management of American detainees, portrayed by the Pueblo and helicopter incident, indicate no significant changes in their approach to the handling of prisoners since the Korean War. In at least one respect their current system was found wanting. A sufficient number of the Pueblo's crew maintained a spirit of resistance which embarassed the North Koreans in the eyes of the world. It is conceivable that the failure of their conditioning process may have been due to the following:

(a) Underestimating the psychological resistance capacity of their target group. (The Pueblo crewmen exhibited a more sophisticated type of personality and were better trained and educated than the general run of the mill captive encountered during the Korean War.)

(b) The use of extreme brutality to extract quick confessions may have been counter-productive. Although the goal was achieved, the more severe the beatings, the greater the hatred generated in the detainees toward their captors.

(c) Failure to segregate older more experienced crewmen from younger impressionable sailors permitted the former to exercise their influence in countering Communist propaganda.

(d) Failure to effectively utilize the isolation process. Although communication between rooms and between officers and enlisted men was forbidden, the prison environment was so carelessly structured that communication did occur. Further, the men rooming together were able to reinforce each other psychologically.

(2) ~~(S)~~ The necessity of eliciting a quick response from their captives in the form of signed confessions and admissions of guilt caused the North Koreans to concentrate initially on the interrogation process, immediately employing brutal methods for their shock effect. The civil population assisted in intimidating the prisoner, heightening his fear and uncertainty. They also had the effect of developing dependency feelings in the prisoner toward his captors. In keeping with past practices, a concerted effort was made to degrade the individual and strip him of his dignity. The beatings served this process in addition to instilling fear. The insistance on the establishment of a response pattern on the part of each captive was again noticeable. The validity of the response remained less important than the response itself. The procedure of establishing a special interrogation center and intensifying the process for select individuals was once more followed. Unlike the past, the gathering of military intelligence was a major objective rather than a subobjective of interrogation. The capture of the Pueblo's classified documents and equipment, together with the crew, was an opportunity that could not be overlooked.

(3) ~~(S)~~ Indoctrination followed the usual pattern of breaking down the individual's defensive mechanism to chip away at his established beliefs and value system and to shake his faith in the United States. All the standard techniques were employed - personal history forms and autobiographies to assess the personality,

group discussion, lectures, propaganda movies and radio broadcasts, self-criticism, essays, select reading matter, and the use of skilled indoctrinators - instructors as discussion leaders. The North Korean attempt at personality restructuring apparently was a failure for the reasons previously mentioned.

(4) (U) Despite the shortcomings of their indoctrination program, it should be noted that the North Koreans, by the skillful propaganda and political exploitation of the detainees, won a resounding victory in the "cold war." The major power in the West was humbled in the eyes of the world. This has implications for the future. The success scored by the North Koreans may increase the possibility of peacetime detention of U.S. servicemen.

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SECTION III: (U) IDENTIFICATION OF COMMUNIST MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES (U)

1. (U) ROLE OF COMMUNIST NATIONAL POLICY:

a. Goals and Objectives.

(1) Policy may be viewed as the course of action adopted by a country to achieve objectives that promote its national interest. In a wartime environment, national interest dictates that a captive be detained to prevent his further participation in the conflict. This concept has been the foundation for the established prisoner of war policy of most Western nations. These nations also recognize that prisoners have certain well-defined rights guaranteed by the Geneva Convention (1949). In addition, they are pledged to abide by the laws of land warfare and the basic precepts of humanity. It is within this frame that U.S. prisoner of war policy is formulated and carried out. Communist prisoner of war policy, on the other hand, rests on a different foundation. It is formulated in what is conceived to be the national interest within the framework of Communist ideology. Concepts, such as humanity and adherence to international law, have meaning only to the extent that they further the cause of Communism. That is why the Leninist contention that any opposition to Communism is a crime impacts directly on Communist national policy involving prisoners of war.

(2) Communist governments in the 20th century came to power either by the threat or use of force, rather than democratic processes. In conformance with ideology and to eliminate any threat to their consolidation of power, laws were passed making opposition to "the smooth functioning of the organs of government," a serious crime.[1] Internationally, all nations opposing Communism and/or their agents are considered "criminal." As a result, it is Communist policy to declare perfectly legitimate PW's to be war criminals. As such, they are not entitled (in the Communist view) to the protection afforded by the Geneva Convention.

(3) The Communists often justify their actions on the basis that in such conflicts as Korea and Vietnam, no formal declaration of war is involved; and therefore, captives are not entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention. Fighting low intensity conflicts without such formal declarations facilitates the placing of pressure on American captives by the Communists who threaten to classify them as "criminals" rather than as PW's.

(4) This practice is contrary to Article 2 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War which states

that the Convention is applicable in situations of "armed conflict" even if the state of war is not formally recognized.

(5) Article 85 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War specifically states: "Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention."[2]

(6) Communist nations signing the Convention objected to Article 85 and entered reservations to it. They do not consider themselves bound by the Article with regard to "war criminals." Therefore, they will not extend the application of the Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted of having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. In their view, persons so convicted would be subject to the existing laws of the country in question. It must be noted that the Geneva Convention clearly safeguards the rights of both prisoners of war and of persons accused of war crimes. War criminal status can only be conferred upon conviction. Despite this fact, Communist policy has evolved to the point where captives are arbitrarily classified as criminals. This has certain advantages for the Communists:

(a) It permits them to evade their international and humanitarian responsibilities toward their captives.

(b) It gives a semblance of legality to what otherwise might be construed as an illegal act (depriving legitimate PW's of their legal rights under international law).

(c) It provides a cover of respectability for their PW practices which violate the spirit and intent of the Geneva Convention. (international law has been violated when a prisoner of war is compelled to make statements or perform acts detrimental to his own interests, those of his country, or his comrades.)

(7) The real threat to the individual PW from the Communist policy of declaring prisoners "war criminals" is that the captors have it within their power to convict and sentence any prisoner they choose, although they are nominally bound to apply and be limited by the principles of liability established at Nuremberg. The Soviet Union made good this threat during and after World War II. North Korea used the threat effectively at the bargaining table, just as the North Vietnamese are doing at this writing. The Communist insistence on a detailed and credible "confession" is partially related to the "war criminal" policy. In Communist jurisprudence, confession on the part of an accused person is an almost essential prerequisite

to conviction.[3] A signed confession may not only be used to embarass the United States but makes the prisoner vulnerable to conviction as a war criminal.

(8) An adjunct of the "war criminal policy" is a declared policy of "leniency," generosity, or humanitarianism toward criminals who have acknowledged their guilt and expressed a "sincere" desire to atone for their actions. To American eyes, as one author put it, this seems like the highest expression of hypocrisy and cynicism.[4] However, within the framework of Communist policy and practices, it is a very rational and, to them, praiseworthy approach.

(9) As has already been indicated, Communist policy supports the concept that PW's can be considered hostages and used to extract concessions from an enemy. USPW's were used in the past for this purpose and are being used today as pawns in the Paris peace talks. A reflection of this policy is the Communist attitude toward repatriation. Traditionally, they have favored forced repatriation but were required to make concessions on this point when the Korean truce was negotiated. The evidence would indicate that a policy of forced repatriation is not fixed but subject to change in return for greater political or military advantage.

(10) Normally, Communist nations adopt a policy which denies public and private international organizations access to the prisoners which they are detaining. The acceptance or forwarding of letters or packages is done only at the discretion of the captor state; wholesale censorship of correspondence is the rule. External organizations are apt to receive abrupt rebuffs to inquiries concerning the welfare of PW's, and requests for permission to inspect detention facilities are rejected as unnecessary and gratuitous interference.[5] Communist-oriented organizations, or those with objectives which coincide with those of the Communists, are an exception to the established policy, but their activities are severely restricted and monitored.

(11) However, the cornerstone of Communist prisoner of war policy is exploitation of the captive. Because of its importance, this topic is treated separately. (See 5. EXPLOITATION, below.)

b. Status of PW's.

(1) In the current world environment of hot and cold war, no serviceman, whatever his rank or military skill rating, is immune from capture or detention by a hostile nation or group. It has been contended that there are four main categories of detention or capture facing a U.S. serviceman today:[6]

Uniformed members of the armed forces of the United States who fall into the power of an enemy with whom the United States is actually and legally in either a state of war or of armed conflict, such enemy being a recognized and responsible government whose actions fall within the purview of accepted international law. Servicemen captured in such conflicts are, and continue to be, prisoners of war.

Those same uniformed instruments of the United States Government who fall into the power of groups manifestly hostile towards the United States but to whom the international community of nations has not seen fit to grant recognition as a sovereign, independent, responsible state possessing actual territory, a national capital, and a legal capacity as is normally assumed by sovereign states. While, of course, considered to be prisoners of war by the United States, servicemen captured by such groups and under such circumstances are more akin in numerous respects to kidnaped hostages.

Members of the armed forces of the United States who may, in the absence of a state of war or of armed conflict, find themselves seized in the territory of a sovereign state, such intrusion, however, being perfectly innocent and inadvertent, and posing no threat to the security of the detaining state. Under no circumstances are men such as these to be considered prisoners of war; they are, in fact, detainees.

Members of the armed forces of the United States who may be seized by the authorized representatives of a sovereign, independent and responsible state while in territories or waters where they have a perfect legal right to be, but whose seizure and detention may be prompted by the desire to embarass the United States and to extort political or propaganda ransom as the price for the

release of those so abducted. Servicemen in this category are not prisoners of war, however, rather like those mentioned in the second and third categories above they are mainly hostages to ransom.

(2) The legal status of U.S. military personnel captured or detained in a period of armed conflict by Communist nations is that of prisoner of war. Their actual status, on the other hand, appears to be that of persons who, though still prisoners of war in the eyes of international law, are considered by their detainer as war criminals.[7] Although an illegal act, it provides the Communists with a rationale for denying captives their rights under international law.

(3) Upon capture, a military man's legal status changes from that of a recognized instrument of his government to that of a ward of the detaining power. As such, the prisoner, still owing allegiance to his government, is required by it and international law to obey the laws, orders, and regulations in force in the armed forces of the detaining power at the time of his capture.[8] This is recognized by all nations as necessary to insure discipline and good order. The detaining power is held accountable and responsible for the prisoners' safety and well being. The implication here, that prisoners would not offer further physical resistance to their captors, was predicated strictly on the understanding, of course, that these same captors would themselves scrupulously refrain from improper and illegal attempts to manipulate prisoners of war for political, military or other reasons.[9] Although it is not specifically addressed in the Geneva Convention, nations consider it the duty of their captured personnel to resist attempts by their captors to utilize them improperly or illegally as political and psychological weapons against their own country.

(4) The legal status of captured or detained U.S. personnel held by hostile groups or organizations (not recognized as responsible government) more closely resembles that of kidnap victims or seized hostages since their captors owe no allegiance to any recognized responsible government. In the case of the NLF, it might be argued that in reality it is a creature controlled by North Vietnam, an internationally recognized nation state, which can be held responsible for the welfare of its captives. U.S. servicemen seized, on the order of the Pueblo, are not legally considered prisoners of war, but rather hostages held for ransom. Detainee status is reserved for those who have inadvertently intruded the territory of a sovereign state.

(5) U.S. servicemen held captive by Communist nations are vulnerable to accepting their captor's false accusation of culpability (the "war criminal" charge), creating in their minds the self-doubt and guilt feelings which make them more susceptible to the enemy's conditioning process.

c. Effect of U.S. and World Opinion on Communist PW Policy.

(1) Communist states exhibit ambivalent attitudes toward world or U.S. domestic opinion on the PW issue. On the one hand, Communist states have appeared to be sensitive to adverse public opinion concerning treatment of PW's/detainees. Regardless of the country, vigorous efforts are made, whether in press conferences, repatriation proceedings, or released pictures, and news accounts, to give every evidence that all necessary measures have been taken to insure the health and well-being of PW's. For example, North Korea attempted to convey to the world at the time of the release of the Pueblo crew that its treatment of the crew was considerate and generous, bearing in mind, of course, that the subjects in question were "pirates and conspirators" and not true PW's. Additionally, in 1966 North Vietnam showed itself to be acutely responsive to the emotions of the international community by reversing itself and canceling planned war crimes trials for downed American fliers in response to worldwide protests.

(2) On the other hand, when it serves their interests, Communists can be singularly indifferent to international opinion. This is dramatically evidenced by North Vietnam's disregard of American and international requests for access to American pilots held by that country. Confronted by North Vietnamese indifference to their requests for information on and communication with American pilots, humanitarian organizations can do little.

(3) Communist rationalization for this apparently conflicting approach to international and American opinion is that international agencies and public and private American organizations have no right of access to imprisoned PW's. Such personnel are considered "war criminals" and "international bandits" and, as such, have no claim to the rights and protection afforded by the Geneva Convention. At the same time, Communist states demonstrate their duplicity by going to great lengths through propaganda photographs and radio broadcasts to show that in a Communist society even "war criminals" are treated well by their captors.

d. Summary - Role of Communist National Policy.

(1) The denial of PW status to captives, American or otherwise, is a crucial element in the Communist procedures for exploiting prisoners. Under International Law, as clarified by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), captives taken in situations of "international armed conflict" are entitled to classification as prisoners of war; and, as such, their rights are protected. In return for such protection, prisoners must also abide by international law, which essentially involves a cessation of physical acts designed to inflict damage upon their captors.

(2) The Communist powers, on the other hand, regularly threaten American prisoners with treatment as "war criminals." In fact any "confessions" signed - even if later repudiated - give to the Communists a legal pretext with which to evade their responsibilities under the Geneva Convention. This is because the Communist states, by their reservation to Article 85, consider "war criminals" not to be protected by the geneva Convention.

(3) U.S. servicemen seized in situations other than that of armed conflict by groups not recognized as responsible governments are, in effect, hostages held for ransom.

(4) The Communist states are sensitive to world and American public opinion, as exemplified by the stories and photos they release to convince the world that the prisoners are being well treated. However, these states deny outside international agencies access to the prisoners as part of the usual attempt to control the prisoner's environment.

(5) U.S. servicemen, no matter where or under what circumstances he is captured by a Communist state, will be treated as a political prisoner to be exploited for the full benefit of the state.

2. (S) ADMINISTRATION OF PRISON CAMPS:

a. (S) Facilities and Location.

(1) (U) Historical review of Communist PW internment reveals a wide variance in the use of physical restraining facilities. This difference is due primarily to the equally wide variance in the prisoner population. During World War II, the Soviet Union interned PW's in primarily "compound-type" prisoner of war camps. Most of the camps were located far to the rear in the Siberian tundra. Although complete with restraining wire and guard towers, the hostile terrain surrounding the camps was the most effective deterrent to escape. The experiences of the USPW's held by the North Koreans and later the

Chinese Communists during the Korean War were somewhat similar to that of the German PW's. The camps, ranging in population from 50 to 1400, consisted primarily of mud hut-type quarters with restraining non-electrified fences.[10] Again, with the camps located along the Yalu River on the Korea/China border, the ruggedness of terrain in addition to the prominence of an Occidental in an Oriental environment, made the prospect of a successful escape extremely slim. In fact, although several attempts were made, there is no record of a USPW successfully escaping from the permanent camps on the Yalu.

(2) (U) In both the Soviet camps and the Korean/Chinese camps, furnishings for the comfort of the PW's were sparse - basically just the essentials: a bed (normally slats), a thin mattress, and the minimum of blankets to prevent freezing to death in the extreme cold of winter.

(3) (U) While the Communists in Korea were dealing in thousands of prisoners held (they repatriated a total of 4428 U.S. military personnel),[11] the Communists in both North Vietnam and South Vietnam deal in hundreds. North Vietnam has acknowledged having 339 U.S. military under control, while the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA), in one way or another, have admitted having captured 20 Americans. The only existing hint of numbers involved is that a total of 1552 U.S. military were reported missing or captured as of January 1971.[12] The debriefs of the returnees indicate that the relatively small PW population, both in the North and South, eliminates the need for "compound-like" camp. In the North, a former French prison, the Hanoi Hilton (Ha Lo Prison) is being used.[13] These facilities are walled with either broken glass or barbed wire on the top. They have individual cells, ranging in size from solitary to five-man, and contain centralized latrine facilities. Again, as in previous conflicts mentioned, the furnishings for the PW are sparse. Climatic conditions, however, make the environment a bit more habitable.

(4) (U) Escape possibilities from these camps are good but evasion is practically impossible. All known USPW camps are located in or around Hanoi, and again the problem of an Occidental escaping through a hostile Oriental environment is formidable.

(5) (U) As would be expected, the facilities for restraining US PW's in South Vietnam are crude but effective. Individual or multiple cells constructed of bamboo or other wood are the rule. These facilities are located deep in the tropical forests and at considerable distance from centers of civilization. The hostile

terrain is a strong deterrent to escape. Normally, restraining fences are not used. The fact that several escapes (9USA, 1 USN, 5 USMC) have been made after capture in South Vietnam indicates the greater feasibility of such an act in the South than in the North.[14] Because of the fluid battle situation, PW's there experience frequent change in their locations, but the nature of the facilities in which they are kept remains relatively constant.

(6) (U) The pattern which runs throughout the conflicts investigated is that the permanent PW camps are located well away from possible recovery areas and in remote hostile environments which facilitate control. The hopelessness of escape is a strong demoralalizing factor which works to the benefit of the Communist captor and to the detriment of the captured.

b. (C) Organization and Personnel.

(1) (C) The review of past and present Communist PW management practices reveals a common pattern of camp administration. Camp operation is divided between the day-to-day functions (such as guard, messing, work details, and head count) and the development of the proper attitude among the PW's through interrogation and indoctrination The routine functions are performed by the detaining powers' regular military forces. Their relative skill and efficiency increase proportionately as the permanency of the camp increases. This routine operation usually falls under the purview of the camp commandant, a ranking military officer. Second in command, the executive officer, is normally a unit political officer of lesser rank than the commandant. In North Korea and North Vietnam, this individual controlled the indoctrinators and interrogators. In areas where a camp decision might infringe upon politics, the executive officer could overrule a decision made by the higher ranking camp commander.[15] This politico-military organization for administering PW's is found even in the rudimentary camp in the tropical forests of South Vietnam, with only minor differences in the ranks of the key individuals.

(2) (C) The Russians during World War II, the Chinese in Korea, and in one isolated case the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, used as part of the administrative staff, progressives who, in return for better treatment, cooperated with their captors. These individuals were held responsible for head count, designation of work parties, ration distribution, and reporting of reactionary or dissident activities.[16]

(3) (C) In the larger camps, a key individual in the staff is the company instructor. Assigned directly to a company of PW's,

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he is usually the highest ranking member of the staff who speaks the language of the PW. He normally has the authority to administer punishment and rewards. As such, he is the key link to the prison authority for the PW.[17]

(4) (U) The ultimate objective of the compound staff in a permanent camp is to create a socio-psychological environment which will foster the interrogation and indoctrination processes. By using physiological and psychological stresses such as hunger, fear, reward, and punishment, they attempt to destroy the PW's resistance to exploitation.[18] Controlled, and sometimes uncontrolled, psychological and physiological stress may be applied by the camp staff in order to insure rigid control and to facilitate the task of the interrogator and indoctrinator. In the Communist tradition, the compound staff and commander are held accountable for meeting specific objectives in regard to the PW's under their control. The criteria for evaluating their efficiency may include the fulfillment of production quotas or the accomplishment of indoctrination objectives.

(5) The use of joint politico-military responsibility in the camp management of PW's is a cornerstone principle of Communist technique. The skill and intelligence of the individuals occupying the key positions increases significantly with the degree of permanence of the camp. By design, the organization of the camp staff is tailored to accomplish these missions.

c. (U) PW Processing.

(1) (U) The main purposes behind the PW processing procedures used by the Communists is to encourage from the outset a feeling of dependency on the part of the prisoner and to establish a pattern for compliance.

(2) (U) Two major procedural steps are used. The first occurs during the initial meeting between a PW and a formal interrogator. The interrogation is designed to extract, in addition to any immediate tactical intelligence, the prisoner's biographical data. This data is made a portion of the PW's dossier and follows him throughout future interrogation and indoctrination sessions. This filling out of forms or the answering of seemingly harmless questions on his background fulfills one of the major goals of initial processing; i.e., the establishment of a dialogue, between captured and captor, whereby the individual PW's personality and character are assessed.

(3) (U) The second major step which is common to all Communist detention facilities is segregation; segregation by rank

to eliminate leadership and therefore resistance, and segregation by race and/or class structure to obtain a homogeneous group toward which a particular brand of indoctrination can be aimed.[19] In both World War II and Korea, the Communists further segregated into separate camps those they considered hopeless "reactionaries;" that is, those who were hard-line resisters to any form of indoctrination or exploitation.[20] Although segregation is less relevant to the small, homogeneous group of PW's being held in North Vietnam, the hard-line resisters do find themselves undergoing prolonged periods of isolation.

(4) (U) In all cases examined, the initial processing screened out the high ranking and the technically qualified; e.g., fighter pilots or communications personnel. These individuals received much more rigorous initial interrogations to obtain tactical intelligence. This screening and segregating process is an effective means to reduce resistance and facilitate PW control, interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation.

d. (U) Control Measures and Regulations.

(1) Most every action undertaken by the Communists in their management of PW camps has as one of its goals the effective control of the PW's. The site selection, the organization of the cadre, and the initial processing procedures have already been discussed in this light. The "carrot and stick" approach is standard procedure. If the PW maintains the proper attitude, shows the proper respect to his captors, performs all tasks assigned to him, and makes every effort to learn the righteousness of Communism or whatever the indoctrination program is inclined toward, he will be rewarded. Should he fail in any of these areas, he will face punishment, usually in the form of increased harassment and the application of stress.

(2) The forms of punishment that prisoners of the Communists have endured range from stern and prolonged lectures to capital punishment. The latter has rarely been used against U.S. personnel, but a wide range of physical and mental abuse has been. Often the degree of abuse received is not in proportion to the magnitude of the offense committed, but rather at the whim of the cadre in charge at the time. There is, however, one form of punishment which was commonly used in World War II and Korea and is presently the most frequent and effective punishment used by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. This is isolation. This "stick" is double-edged. It not only acts as a deterrent to resistance, thus aiding overall control, but it also serves the conditioning process.

(3) Sufficient brutality has occurred in enough instances of Communist internment to make the "threat" credible and a strong deterrent to physical resistance against the captor. One captive of the Viet Cong stated, that upon considering a second escape attempt, simply the recall of the severe punishment he underwent following his recapture on his first attempt brought back many of the psychological and physical reactions he had experienced while undergoing the punishment.[21]

(4) Although pure brutality; i.e., the use of physical violence to the point of physically maiming or killing the PW, has been relatively rare in the case of USPW's, slaps, kicks, and the liberal use of a rifle butt has been common. The VC commonly immobilize the USPW through the use of leg irons and have been known to expose the USPW naked to the elements and mosquitoes for disciplinary purposes.[22] In most cases, punishments when applied are done so because a PW showed an improper "attitude" or failed to obey a camp regulation.

(5) Most Communist detention camps have a set of regulations which the PW is expected to obey explicitly. They normally prescribe daily routine, sanitation standards, and the procedures for showing the "proper" respect to the prison cadre. It is also usual to have at least one rule or regulation stating the requirement that PW's will cooperate with their captors in interrogation and indoctrination.[23] As mentioned above, failure to comply to the letter with the camp regulations normally brings swift, and occasionally severe, retribution.

(6) Outside of the normal contingent of guards acting as security in the larger camps, "progressives" from the ranks of the PW's are used to assist in administering and controlling their fellow prisoners. In Korea and in Russia, the use of PW's as "unit leaders" was reinforced by the use of other "progressives" as "informers." These individuals, in return for favors granted by the Communist captor, would inform on the dissident activities of their fellow prisoners. Although this is detestable to the American sense of fair play, the Communists have used such information to divide camps into easily manageable cells and nipped many resistance plans in the bud.

(7) In summary, the Communists use both physical and psychological forms of restraint to obtain control. Physically, they use the usual means of buildings, walls, wire, and an adequate guard force to secure these facilities. Psychologically, they use verbal

and physical abuse and attempt to set prisoner against prisoner. Finally, under normal circumstances, there was a posted set of regulations in the detaining facility which regulated the activities of the PW. It is in support of these regulations that the above restraints are applied.

e. ~~(U)~~ Medical Care - Sanitation - Mess.

(1) (U) In general, the adequacy of medical care, sanitation, and mess as they pertain to Communist internment camps is poor. In all the conflicts under consideration, except for treatment accorded the Pueblo's crew, the Communists permitted captured medical personnel to tend to the needs of their fellow prisoners. However, the quantity and quality of the medicines provided were sorely lacking. In those cases where captured medical personnel were not available, treatment was quite often delayed and, once performed, rudimentary. Often the doctor provided was relatively unskilled and, in combination with defective drugs or no drugs at all, the results disastrous.[24] In the case of North Vietnam, treatment of USPW's has been sporadic. There have been cases of immediate and satisfactory treatment and cases where the seriously injured have waited weeks for treatment. This inconsistency has existed in past conflicts as well. It has been established that the Communists are not adverse to withholding medical aid as an inducement for prisoner compliance. This seemingly gross medical deficiency is somewhat mitigated by the fact that in all conflicts examined, the Communist forces had inadequate medical supplies and doctors for their own casualties and thus had very little to spare for their enemy. Due to this and other considerations, it can be concluded that adequate and proper medical treatment of captured enemy personnel is not a common occurrence in Communist internment camps.

(2) (U) Although not an item specifically referred to in most reference documents, enough commentary is available to give inference that sanitation conditions in the Communist internment camps are primitive, and the state of hygiene is in direct relation to the efforts the PW's themselves put into controlling it. The common use of rudimentary central latrines and the high rate of intestinal diseases experienced in these camps makes that aspect of hygiene extremely important. This problem is compounded by the limited amount of cleaning supplies the Communist captors provide their prisoners to maintain their clothes, bedding, and living areas. Commentary on the existence of rats, lice, and other infestations can be found in any study dealing with sanitation in Communist PW camps.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Food, like sanitation and medical treatment, is normally just adequate to sustain life but little else.[25] The food offered is the dietary staple of the detaining power. The USPW in Korea and Vietnam have had considerable difficulty existing on the food provided by their captors. Even after learning to stomach it, and receiving sufficient quantity, it lacked the mineral and vitamin content the U.S. captive needed.

(4) ~~(C)~~ Another common complaint is the unchanging variety of the diet. With the exception of seasonal vegetables when available, the nature of the diet remains basically unchanged month after month. This lack of variety made the vitamin deficient food even more unpalatable. The resulting malnutrition caused a substantial number of deaths in Korea, and the story is yet to be told on Vietnam.[26]

(5) (U) It should be noted that food has often been used by the Communists as an incentive to encourage receptiveness to indoctrination and cooperation.[27] Recalcitrant PW's have their rations reduced whereas those who show a proper attitude are rewarded by an increase in the caloric value of their food. This "carrot and stick" approach is a common theme throughout the management system in Communist PW camps.

(6) (U) A deficiency in any one of the three areas; medical, sanitation, mess, is a severe handicap to the PW's chances for survival should he contract any serious disease or be physically injured in any way. Their combined effect has caused the death of many prisoners held captive in Communist PW camps.

f. ~~(U)~~ Prison Routine.

(1) ~~(U)~~ Although varying from camp to camp in all the conflicts reviewed, the Communists maintained strict daily routines for the PW's under their control. The daily schedule is normally posted prominently within the camp. Failure by the PW's to adhere to it constitutes a breach of camp regulations and is therefore punishable by the camp authorities. A normal daily schedule begins between 0500 hours and 0600 hours and ends around 2100 hours. The intervening hours are filled with work details, indoctrination sessions, meals, and free time. The amount of time allotted to certain activities fluctuates from time to time for political reasons. In the Korean War, the more "progressive" a PW was thought to be, the less time he spent on work details and the more time devoted to his indoctrination.[28] While the Russians in World War II and the Chinese in Korea permitted discourse and recreation between PW's during scheduled free time, the

returnees from Vietnam indicate their free time was spent back in their cells (cages) with their roommate(s) or in isolation.

(2) ~~(S)~~ The strict scheduling creates a morale problem. The routine rarely varies and the resulting boredom is rampant among the interned PW's. This particular aspect of Communist internment has been mentioned by several of the returnees from North Vietnam.[29]

g. ~~(S)~~ Prisoner Welfare.

(1) (U) Prisoner welfare, like mess, medical, and sanitation, is minimal in Communist internment camps. Often the instruments of welfare, especially mail or recreation, are withheld from the PW's either as punishment or to encourage the development of a proper attitude toward the detaining power.

(2) (U) Past experience indicates that the Communists do not forward the mail of PW's unless it contains statements favorable to the Communist propaganda cause. Similarly, they do not deliver mail to PW's that contains statements which will hinder the indoctrination process. Often, this censorship is arbitrary and at the whim of the political censor. Because of such strict censorship, mail becomes a potent instrument of coercion.[30] It forces the PW to parrot the "party line" when corresponding with his relatives. As occurred in North Korea, letters which are particularly advantageous to the Communists are reproduced and distributed by leaflet among the troops of the opposing force.[31] Obviously, this manipulation of the mails is in direct violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; however, history reveals the Communists pay little attention to the humanitarian requirement of regular and undelayed exchange of correspondence by the PW. Clearly, the Communists regard PW mail as one more instrument to be used to their advantage in the furtherance of both their foreign propaganda and PW indoctrination campaigns.[32]

(3) (U) Various forms of recreation are sometimes made available to the PW, usually after they have been well indoctrinated. Most common are volleyball, ping-pong, basketball, soccer, and in the case of USPW's, baseball. The games are normally intra-camp although in the Korean War an "Inter-camp Olympics" was held.[33] Returnees from North Vietnam noted no such recreation program; however, a photo released by Associated Press on 5 November 1970 showed three USPW's in North Vietnam engaging in basketball. Inasmuch as photographs have long been used by the Communists for solely propaganda purposes, it is not feasible to speculate, at this time, whether or not a sports/recreation program has been instituted by the North Vietnamese. However, there is evidence of an organized, but intermittent, exercise program.

(4) (C) The extent of indulgence in the more vigorous sports is directly dependent on the physical state of the PW's. In the early part of the Korean War, the effects of malnutrition severely limited USPW participation in sports. Also, as in any other facet of internment, permission to engage in athletic or other recreational activities is at the whim of the detaining power, and the privilege can be withdrawn also serves as a control factor. However, in general, a limited amount of recreation is permitted and encouraged in Communist internment camps, although the extent and frequency varies from camp to camp and from conflict to conflict. It should be noted that athletic participation permits the PW to give vent to his feelings of aggression, hostility, and frustration. Occasionally, this has acted as a divisive factor among the PW's.

(5) (C) In most cases, literature and movies are made available to the PW. However, what is made available is closely screened and either extolls the virtues of the Communist state or degrades the principles of capitalism. The primary source of documents is from the detaining power or other Communist nations. Rarely are U.S. publications made available and then only those which present the United States in the least favorable light. In the case of North Vietnam, the only U.S.-published articles seen by the PW's are those which show protest or violence within the United States itself or uphold the Vietnamese cause.[35] As in the case of mail, the strict censorship of what the PW is permitted to read or, in the case of movies, see is another instrument of the indoctrination process.

(6) (U) As a final note, it bears mentioning that the Communists normally do provide the minimum essentials for personal hygiene. Bathing facilities are made available on a periodic but regular basis; and soap, towels, toothbrushes, and toothpaste (powder) are made available either by issue or by purchase through a camp canteen. The quantities of these materials are strictly rationed, and although the amount is normally adequate, a surplus is rare.

h. (C) Summary - Administration of Prison Camps:

(1) (C) Some definitive conclusions can be drawn from the preceding discussion on Communist camp administration. The evidence is overwhelming that practically everything they do, or do not do, is aimed toward tightening their control over the PW and enhancing the indoctrination process. The North Vietnamese have carried this process to its extreme in their attempt to totally control the

environment of their prisoners. Particular emphasis is placed on isolating the individual prisoner from contact with fellow prisoners or outside agencies such as the International Red Cross.

(2) ~~(C)~~ The Communists make every effort to so locate their camps as to isolate the PW from any possible chance of escape. He is often isolated by the hostility of both the terrain and the outside civilian population. The camps themselves are regulated according to rigid schedules and the day-to-day routine is relatively unchanging. The camp cadre is politico-military in composition and professional in the execution of their duties. The compound staff is held accountable for their prisoners' "progress." The PW receives only the minimal necessities in food, medicine, and personal items to sustain life, and his chance for survival largely depends on his ability to adapt and innovate. He is subjected to both verbal and physical abuse. The latter is usually of a minor nature; however, there have been instances of excessive brutality.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Every attempt is made through threats, promises, informers, and segregation to disrupt PW organization and individual loyalties; thus reducing organized resistance. To reduce the PW's resistance to indoctrination, the "carrot and stick" approach is used in the distribution of medicine, food, and correspondence. Recreation privileges and the application of disciplinary measures are used in the same manner. Repetition is another method, and the indoctrination process is continuous, lasting the entire period of internment.

(4) (U) Communist PW administrative procedures and principles are an integral part of the overall management system. They are not applied in isolation, or as a separate element, and have proven an effective tool for controlling PW's and enhancing exploitation.

3. ~~(C)~~ ROLE OF INTERROGATION:

a. ~~(C)~~ Objectives.

(1) (U) Interrogation may be defined as any attempt on the part of one person to elicit or extract information from another person when reluctance to supply that information is present. It varies from indoctrination in that it sets out to extract information, whereas indoctrination is designed to impart it.

(2) ~~(C)~~ The interrogation process occupies a prominent and vital role in the scenario of Communist management. Although normally thought of as a process by which tactical intelligence is obtained

from captured prisoners of war, the Communists have refined it to a state where it becomes an integral part of their overall program for maximum political exploitation as well. In all conflicts reviewed, the Communist interrogators initially attempted to obtain military information which would help them in the immediate tactical future. In the Korean War and in the Vietnam War, the extraction of military information, although still sought, was not and is not the primary goal. USPW's in both conflicts have indicated that their Communist interrogators rarely questioned the answers given on tactical matters. The Communists appeared satisfied with any answer given if it appeared logical and was given in a straight forward manner without "arrogance." In several cases, interrogation on tactical matters was actually a preconceived method of entrapment. The captor was fully aware of the answers to his questions but sought to catch the PW in deceit for the dual purpose of establishing the PW's "sincerity" (or lack thereof) and "proving" the futility of refusing to answer questions truthfully.[35]

(3) (U) The seeking of answers without emphasis on tactical accuracy is a key to a main thrust of Communist interrogation. It is an effort to encourage and persuade the PW to enter into compromising conversation with the interrogator. Having established the initial dialogue between captured and captor, subsequent interrogations and indoctrinations are designed to increasingly compromise the PW in order to more effectively exploit him. It is a step in the PW manipulation process toward conditioned response; i.e., the question is asked, the question must be answered. In the case of North and South Vietnam, this initial dialogue is an attempt to break the USPW's preconceived notion on the items of information he may morally give the enemy under the Code of Conduct. The breach of the individual's resistance constitutes a major step in "breaking" him; i.e., making him more receptive to indoctrination.

(4) (U) In addition to questions of tactical import, the Communists conduct exhaustive inquiry into the PW's biographic background. This type of information is sought immediately upon capture and is expanded throughout the subsequent interrogations. The information is obtained either through oral questioning or by requiring the PW to write his own biography, or a combination of both. The data thus obtained becomes a permanent part of the PW's file and is used as a point of reference during future interrogation or indoctrination sessions. The knowledge gained about him, his family, and his personal attitudes is often employed as a means of coercion to pressure the PW into cooperation with his captors. Also, in a manner similar to that described for military interrogation, the interrogator often

tries to entrap the PW into replying differently to a previously asked and recorded biographical question.

(5) ~~(C)~~ A second, and equally important objective, of Communist interrogation is personality assessment. Through an evaluation of the individual's overall response to a series of probing questions, the PW's personality is assessed for the purpose of determining his ability to resist indoctrination. Based on this assessment, the prisoner is classified as either exploitable or non-exploitable. The latter category consists of the basic enlisted men, who have neither military nor political significance, and those PW's who show resistance. Not all hard line resisters escape future indoctrination efforts. Depending on their background and expertise, they may be sent to special interrogation centers for more intensive processing. "Pak's Palace" during the Korean War typifies this type of facility.

(6) ~~(C)~~ Those assessed as exploitable are PW's whose performances during initial interrogation indicate that they have particular political significance or that they can be manipulated into the proper attitude for future exploitation. Such individuals are usually subjected to a regular schedule of interrogation and indoctrination sessions.

(7) ~~(C)~~ Personality assessment and early identification of potentially exploitable prisoners is of administrative benefit to the camp authorities. It selectively reduces the indoctrination workload of the political cadre and identifies PW's against whom the indoctrination process has a greater chance of success.

(8) ~~(C)~~ Interrogation has also been used as a form of punishment or harassment. USPW's have often been subjected to interrogations, at odd hours and intervals for extensive periods of time, in which they were required to provide answers to seemingly meaningless questions. In Korea, USPW's who expressed opinions contrary to "political instruction" during indoctrination sessions were summoned to camp headquarters where, through a series of interrogations, self-criticisms, and veiled threats, they were shown the "error of their ways."[36] In such instances, interrogation sessions often change into indoctrination sessions of a political and historical nature.

(9) ~~(C)~~ In any type of interrogation, the emphasis and aims of the questioning will vary, depending on the expertise and personality of the PW, the point and circumstances of his capture, the skill of the interrogator, and the ultimate intentions of the

detaining power. In the case of Communist interrogation, it is apparent that its ultimate objective is to establish a dialogue between the PW and the detaining power authorities. The knocking of a PW from his posture of silence or "name, rank, serial number, date of birth" position into a dialogue achieves the aim of the interrogation.[37] Although such interrogation is militarily unproductive, it must be accounted a professional and psychological victory. The first step towards required compliance by the PW has been accomplished. Once conditioned response has been ingrained into the PW, exploitation for political or military purposes becomes a logical step in the PW manipulation process.

(10) (U) To a lesser degree but still important, the collection of tactical and strategic intelligence continues to be an objective of Communist interrogation. As stated earlier, there has been ample evidence that the veracity of information received is often not checked. It cannot be concluded with assurance, however, that military intelligence received during interrogation was not utilized against the opposing forces. On the contrary, unless proved substantially otherwise, answers given to questions of tactical importance were most likely utilized when the information was found to be valid.

(11) (U) A final objective is the acquiring of material for propaganda exploitation. The prime examples of this effort are the extraction of "Biological Warfare" confessions from Air Force personnel in Korea and "Spying in Territorial Waters" confessions from the crew of the Pueblo. The intense effort required to extract such information and to present it to the world in a credible fashion has limited this particular use of interrogation to select PW's and special situations. Interrogative pressure on the PW to attain this objective has in times past been the exception rather than the rule. The development of propaganda through PW exploitation is more commonly executed in the indoctrination phase.

b. ~~(C)~~ Training and Proficiency of Political Cadre.

(1) ~~(C)~~ From an analysis of the experiences of PW's detained by Communist States, interrogation beyond the initial stages is carried out by special politically-trained cadre.[38] In most circumstances, certainly in permanent detention sites, such personnel have ultimate authority over the PW's. Even the camp staff is known to show them deference and respect. Training and educational levels of the political cadre at detention sites has varied according to the duration of the conflict and with the nationality of the camp cadre. In most instances, Korean personnel appear to be significantly less competent

and more brutal than their Chinese, Russian, or Vietnamese counterparts. Political officers of these nationalities have shown considerable fluency and skill in the language of their prisoners. During interrogation, they have demonstrated close acquaintance with socio-economic matters of the country of the PW, as well as a fairly good knowledge of certain aspects of his armed forces.[39] However, North Vietnamese political officers have shown only a limited knowledge of U.S. military technology thus giving the USPW a fair chance to succeed with inaccurate answers to questions on technical military matters.[40]

(2) (U) The talents of the political cadre are utilized as early as the situation permits. If the circumstances of capture are such that immediate intensive interrogation by politically trained personnel is impractical, initial questioning is conducted by the highest ranking individual present. Once circumstances have stabilized and certainly once the PW has arrived at the permanent detention site, further interrogation is carried out exclusively by the political cadre.

c. (C) Facilities and Special Equipment.

(1) The interrogation facilities utilized by the Communists are normally very austere with no effort toward special design or construction. There is rarely any special equipment in evidence although devices for the purpose of applying physical coercion are occasionally present for psychological effect. Interrogation is normally carried out within the confines of the internment camp and in a room apart from the PW's cell. At times, as in the case of the Pueblo crew, it is located close enough to the cell block so that the effects of applied physical duress can be heard by fellow PW's. The psychological effect of this technique is obvious.

(2) (C) The interrogation room is sparsely furnished with usually nothing more than a solitary table, several chairs, and rudimentary lighting. It is normal for the PW to be seated on a stool or chair which places him at a lower level than that of his interrogator. This is also a psychological measure designed to demean the PW and to impress on him his requirement to submit to authority. Some PW's have reported the use of special equipment during the interrogation sessions though the employment of such devices has been far from widespread. Among the most frequently mentioned in Korea and Vietnam have been straps and ropes of various kinds designed to inhibit circulation and restrict movement. There have also been reports on the use of pipes, rubber hoses, blocks, and bamboo slats. In Korea, mention was made of two-way mirrors, wire recorders, and hidden microphones.[41]

d. Techniques and Procedures.

(1) (U) Several factors bear on the particular technique used by the Communists for a given situation. The first is the urgency of the information required. If the desired information is needed immediately, either to gain a tactical advantage or to score a propaganda coup, the technique to be used is the one which will force the PW to provide the data in the shortest possible time. Often this leads to extremes in brutality. A second factor is the purpose for interrogation. If its purpose is to obtain specific information, one technique may be used. If, on the other hand, the purpose is to establish an initial or continuing dialogue between captured and captor, a substantially different approach is used. The expertise and personality of the PW as well as the relative skill of the interrogator are factors to be considered in determining technique. And finally, as indicated by the first factor, the time available to the interrogator to attain his goal is a major guide to what interrogation technique will be used.

(2) (U) Several techniques have been used by the Communists in the past and are in use today in Vietnam. The least used, and yet there have been sufficient cases noted to warrant its examination, is that of applied, calculated physical brutality. This normally involves the use of physical instruments to cause extreme pain to the individual PW. The most recent example of mass applied physical abuse was that which was used against the crew of the Pueblo. All members indicated that they had been severely beaten by sticks or rifle butts and many suffered even greater indignities. The infrequent use of this method is in part due to the fact that there have been a significant number of cases wherein the use of physical duress has had a reverse effect from that desired. The PW under interrogation increased his resistance in proportion to the increase of physical abuse received.

(3) (U) The opposite to the "hard sell" of physical brutality is the "soft sell" or friendly approach. The PW is subjected to a series of gently probing questions by an interrogator who attempts to give the PW sincere assurance that he is the PW's friend and confidant. He will make promises of better treatment in return for desired information. The entire tenor of the interrogation session is one of warmth and sincerity. When the PW expects the worst from his captors, he tends to be caught unprepared by his "friendly" interrogator.

(4) (U) A common technique is the alternating of the hard sell with the soft sell. Sometimes referred to as the "Mutt and Jeff" technique, it involves two interrogators mixing applied physical force

with gentle reassurance that such treatment is not supposed to occur. Its effectiveness lies in the gratitude of the PW toward the second interrogator who prevents the first interrogator from using physical abuse. It gives the "kind" interrogator the lever that should the PW not enter into conversation with him then it is out of his hands and the PW will have to be returned to the control of the harsher interrogator.

(5) (U) However, the most common technique is the simultaneous mixture of hard/soft sell on the part of a single interrogator. The "hard sell" is not the true brutality but rather consists of slaps, kicks, and an occasional rifle butt. The soft sell is a determined effort on the part of the interrogator to enter into a dialogue with the prisoner. A great deal of the abuse applied in this form of interrogation is verbal and is in the form of overt or veiled threats of dire consequences should the PW continue to resist. What physical abuse is applied is normally done by a guard present in the interrogation room or called into the room for that express purpose. The mixture of hard and soft keeps the prisoner off-balance and is psychologically effective in breaking down resistance to interrogation.

(6) (U) The "tools" of the trade are human frailties, applied force, and isolation. In the first category, the interrogator plays upon the fears of the PW; his fear of pain, his fear of death, and most important, his fear of the unknown. The last fear is most effective during the period immediately after capture while the prisoner is still in a state of shock and disorientation. The interrogator attempts to increase the feelings of guilt which most repatriates have indicated they felt. The PW will normally have a sense of guilt over being captured, based on the feeling that he somehow failed his family and country. As answers are drawn out of him, the interrogator will point out to the USPW in Vietnam how he has broken the Code of Conduct thus attempting to reinforce the prisoner's sense of guilt. These guilt feelings lead to doubts. Doubts about one's country, one's family, one's self. The guilt-ridden, doubting PW is fair game to the "friendly approach" of interrogation.

(7) (U) Applied force is a tool with both physiological and psychological ramifications. As the "tool" of the brutality method, its purposes have already been discussed. Not commonly used, it is employed primarily against the "arrogant" resister or when immediate results are desired.

(8) (U) Another common "tool" used by the Communist interrogator is that of distrust. There have been numerous instances

of interrogators revealing classified information or compromising statements to a PW with the explanation that he obtained them from another PW. Playing one PW against another for the purpose of softening the resistance of one or both is a frequently used and effective technique.

(9) (C) Perhaps the most insidious, but effective tool, is that of isolation. Man by nature is gregarious; he seeks and needs the companionship of other human beings. By cutting the PW off from his fellow prisoners, the Communists have placed him in an unnatural environment wherein the psychological pressures bearing on him are overwhelming. While locked up in solitary, the PW has nothing to do but think: think about his guilt, about his fears, about his need for human companionship, and his family. Nothing is done to assauge his fears and after an extensive period of isolation he is not only ready to talk to someone; he must talk to someone. The Communist interrogator stands ready to be that someone.

(10) (U) It should be noted that the use of isolation as a tool of interrogation is not a recent development; it was used effectively by the Russians in their interrogations of German PW's in World War II.[42]

e. (U) Duration and Frequency.

(1) PW's are subjected to an initial interrogation as soon as practical after capture in order to take advantage of the momentary confusion, disorientation, and indecision due to apprehension. Such questioning usually lasts only until information of immediate tactical value and initial biographical data are obtained. Tactical intelligence is highly perishable and usually becomes valueless in 2-3 days after capture.

(2) Upon arrival at the permanent detention camp, more intensive and thorough interrogation begins. The length and frequency of these proceedings vary greatly with rank and degree of expertise of the PW. Officers and those who occupied sensitive positions are often subjected to lengthy and comprehensive questioning over a period of months.

(3) When probing for specific intelligence information or seeking specific "confessions," interrogation sessions are usually scheduled on a regular basis. Depending on the perishability or conceived importance, the sessions occur at prescribed hours either morning, afternoon, or night, or all three. Interrogation merely

for harassment's sake and as part of the overall manipulation process is normally unscheduled. In some cases, it may be carried on for an extended period. Depriving the PW of food, sleep, and medical care are part of the process.

f. (C) Evaluation of Effectiveness.

(1) The Communist interrogation process is undeniably effective. In the course of the conflicts reviewed for this study, there have been only rare instances where the interrogation process has not obtained the results sought by the Communists. When viewed in the light that a major objective of the interrogation is to elicit dialogue from the PW, the success in the Korean War was overwhelming. Peace petitions, peace conferences, newspapers, letters home, and biological warfare confessions attest to this success. A similar argument could be made for the political exploitation of the officers and men of the USS Pueblo during their internment by the North Koreans.

(2) With respect to the effectiveness of the interrogation process in Vietnam, all the repatriates from that theater to date have indicated that they were unable to avoid going beyond name, rank, service number, and date of birth when interrogated. If going beyond the "Big Four" establishes dialogue, then the interrogation process must be considered a success. The effectiveness of the interrogation process as practiced by the North Vietnamese or any of their Communist counterparts cannot be downgraded or ignored. It has been and continues to be an effective principle of Communist management techniques.

g. (C) Summary - Interrogation.

(1) (C) There has been a profound shift in emphasis away from interrogation for purely military advantage such as was the case during World War I and World War II. Interrogation is conducted by the Communists as the first step in their campaign of prisoner exploitation.

(2) (C) The initial objective of Communist interrogation is to screen prisoners based on biographical data and a personality assessment of the individual captive. The goal is for the interrogator to sort out those prisoners who are worth the most effort from among those who know little and/or demonstrate high resistance capabilities. It is clear that the establishment of a dialogue with the interrogator is a primary objective. This takes the captive beyond the

"Big Four" of name, rank, service number, and date of birth and makes him subject to feelings of guilt for allegedly violating the letter of the Code of Conduct. Interrogation for purposes of harassment is a common practice. Finally, the collection of intelligence information from captives remains an objective of Communist interrogation, especially of higher ranking and/or specially trained personnel. However, this objective tends to diminish relative to the other objectives as the length of captivity increases.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Interrogation is carried out by specially trained personnel who usually possess varying degrees of competency in the language of their prisoners. These interrogators have a great deal of latitude in their dealings with PW's. They are responsible along with the indoctrinators for manipulating "the carrot and the stick" in order to derive information from PW's.

(4) (U) Both the "hard sell" and the "soft sell" (or a combination of both) have been used by Communist interrogators. The application of physical force is most likely where quick results are desired, as occurred in the case of the Pueblo. At times, such force proves disadvantageous to the captors by increasing prisoner group solidarity and fostering their hate for their captors. The "soft sell," on the other hand, is dangerous if prisoners do not recognize it for what it is. The prisoner who is expecting to be subjected to brutality is at a psychological disadvantage when his captors act in a friendly manner.

(5) (U) Interrogators will attempt to foster feelings of guilt in a prisoner - guilt at having failed his country by being captured and, if the PW is drawn into a dialogue with his interrogator, guilt at not having lived up to the letter of the Code of Conduct. Spreading distrust among the PW's is a favorite tool of the interrogators. The purpose is to disrupt any organized resistance, as well as to psychologically isolate the individual PW's. Isolation is perhaps the greatest weapon in an interrogator's hand since it channels the PW's intercourse with fellow prisoners through the interrogators.

(6) ~~(C)~~ The effectiveness of Communist interrogator techniques is quite high especially in terms of establishing a dialogue with the individual and screening the PW's into categories based on knowledge and/or resistance potential. To what extent enemy interrogators are securing tactically useful information is not known. It may be assumed, however, that it is this kind of perishable information that the PW's will most strongly resist revealing.

4. ~~(C)~~ ROLE OF INDOCTRINATION:

a. ~~(C)~~ Objectives.

(1) Indoctrination is a logical progression from the interrogation phase of internment. As previously stated, interrogation as used by the Communists qualitatively selects those individuals who manifest characteristics which indicate responsiveness to indoctrination and future exploitation. Further, it breaks down the first barriers of silence and establishes the initial dialogue between the captured and the captor. This leads into indoctrination which attempts to change the ingrained values of these individuals wherein they become the witting or unwitting instruments for exploitation. The alteration process is accomplished by placing the individual in a controlled environment which is conducive to attaining the mental condition desired.

(2) General objectives of Communist indoctrination efforts in past conflicts are to:

(a) Engender in the PW a favorable/sympathetic attitude toward the captor's political and/or military goals.

(b) Undermine the PW's faith and trust in his own country and in his fellow prisoners.

(c) Encourage active and witting support of propaganda campaigns which serves the interests of the captor power.

(d) Convert PW's from their beliefs to Communist ideology.

(e) Recruit agents from among the ranks of the PW's.

(3) It should be noted that the last objective was actively pursued by the Russians in World War II and by the Chinese in the Korean War. The Soviets were not notably successful in their efforts although approximately 1-2% of the German PW's they held became sincere participants in the anti-fascist program.[43] The Chinese also enjoyed only a small amount of success. Twenty-one U.S. soldiers refused repatriation at the time of operation "Big Switch" in 1953, and by 1959, according to one source, 75 agents had been found among the repatriated U.S. prisoners.[44] It is difficult to establish, with any degree of certainty, that the recruitment of agents is still on the

priority list of Communist objectives. Members of the Pueblo crew, however, did report that their captors made overtures in this direction.

b. (C) Personnel-Status-Training.

(1) (U) Inasmuch as the indoctrination process is executed substantially in the permanent camps, the quality of indoctrinators does not fluctuate quite as much as does that of the interrogators. The indoctrinators are fixed assets of the camps and are normally well-trained and skilled in their duties.

(2) (C) During World War II, responsibility for the Soviet indoctrination program of the German PW fell under the purview of the NKVD, the state security police. At first, the indoctrination sessions were led by Soviet political officers or German Communists who had been in Russia for several years before the war.[45] Later the program was turned over to collaborating prisoners who had been sent to specially established "Anti-fascist" schools for terms of 6 weeks, 3 months, or longer.[46]

(3) (C) The use of political cadre, as opposed to strictly military staff, in the role of indoctrinator appears to be an established Communist principle. It has held true in all the conflicts and/or experiences investigated. During the Korean War, a "political instructor" was assigned to each "company" of USPW's. This individual was the political counterpart of the Chinese company commander who represented the Chinese military structure. Since the company commander rarely spoke English, the "instructor," who spoke it fluently, gradually assumed the dominant role in company business. The instructor's functions were not limited to interpreting or delivering indoctrinary lectures. He held the authority to excuse an internee from work details, to facilitate going on sick call, to administer punishment, and in general to make the prisoner's lot either pleasant or difficult. After a very short time in camp, each PW became aware that his company instructor was a very powerful individual. In retrospect, the setting up of the company instructor as an all-powerful figure "from whom all blessings flow" was obviously a calculated maneuver to make the American PW more amenable to his indoctrination efforts.[47]

(4) (C) The cadre which dealt most directly with the indoctrination efforts aimed at the crew of the Pueblo were established along much the same line as the Chinese cadre during the Korean War. Working under a chief political officer, three "instructors," known

to the crew members as "room daddies," carried out his dictates in matters of indoctrination while supervising the welfare of the detainees in the name of the camp commander. As has been previously noted, the senior political officer, although junior in rank to the commanding officer, could overrule the latter if he touched upon the political officer's domain. In the case of the Pueblo, the crew members felt that the political cadre were better educated than the rest of the camp cadre.

(5) ~~(C)~~ The same procedure is in use in North Vietnam. The indoctrinators have responsibility for a group of prisoners (a type of "buddy" system), and they have initial responsibility for the welfare of their charges. As with the Chinese "company instructor," it is to these "buddies" that the PW's must go to air their grievances or ask questions. Again, the indoctrinators are members of the political cadre and are held accountable by the senior political officer in each of the compounds. As in North Korea, the political cadre appeared better educated than those in charge of camp administration.[48]

(6) ~~(C)~~ One of the parallels noted between the USSR indoctrination efforts of the German PW and the similar efforts of the Chinese in Korea was the training of selected PW's to carry on the indoctrination program.[49] These PW's, either because they had embraced the Communist ideology or because of opportunism, were considered sufficiently "progressive" in their thinking to instruct their fellow PW's in the "party line."[50] The psychological impact of instruction coming from a countryman and couched in proper idiomatic language instead of stilted English significantly increases the effectiveness of an indoctrination session.

(7) ~~(C)~~ In summary, it can be said that the Communists make a concerted effort to use their better educated officers to act as indoctrinators. Those selected are political officers who have had specialized training in indoctrination methodology. In the internment camps, the indoctrinators wield considerable power in behalf of or against the prisoner. In matters of indoctrination and prisoner welfare, they can overrule the dictates of the military camp commander. Where the indoctrination program proves a success, converted PW's replace the captor indoctrinator in the conduct of indoctrination sessions.

c. (U) Facilities and Special Equipment:

There is no evidence in the conflicts examined that any special facilities and/or equipment were utilized to facilitate the indoctrination of PW's. Size of facility appears dependent on the number of PW's

involved in the session. In Russia and Korea most sessions involved mass numbers of PW's, whereas in Vietnam such sessions were aimed at an individual. The movie projector, for the purpose of showing propaganda films, and the loudspeaker, for blaring out propaganda during scheduled and unscheduled periods, are the only two special items of equipment stipulated in the documents reviewed. Exceptions to this general rule were the special indoctrination compounds for select PW's who were considered more "progressive."

d. (U) Techniques and Procedures:

(1) (U) In simplest form, the indoctrination process is designed to subject the prisoner of war to an information and reeducation campaign which will condition him for exploitation in a desired manner. From the management standpoint, the information imparted can be considered the "input" of the process. The first step, however, is the removal of any concepts and attitudes on the part of the prisoner which are detrimental to the Communist point of view.

(2) (U) To an almost total degree, the captor has control of the environment of the prisoner. By keeping that environment in a constant state of flux by alternating moods (e.g., apprehensive - hopeful, tense - relaxed, isolated - gregarious), the PW's normal behaviorial responses are gradually eroded, his attitudes modified, and his resistance overcome.

(3) (U) Numerous techniques are employed to place the PW in the proper frame of mind to be receptive to the "input" and erode his existing value system. The more common are: isolation, "overstimulation" (deprivation of privacy), segregation, arousal of fear and suspicion between PW's interruption of sleep, intense periods of questioning, accusation and criticism coupled with verbal abuse and physical maltreatment, rewards and punishment, unscheduled activities, and the arousal of guilt, apprehension, and anxiety.[51] A brief description of a few of the above techniques follows.

(4) (U) Isolation is one of the most common techniques for mind conditioning used by the Communists. According to the returnees from Vietnamese internment, it was the most effective technique they had to confront. Isolation runs the gamut of simply separating the individual from his normal sources of information (mail, news articles, magazines, and radio) to the total isolation of depriving the individual of contact with his fellow PW's. In the latter case, the PW is insulated from <u>any</u> form of communication and, as described

in the discussion on interrogation, is forced to live in his own world of fear, anxiety, and guilt. What communication he does receive is strictly limited to that which the captor wishes him to have.

(5) (U) Another common form of isolation is that of "social isolation." Here the PW is isolated, not from other people, but only from others who can confirm his present self-image. In Chinese thought-reform programs, the prisoner was surrounded by cellmates who were already "converted" and sought constantly to undermine the values of the captive and discredit these values in his own mind.[52] In the Korean War, the Chinese sought to isolate the potentially exploitable PW from undesirable influences by establishing a separate penal camp for "hopeless reactionaries."[53]

(6) (U) The opposite approach to mind conditioning from isolation is that of "overstimulation." Isolation insulates the individual from his normal social contacts; "overstimulation" overwhelms him. It has been postulated that if physical isolation is comparable to understimulation and can effect personality change, then the Chinese method of denying any privacy whatsoever to the individual ("overstimulation") can have an equally disorganizing effect on the personality.[54] The Chinese utilized this technique in Korea where they showed a marked tendency toward group activities and mass thought-reform sessions. The method involves a constant stream of input which does not allow the victim to withdraw and compose himself.[55] To handle lax periods, modern science has furnished the loudspeaker to provide the prisoner with company at irregular or scheduled intervals.

(7) (U) Segregation is a logical tool for enhancing the indoctrination program. The careful sifting of prisoners into smaller and smaller elements was an effective technique of the Chinese in Korea.[56] Using a system of tight compartmentalization, they segregated PW's according to rank, race, nationality, and sometimes, by socio-economic background. As mentioned in the section on isolation, they also segregated by resistance level. By categorizing and forming the PW's into small politically definable groups, the indoctrination material can be selected which appeals to the characteristics of each.

(8) (U) Reward and punishment is a powerful weapon in the hands of the indoctrinator. Reward for displaying the proper attitude toward the indoctrination program ranges from increased privileges such as receiving mail or additional food, to promises of early release or repatriation. Punishment for displaying reactionary behavior or attitude ranges from prolonged stern lectures on the

proper attitude to total isolation. This "carrot and stick" approach to learning often causes the PW to at least give a semblance of receptiveness to the propaganda being expounded.

(9) (U) Eugene Kinkead in his book, In Every War But One, divides Communist indoctrination techniques into three categories - repetition, harassment, and humiliation. Although he is describing the techniques in reference to the Chinese treatment of USPW's in Korea, these techniques are an integral part of a Communist State's PW management principles:[57]

> Repetition was used both in classes and in individual instruction. Prisoners were required to memorize certain material such as the contents of a pamphlet on communist ideology, and they were examined on this material day in and day out, week in and week out. While they were being crammed with the literature and questioned on it over and over again, the prisoners were given no other duties and were allowed to read nothing else....
>
> The technique of harassment was equally successful. It was used on all the men; even the most fawning progressives were subjected to it when the captors wished greater cooperation from them. The most minor offense, deliberate or not, could set the technique in motion. Suppose a prisoner failed to answer a question in class. He was ordered to camp headquarters and given a long lecture on the grave necessity of paying strict attention to the instructor and rembering what was said. This was only the beginning. The same prisoner would be called to headquarters again, perhaps at midnight, and lectured in the same way. The next day, he might be...given another lecture on his grievous shortcomings. Then he would be aroused at two o'clock the next morning, and once again his offenses would be discussed. The Chinese know that this treatment deprived the prisoners of what they wanted above everything else - to be left alone to lead a normal prisoner's life....

> Of the three tactics, the third, humiliation, did the most psychological damage. Prisoners were specifically promised...that under the 'lenient' policy of their captors they would not be subject to humiliation. Despite these promises, prisoners were humiliated whenever the communists desired.... When a prisoner objected to the instructor's statement, the instructor ordered the entire class to stand, and remain on its feet until this one man abandoned his objections. After some hours of standing, the other prisoners began to mutter against the objector. Under this pressure the man capitulated. But the incident did not end there. The next day, the prisoner had to compose and read to the class a long criticism of his own conduct, ending with an apology to the class and to the instructor. On each of the following four or five days, he had to repeat his self-criticism and to elaborate upon it. His classmates were ordered to criticize him, which they did. This is one of the important communist methods of bringing about chaos in a group's relations.... In the prison camps, incidents like this classroom one lead to chaos and favored the establishment of an informer system.... This lack of trust among prisoners was debilitating.

(10) (C) The principle of self-criticism as mentioned by Kinkead is important and merits expansion. The practice of demanding self-criticism was widely used and was a first step in prisoner degradation.[58] Extracts from these self-incriminatory statements were used both in indoctrination lectures, to show the weaknesses of capitalistic society, and as evidence in trials of PW's accused of crimes against the captor authorities.[59] Initially, the PW was required to confess extremely trivial violations of camp rules and regulations before his entire company and to express regret for his actions. Promises to remit punishment if the PW confessed was the incentive used to obtain compliance. After numerous sessions of degrading himself for trivia, the habit was formed, and it took less pressure each time to extract more serious self-accusation.[60] The step from criticizing one's self to criticizing others and, finally, to informing on others seemed easy

and natural for the individual after he had done enough of the first.[61] Threats to bring him to trial for self-confessed criminal acts was added inducement to encourage informing on his fellow PW's.

(11) (C) Although the recruitment of informers from the ranks of PW's through the technique of self-criticism was of major significance in Korea, there is no indication of that tactic being used by the Vietnamese Communists. The relatively small PW population held by the NVA/VC may account for their not employing what to the the Chinese was an effective tool for mind conditioning and PW control.

(12) (C) The format for presenting the information to the PW varies as the PW population varies. Where the numbers of PW's to be indoctrinated range in the hundreds or greater, extensive use is made of lectures. These are initially given by captor indoctrinators but are later presented by converts when they become available. Compartmentalization permits the use of seminars even when the total PW population is massive. Seminars are perhaps the most effective means of verbal indoctrination. During such sessions, participation by the PW in discussing selected topics is demanded by the Communists. Criticism of self and others, reading of PW-prepared treatise on rhetorical matters, question and answer periods, viewing of Communist-produced films, and review of Communist progressive literature are a few of the activities scheduled. The central theme is to gain PW participation. This involves a dialogue either between the PW and the indoctrinator, when the session involves only one individual, or between the group and the indoctrinator, when the session is being presented to more than one prisoner.

(13) (C) The power of the written word is not overlooked. Probably the most effective means employed by the Communist to indoctrinate the PW in Korea were the many camp and company newspapers managed and staffed by the PW's themselves. These propaganda sheets offered a steady diet of Communist doctrine and slanted news about the progress of the war.[62] This technique was not original to the Chinese. Japanese prisoners held by the Soviets in World War II were subjected to a similar barrage published in a Japanese-language newspaper entitled Japan News (Nippon Shimbun).[63]

(14) (U) A well-stocked library of "progressive" literature from both the Communist states and the PW's own country is a normal feature of a PW camp managed by the Communists. Here the PW has the freedom to select his own reading material for discussion during an indoctrination session or just for his own edification. It is a basic tenet of Communist management to isolate

the PW from any communication media that deviates in the slightest from the intended precepts. Mail, literature, newspapers, films, and discussions are strictly censored to insure only the desired information is imparted. The goal is to weaken the precapture values and beliefs of the PW.

e. (U) Themes:

(1) Several basic propaganda themes are identifiable. The first of these is the magnanimity of the detaining power toward the detained PW. Described as the "lenient policy" by the Chinese in Korea and the "humanitarian policy" by the North Vietnamese, it is an initial attempt to overcome the natural antipathy of the prisoner toward his captor. The realization that he is not to be shot, but treated "leniently" or "humanely," creates a feeling of gratitude in the PW toward his captors. The gratitude mitigates the hatred, or at least submerges it, to a point where the PW is capable of accepting subsequent doctrinal matter.

(2) A second and obvious theme is that of extolling the virtues of communism and the people and government of the detaining power. Normally, this is accompanied by an effort to gain understanding and/or sympathy for the detaining power's military/political position in the current conflict. Once attained, a sympathetic or understanding PW is ripe for exploitation.

(3) A recurring theme and one which engenders a natural emotional response on the part of the PW is that of peace. Emphasis is placed on the desire of all sane individuals for peace with Communism. The detaining power is painted as one of the leaders in the pro-peace/antiwar movement. The "humaneness" of the detaining power is always contrasted against the "war-mongering, blood-thirsty" capitalist/fascist state that is in conflict with it. Rarely is the PW himself accused of being the war-monger. Normally, he is informed that he is considered a "dupe" of his country's ruling class. This approach provides the PW an opportunity to realign his loyalties with the forces of peace and decency.

(4) The opposite to the theme of extolling the captor nation is the degradation of the captive's nation. This theme attempts to pervert the PW's concepts of his nation's ideals and the history which formulated them. Presentation of only those historical items which are considered derogatory to the esteem of a nation provides a historically valid but distorted picture. With discussion and literature strictly censored and the normal lack of political insight,

the PW when confronted by a skilled indoctrinator finds himself hard pressed to defend his country. The erosion of his faith in country makes him more amenable to sympathizing with his captor's viewpoint.

f. (U) Duration and Frequency:

(1) There is no standard for either duration or frequency insofar as indoctrination sessions are concerned. Normally, the indoctrination period follows the period of interrogation but not necessarily. In Korea, the Chinese greeted USPW's immediately upon capture with a description on their "lenient policy" in an effort to pacify them and earn their gratitude. The North Vietnamese, in transporting downed U.S. pilots to "Heartbreak" (Ha Lo Prison), occasionally appeared to make a conscious effort to expose them to the "wrath" of the Vietnamese civilian populace, which is a not-so-subtle form of indoctrinating the prisoners on the futility of escape through such a sea of hostility.[64]

(2) The frequency of indoctrination could best be described as irregular but constant. Once started, indoctrination becomes an integral part of internment routine and does not cease until the individual physically departs the control of the detaining power. (One PW released from North Vietnam received an indoctrination lecture minutes before he was to board the aircraft transporting him to freedom.) The intensity of indoctrination does fluctuate however. The most intense indoctrination occurs immediately following the interrogation phase, and then it gradually decreases. Based on the fortunes of war or political negotiations, the tempo of indoctrination rises and falls. The key, however, is that it never truly stops.

g. (U) Evaluation of Effectiveness:

(1) (U) The "tally sheet" on the effectiveness of Communist indoctrination reflects some astonishing successes and some abject failures. Overall, and in light of the objectives given at the beginning of this section, the indoctrination process as employed by the Communists must be considered effective.

(2) (U) The one objective in which they have consistently failed to gain any significant measure of success is that of completely transforming the prisoner into a dogmatic follower of the Communist ideology. This has been especially true where the subject was a USPW. In Korea, although numerous "opportunists" espoused the belief for the purpose of improving their lot, and 21 (less than 1% of those repatriated) elected to remain behind following "Operation

Big Switch," the return for the massive indoctrination effort exerted to obtain converts must be considered insignificant. However, it must be stated that, although not converted to Communism, these same opportunists measurably contributed to the success of other indoctrination goals by acting as instructors, informers, and unit leaders.

(3) (U) The Communists have proven themselves masters at making the PW his own worst enemy. With rare exception, they are able to sow the seeds of fear and distrust among the PW's through the use of threats, self-criticism, and informers. The liberal use of such informers in Korea caused numerous repatriates to comment on the fact that there was no one in the camps they could rely on.[65] Success in this endeavor provides the Communists with a measure of control not otherwise available to them.

(4) ~~(C)~~ It is worthy of note that the North Vietnamese do not appear able to attain this goal. Despite extensive use of isolation and complete environmental control, a PW command structure exists which frustrates the generation of distrust and disloyalty. The overwhelming majority of the returnees have expressed nothing but admiration for their fellow PW's and a sense of comradeship with them. Similarly, although the North Koreans attempted to play one against the other, unity among the crew of the USS Pueblo prevented any significant breakdown in trust and faith.

(5) ~~(C)~~ In all the conflicts examined, the Communists were able to achieve significant propaganda exploitation of the PW's under their control. Some of the successes were with the compliance of the PW's and some without. With or without compliance, the fact that the PW's were effectively exploited for propaganda purposes makes this objective of indoctrination a notable success. In this regard, the indoctrination process has proven its worth.

h. ~~(C)~~ Summary - Indoctrination:

(1) ~~(C)~~ Indoctrination (the imparting of information) is the logical follow-up to interrogation (the extracting of information). Controlling the environment of the individual, especially through isolation, is a necessary prerequisite to successful indoctrination attempts. The objectives of the Communists are to destroy a PW's faith in himself, in his military service, and in his country. The goal is to engender a sympathetic attitude in the PW which will lead to positive acts, such as signing "confessions," making propaganda broadcasts, and informing on his fellow prisoners. A long range goal of such indoctriantion would also be the recruiting of agents for intelligence after the termination of open hostilities.

(2) (C) Indoctrinators are political cadre, not strictly military personnel, in the Communist system. The "instructor" has a great deal of power over the PW's and often possesses a great deal of competency in the English language. Wherever possible, "progressives" among the prisoners themselves are utilized to conduct indoctrination sessions.

(3) (C) Isolation can be complete or social. Complete isolation involves separating an individual from all outside stimuli. Social isolation separates resisting prisoners from one another or surrounds such prisoners with converted PW's who have the mission of subverting their values. Complete isolation has been the prevalent mode in Vietnam. This latter practice was used in Korea. The purpose here is to foster anxiety and doubt while undermining the individual's value system. These are necessary prerequisites to substituting elements of the Communist ideology for the previously held beliefs of the PW. Repetition, harassment, and humiliation are three principal indoctrination techniques. Self-criticism is also extensively used with the intention of leading the prisoner into criticism of other PW's as well as his country.

(4) (U) There are several identifiable themes in Communist propaganda directed towards PW's. One is the magnanimity of the detaining power. Others include the virtues of Communism and of the detaining power, peace, and assaulting the ideals of the PW's own country.

(5) (C) A significant failure in the indoctrination program is the inability of the program to turn out dogmatic followers of the Communist ideology from among USPW's. However, in Korea, the Communists did secure enough opportunists to have "progressives" as unit leaders, informers, and indoctrinators. Returnees from North Vietnam, as well as the Pueblo crew, indicate that the Communists have not been able to do this and that group solidarity did exist among the prisoners.

5. (U) EXPLOITATION:

a. (U) General:

(1) (U) Throughout history, it has been the fate of the prisoner of war to suffer exploitation by his captor. The early practice of killing captives, while satisfying the spirit of vengeance and serving as a warning to potential foes, was found economically unrewarding. Enslaving the prisoner was much more profitable. War

captives furnished ancient Greece and Rome with their chief source of slave labor. During the Middle Ages, it was a vassal's duty to ransom his lord taken in battle, attesting to the importance placed upon exploiting the captured for financial gain. Prisoners were also effectively exploited as hostages to gain a political end. Despite humanitarian efforts to eliminate this practice in modern times, the prisoner of war continued to be exploited up to and including World War II.

(2) (U) The Geneva Convention (1949) sought to firmly establish the principle that the sole reason for detaining enemy captives was to prevent them from continuing their participation in the conflict. Exploitation of the PW in any form which causes him to commit acts inimical to his own interest, that of his fellow captives, or his country, is forbidden. If there is any exception at all in the protection provided the PW against exploitation by international law, it lies in the tacit understanding that prisoners represent a possible source of intelligence information and that non-coercive methods may be used by the captor to elicit such information.[66]

(3) (U) The overall objective of the Communist PW program is the maximum exploitation of the prisoner: for economic gain, to obtain intelligence, to achieve political objectives, to provide support for world-wide propaganda campaigns, and to foster subversion. The use of captives to gain an advantage over ones antagonist in the areas mentioned is not unique to the Communists. What is unique to them is the importance they attach to it and the massive effort they apply to attain it.

(4) (U) Intelligence exploitation of the PW is common to all nations party to a conflict, although the Geneva Conventions prohibit violent or coercive measures. In their intelligence exploitation of the PW, Communist nations ignore this prohibition when it suits their purpose. Information sought runs the gamut from Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE's) to data on highly sensitive, specialized equipment. Although apparently of less importance to the Communists than political exploitation, attempts to secure military intelligence are nevertheless considerable.

(5) (U) As has been previously pointed out, the economic exploitation of PW's was extensive during and immediately after World War II. Communist nations have a long history of exploiting prison labor. In the 20th century the Soviet Union adapted and refined the Tsarist custom of incarcerating large numbers of political prisoners as a means of insuring the security of the State.

The Soviet Union, because of its ideological base, extended this concept and viewed the prisoner as a productive unit, which should be used to improve the economy of the state. Prison labor, both skilled and unskilled, was utilized to benefit the state. National economic planning included goals and objectives which were to be met by the slave labor force. During and after World War II this concept was extended to the large number of enemy prisoners captured by the Russians. They were used in factories, farms, public works projects, and in Siberian labor camps. In all their efforts they were required to meet planned norms and quotas for which various supervisory echelons were held accountable. The use of PW's as a labor force proved of significant value to the Soviet Union.

(6) (U) Communist nations during the Korean, and in the present conflict, have not made any significant effort to exploit their American captive for economic gain; however, the threat does exist. Captured enemy (North Vietnamese) security personnel have reported that the United States will be made to pay for rehabilitating North Vietnam.[67] If true, it might be inferred that North Vietnam expects economic concessions and, without these, may be predisposed to exploit the technical skills of their captives just as the Russians did following World War II. The Communists have unquestionably prepared the way by extracting "war crimes" confessions from many of their captives. They have the power to sentence any captive they choose to a lengthy term in prison. The fate of many German and Japanese PW's still serving legally-imposed (by Communist standards) sentences, requires that this threat be taken seriously.[68]

(7) (U) The Communists have experienced varying degrees of success in political exploitation in all the conflicts examined. U.S. personnel detained in Korea and in South and North Vietnam have been forced through coercion to make statements detrimental to the interests of the United States. While requests for amnesty have been made by most of the releasees from North Vietnam the extent of the damage to the individual or the PW's remaining in captivity cannot be determined at this time. Inasmuch as the making of the request was a condition of release, the action is understandable; however, a request for amnesty is a tacit admission of guilt for a crime committed. To the uncommitted and uninformed nations of the world, the admission of guilt by U.S. pilots acting as instruments of their government casts guilt upon the United States and justified the righteousness of the North Vietnamese position. For a small nation whose most effective political weapon is world opinion, this type of political exploitation is tailor-made.

(8) (U) Political exploitation may also take the form of using war captives as pawns for obtaining concessions in armistice or

other negotiations. This challenge was faced by the United States in Korea both during the war and again as it sought to effect the release of the Pueblo crew. During the Korean War, discussions on the prisoner of war question did not begin until 5 months after the armistice talks commenced. Most important issues were settled prior to the PW question being raised. This meant that the United Nations Command (UNC) negotiators had few remaining concessions to make that could be traded for Communist concession on the prisoner of war issue. As a result, the UNC was forced to negotiate for the return of its prisoners, about whom it cared deeply, while having little to concede.[69] The advantage in subsequent negotiations obviously lay with the Communists.

(9) (U) The United States did not escape scot-free from the Pueblo incident either. The ransom demanded by the North Koreans for the return of the crew was a public apology by the United States for deliberate intrusion into North Korean territorial waters for the purpose of espionage. It took the United States 11 months of soul-searching before paying that ransom. Although concurrently repudiated at the time of issuance, the effect of the apology on world opinion was considerable. The Communists obviously felt that they had wrung every bit of political exploitation from the crew that they could and so, upon payment, released the captives. In the current truce negotiations with North Vietnam, the United States has sought to take up the matter of war prisoners separate from other aspects of the conflict. This the Communists have refused to do. If history serves as a guide, a high price will be extracted from the United States for the safe return of its interned military personnel.

(10) (U) The Communists have a long history of successfully exploiting prisoners for propaganda purposes. The objective of course is to gain a political end which relates directly to the concept of political exploitation. The prisoner of war is made to serve the Communist propaganda machine in a number of ways. One way is using PW's to bolster the morale and fighting spirit of the detaining power's own populace. In Korea, USPW's were paraded through large towns where they were exposed to the hatred and, at times, physical maltreatment at the hands of the civilian populace.[70] In Vietnam, pilots are displayed in villages and exposed to humiliating treatment by the civilian populace similar to that of their counterparts in Korea. This exposure of the "paper tiger" serves to whip up emotions and engender hatred of the enemy and love of the fatherland. Photography plays an important role in such exploitation. Publication of actual photographs permits the humiliating scenes to be disseminated beyond the local scene of occurrence. Often such photographs are staged for more effect.

(11) (U) It is also customary for the Communists to disseminate photographs, PW statements, and PW mail which demonstrate the kind and humane treatment the captives have received. Although historically Communist treatment of PW's has never reached the ideals set forth in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, they expend a great deal of time and effort to persuade world opinion such is the case. Photographs and films are made public showing PW's engaged in athletics, going on field trips, sunning themselves, eating sumptuous meals, and other relaxing experiences. Radio broadcasts by PW's normally include statements concerning the humane treatment they are receiving at the hands of their captors. Occasionally, as in the case of the Pueblo, charges of prisoner maltreatment are countered by explanations that captives are not prisoners of war but "criminals."

(12) (U) A great deal of the Communist propaganda exploitation effort is spent in just such "self-defense" mechanisms. In exploiting the PW's, they seek to put their "best foot forward" in the area of world opinion. They try, for example, to justify their military and political aims. As mentioned above, they defend their "humane" treatment of PW's. And often, as will be discussed later, they attempt to show the "pacifistic nature" of their ideology. A most effective technique of getting their message out is the manipulation of PW mail. In Korea, the probability of a letter reaching its destination increased proportionately with the amount of material it contained which was favorable to the Communists.[71] During the height of the bombing over the North, however, the North Vietnamese insisted that all letters include "stop the bombing" sentiments.[72] To justify their seizure of the Pueblo, the North Koreans required the crew to include in their letters home statements to the effect that their ship had deliberately sailed into North Korean waters for the purpose of espionage and that only after the United States made a public apology would they be released. For added emphasis, all members were required to write a similar letter to the President of the United States with the added message urging him to make that apology.[73] Inasmuch as a letter's audience is limited primarily to the addressee, the Communists overcome that hurdle by reproducing particularly favorable ones. These are shown to other PW's as encouragement for their own compliance or are disseminated among the opponent's front line troops for the demoralization effect.[74]

(13) (U) A continuing theme for Communist exploitation is that of peace. The ultimate aim is to weaken the opponent's will to fight and cause confusion in his ranks. The Russians in World War II established a pattern which is still in use. By fraud, deception,

and the use of German collaborators, numerous German prisoners were persuaded to sign "peace petitions" which the Communists published throughout the world.[75] In addition, the PW's published camp newspapers and made radio broadcasts expounding the same theme. An identical program was established by the Chinese in the USPW camps along the Yalu River. Many peace petitions were prepared by the propaganda workshop (a PW-staffed publication center) and collaborating PW's were photographed standing in line as if waiting to sign their names to these petitions. Like the Russians before them, the Chinese gave wide dissemination to these photographs underscoring the fact that UN prisoners were supporting the Communists in their "peace crusade" and were "opposed" to the Korean War. Pro-peace sentiments expressed by PW's were broadcast throughout the Communist world. "Peace" was also the most constant theme in Toward Truth and Peace, which was the major camp newspaper published.[76]

(14) (U) The release of three American soldiers in Cambodia in November 1967 revealed a new technique to advance this theme: the men were turned over to a representative of an American antiwar group. The release, according to the National Liberation Front representative at the scene, was in response to the "United States movement of opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War."[77] Subsequent releases by the North Vietnamese of nine USPW's have been conducted in similar fashion and for similar motives. Using peace groups as the instrument for release gives credence and importance to these groups back in the United States. It encourages such groups to flourish and further divides U.S. public sentiment on Vietnam involvement.[78] The propaganda value of the "humanitarian" release of U.S. "war criminals" is obvious.

(15) (S) The exploitation of prisoners of war for the purpose of subverting an enemy nation, presents a very real threat to the free world. Efforts on the part of the Communists to recruit PW's for espionage purposes after repatriation constantly reappear in the history of Communist management of PW's. It initially occurred during World War II when the Russians made attempts to recruit both Germans and Japanese during their periods of confinement in Russian PW camps.[79] A number are still being uncovered 25 years later. The Chinese/Koreans attempted to recruit Americans for the same purpose during the Korean War. Seventy-five agents were found among the 4,428 repatriated U.S. prisoners. These agents, when discovered and questioned, were found to be extensively trained and possessed detailed instructions regarding their future plans.[80] In other incidents where Americans have been detained by Communist powers, the Communists used subtle implications to determine the individual's feelings toward performing such activities. If the Communists met

resistance, the subject was apparently dropped as occurred with the crew of the USS Pueblo. In cases such as this, the Communists switch their emphasis and appear to seek, if not outright converts, then individuals who, when repatriated, will be sympathetic to the political and/or military aims of the detaining power. (See Paragraph 4. INDOCTRINATION)

(16) (U) As a final note and for further emphasis, it should be noted that when wives of U.S. servicemen missing in Southeast Asia asked the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris if there was anything they could do to help their husbands, they were told "to join Dr. (Benajmin) Spock and the 'Women Strike for Peace' and demonstrate against the war."[81] Such callous use of prisoners to further their own aims typifies the Communist exploitation efforts.

b. (U) Summary - Exploitation:

(1) (U) Communist nations view prisoners of war as tools to be manipulated in the pursuit of their national policies. The purpose of the overall Communist PW program is the maximum exploitation of the captive who is used to gain an economic, political, propaganda, or intelligence advantage.

(2) (U) The economic exploitation of PW's is primarily associated with the period during and after World War II. No economic exploitation of UN prisoners occurred during the Korean conflict. The possibility of North Vietnam exploiting skilled American prisoners in the rebuilding of the North remains a threat to those prisoners.

(3) (U) The fate of the USS Pueblo crew illustrates the use of prisoners for political purposes. The crew served as hostages of the North Koreans while an apology was wrung from the United States for "intruding" into North Korean waters for the purpose of espionage. Similarly, in the Korean truce negotiations, the Chinese Communists used the UN prisoners as bargaining points to be traded for political advantages in the negotiations. The refusal of the North Vietnamese to discuss the fate of American prisoners prior to an understanding being reached on "total US withdrawal" is another example of exploitation of prisoners for political reasons.

(4) (U) The PW is utilized by a Communist state for propaganda purposes in a number of ways. The exposure of the PW's under humiliating circumstances to the civil populations of North Vietnam and North Korea undoubtedly serves to bolster the image of the Communist regime with its own people while degrading the United States and its Armed Forces in the eyes of those civilians. Propaganda

films and coerced "confessions" are used to influence world opinion, especially in the lesser developed areas of the world whose peoples are not particularly sophisticated in interpreting propaganda. The North Vietnamese, like the Chinese Communists in Korea, have used PW expressions of "sorrow" at their participation in an "unjust war" in an attempt to impact upon American public opinion.

(5) (U) The possibility exists that PW's may be recruited to serve as Communist agents in the post-conflict period after they are released and returned home. The Pueblo crew mentioned that there were some overtures made in this direction by their North Korean captors. There is evidence that a very small number of USPW's in Korea were so recruited, as were German and Japanese prisoners of the Soviet Union during and after World War II.

(6) (U) U.S. military personnel captured in future conflicts with Communist nations will face the threat of intense exploitation. The danger also exists that, given the opportunity, Communist nations or insurgent groups will seize and detain U.S. military personnel for political and propaganda purposes during peacetime.

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SECTION IV: ~~(C)~~ IMPACT STATEMENTS (U)

1. (U) GENERAL:

a. Communist PW management principles constitute a threat to the United States and to the individual serviceman who might be captured. These principles have as their origins the ideology of communism. They are time-tested and constantly updated. Most importantly, these principles constitute an effective means of exploiting PW's.

b. The impact of these principles falls upon the PW's country of origin, but it falls most immediately and most directly upon the PW himself. Consequently, the sequence of events which the PW will experience from capture to repatriation constitutes an appropriate summary of the threat. To summarize these events and their impact upon the individual soldier, a series of impact statements follow.

2. ~~(C)~~ IMPACT STATEMENTS:

a. (U) UPON CAPTURE, THE U.S. SOLDIER WILL EXPERIENCE IMMEDIATE TACTICAL INTERROGATION.

(1) The tactical situation might prevent or delay this interrogation.

(2) The information requested is normally limited to name, rank, serial number, date of birth, and unit to which assigned.

b. (U) THE INITIAL INTERROGATION WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY VERBAL AND CONTROLLED PHYSICAL ABUSE.

(1) The occasion of severe brutality at point of capture will be rare.

(2) Physical abuse will be limited to slaps, kicks, and rifle butts.

(3) Threats against the life of the U.S. soldier may be expected.

c. ~~(C)~~ THE USPW WILL BE MOVED AWAY FROM THE FIGHTING FRONT AND TO A PERMANENT PW FACILITY AS RAPIDLY AS THE TACTICAL CONDITIONS PERMIT.

(1) This permanent PW facility will be well isolated from the battlefield.

(2) Transportation, if provided, will be primitive.

(3) If transportation is by foot, marches will be long and on minimum rations.

(4) USPW will likely be exposed to public display, accompanied by physical abuse.

d. (U) THE PERMANENT PW FACILITY WILL BE STAFFED BY DEDICATED AND SKILLED MILITARY AND POLITICAL CADRES.

(1) Military cadre will handle the routine camp administration.

(2) Political cadre will control the interrogation and indoctrination sessions.

(3) Ultimate responsibility for the USPW will lie with the political cadre.

e. (U) THE USPW WILL BE INITIALLY SEGREGATED BY RANK.

(1) Every effort will be made to destroy U.S. camp organizations, overt or covert.

(2) Rank segregation will continue throughout internment.

f. (U) THE INITIAL AND SUBSEQUENT INTERROGATIONS WILL BE USED AS SCREENING AIDS TO FURTHER SEGREGATE PRISONERS BY MENTAL ATTITUDE AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO EXPLOITATION.

(1) Such segregation will further destroy camp organizations and resistance.

(2) Segregation into homogeneous groups (Compartmentalization) enhances indoctrination and exploitation.

g. (U) THE USPW WILL BE REQUIRED TO FILL OUT ONE OR MORE BIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONNAIRES.

(1) The data given will be filed and constantly checked during subsequent interrogations.

(2) Physical or mental duress will be applied to enforce compliance.

(3) Data requested will far exceed that required by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).

(4) In addition to the questionnaires, autobiographical statements may be required. These, too, will be filed for future reference.

h. (U) THE USPW WILL ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE WITH HIS INTERROGATOR/INDOCTRINATOR.

(1) The skilled interrogator will trick, cajole, or force the PW into breaking his silence.

(2) Initial dialogue will not be compromising to the PW but will exceed Code of Conduct guidance.

i. (U) THE USPW, DEPENDING ON HIS DEGREE OF RESISTANCE, WILL FACE A VARIETY OF INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES.

(1) The arrogant, hard resister may face harsh, if not brutal, interrogation.

(2) The average USPW who attempts whenever possible to adhere to the Code will face an alternating hard and soft sell. Severe brutality most likely will not be used.

(3) The compliant USPW will face a friendly approach as long as he continues to provide information or acts in the manner expected.

j. (U) INTERROGATION WILL CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF INTERNMENT.

(1) Frequency of interrogation will decrease with the length of internment.

(2) Interrogation may be used as a form of punishment. At these times it will be lengthy and conducted at irregular hours.

k. (U) THE USPW WILL BE INTERROGATED ON ITEMS OF TACTICAL OR STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE.

(1) Reasonable answers, although inaccurate, may be acceptable.

(2) Officers and technicians are special targets of this type of interrogation.

(3) Primary intent of such interrogation at permanent camps is to establish dialogue.

1. (U) INDOCTRINATION SESSIONS WILL BEGIN UPON COMPLETION OF INITIAL INTERROGATION CYCLE.

(1) Indoctrination may begin immediately upon capture.

(2) Initial indoctrination will stress the leniency of the captor nation.

(3) Depending on the PW population, indoctrination sessions will be individual or small group.

m. (U) INDOCTRINATION WILL BE DIRECTED AT HOMOGENEOUS GROUPS FORMULATED THROUGH SCREENING DURING THE INTERROGATION PHASE OF INTERNMENT.

(1) Prisoners will be grouped by rank, class structure, and degree of resistance.

(2) Indoctrination will be continuous throughout period of internment.

n. (U) THE GOALS OF THE INDOCTRINATION PROGRAM WILL BE FIVE-FOLD:

(1) To engender a favorable/sympathetic attitude toward the captor's political and/or military goals.

(2) To undermine the PW's faith and trust in his own country and in his fellow PW.

(3) To encourage active and willing support of propaganda campaigns which serve the interests of the captor power.

(4) To convert PW's to Communism.

(5) To recruit agents from the ranks of the PW's.

o. (U) CULTURAL AIDS (BOOKS, MOVIES) WILL BE USED AS AIDS TO THE SEMINAR/LECTURE INDOCTRINATION SESSIONS.

(1) Material presented will be pro-Communist, anti-United States.

(2) Radio broadcasts will supplement the indoctrination program.

p. (U) THE PRIMARY THEME OF INDOCTRINATION WILL BE THAT OF "PEACE."

(1) The Communist detaining power will be portrayed as peace-seeking and rational.

(2) The United States will be portrayed as a nation of warmongers and imperialists.

(3) The individual PW will be considered a "dupe" of the U.S. "ruling class."

q. (U) PERIODS OF INTENSE INDOCTRINATION WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY STRICT ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS.

(1) Extensive use will be made of isolation.

(2) Compliant PW's will be segregated from other PW's who display attitudes of resistance.

(3) Rewards and punishments will fluctuate widely to keep the PW off balance.

(4) Indoctrination sessions will be unstructured and held at irregular hours disrupting schedules and sleep.

r. (U) THE USPW WILL EXPERIENCE PERIODS OF TOTAL ISOLATION.

(1) Isolation is a common mind-conditioning technique of the Communists.

(2) It has been used in every conflict reviewed.

(3) Periods of isolation may range from a day to a month or, where only small numbers of PW's are held, up to and beyond one year.

s. (U) USPW FOOD AND MEDICINE WILL BE MANIPULATED BY THE CAPTORS.

(1) Food and medicine will be withheld as punishment for breaches of camp regulations.

(2) Food and medicine will normally not be withheld for failure to respond to indoctrination.

t. (U) PW MAIL WILL BE CONTROLLED AS ANOTHER ELEMENT OF "REWARD AND PUNISHMENT."

(1) Outgoing mail normally will not be posted unless it expresses sentiments favorable to the Communist cause.

(2) Incoming mail will be withheld if the contents are judged likely to impair the indoctrination process.

(3) Mail is also withheld as punishment or allowed as a reward.

u. (U) THE FACILITIES IN WHICH THE USPW WILL BE INTERNED WILL BE AUSTERE.

(1) Minimum bedding, clothing, and sanitation aids will be provided.

(2) Food will be adequate to sustain life but not health.

(3) Medical assistance will be rendered on a sporadic basis and will be below U.S. standards in both quality and application.

v. (U) ESCAPE AND EVASION BY A USPW FROM A COMMUNIST PW FACILITY WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.

(1) The PW facility will be properly secured by the military forces of the detaining power.

(2) The camp will be located far away from the scene of battle, maximum use being made of hostile terrain and/or a hostile surrounding population.

w. (U) THE USPW WILL BE CONSIDERED A "WAR CRIMINAL" BY THE DETAINING POWER.

(1) Communist nations ratified the Geneva Convention of 1949 (GPW) but entered a reservation to Article 85, which guarantees the protection of the convention to alleged "war criminals."

(2) Classification of a prisoner as a "war criminal" is regarded by the communists as sufficient justification to deny him the protection of the GPW.

(3) Conviction of a PW as a "war criminal" can result in a term of imprisonment which may extend beyond the period of hostilities.

x. (U) THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT HAVE ACCESS TO ITS PW'S THROUGH THE AUSPICES OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

(1) Communist nations have shown total disregard for the humanitarian goals of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

(2) Communist nations consider international inspection of their PW camps to be meddling in their internal affairs.

(3) Denial of external access to the PW's is part of the system of environmental control established by the Communist captor.

y. ~~(C)~~ THE USPW WILL BE EXPLOITED BY HIS COMMUNIST CAPTORS.

(1) For propaganda purposes efforts will be made to induce/force USPW's to sign statements/petitions, make radio broadcasts and appear in films/videotapes, the contents of which are detrimental to the U.S. effort.

(2) USPW's will be considered pawns in any negotiations to cease hostilities or to gain concessions at the conference table.

(3) USPW's may be repatriated early through the auspices of a "peace-organization" to lend credence and importance to this organization within the United States.

(4) Tactical information will be sought from the USPW.

(5) Subversive agents or sympathetic activists are sought from the ranks of the USPW's.

z. (U) THE USPW WILL HAVE HIS FAITH IN HIMSELF, HIS FELLOW PW AND HIS COUNTRY JEOPARDIZED, IF NOT COMPROMISED.

(1) In the controlled environment of internment, the Communists make every effort to use one PW against the other.

(2) When applied over a prolonged period of time, the skillful exposure of the PW to literature and statements against U.S. policy, especially when authored by prominent Americans, can gradually erode the convictions of the PW.

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SECTION V - (U) DOCTRINAL REQUIREMENTS

1. GENERAL:

a. The 26 impact statements listed in Section IV provide a summary of what the U.S. soldier may expect should he be captured by the Communists. Knowing the type of treatment expected, it is necessary to formulate doctrine to counter that treatment. This formulation is begun by identifying doctrinal requirements that are necessary in order to provide the solider with the knowledge required to survive internment and to enhance the process of his rehabilitation upon his return to U.S. control.

b. The purpose of this section is to list the requirements generated by the Communist prisoner of war management principles, giving on the one hand the requirements and on the other, the rationale behind that requirement. Each of the succeeding chapters which cover the three phases of internment will compare the current Army doctrine against these requirements. Most of the requirements generated by the Communist treatment of USPW's are relatable to some form of training for the American soldier. They are discussed in Chapter 4, Pre-Internment.

c. To identify precisely what Communist principle/technique generated the requirement, the list number of the appropriate impact statement(s) (developed in the preceding section) is provided in parenthesis at the beginning of each requirement; e.g., (#2a, b & f). Where the requirement was generated by the entire spectrum of the Communist PW management process, the word (General) appears before the requirement.

2. REQUIREMENTS:

#1 (General) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED ON THE COMMUNIST MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES AND HOW THESE ARE USED TO HIS DETRIMENT AND THAT OF HIS COUNTRY.

Rationale: Former PW's from both the Korean War and the Vietnam War have unanimously agreed that foreknowledge of what to expect from the enemy would have been very beneficial to them. It is the fear of the unknown and anticipation of the worst which create anxieties that work to the benefit of the Communist captor.

#2. (General) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE THOROUGHLY CONVINCED THAT HIS SURVIVAL IS DEPENDENT ON HIS KEEPING FAITH WITH HIMSELF, HIS FELLOW PW'S AND HIS COUNTRY.

Rationale: A cornerstone of Communist management of PW's is their constant attempt to "isolate" the individual from his fellow PW's, his country, and his pre-capture beliefs. Every conceivable method, both physical and mental, is used to accomplish this aim. The strength that is derived from group solidarity, even if the group is scattered, can be essential to both continued resistance and survival. Equally important to the PW is the knowledge that his country is doing everything possible to effect his release and care for his loved ones at home. Every effort must be expended to provide the U.S. solider with the knowledge that this is so and that his survival and that of others depends on keeping faith with them.

#3. (General) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE GIVEN EXPLICIT GUIDANCE WHICH HE CAN REALISTICALLY FOLLOW WHEN PLACED IN A PHYSICALLY AND/OR MENTALLY STRESSFUL SITUATION SUCH AS CAPTIVITY. THE DEGREE OF TRAINING RECEIVED MUST BE COMMENSURATE WITH THE "RISK OF CAPTURE" POTENTIAL OF HIS DUTY POSITION.

Rationale: The Communists play upon and attempt to expand the doubts that exist within the PW. It is imperative that the USPW knows what his country expects of him while he is a prisoner and he must be confident that he can live up to those expectations. Conversely, his country must provide him with reasonable and attainable goals of conduct, thus enabling him to survive with his honor intact. Taking for granted that some duty assignments expose an individual to the risk of capture more than other assignments, the time and effort expended to provide such guidance to the U.S. soldier should be allocated in accordance with the risk factor.

#4. (#2a, b, f, i, j, & k) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE AWARE OF THE VARIOUS INTERROGATIVE TECHNIQUES AND HOW BEST TO EVADE GIVING SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION.

Rationale: The ability to recognize the various interrogation techniques, along with knowledge of how best to handle them, will substantially help the USPW resist interrogation. The knowledge that he can resist, and successfully, will enhance the U.S. soldier's desire to resist and ultimately survive his internment ordeal.

#5. (#2b & e) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE IN PEAK PHYSICAL CONDITION.

Rationale: There is a need to provide a degree of physical conditioning to each soldier in the US Army. Many of them come from environments which have provided virtually no opportunity for exercise. Psychologically, it is important for the soldier to be in

top physical condition. The confidence that the individual gains from being in good physical condition is of critical importance in preparing him for a role in combat.

#6. (#c & v) THE U.S. SOLDIER SHOULD BE WELL VERSED IN ESCAPE TECHNIQUES AND HOW TO RECOGNIZE ESCAPE OPPORTUNITIES.

Rationale: Self-explanatory.

#7. (#3 & 22) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE TAUGHT EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR EVADING CAPTURE. (Note: E&E training should be "theatre-oriented.")

Rationale: Self-explanatory.

#8. (#2d, e, m, n, q, s, y, & z) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST FULLY UNDERSTAND HOW HIS SURVIVAL AND THAT OF OTHERS IS DEPENDENT ON DISCIPLINE AND ADHERENCE TO A CHAIN OF COMMAND REGARDLESS OF THE RANKS INVOLVED AND COMMUNIST SEGREGATION EFFORTS.

Rationale: The Communists make every effort to break down military discipline and the chain of command. As long as one individual outranks another, and both are interned, the senior must control the actions of both and both must work in concert to defeat the enemy's exploitation efforts.

#9. (#2e & f) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED ON THE USE OF SEGREGATION AND THE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES IN EMPLOYING IT.

Rationale: Segregation is the primary technique for destroying the command structure and discipline in the PW camp. Such action isolates individuals and groups into homogeneous targets against which the Communists can direct their indoctrination. The U.S. soldier must recognize segregation for what it is and continually strive to maintain a semblance of command structure which will assist in defeating the effort.

#10. (#2g & h) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE FULLY AWARE OF WHAT HE IS PERMITTED TO SAY AND WRITE WHILE IN CAPTIVITY AND WHAT VARIANCES ARE ACCEPTED UNDER DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DURESS.

Rationale: Current guidance is primarily in the negative sense; i.e., what the PW should not say or write. Returnees from both Korea and Vietnam have indicated that reliance on the "Big Four" (name, rank, serial number, and date of birth) is not sufficient

and basically unrealistic. When faced by a Communist interrogator/ indoctrinator, the USPW must be able to express himself within defined limits and with a clear conscience.

#11. (#2l, m, n, o, p, q, & r) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE AWARE OF THE TECHNIQUES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION PROGRAM AND WHAT INDIVIDUAL COUNTERMEASURES CAN BE TAKEN.

Rationale: Prior knowledge of the indoctrination themes commonly used by the Communists will assist the USPW to reject them. Recognizing the technique being applied also weakens its effect and provides the USPW with an additional measure of resistance.

#12. (#2n, o, p, x, & z) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE FULLY AWARE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF, HIS FELLOW PW'S AND HIS FAMILY DURING AND AFTER HIS INTERNMENT.

Rationale: See 2b, above. The despair of being forgotten is an emotion encouraged and capitalized on by the Communists. The U.S. soldier must be thoroughly convinced prior to his capture that his Government will never forget him and will continuously strive for his release until it is attained. He must also be thoroughly convinced that his dependents (family) are being cared for on a personal, compassionate basis.

#13. (#2m, n, o, p, & z) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST HAVE A BASIC GRASP OF THE CONFLICTING IDEOLOGIES.

Rationale: The Communists will emphasize the injustices which occur in the United States while harping on the glories of the Communist State. The U.S. soldier must be aware of the social and economic injustices within the United States, but he must also be made aware of past and current efforts to correct these injustices. It is equally important that he recognize the totalitarian aspects of Communism and the widespread political, social, and economic injustices of that society. There is no need that he become a scholar in political science, only that he be able to sift the truth from a one-sided political discussion.

#14. (#2 q & r) THE U.S. SOLDIER SHOULD BE FAMILIAR WITH THE EFFECTS OF ISOLATION AND THE MEANS TO COMBAT IT.

Rationale: Isolation is a primary mind-conditioning technique of the Communists. It has been used in all the conflicts examined in this study. Periods of solitary confinement run from a day to

over a year. Its repetitive use is indicative of its success. The American soldier should have some concept of what it is like to be totally alone with no outside stimuli. Having experienced it in training, it would be far less frightening in captivity.

#15. (#2s & u) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE TAUGHT THAT HIS SURVIVAL IS DEPENDENT ON HIS EATING REGARDLESS OF HOW UNPALATABLE THE FOOD MAY BE.

Rationale: Former PW's have indicated that PW rations are less than those of his captor. Often, to survive, PW's have caught and cooked such unpalatable items as dog, cat, snake, and maggots. Raw fish kept former Vietnam USPW's alive on several occasions. Anything that walks, crawls, or swims has nutrient value and with rare exception can be eaten.

#16. (#2s & u) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE KNOWLEDGEABLE IN THE COMMON DISEASES AND INJURIES EXPERIENCED DURING CAPTIVITY AND HOW TO TREAT THEM WITHOUT THE AID OF COMMERCIALLY PREPARED MEDICINES.

Rationale: Communist captors rarely have nor do they often provide commercially prepared medicines in adequate quantities to PW's. The U.S. soldier should be knowledgeable in primitive medicine and be able to diagnose and cope with such common ailments as diarrhea, dysentery, beriberi, and pneumonia. In the weakened state of the PW, the most minor ailment can either prove fatal of itself or lead to more serious complications which produce death.

#17. (#2s & u) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE KNOWLEDGEABLE IN THE AREAS OF SANITATION AND PERSONAL HYGIENE IN ORDER TO BE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING HIMSELF AND HIS ENVIRONMENT IN A MANNER CONDUCIVE TO GOOD HEALTH.

Rationale: The importance of hygiene and sanitation to the preservation of health has been documented. The prison environment with its primitive conditions requires an increased emphasis in these areas. Their practice will enhance the individual PW's ability to avoid disease and also provide better conditions in which to effect a cure should a disease be acquired.

#18. (#2w) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE FULLY INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (GPW).

Rationale: The USPW should be aware of the treatment which he should receive under the GPW. Knowledge of his rights will permit

him to accurately advise his captors of shortcomings in their treatment of him. Knowledge of his obligations might prevent him from signing, doing, or writing something which could cost him his protection under the GPW.

#19. (#2w) THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES THAT MAY OCCUR FROM WHAT HE SAYS AND WRITES BECAUSE OF THE COMMUNISTS' REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE ARTICLE 85, GPW.

Rationale: Failure on the part of the USPW to understand Communist reservations to Article 85, GPW, might cost him his protection under the Conventions and place him in a war criminal status subject to the criminal laws of the captor nation.

#20. (#2y & z) THE U.S. SOLDIER SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED ON THE EXPLOITIVE AIMS OF THE COMMUNIST POWERS.

Rationale: In order to resist the exploitive aims of the Communists captor, the USPW must be able to recognize what form the exploitation is taking. He must also be aware of the detrimental effect such exploitation might have upon himself and upon the policies of his country. The concepts of military, political, economic, propaganda, and subversive exploitation; and the ramifications of each must be fully explained.

SECTION VI: (U) SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS

1. GENERAL:

a. This section provides the results of the analysis of Communist Management Principles in as concise a form as possible.

b. The findings given below are the basis for the subsequent Conclusions and Recommendations found in Chapter 7, this Study.

2. FINDINGS:

a. The Communists consider the prisoner of war as an instrument to further their political/military goals and to influence world opinion. They exploit PW's to manufacture propaganda supporting their cause and respond quickly, though not always positively to efforts of influential international organizations. They have had significant success in attaining this exploitation.

b. There is a distinct similarity to the manner in which Communist countries handle prisoners of war. Differences in treatment are due more to prisoner population and availability of internment facilities than to ethnic/cultural backgrounds of captor states. The key, however, is that there are specific and identifiable managment principles upon which Communist states rely to accomplish their exploitation goals.

c. Environmental control is the key to the Communist management of prisoners of war. Intense interrogation, unrelenting indoctrination, isolation, selective segregation, and manipulation of food, medicine and mail all create a depressing and debilitating atmosphere in which the will to resist is gradually eroded. Psychological pressures are used to a far greater extent than physical abuse.

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CHAPTER 3

NATIONAL/DOD POLICY (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. The purpose of this chapter is to review the historical development of national policy and discuss the principal means by which that policy is revealed, specifically the 1949 Geneva Conventions and relevant DOD directives. The latter establish requirements for Department of the Army. These requirements are identified in a later segment of this study.

2. (U) GENERAL. National policy is sometimes vague. It is created by statements, written or oral, by members of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of the government. It is solidified by passage of public law or governmental department directives. For the purposes of this study, the substantive guidance on national policy concerning prisoners of war is found in US ratification of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and issuance of Department of Defense memoranda.

3. (U) CHAPTER ORGANIZATION: This chapter is divided into four sections.

a. The first section starting on page 3-3, deals at length with the evolvement of U.S. national policy on PW matters. It covers the goals of that policy and the international agreements which the United States has entered in to as an outward manifestation of its policy.

b. The second section, beginning on page 3-41, discusses the specific Department of Defense memorandums and directives which provide guidance to the four services on prisoner of war related programs.

c. The third section beginning on page 3-51, enunciates specific requirements generated by national and Department of Defense policies which must be adequately satisfied by Army doctrine for captured/detained personnel.

d. The last section on page 3-57 presents the significant findings identified through the analysis of current national and Department of Defense policies.

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SECTION I: (U) NATIONAL POLICY

1. INTRODUCTION:

a. Within this section the following areas are addressed:

(1) The historical considerations that have promoted the development of American prisoners of war doctrine.

(2) The evolution of prisoner of war doctrine spanning the period from WW II to the Pueblo incident. More recent and pervasive in its impact, the war in Vietnam is dealt with throughout all sections of this chapter.

(3) Those concepts and procedures constituting existing US prisoner of war policy.

(4) An evaluation of the effectiveness of current US doctrine in meeting the challenges of Communist management techniques for prisoners of war.

(5) Future trends in the field of national prisoner of war policy.

b. Presented in Appendix L is a discussion of the role played by those segments of society less structured in their relation to prisoner of war issues. Included is an examination and evaluation of the role and effectiveness of organizations operative on the international level, specifically the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross; the activities and intentions of private organizations operative on the domestic level; and the significance of public opinion, both domestic and international, in its function as an expression of sentiment impacting on prisoner of war policy. These roles are analyzed in the context of their impact in the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts.

2. GOALS OF US PRISONER OF WAR POLICY:

a. Current USPW policy is based on a series of positions, procedures, and attitudes adopted to attain goals which are in the national interest and which have developed as results of the US involvement and relations with other countries. The national interests are the primary bases upon which war aims or goals are grounded and thus, by extension, are primary bases for a PW program. The US prisoner of war program comprises three general areas.[1]

(1) Those aspects of prisoner of war policy that relate to the US program in its entirety. These aspects encompass six broad concepts:

(a) To obtain adequate treatment for PW's.

(b) To establish clear lines of authority and responsibility on the national level and within the defense establishment for a program that includes captured US and enemy personnel.

(c) To gain positive public support for the PW program of the United States.

(d) To gain world support for the US position in its interpretation of the Geneva Conventions.

(e) To persuade nonsignatories of the Geneva Convention to become signatories.

(f) To provide a means by which captured personnel are permitted an option with respect to repatriation.

(2) Those goals pertaining specifically to the USPW program:

(a) Provide for the protection and humane treatment of captured US personnel.

(b) Improve the ability of the US serviceman to fight the enemy, resist capture and, if captured, to resist the enemy while in captivity, to include training and indoctrination in evasion, escape, and survival.

(c) Provide a unified and purposeful standard of conduct for USPW's.

(d) Promote morale, esprit de corps, discipline, and strengthen character, citizenship, and faith in the United States.

(3) These goals pertaining to US Enemy Prisoners of War (USEPW) Policy:

(a) Provide for the protection and humane treatment of captured enemy personnel.

(b) Encourage defection and weaken the will of the enemy to resist capture.

(c) Provide for timely and maximum intelligence exploitation of captured enemy personnel.

(d) Establish an educational, vocational training, and information program for captured enemy personnel.

(e) Establish a coordinated PW program for captured enemy personnel in combined operations.

b. From the three general areas discussed, the substance of US doctrine can be reduced to the following two propositions: (1) the United States through the principle of reciprocity attempts to provide standards for the humane treatment and protection of its nationals in enemy custody as provided for in recognized international law, and (2) the United States by observing such standards of PW treatment and confinement seeks to fulfill, on the basis of its own merits, elementary concepts of humane and civilized conduct of relations between states and individuals. Thus, it is evident that the principal concern of US policy is to attempt to persuade hostile nations detaining US personnel to provide treatment and protection in accordance with the provisions of international law and custom, primarily the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Furthermore, the principal--perhaps the only--method to bring about such a situation is by providing prisoners of war of hostile nations with the kind of treatment and protection the United States desires for its own.

3. EVOLUTION OF US PRISONER OF WAR POLICY:

a. General:

(1) During periods of US involvement in armed conflicts, national policies inevitably change due to events and shifting of national goals. The process of policy revision applies as much to prisoner of war matters as it does to all other areas of policy expression. Shifts in this area reflect reevaluation of national objectives in light of significant international and domestic developments.

(2) Equally important are changes in policy which reflect popular attitudes and the pressures of public sentiment. Normally, any response to these influences vis-a-vis international pressures develops more slowly and thus has a delayed impact. For these reasons, when dealing with areas of national interest, it is difficult to speak in terms of the constant and absolute, except in those areas firmly rooted in the nation's culture and heritage.

(3) Due to the historical fluctuations which have occurred in forming and implementing PW policy, it is worthwhile to conduct a survey of past policy formulation. By examining past goals and procedures and their effect on the treatment accorded PW's, it may be determined if former policy positions will have current application.

(4) For the most part, present US doctrine with regard to PW's and other detained personnel is basically applicable to situations arising during modern times. As such, it is unnecessary to review policy evaluation beyond the period of WW II, for the mainsprings of US policy have been developed in great measure during WW II and the period immediately thereafter.

b. The 1929 Geneva Conventions and World War II:

(1) At the commencement of US involvement in World War II, USPW policy remained similar to policies pursued during World War I. Throughout the 1917-1918 period of hostilities, the United States had scrupulously adhered to the principles expressed in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1906. These agreements codified existing international law and custom regulating the conduct of war on land and reaffirmed standards of naval warfare enumerated by earlier international treaties.

(2) While the United States considered such international accords as recognized standards for the conduct of warfare and the treatment of prisoners of war, it never regarded the Conventions as legally binding upon itself. The Adjutant General, US Army, in a letter dated 19 January 1918 stated: "While neither the Hague nor the Geneva Convention is recognized by the US government as binding in the present war, the principles thereof are being followed."[2]

(3) In 1929 representatives of 46 nations convened at Geneva to rectify the inherent faults of earlier agreements for the regulation of hostilities. The draft conventions for the meeting were prepared by the International Law Association and the International Red Cross. From their efforts, the 1929 Geneva Conventions emerged. Included among them was the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

(4) The treaty was designed to resolve the uncertainties regarding the status and treatment of war prisoners arising from the confusion of practices which existed during World War I. The treaty was initially signed by 33 nations and by the outbreak of World War II had been ratified by France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States among the great

powers. The net effect of the 1929 Geneva PW Convention was an effort to prevent indignities being heaped upon enemy soldiers simply because they suffered the misfortune of being captured.

(5) When World War II began, there existed at long last a legally binding convention that all signatories were committed to observe. However, difficulties soon arose with respect to nonsignatories. Neither Russia nor Japan were bound by the 1929 Geneva PW Convention. Russia had not signed and Japan had not ratified.

(6) The 1929 Geneva PW Convention was a treaty ratified by Congress; therefore, it was the "law of the land." As such, it became the principal guide followed by the US War Department in administering the USPW program during World War II. The provisions of the Convention were promulgated through Army regulations and directives which set forth in great detail and with much precision the procedures to be followed in the handling of enemy prisoners.

(7) Even at this stage of policy formulation, the US envisioned the application of the concept of reciprocity of PW treatment. The United States regarded application of the provisions of the Convention to enemy PW's as the most effective way of insuring the same considerate treatment for American soldiers in the hands of the enemy. The United States abided by the 1929 Geneva PW Convention in virtually all respects throughout World War II. Such a position was regarded not only as a treaty obligation and thus legally incumbent upon the United States; observance was also felt to be an expression of humanitarian principles to which the United States had consistently adhered.

(8) When war was declared, the US State Department, as the government agency ultimately responsible for PW matters, requested the Swiss government to inform hostile states that the United States would comply with the Geneva Prisoner of War and Red Cross Conventions of 1929. In order to maintain the support of world opinion favorable to the United States, American treatment of enemy PW's was firm and correct, entirely in accord with the Convention.

(9) In theaters of operations, the policies and procedures of the 1929 GPW were similar to those applied in the United States for enemy PW's detained there. As a general summation of USPW policy during World War II, the Assistant Provost Marshal General in testimony before the House Committee on Military Affairs in November 1944 stated: "We do not coddle prisoners of war, but we treat them fairly and firmly."[3]

(10) The protection and humane treatment accorded American PW's during World War II reflects more than anything else the two types of

enemies the United States was fighting: the Occidental on the one hand, and the Oriental on the other. Generally speaking, American prisoners captured by Germany and Italy were accorded essentially correct and adequate treatment. There were exceptions, of course--the Malmedy Massacre of 86 unarmed USPW's by German troops on 17 December 1944, for example. For the most part, however, treatment of American PW's in the European theater of operations was generally consonant with the provisions of the 1929 GPW. The protection and treatment under the Japanese, on the other hand, were totally different matters. It is estimated that of the total number of American PW's interned during the war, 40.3 percent died while under Japanese control as contrasted with 1.1 percent that died in captivity in Germany and Italy.[4]

(11) There was a vivid contrast not only in standards of confinement of PW's by Germany and Japan, but also in the Axis states' attitude toward other aspects of the 1929 Geneva PW convention and other elements of international law. Throughout World War II the US State Department conducted negotiations with enemy states concerning treatment and exchange procedures for PW's through the intermediacy of neutral nations, most often Sweden and Switzerland.

(12) The United States and Germany mutually agreed to exchange sick and wounded PW's and some sanitation personnel on several occasions. Germany agreed to the admission of Swiss Red Cross observers to inspect the conditions of most prison camps. Furthermore, the exchange of Red Cross parcels to USPW's was permitted by German authorities.

(13) There was a far lesser degree of success in communication of PW matters with the Japanese government. There were only two minor exchanges of sick and wounded PW's with Japanese forces.[5] The Japanese permitted exchange of mail, relief supplies, and parcels, but only after lengthy and tedious negotiation.

c. War Crimes Trials:

(1) Throughout the war, the Allies issued formal warning that those who violated the recognized standards of warfare would be brought to justice soon after the termination of hostilities. Following the cessation of hostilities, the victorious Allies convened a series of war crimes trials designed to pronounce judgment on members of the German and Japanese governments and armed forces allegedly demonstrating complicity in violations of the established laws of war. The establishment of such tribunals was predicated on the proposition that acts committed in violation of fundamental laws of war generally recognized by the international community were punishable as war crimes.

(2) In the Asian theater of operations, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established to prefer charges against individuals of the Japanese government and its armed forces. The tribunal defined its jurisdiction and legality in terms laid down by the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945. After determining grounds for charges, the Tribunal brought indictments against 28 defendents, later reduced to 25, all of whom were subsequently convicted.[6]

(3) The most significant of the war crimes trials were those conducted by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) which convened at Nuremberg, Germany, on 20 November 1945. Established by the Allies to weigh the actions of officials of the German nation, the tribunal functioned pursuant to an agreement signed in London in August 1945, by representatives of the United States, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and 19 other states. The tribunal brought charges against the defendants on three categories of offenses for which there was to be individual responsibility:

(a) Crimes against peace--the planning and waging of an aggressive war.

(b) Crimes against humanity, specifically genocide.

(c) War crimes--brutality and atrocities committed against PW's or civilians. Of 24 former Nazi leaders against whom indictments were lodged, 22 were actually tried and all but 3 were convicted. Of those against whom guilty verdicts were returned, punishment ranged from the death penalty (12) to some period of imprisonment (7).[7]

(4) In preparing for the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, it was anticipated that a major plea of the defense would be that of obedience to superior orders. Thus, Article 8 of the charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated, "The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires."[8]

(5) From the Nuremberg Trials emerged the following precedent, vitally important to international law and of particular consequence to PW matters, both United States and international. In effect, the trials established that an individual acting pursuant to the orders of a superior or of his government is not relieved from the responsibility for his actions, providing the individual is aware such orders are illegal.

(6) The traditional legal doctrine had been to place culpability for violation of laws of war, or for unacceptable activities on the battlefield, upon the superior who had ordered the commission of such criminal actions rather than upon the subordinate who actually carried out the orders. The tribunal at Nuremberg firmly established the precedent as an integral part of the laws of war, incorporating it into the body of international law on the subject.

(7) Provisions similar to that in the Nuremberg Charter were included in the charters and regulations of the Tokyo Tribunal and of the various national military tribunals of the Allied Powers. Further, the opinions of the IMT both on defense of superior orders and on military necessity were upheld by the Nuremberg courts. The Tokyo Tribunals also upheld these opinions.

(8) Upon the United States, as the dominant power among the Allies, evolved the ultimate responsibility for the conception and execution of the Nuremberg trials and the precedents it established for the conduct of warfare. Some years later the North Vietnamese declared their intention to bring US pilots to trial for alleged war crimes on the basis of precedents established at Nuremberg. In the context of this evaluation there are three principles of law applicable as a result of Nuremberg:

(a) War criminals may be brought to justice for their crimes.

(b) The plea of superior orders will not always be a defense against prosecution.

(c) The categories of offenses established at Nuremberg--crimes against peace (aggressive war), crimes against humanity (genocide), and war crimes (murder of prisoners)--are retained.

(9) Basically, North Vietnam claims that the United States has committed a crime against peace ("aggressive war in Vietnam and bombing North Vietnam"), that USPW's have committed crimes against peace ("participating in an aggressive war and bombing or attacking North Vietnam"), that USPW's have committed war crimes ("bombing innocent civilians and hospitals") and therefore, in accordance with North Vietnamese reservations to Article 85 of the Geneva PW Convention, the United States and USPW's are alleged war criminals and should be tried for their crimes.

(10) The validity of this position depends upon the actual facts, and the United States and North Vietnam have different

viewpoints on what the actual facts are. By their view of the facts, the North Vietnamese are acting within and in accordance with the Nuremberg principles. In summary, the Nuremberg principles apply to any international conflict and as such give the color of legality to North Vietnamese actions, until the factual bases are determined.[9]

d. The 1949 Geneva Conventions:

(1) The excesses of the Second World War dramatized the necessity of clarifying regulations concerning war victims and of rectifying the inadequacies of international law in light of the new weapons technology arising from World War II. From April to August 1949 a diplomatic conference for the revision of the 1929 Geneva Conventions was convened in Geneva.

(2) From the conference emerged four treaties, called collectively 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims. Three of these conventions were revisions of earlier international agreements dealing with similar subjects. They are: the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, the Geneva Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The fourth convention--the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War--was completely new and was designed to minimize, to the greatest possible extent, the suffering of civilians caught in the turbulence of modern warfare.

(3) The Conventions and their applicability, particularly the 1949 Geneva PW Convention, will be discussed when examining the components of existing US policy on prisoners of war. For the purposes of this historical survey, suffice it to say that the 1949 Conventions--signed by the US representative at the conference but not yet ratified at the outbreak of the Korean War--was to form the foundation of all future US policy in the field of PW management.

e. Korea:

(1) At the opening of hostilities in Korea on 25 June 1950, none of the belligerents had ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions. By 15 July 1950, the United States and both North and South Korea had indicated their willingness to observe the principles and procedures of the Conventions, though none of the states were yet party to them. The General Assembly of the United Nations took the position that the GPW

should be applicable to the Korean situation. In September 1950, General MacArthur announced that he had extended these principles to all members of the UN command.[10]

(2) As was described in the previous chapter on Communist Management Principles, the Communist forces during the Korean conflict paid scant attention to the Geneva PW Convention. In comparison with standards of prisoner treatment and confinement exhibited by Communist forces during the Korean conflict, those established by the UN Command were for the most part in strict observance of the Geneva PW Convention. UN standards were humane and reasonably just in application, though at times subject to the exigencies of the combat environment.

(3) Though initially the United Nations considered itself the detaining power for all enemy prisoners of war (EPW), effectively, control rested with the United States. The State Department concluded that the net result of the immediate presence and predominance of US Forces in the enforcement operation was to render the United States the equivalent of the detaining power under GPW, though some authorities have disputed this position.[11] As such, the United States assumed responsibility for EPW affairs during the Korean conflict and made strenuous efforts to keep North Korean and Chinese PW's secure, safe, and healthy.

(4) During the initial phases of the war the military situation was precarious with UN contingents being hard-pressed by North Korean Forces. During this time logistical and personnel difficulties often resulted in inadequate conditions, such as poor shelter and inadequate rations, for Communist PW's. Following the Inchon landings and the Chinese intervention, increasing numbers of PW's threatened to overtax existing detention facilities located around the Pusan area. Aggravating the situation even further were the large number of civilian internees, the lack of sufficient internment facilities, and the limited number of trained troops of member nations (of the UN command) for administrative and guard duty.

(5) By May of 1951 the military situation had somewhat stabilized. As a result, most EPW's had been moved to Koje-do, a small island off the southern coast of Korea, where the extent and quality of facilities greatly improved conditions. Despite such efforts, overcrowded conditions and the consequent lack of adequate control of PW activities continued to plague efforts to achieve stability in PW operation. At the same time, incomplete segregation of those PW's favorable to the Communist cause and those elements opposed precipitated a struggle for internal control of the compounds. After a period of continuing unrest and active resistance

to UN control, widespread fighting and violence broke out between PW's and UN camp personnel. The insurrections were finally put down through harsh measures imposed by UN security elements brought in from operational areas.

(6) Throughout the Korean conflict, representatives of the International Red Cross were accorded virtually unrestrained access to UN command detention compounds. As has been noted, during brief periods early in the war the enforcement of certain standards was occasionally lax due to the priorities of the battle front. For the most part, however, the reports of impartial authorities were highly favorable to the effect that the Geneva Conventions were being closely followed with as great a degree of success as could reasonably be expected.

(7) A study of the history of PW treatment during the Korean War and an analysis of attitudes regarding international law on PW matters during that conflict reveal a record of, on the whole, mixed and disappointing results. On the one hand, an examination of Communist management techniques for PW's produces a dismal record of atrocities, calculated indoctrination, and unrelenting exploitation of prisoners of war. Such methods ascribed to both North Korean and Chinese Forces evidence a certain disregard of standards of international law and custom as embodied in the 1949 Geneva PW Convention and of elementary concepts of morality and decency. On the other hand, the quality of treatment and the standards of confinement of Communist PW's presents an altogether different and much more satisfactory picture. Despite overcrowded conditions in some camps, detention facilities were apparently quite adequate. Ration and clothing issues and privileges granted PW's received the approval of numerous inspection authorities. In any event such treatment of EPW's by UN Forces failed to bring about reciprocal treatment towards UN PW's by Communist forces and in this respect PW treatment during the Korean conflict was highly disappointing.

(8) US prisoner of war operations during the Korean conflict and the relative success of the United States in applying the 1949 Geneva PW Convention fairly and uniformly were somewhat hampered by two constraints on US action.

(a) Throughout the war the question of the possession of ultimate authority on PW matters was never entirely resolved. The United States contributed the most substantial presence of the allied forces, while, technically, the enforcement operation was a function of the United Nations. As a direct result of such uncertainty the United States found itself utilizing military forces of South Korea for detention camp security and for personnel functions within the camps.

Such measures contributed in great measure to an atmosphere of resentment and friction within the compounds.

(b) A further matter of concern was the disturbing realization that even after capture Communist soldiers continued by intrigue and open violence to resist their captors. International law, as represented by the 1949 Geneva PW Convention, did not contemplate an openly hostile contest between captor and captive. If such practices should recur in any future conflict, many of the humanitarian provisions of the 1949 PW Convention would become difficult to implement.

f. Code of Conduct:

(1) During the Korean War, policy encompassing standards of conduct for US military personnel detained by the enemy was embodied, for the most part, in the Articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. From the experience of US prisoners of war, however, it became evident that the UCMJ was inadequate to meet the Communist threat.

(2) The conduct of a relatively small number of individuals detained by the Communists fell short of desired national and military standards, and resulted in national reflection on the adequacy of existing Army PW training in such areas as survival and behavior during captivity. Furthermore, the likelihood that a future Communist adversary would adopt similar techniques in its PW management program, posed clear and unmistakable challenges to the thrust of USPW doctrine.

(3) In light of the experience of USPW's during the Korean conflict it became apparent that a clearcut, uniformly understood policy on PW conduct did not exist. To evaluate existing PW-related training programs, the Secretary of Defense on 17 May 1955, appointed an Advisory Committee on PW's with the responsibility to make recommendations for revised training and personnel practices and to devise new standards for PW conduct. As a result of the activities of the committee, strong changes were made to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of armed forces training and education programs in the PW field.

(4) Furthermore, the members of the committee agreed that the threat posed by Communist PW management methods required a unified and purposeful standard of conduct for American prisoners of war "to reaffirm the duties, responsibilities, and code of conduct required of United States personnel in the hands of the enemy."[12]

(5) On 17 August 1955, President Eisenhower promulgated the Code of Conduct for the US Armed Forces as the definitive statement for

those standards of conduct guiding members of the Armed Forces during combat or captivity. A detailed analysis and evaluation of the Code of Conduct is presented in the next chapter of this study. For now, it is sufficient to recognize that just as the Geneva Convention constitutes the foundation of US foreign policy toward prisoners of war, the Code of Conduct presents the recognized standards of military conduct.

g. The Pueblo Incident:

(1) Following the termination of hostilities after the Korean Armistice, USPW doctrine remained one of relative stability. It remained so at least until the Pueblo incident. The seizure of the US Navy intelligence ship, the USS Pueblo, 23 January 1968, marked a period of uncertainty and indecision in the application of established standards for conduct during periods of detention.

(2) The United States contended that regardless of the circumstances of seizure, the crew was entitled to the protection of customary international law applicable to detainees. At the same time there was apparently little effort by the United States to contend that the provisions of the 1949 Geneva PW Convention regarding prisoners of war was strictly applicable to the situation. The confusion was created by our strict interpretation that the Geneva PW Convention was applicable only to situations involving mutual belligerency between states. Based on this interpretation and the fact that no such state existed between the United States and North Korea at the time, the United States was reluctant to claim protection lest it imply a state of war actually existed. In such circumstances, the North Korean action could only be considered an isolated act of hostility and not an instance of hostile contact normal during a state of belligerency.

(3) It has been observed that, "in the Pueblo case, the United States was reluctant to characterize the seizure of the vessel as having taken place in time of war, since it was in the political interest of the country to maintain that peacetime conditions had been restored between the United States and North Korea. To concede the continuance of a state of war could have led to prolonged detention of the Pueblo prisoners and might have formed the basis for a resumption of hostilities by the North Korean Forces on the grounds that the United States by violating the armistice through the intrusion of the Pueblo, had itself indicated hostilities."[13] As a result, in response to the brutal behavior exhibited by the North Koreans in every aspect of the captivity of the Pueblo crew, the United States could only resort to the customary rules of international law and had no recourse to the standards of detention stipulated by the Geneva PW Convention.

(4) Though strictly speaking not a matter of concern for this chapter and to be discussed elsewhere in the study, further hindering the efficiency of US policy was disagreement over the applicability of the Code of Conduct to the behavior of the Pueblo crew under the pressures of confinement and indoctrination. It is the view of Commander Bucher that the Code of Conduct has no applicability in situations of the order of the experiences of the Pueblo crew. It is his contention that the absence of hostilities equivalent to a state of war constitutes sufficient ground to question the applicability of the Code. There is evidence that this proposition was once shared to some extent by the Department of the Navy.[14] The Department, however, subsequently adopted the position that the standards of the Code were indeed applicable.

4. COMPONENTS OF EXISTING USPW POLICY:

a. General:

(1) The goals of US prisoner of war policy as examined in Section II provide the conceptual framework of PW doctrine. Within these goals are the components which constitute present US policy in the field of prisoners of war. This section focuses primarily on the 12 August 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). This treaty effectively constitutes the cornerstone of US policy in the area of PW treatment. In addition, it and its three companion conventions further constitute most of the recognized international law governing the treatment of individuals during armed conflict.

(2) This review also examines the question of enforced repatriation or asylum for prisoners of war during or after hostilities. In a historical survey of US repatriation policy, specific attention is devoted to questions arising during WW II and the Korean conflict.

b. The Geneva Conventions of 1949:

(1) The most fundamental of all approaches adopted by the United States relating to prisoners of war lies in the principle that this nation adheres to the humanitarian concepts embodied in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.[15] Throughout its history, the United States has taken pains to comply with recognized international law and custom governing the conduct of hostilities between states. The United States has considered such a position desirable for several reasons:

(a) Such actions are morally and legally incumbent upon the United States.

(b) Such policy is in the national interest of the United States, to insure its standing within the international community.

(c) Meticulous compliance with standards of international law by its forces may provide added motivation to enemy states to provide similar humane treatment to USPW's.

(2) Concern for the welfare and safety of prisoners of war has caused the United States to give either official or tacit approval to internationally recognized agreements. The origin of USPW policy first emerged from the Civil War with the promulgation of General Order 100--the Lieber Code--the predecessor to the great conventions to follow.

(3) In 1949 representatives from 61 nations, including the United States, convened in Geneva, Switzerland, to devise solutions to the legal problems involved in modern warfare. On 12 August 1949, the conference completed its efforts and presented four agreements--called conventions--designed to provide more humane standards of treatment for both military personnel and civilians in time of war. These conventions were intended to do away with as much bloodshed and suffering as can be avoided by warring nations without lessening the chances of victory or increasing the likelihood of defeat for any of the participants.

(4) Four in number, "The Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims" have been acceded to by most of the nations of the world including the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other Communist states. Both North and South Vietnam are parties to the covenants. In July 1955 the US Senate gave its advice and consent to the President's ratification and the Conventions came into force for this country--and thus became binding on our Armed Forces--on 2 February 1956.

(5) Of the four conventions, three are revisions of earlier international agreements and treaties--dating back perhaps a hundred years--on the restrictions governing the conduct of war. The first two of these are the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, and the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. These two enumerate standards of care and protection and define the procedures to be observed in dealing with military personnel incapacitated in land and sea environments, respectively. The Conventions specify treatment and facilities to be accorded such personnel and the rights and privileges extended to them and to those responsible for their welfare, such as chaplains and medical authorities.

(6) The third of the revised Conventions, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, is the "heart" of our national policy. Due to its singular importance, it is dealt with in considerable detail below.

(7) The fourth Convention, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, is an entirely new treaty having no direct predecessor in previous treaties restricting conduct of forces during warfare. Its purpose was to minimize the suffering of civilians caught in the turbulence and violence of conflict.

c. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW):[16] The key to this study is a clear understanding of the basic precepts of the GPW for they represent the standards by which the United States insists its USPW's be treated. It is for this reason that the following discussion on the GPW far exceeds in depth the discussion of the other three conventions. Four principal roles are addressed: the PW himself, the Detaining Power, the Protecting Power, and the PW Representative.

(1) The Prisoner of War:

(a) General. The Geneva PW Convention protects a prisoner of war from the very moment of his capture until his final release and repatriation. However, not every person who falls into the hands of opposing armed forces qualifies as a prisoner of war. Past wars did not present significant PW classification problems. Most captives wore uniforms and were plainly identifiable as members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. This is still generally true in conventional war situations although the situation is obviously greatly complicated in unconventional and guerrilla environments. It is in this context that a great many problems have arisen for US policy in Vietnam.

(b) Definition of PW's.[17] Article 4 of the PW Convention sets forth the categories of individuals who are entitled as a matter of right to treatment as prisoners of war and to the protection of the Convention. Such individuals may be grouped generally into two classes, military and civilian.

1. Military personnel who are entitled to the protection of the 1949 Geneva PW Convention are classified into the following categories:

a. Members of the Armed Forces of a Party to the Conflict. This is the most obvious and the principal group.

constituting as it does the regular, uniformed members of a nation's military forces. (Commando's and airborne troops are included in this category.)

b. Members of Resistance Movement. Following the confusion which existed during World War II as to the status of Free French Forces operating on the continent, the 1949 PW Convention sought to clarify the position of such forces. It was done in a manner which would give adequate protection to the regular forces of belligerent against irregular forces which attack them. First, resistance movements were classified as militias and corps of volunteers not "forming part of the armed forces" party to the conflict. Second the members of resistance movements are required to have certain distinctive characteristics identifying their para-military status.

c. Members of Regular Armed Forces of Governments Not Recognized By the Detaining Power. The distinguishing feature of such armed forces from either militia or other regular armed forces is simply the fact that in the view of their adversary, they are not operating under the direct authority of a party to the conflict in accordance with Article 2 of the Convention.

d. Military Personnel Interned in Neutral Countries. Article 4 gives military personnel interned in neutral countries the protection of the Convention thereby defining the status which they shall be accorded. This category intentionally excludes prisoners who have escaped from PW camps and who have fled to neutral countries. The situation of the escaping PW who gains entrance to a neutral country is to be distinguished from the situation in which a neutral country receives bodies of troops on its soil who are fleeing in order to escape capture. The neutral is permitted to intern troops.

e. Demobilized Soldiers. Article 4 covers a category not formally included in international law; i.e., demobilized soldiers in occupied territory who are arrested by the Occupying Power because of their membership in the Army of the occupied country.

2. Civilian personnel captured during hostilities and entitled to the protection of the 1949 Geneva PW Convention are grouped into the following categories:

a. Civilians Accompanying the Forces. This group includes but is not limited to civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, and members of labor units, or Services responsible for the welfare of armed forces personnel. These

organizations must have received authorizations from the armed forces which they accompany and possess an identity card evidence to that effect.

b. Civilian Crews of Ships and Aircraft. As a result of the experiences in World War II, it was deemed preferable to treat members of Merchant Marine crews falling into enemy hands as prisoners of war, rather than as civilian internees. It was considered advisable to add the crews of civil aircraft and to reserve to both the most favorable treatment which might be accorded them by virtue of other stipulations of international law.

c. Levee En Masse. A levee en masse is a group of civilians who spontaneously rise up to resist an invader. Time has not permitted their incorporation into the regular armed force, their procurement of a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, or in many cases, their command by a person responsible for his subordinates. However, to be afforded the protection of the convention they must bear their arms openly and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

(2) Rights of PW's and Obligations of the Detaining Power:

(a) General:

1. As well as categorizing the groups eligible for the protection of the 1949 PW convention, the articles of the Convention stipulate standards for treatment and confinement of prisoners of war. One of the most significant provisions of the Convention is stated at the outset: "Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention . . ." (Article 7).

2. A PW may not be requested, induced, or forced to give up any of his rights. Even if he wants to do so, he cannot waive any of these rights. Furthermore, a party of the Convention may not lawfully deprive its personnel or the personnel of any other party to the Convention, by special agreement or otherwise, of the rights and privileges to which they are entitled under the Convention.

3. Generally speaking, the 1949 PW Convention provides that prisoners of war must under all circumstances be treated humanely, without adverse distinction based on race, color, religious belief, or similar criteria. The murder, mutilation, or torture of a prisoner of war is a serious violation of the Convention.

4. Prisoners may not be humiliated or degraded in any way. They must be protected against all acts of violence, insults, public curiosity and reprisals of any kind. Women captives must be accorded treatment at least as favorable as that granted to male prisoners and must be treated with all regard due their sex.

(b) Rights, Privileges, Obligations:

1. There is an obvious need for some communication between captives and captors. Upon capture, a prisoner is required by the Convention to give his name, rank, service number, and date of birth, all of which serve to establish his identity. A prisoner is obliged to give this information, and failure to do so may render him liable to a loss of privileges due him by reason of his rank or status.

2. All effects and articles of personal use--except arms, military equipment, and military documents--are to remain in possession of the prisoner, according to the Convention. Articles issued for his personal protection, such as gas masks, metal helmets, and like articles, may also be retained by him. Also, a prisoner's clothing and mess/gear, his insignia of rank or nationality, and his decorations, as well as any articles of sentimental value may not be taken away from him. Further, only officers may order money or valuables to be taken from prisoners, and in all such cases receipts must be given.

(c) Humane Treatment Prescribed. Article 13 of the Convention prescribes that prisoners of war be treated humanely at all times and expressly forbids treatment that would cause the death or seriously endanger the health of a prisoner of war. Under the Convention no physical or mental torture, or any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners to obtain any kind of information from them and no unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment may be meted out for a refusal to answer. All prisoners of war must be questioned in a language which they understand.

(d) Movement of PW's. Evacuation of prisoners of war from the battle areas must be carried out as swiftly, safely, and as humanely as possible. While awaiting such movement, prisoners must not be exposed to danger unnecessarily. When prisoners are transferred from one camp to another they must be permitted to take their personal effects with them and be provided with necessary food, potable water, clothing, and medical attention during the transfer. All transit or screening camps through which prisoners pass on their way to permanent installations must meet the same general requirements as those for a permanent internment camp.

(e) Basic Rights:

1. Internment Camps. The Geneva Convention prescribes that prisoners of war "may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness." The Convention also provides that no prisoner may be kept in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations. The detaining power must let the other side know the location of PW camps. They must be marked, when military considerations permit, with letters large enough to be seen clearly from the air. Prisoners must be assembled in camps or compounds according to nationality, language, and customs, but they may not be separated from the prisoners of the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of the capture, except with their consent. The Convention declared that "prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the detaining power who are billeted in the same area." Allowance is made for "the habits and customs of the prisoners." In no case may camp conditions be permitted to become dangerous to prisoners' health. Food must be "sufficient in quantity, quality, and variety" to keep the prisoners in good health, without loss in weight. In addition the detaining power is required by the Convention to take account of the habitual diet of prisoners. Prisoners must be provided with adequate messhalls and kitchens where they may assist in the preparation of their own food. The captor must also furnish prisoners with sufficient safe drinking water, and allow them to use tobacco if they wish. Restrictions on food as a form of mass punishment are forbidden.

2. Clothing. The Detaining Power must provide clothing, underwear, and footwear, as well as regular replacement and repair of these articles. If possible clothing should be taken from stocks of uniforms captured from the prisoners' own forces. Work clothing must also be provided. Allowance should be made for the climate of the region where prisoners are detained.

3. Canteens. Every camp is required under the Convention to set up a "canteen" for prisoners, where they can buy "foodstuffs, soap and tobacco, and ordinary articles in daily use" at prices no higher than those charged civilians in the area. Any profits are to be used "for the benefit of the prisoners."

4. Health and Medical Care. To assure at least a minimum standard of health, the Convention includes detailed provisions for the health and medical needs of prisoners. Camps must include adequate latrines, showers, and laundry facilities. The captor "shall

be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to insure cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics." Every camp, says the Convention, "shall have an adequate infirmary" where ailing prisoners may be treated, preferably by captured medical personnel of their own forces. A regular sick call must be maintained. Regular medical inspections must be held at least once a month. These must include periodic X-ray examinations for tuberculosis and tests for other infectious and contagious diseases, especially malaria and venereal disease. Costs of treatment are to be borne by the captors.

5. Religious, Recreational, and Intellectual Activities. Prisoners must be permitted to enjoy the right to practice their own religion, including attendance at services of their faith. The Convention says the provision must be made for physical exercise, including outdoor sports and games. It also required that intellectual and educational activities be encouraged. Captured medical personnel and chaplains--who are designated in the Convention as "retained personnel" are not considered to be prisoners of war. They must be allowed to carry on their normal work for the benefit of prisoners. Although they remain subject to the discipline of the camp, medics and chaplains cannot be required to perform any work other than the duties of their profession. They are instead expected to remain free to visit prisoners inside or outside enclosures. Chaplains in particular are guaranteed maximum freedom to minister to the religious needs of prisoners.

6. Mail. Recognizing that letters are the most significant link between the PW and his family, the Convention makes detailed provisions for the exchange of mail. As soon as possible after his capture, and in no case later than a week after he reaches a prisoner-of-war camp, each prisoner must be allowed to send out at least the "capture card" prescribed by the Convention, informing his family of his whereabouts and his state of health. A copy of this card is also sent to the Central Prisoners of War Information Agency, a clearing house operated by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. Whenever a prisoner is transferred to another camp or hospitalized, this agency must be notified. In addition to these routine notifications, prisoners are entitled, according to the Convention, to send at least two letters and four cards monthly, subject to some possible special restrictions. They may also receive letters and relief packages as often as such items are forwarded through neutral agencies.

7. Discipline. Military discipline continues in a prisoner-of-war camp. The Convention provides that enlisted prisoners will show officers of the Detaining Power the same customs of respect as provided in the regulations of their own forces. Officer prisoners

are required to salute higher ranking officers of the Detaining Power, and the camp commander regardless of his rank. Prisoners must be permitted to wear their own rank insignia and decorations. Every camp is required to have a copy of the Convention posted in the prisoners' own language in places where prisoners may read it. All camp notices, regulations, and orders, including orders to an individual prisoner, must always be in a language which the prisoner understands.

8. Legal Rights of PW's:

a. Generally, prisoners of war are subject to appropriate laws, regulations and orders of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, and can be punished for violating them. The Convention urges that prisoners be given the lightest possible punishment authorized for the particular violation concerned.

b. If a prisoner is charged with an offense requiring a trial, the court must be a military one--unless the offense is one for which, under the laws of the Detaining Power, a member of its own armed forces would be tried in a civil court. In other words, prisoners must be tried in the same court and according to the same procedures as members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.

c. Additional safeguards provided in the Convention include the right to counsel and the services of a competent interpreter; ample time for preparation of the defense; advance knowledge of the charges; and the right of appeal, as provided under laws of the Detaining Power applicable to its own armed forces personnel. Advance notice of the trial must be given to the Protecting Power, which is entitled to have a representative attend the proceedings.

d. No prisoner may be punished more than once for the same act or on the same charges. Regardless of the charge, the Convention provides that the prisoner may not be given a sentence more severe than a member of the Detaining Power's forces would receive for the same offense.

9. Escape. The Convention provides that a prisoner who makes good his escape by rejoining his forces or by getting out of the territory held by his enemy, and who is later recaptured is not liable to any punishment for having escaped. If, during an attempt to escape, a prisoner commits an act not involving violence to life and limb, for which his captors may take disciplinary action, the fact that he was trying to escape must not be used as an excuse to impose punishment more severe than otherwise authorized. This prohibition covers

such relatively minor offenses as forging identity papers, stealing civilian clothing, and the like. On the other hand, if he endangers someone's life or limb, more than mere disciplinary action may result, including trial and appropriate severe punishment. Even in such cases, however, no additional punishment can be given solely on grounds that the prisoner was attempting to escape. A prisoner who is recaptured before making good his escape from enemy territory is subject only to disciplinary punishment; his attempt to escape is not considered a criminal offense. Prisoners who help fellow prisoners escape shall be liable on this count only to disciplinary punishment, unless their participation includes acts of violence to life and limb.

10. The Convention lists the forms of punishment that are considered "disciplinary" and therefore suitable for minor offenses. Disciplinary punishment can include: (1) fines up to one-half the prisoner's pay for no more than 30 days, (2) withdrawal of any privileges granted beyond the treatment required by the Convention (no required privilege may be withdrawn), (3) not more than two hours a day of fatigue duty, and (4) simple confinement for not more than 30 days. Even when a prisoner is found guilty of several minor offenses in the same proceeding, the Convention limits his disciplinary punishment to not more than 30 days. If he is resentenced to another 30 days, at least 3 days must elapse between sentences. Under the Convention, only the camp commander or a camp officer named by him can sentence a prisoner to disciplinary punishment. This power cannot be given to another prisoner regardless of grade. The prisoner must be informed of the offense and given an opportunity to defend himself. He may also call witnesses to testify on his behalf. The camp commander is required to keep a record of the proceedings which must be available for inspection by representatives of the Protecting Power. Even while undergoing disciplinary punishment, a prisoner must be given medical attention. He must also be allowed at least two hours of open-air exercise each day, and time to read and write.

11. Work by Prisoners. Most PW's can be put to work by the Detaining Power--but only as long as it observes a number of restrictions laid down in the PW Convention. Officers and "persons of equivalent status" may not be compelled to work, but may request suitable work if they choose. Noncommissioned officers "shall only be required to do supervisory work" but may request other kinds of work. All working prisoners must be paid for their services. The work which prisoners may be required to perform must not be injurious to their health and cannot have any "military character or purpose." They may not be required to work when ill or in poor physical condition. In a full day of work

there must be at least an hour's break at noon. Prisoner labor is limited to a maximum of 6 days a week. Enlisted prisoners may be compelled to perform specified kinds of work, described in the Convention as: (1) administration, maintenance, and installation of the camp; (2) agriculture, (3) industries connected with raw materials and manufacturing (but not metallurgical, chemical, or machinery industries); (4) public works and construction which have no military character or purpose; (5) commercial business and arts and crafts; and (6) domestic service. The prisoners must be employed under conditions at least as favorable as those provided members of the Detaining Power's forces under comparable circumstances. Laws of the Detaining Power for the safety and protection of workers apply to prisoners of war.

12. Pay. The military pay of a prisoner of war continues while he is in captivity. Normally, his government holds it for him until his release. Under the Convention the Detaining Power is required to provide him, as a "monthly advance of pay," a stated sum which varies according to his rank.

(3) The Protecting Power:[18]

(a) General. The 1949 PW Convention establishes the requirement for a Protecting Power to inspect the condition of prisoner of war camps and to insure adequate and humane treatment as prescribed by the Convention. Generally speaking, the Protecting Power is a state selected by a party to a conflict to look after its interest either in the territory of its enemy or in its own territory which has been occupied by its enemy. The use of a Protecting Power is not an idea originating with the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Protecting Power's position in international law evolved slowly from its first beginnings but was not specifically delineated in a multilateral treaty until the 1929 Geneva PW Convention. Despite such provisions, approximately 70 percent of the prisoners of war during World War II were deprived of the services of a Protecting Power.[19] As a result, the 1949 Geneva PW Convention enlarged the duties and functions of the Protecting Power in order to enable it to supervise all the humanitarian provisions of the new convention.

(b) Selection of the Protection Power. As the term is used in the 1949 Geneva PW Conventions the Protecting Power is a state, rather than an organization or international body. It is also a neutral state. A neutral state becomes a Protecting Power by request of the parties to the conflict and its consent. A belligerent state desiring the services of a Protecting Power must first request a neutral state

to act in its behalf. If the latter is willing to assume the functions of a Protecting Power, it so notifies the requesting state. The neutral state must then obtain the permission of the Detaining Power to exercise the functions of a Protecting Power within its territory. It is easily conceivable that no neutral state or organization can be found which is acceptable to both sides. In the event no such Protecting Power or organization is functioning, two substitutes are acceptable. The first substitute is a neutral state selected unilaterally by the Detaining Power. This neutral state is not in the strict sense a Protecting Power. Its appointment is exceptional and is done so that someone may act. This substitution only takes place after all efforts have failed to obtain a mutually acceptable neutral. This substitute performs all the functions of the Protecting Power. This is not true in regard to the second substitute. In the event no neutral state is selected or has been appointed unilaterally, the International Committee of the Red Cross may offer its services which shall be accepted by the Detaining Power. The function of the ICRC in such an event only pertains to the "humanitarian functions" performed by the Protecting Power. However, at the 1971 Conference of Government Experts in Geneva, the ICRC stated it would consider all functions of the Protecting Power to be "humanitarian".

(c) Functions of the Protecting Power. References to the Protecting Power are contained in 36 of the Convention's 143 Articles. The basic charter for the Protecting Power is contained in Article 8. Convention provisions for implementing Article 8 may be divided into two general categories:

1. Provisions common to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions.

2. Provisions peculiar to the PW Convention to include:

a. Activities as an intermediary.

b. Supervision and means to facilitate supervision.

c. Activities connected with the financial resources of prisoners of war.

d. Activities connected with correspondence and relief for prisoners of war.

e. Activities of a judicial character.

f. Activities in case of transfer of prisoners of war to another Power.

g. Activities connected with Mixed Medical Commissions.

(d) The International Committee of the Red Cross:

1. The ICRC has traditionally devoted its energies to the care and protection of prisoners of war. Article 9 of the 1949 PW Convention reserves for the ICRC all the rights which that organization has enjoyed in the past. The result is that in some instances the functions of the ICRC and the Protecting Power overlap. In other instances the allocation of functions is not as clear as it might or should be. The ICRC is given the following specific rights and duties in the 1949 Convention which paralled those of the Protecting Power:

a. To act as a "substitute" for the Protecting Power when one cannot be chosen.

b. To have the right to visit any PW camp.

c. To handle relief shipments.

d. To receive communications from the PW representative.

2. The relationship is such that despite partial overlapping, the functions of the Protecting Power are fundamentally dissimilar in kind and extent from those of the ICRC. The Protecting Power is the mandatory of one or both belligerents, with competency to protect the rights and interest of the States from which it derives authority. The ICRC is concerned with humanitarian tasks, although it may also act as the substitute of the Protecting Power. Its functions are not limited to those which are guaranteed by law, but embrace such enterprises in the interests of humanity as appear essential, or which are justified through a request made by a belligerent.

(4) The Prisoner of War Representative:[20]

(a) General. The 1949 Geneva PW Convention describes basic procedures under which violations of its rules are reported to the Protecting Power or alternatively the International Committee of the Red Cross. The 1929 Geneva PW Convention was the first agreement which

outlined the duty of the prisoners' representative in regard to relief supplies for PW's and representing PW's before the Detaining Power and before the Protecting Power. The 1949 Geneva PW Convention expanded upon the former treaty by developing still further the role and function of the PW representative. At the same time it clarified further his manner of selection, his duties, and his relationship to the Detaining Power.

(b) Selection of the PW Representative. The 1949 Convention provides that in all prisoner groups containing no officer prisoner, the prisoners may freely choose their spokesman or representative by secret ballot every six months. In camps for officer prisoners, or in camps for both officer and enlisted prisoners, the Convention provides that the senior officer must be recognized as the camp's prisoners' representative. In actual practice, Detaining Powers usually have maintained separate camps for officer and enlisted personnel. An elected prisoners' representative holds his job at the pleasure of the Detaining Power, which can dismiss him as spokesman. It must file notice of such dismissal with the Protecting Power. An officer's position as spokesman, on the other hand, is not subject to approval by the Detaining Power; the Convention specifies that the senior officer holds that position.

(c) Duties of the PW Representative:

1. Article 80 provides that the prisoners' representative "shall further the physical, spiritual and intellectual well-being of the prisoners of war." On behalf of particular prisoners or all of them, the prisoners' representative may appear before the military authorities, the Protecting Power, the ICRC, and other organizations authorized to assist him.

2. The prisoners' representative is an important person. He may accomplish his task by improving the lot of prisoners of war and by insuring the proper implementation of the Convention. As a kind of "head man" among the prisoners, he can, for example, preside at their meetings and gripe sessions.

3. The PW representative cannot be required to perform any work that would interfere with his duties as spokesman, since he must be left free to visit and talk with prisoners. He may also appoint assistants. The PW representative rates access to telegraph and mail facilities for communicating with the authorities of the Detaining Power, the Protecting Power, the ICRC, mixed medical commissions, and other bodies that give assistance to prisoners of war.

4. The representative's main job is to carry complaints to the camp authorities. If he fails to get satisfaction from the camp commander, he is authorized to register the complaint with the Protecting Power. The Convention forbids the punishment of prisoners for filing complaints, even though the complaints may eventually prove to be unfounded.

5. Despite the numerous duties assigned to the PW representatives in the Convention, he is not by virtue of his position "in common" of the PW's. In order to prevent acts of PW's reflecting upon the PW representative, the representative shall not be held responsible simply because of his position for any offenses committed by PW's.

(5) Summary. The following is a summary of some of the more significant specifications contained in the PW Convention:[21]

(a) The taking of reprisals, executions without regular judgment, torture, and cruel or degrading treatment are actions prohibited against prisoners of war (Article 13).

(b) PW's must always be able to benefit from the activity of a Protecting Power or of the International Committee of the Red Cross (Articles 8-10).

(c) Military personnel and auxiliaries who are captured or who surrender must have their lives spared and at all times be treated humanely (Articles 4, 13, 14).

(d) The names of the PW's will be communicated by the capturing authority to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva (Central Tracing Agency) which will be allowed to visit them and arrange for them to receive relief (Articles 70, 72, 78, 123, 126).

(e) They must, in particular, receive the necessary food, clothing, and medical care (Articles 15 to 30).

(f) If penal sanctions are taken against prisoners for offenses committed before their capture, the ICRC (in the absence of the Protecting Power) will be so informed. It will be authorized to follow the proceedings and assist prisoners in their defense.

(g) In the event of a death penalty being pronounced, the sentence shall not be executed before the expiration of a period of six months from the date on which notification of the sentence has been made to the ICRC (Article 101).

d. Repatriation and Asylum:

(1) General. The purpose of this section is to review US policy toward repatriation and asylum in light of past actions and the provisions of the 1949 Geneva PW Convention.

(2) Repatriation During Hostilities. Repatriation of prisoners of war may occur either during or after hostilities. The repatriation of certain categories of prisoners of war during hostilities, especially wounded and sick prisoners, is specifically governed by the 1949 Geneva PW Convention. The Convention establishes procedures to process detainees to be repatriated, especially those sick or wounded, in Articles 109-116.[22] These articles establish categories of sick and wounded prisoners of war and provide general guidance for their repatriation and release.

(3) Repatriation at the Termination of Hostilities. The basic guidance in international law dealing with the question of repatriation of prisoners of war following the close of hostilities is contained in Article 118 of the 1949 Geneva PW Convention.[23] The Article provides that prisoners shall be released and repatriated without delay following the cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, in situations where in any agreement between the parties to the conflict no provisions describing the repatriation of prisoners of war are implemented, each of the Detaining Powers shall establish and execute procedures for repatriation of prisoners held under its control. Such arrangements shall be conducted in conformity with the principle laid down in the first paragraph of the Article that prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay following the end of active hostilities. Article 118 further stipulates that the "costs of repatriation of prisoners shall in all cases be equitably apportioned between the Detaining Power and the Power on which the prisoners depend." The Article then enumerates conditions governing the share of such costs in the event belligerent states to the conflict control territory in both contiguous and noncontiguous states. Finally, Article 118 insists that under no circumstances is there to be any delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war pending settlement of the financial costs of repatriation procedures.

(4) Historical Survey of US Policy on Repatriation of PW's:

(a) Revolutionary War to World War II:

1. Throughout its history the United States has, with few exceptions, adhered to the policy of nonforcible repatriation of prisoners of war. As early as the Revolutionary War--the first instance

in American history of the application of the policy of asylum--the principle of nonforcible repatriation was in effect throughout the Colonies. At the conclusion of hostilities, both British and Hessian prisoners were allowed to remain in America, many of whom were to contribute greatly to the growing American economy.

2. At the end of the Civil War, there was little problem with regard to repatriation as prisoners on both sides almost universally wished to be returned to their original side.

3. The nonforcible repatriation policy was maintained as the US position at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898. At the end of hostilities, prisoners of war were allowed either to return to their own country or remain in Cuba.

4. With the termination of hostilities at the end of World War I, the United States along with the Allied Powers exhibited general conformity with the concepts of nonforcible repatriation and asylum. Such a position was made evident in the drafting of the several peace treaties officially bringing the conflict to a close. In each of the peace treaties, identical phrasing was used to reserve to prisoners of war the right to refuse repatriation if the PW wished to be excluded from repatriation. The Allied Powers also established the same criteria for the repatriation of prisoners of war held in German hands.

5. In the years following World War I, the attitude of the United States regarding the policies of nonforcible repatriation and asylum remained unchanged. During World War II various nations, including Germany and Russia, employed both forcible and nonforcible repatriation. At the conclusion of the war, the United States repatriated all prisoners of war in its custody despite the fact that many German and Italian prisoners desired not to be repatriated. This fact, however, did not negate the general position of the United States regarding asylum. The post-World War II policy was a pragmatic solution necessitated by the requirement of economics to release jobs in the United States for returning servicemen and to expedite the rebuilding of Europe. In any event, the United States was exercising in this case its right to refuse asylum if such a course of action were deemed to be in the national interest.

6. In 1949 a conference was held in Geneva to revise the Conventions previously written at Geneva in 1929. None of the four conventions regulating the conduct of warfare which were finally approved, addressed the question of forcible.

(b) The Korean War:

1. In June 1950, the Korean War broke out and the provisions of the newly-approved Prisoner of War Convention were soon set to the test. In 1951 negotiations to effect the termination of hostilities were started at Panmunjon and, almost from the first, one of the principal questions at issue was that of the release of prisoners of war and their repatriation.

2. Generally speaking, the armistice negotiations revealed to a great extent virtually every argument and counterargument about the right of a state to grant asylum to prisoners of war. Those who would not forcibly resist would be repatriated and those who would forcibly resist would not be repatriated.[24]

3. The Communist negotiators countered that the principle of nonforcible repatriation adopted by the UN Command was contrary to the Geneva PW Convention, in particular Article 118 which provides, in part, the following guidance: "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities."[25] Also invoked was Article 7, which provides that PW's may not (even voluntarily) renounce their rights under GPW. The Communists thus argued that the "right" to repatriation under Article 118 was nonwaivable by the PW. The United Nations Command took the position that Article 118 only imposed on the Detaining Power the duty to offer every prisoner an unrestricted opportunity to go home. Customary international law had in the past permitted a government to grant asylum to PW's. The 1949 Geneva PW Convention did not revoke this customary rule.

4. The position taken by the Command won overwhelming support in the General Assembly on 3 December 1952. Additionally, it was implemented in the armistice agreement. The agreement accepted the principle of nonforcible repatriation and concentrated its provisions on insuring that a bona fide free choice was actually given to each prisoner.[26] Moreover, the ICRC endorsed the principle, first during the conflict when it communicated with the US State Department and later in its commentary on the 1949 PW Convention.[27]

5. The United States became fully committed to the principle on nonforcible repatriation in Korea and its position in this regard was later stressed by two presidents. Harry S. Truman on 13 August 1952 stated: "We must not use bayonets to force these prisoners to return to slavery and almost certain death at the hands of

the Communists."[28] On 31 May 1951, President Eisenhower stated: "The Armistice in Korea inaugurated a new principle of freedom--that prisoners of war are entitled to choose the side to which they wish to be released. In its impact on history that one principle may weigh more than any battle of our time."[29]

(c) Vietnam:

1. In the present Vietnam conflict, the United States continues to adhere to the policy of nonforcible repatriation. The policy conflict between forcible and nonforcible or voluntary repatriation has not yet surfaced as a major US problem in Vietnam. Despite the fact that the conflict is still in progress prisoners of war are being repatriated by the government of South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese government, as the Detaining Power and with US concurrence, has repatriated enemy prisoners on a nonforcible or voluntary basis.

2. Prior to the release of the prisoner from the PW camp in South Vietnam, he must sign a statement that he understands his rights under the PW Convention and that he is being willingly and voluntarily repatriated. There are no documented instances indicating that the government of South Vietnam has attempted to influence captured North Vietnamese regulars toward voluntary repatriation.[30]

(5) Summary:

(a) Nonforcible repatriation of prisoners of war is the present policy of the United States government. This policy is based on humanitarian considerations, the US interpretation of Article 118 of the Geneva PW Convention of 1949, and the principle of asylum in international law.

(b) This policy is not a new position for the United States. Since the inception of the PW program of the American colonies in the Revolutionary War, with one exception--World War II--prisoners have been authorized to make a choice between being repatriated or not being repatriated.

(c) Beyond the current position regarding the principle of nonforcible repatriation as an essential element of national policy, the legal position of the United States permits great latitude and flexibility. Where circumstances dictate, repatriation policies may be adjusted to meet the demands of a particular situation.[31]

5. AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT USPW POLICY AND A DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPT OF RECIPROCITY:

a. The effectiveness of national policy as it relates to US prisoners of war is measurable only in terms of the treatment afforded captured US personnel by enemy forces. From an analysis of the treatment of US prisoners by enemy forces in past conflicts, the evaluation reveals a mixed record. In some instances, US prisoners have been treated in a fair and humane manner. Such was generally the case during World War I and under German and Italian detention during World War II. In other instances, US personnel have received extreme, often barbaric, treatment. Such occurred at the hands of the Japanese in World War II, the North Koreans and the Chinese during the Korean War, and most recently, the North Korean Forces during the Pueblo affair.

b. The reasons for such disparity in detention standards are not difficult to determine. The US soldier has more often tended to receive unacceptable standards of treatment while in the hands of an Oriental enemy as opposed to a Caucasian.[32] It seems apparent that some element of racial hostility or cultural conflict plays a part in this situation and is reflected in the extremely high casualty rates suffered by US prisoners in Oriental captivity. Moreover, US military personnel have had a particularly difficult time in understanding and coping with Asiatics, especially Asian Communists. The ideological dogma of such peoples has had a further detrimental impact upon the US prisoners of war. This has been especially true when US personnel have fallen into the hands of the North Koreans. Treatment of the USPW by North Korea has consistently been the most harsh and brutal of any experienced. In contrast, the American soldier was, in general, treated fairly and appropriately by German and Italian forces during World War II. It seems likely that such a situation reflected, to a great extent, the lack of racial distinction and an unspoken hereditary tie between captor and captive.

c. There is a great deal that the United States can do to influence the manner in which Communist governments treat USPW's even though a state of war may or may not exist between the United States and the government concerned. During 1969 and 1970, the North Vietnamese demonstrated that they are responsive to world opinion. By enlisting the support of a large segment of the American public in behalf of USPW's in Southeast Asia, such groups as the National League of Families have succeeded in bringing about more humane treatment of USPW's. Pressure exerted by these groups has resulted in more mail, better food, better living conditions, delivery of Red Cross parcels and other concessions benefiting the prisoners.

d. The fact that Communist governments are responsive to world opinion means that they can be influenced by concerted and well-organized programs which sway public opinion. A democratic institution does not always have as much flexibility as totalitarian governments in formulating and carrying out propaganda campaigns designed to influence world opinion, but results thus far achieved indicate that such a program is worthwhile. This study is restricted in scope to actions to be taken by the Army as a matter of Army doctrine. Army activities are limited to those in the functional areas of the Army Information Office and Army PSYOP units. Both functional areas present opportunities for influencing enemy actions through the medium of influencing public opinion. If a few private organizations can achieve a degree of success, more and larger private organizations, overtly or covertly supported by the Army, can achieve greater success. Planned and well-organized PSYOP campaigns can do a great deal to bring the message to the people, thereby bringing the pressure of US and world opinion to bear on the enemy.

e. It is not within the scope of this study to prescribe methods and techniques to be employed by the Army Information Office or PSYOP units. This is an appropriate subject for follow-on study. The key to the legitimacy of such efforts is contained in a DOD communication dated January 1971 (also see page M-17):

> The Department of Defense fully supports legitimate private initiatives that advocate humane treatment and release of US prisoners of war and missing in action (PW/MIA) personnel and enemy compliance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 . . .
>
> Commanders are authorized to assist such efforts including those of PW/MIA family groups, provided the assistance is within the bounds of existing directives. Petitions on the PW/MIA issue may be circulated on military installations if deemed appropriate by the installation commander.

f. There is, however, a further manner in which the United States attempts to influence the actions of enemy states holding US personnel as prisoners of war and that is through the application of the principle of reciprocity of standards of treatment for PW's. In this concept the United States provides for captured enemy personnel the standards of confinement and treatment prescribed in the Geneva PW Convention in the hope that such treatment will be similarly extended to captured US personnel by enemy states. This theory has been amplified in a number of recent Department of Defense publications and releases. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, in

a recent DOD release on implementation and dissemination of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,[33] quotes the Army Provost Marshal General as observing that in training in the Conventions, "Emphasis should be placed on the practical benefits of humane treatment, i.e., the enemy may reciprocate our good treatment" of enemy prisoners of war.

g. AR 350-216, effective 15 June 1970, specifies that, in programs of instruction and training in the Geneva Conventions, "stress will be given to" discourage "acts of violence against and inhumane treatment of personnel" which may "increase the likelihood of reciprocal enemy actions in kind against captured and detained US personnel."[34]

h. Finally, MACV Pamphlet No. 14-16 entitled "Application of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention in Vietnam," dated September 1970, in commenting upon the importance of complying with the Convention, states, "We must realize that the manner in which we treat prisoners of war will have, hopefully, a direct influence on the treatment received by our personnel who are in the hands of the enemy.[35]

i. An evaluation of the effectiveness of a policy based on the concept of reciprocal treatment of prisoners of war is a question difficult to answer convincingly. Judging at least from several recent incidents, it would seem that the enemy in Southeast Asia closely examines the kind of treatment extended to enemy prisoners of war by Allied Forces and is inclined to respond in kind. On 24 June 1965, SGT Harold Bennett was killed by the Viet Cong in admitted reprisal for the execution of terrorists by the government of South Vietnam. In like manner the NLF subsequently announced the reprisal executions of CPT Humbert R. Versace and SGT Kenneth M. Roraback.[36] As a result of these reprisals taken by Viet Cong forces, the South Vietnamese government immediately ceased execution of convicted terrorists in order to avoid reciprocal Viet Cong execution of US/ARVN prisoners under Communist control. In a sense then, the principle of reciprocity has experienced a degree of utilization in Southeast Asia. The United States was forced to recognize that the fate of captured US personnel may depend in certain circumstances upon the kind of treatment given enemy prisoners by Allied Forces.

j. It is closer to the truth to state that the PW policies of enemy states--especially Communist states--far from acting in direct response to the PW policies of the US and its Allies, are much more likely to reflect in their own way aims and intentions derived from their particular interests. Furthermore, any variations in such doctrine are more inclined in a given situation to reflect pressures and contingencies of an international character, for example, dictates of international

opinion or the positions adopted by international organizations and states, whether party to the conflict or not. In any event, there is every likelihood that the United States will continue to regard the principle of reciprocity as an integral component of its prisoner of war program for sometime in the future. Such a position, while by no means certain to insure the provision of fair and humane treatment to US prisoners by enemy forces, offers certain advantages. At the least, it precludes the possibility that enemy states will resort to reprisals against US prisoners they hold, while at best, such a posture affords the opportunity for utilization of reciprocity if such a situation becomes feasible during some conflict at some time in the future.

6. FUTURE TRENDS:

a. In the preceding paragraphs of this chapter has been presented a discussion of the formation of US prisoner of war policy, an analysis of the Geneva PW Convention, and an evaluation of the concept of reciprocity in PW affairs. The theme throughout has been that when dealing with a Communist power detaining US personnel, the United States government has recourse to only limited means to effect fair and humane treatment for USPW's.

b. For all practical purposes, the only leverage that can be brought to bear by the United States upon recalcitrant Communist governments is some degree of moral pressure, as there is no recourse to the recognized legal constraints of international law since Communist states have refused to recognize such procedures. In times past the United States has sought to apply such pressure by seeking to obtain world recognition of the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Conventions and by demonstrating to the international community proper standards of treatment of enemy prisoners of war held by the United States and its Allies. Furthermore, recent experience has shown that the activities of private organizations seeking national and international support for humane treatment of USPW's have proven to be effective in improving the conditions under which USPW's are being held.

c. Recognition of the need for guidance at the DOD level in prisoner of war affairs resulted in the establishment on 18 February 1971 of a Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Task Group formed under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). The primary function of the Task Group is to provide close and continuing coordination of all activities in DOD in the PW/MIA area. In accord with policy guidance, the Task Group is to insure that responsible offices and agencies work together in planning, programming, assessing, and carrying out all required actions.

d. When dealing with nations which subvert or utilize international agreements for their own purposes without recourse to the moral and legal obligations, it becomes impractical to predict future trends in USPW policy designed to combat such techniques. It is sufficient to state that the US government, based on its heritage and national goals, will continue to seek through every legal and moral channel, humane treatment of prisoners of war regardless of nationality.

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SECTION II: (U) DOD POLICY

1. (U) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE:

a. (U) General. In addition to the policy concerning prisoner of war affairs operative at the national level, there is policy or guidance existent at the Department of Defense level as well. Together, they provide the Department of the Army (DA) with doctrinal guidance for the implementation of procedures during pre-internment, internment, and postinternment stages of detention. The analysis of the basic components of PW policy at the national level has been discussed previously. Below, relevant DOD PW policy guidance to DA is considered. It is important to recognize that the preponderance of DOD PW guidance currently in effect is directly aimed at and related to the Vietnam conflict. It is upon this guidance and that provided at the national level that DA bases its doctrine for captured/detained US military personnel.

b. (U) Pre-internment. Policies and guidance for the pre-internment period relate to various aspects of training for the soldier in how to conduct himself during captivity. Current directives are oriented towards training in the Code of Conduct, Survival, Evasion, and Escape, and in some related aspects of existence in detention camp environments. DOD guidance expresses the need to impress the soldier with his responsibilities as an American fighting man and to acquaint him with those values and beliefs representative of his government and of his country. Additional guidance deals with the more practical aspects of a PW's existence: training in techniques of evading and frustrating the efforts of the enemy both prior to and after capture as well as familiarization with those methods of sanitation and hygiene necessary for internment survival. The guidance in these areas is suprisingly direct and comprehensive.

(1) Code of Conduct. Primary guidance for the Code of Conduct is found in DOD Directive 1300.7, dated 8 July 1964. This document directs that the essence of Code training is to develop in every member of the Armed Forces a positive attitude that he can and must successfully resist any enemy of his country.[1] This resistance is equally applicable prior to and after capture. In the event the PW is pressured beyond his capability to resist, DOD provides the guidance that the PW must avoid any act or statement harmful to the United States or detrimental to a fellow prisoner. In addition, DOD expects the Service member to avoid at all costs giving aid or comfort to the enemy.[2]

(2) Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Training: DOD Directive 1300.7 is not solely concerned with the individual articles

of the Code of Conduct. It clarifies and enunciates areas pertaining to the captive environment which must be brought to the attention of each member of the Armed Forces. A key phrase stipulates that the PW compound is in many ways but an extension of the battlefield and that inherent responsibilities of rank and leadership, military bearing, order and discipline, teamwork and devotion to fellow servicemen, and the duty to defeat any enemy of our country, remain.[3] In addition it provides the following specific guidance on resistance, evasion, and escape:[4]

> Each serviceman will be instructed in how to avoid capture, evade detection, and survive when operating in an enemy territory. He should know what to expect from his captors and how to concentrate all his resources toward escape by himself and others.
>
> Resistance to interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation will be developed and hardened by expanding the individual's understanding of basic truths and advantages of our democratic institutions, the moral fiber provided by religious convictions, and national, military and unit history and traditions.
>
> Each serviceman will be instructed in PW camp organization, to include a need for overt and covert systems of organization, the physical and mental aspects of captivity with respect to survival techniques and well-being, and the fact that informing and voluntary collaboration are treasonable conduct which will result in the rejection of the individual by both his fellow prisoners and by his nation.

The directive also insists that Service members receive instructions on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War but does not stipulate whether such instruction should be oriented toward our treatment of enemy PW's or on what rights the USPW should have under the Conventions.[5] Another major oversight is that it does not state explicitly the need to discuss the reservations to the Conventions expressed by the majority of the Communist nations.

c. (U) Internment:

(1) During the internment period other than by efforts directed through international organizations or world public opinion, there is little the government can do for the PW in the way of direct assistance. DOD can, however, adopt certain measures providing assistance to the family of the PW during his incarceration. In his address when promulgating the Code of Conduct on 17 August 1955, President Eisenhower stated:[6]

> No American prisoner of war will be forgotten by the United States. Every available means will be employed by our government to establish contact with, to support and to obtain the release of all our prisoners of war. Furthermore, the laws of the United States provide for the support and care of dependents of members of the Armed Forces including those who become prisoners of war. I assure dependents of such prisoners that these laws will continue to provide for their welfare.

In support of this statement, DOD Directive 1300.7 directs that the Services instruct their members on the family support aspects of US law and also instill in them the knowledge that their government will never cease seeking their release should they become prisoners of war.[7]

(2) There is a separate DOD document which contains detailed guidance on support of the next of kin (NOK), DOD Instruction 1300.9 dated 6 April 1967. It states that in the event a military member becomes a casualty (KIA, MIA, CIA) while on active duty the NOK of the member will be notified as promptly as possible and that such notification will be conducted in a dignified, humane, and understanding manner.[8] All Services, as would be expected, make every effort to meet the tenor of this requirement and do so through the medium of personal contact; i.e., an active duty member of the casualty's own Service, normally of equal or higher rank, personally informs the NOK of the event.

(3) DOD recognizes that personal notification is not by itself sufficient. In the same memorandum, it directs the Services to keep the NOK regularly and currently informed until the case is finally resolved.[9] It is, in fact, explicit DOD guidance that the Services appoint an Assistance Officer who is to act as the point of contact between the military and the NOK. His job is to provide guidance and assistance in matters related to the serviceman's status. His duties continue until the casualty case is finally settled.[10] The recognition

that the needs of the NOK can best be served by personal liaison is crucial to the overall Family Assistance Program and serves as the cornerstone for most other legislation and guidance. It is worth repeating that the Department of Defense recognizing the requirement, feels every member of the Armed Forces should be aware of the family assistance programs available to his next of kin in the event he should become a prisoner of war.

d. (U) Postinternment:

(1) (U) General. DOD policy during the postinternment period can be categorized into four general areas related to the immediate and long term handling of released/recovered/escaped prisoners of war. These areas are: processing and evacuation, debriefing, medical treatment, and rehabilitation. Processing and evacuation measures deal with the initial steps taken by the Services immediately upon the return of a USPW to US control. The subsequent debriefing of the PW is a crucial but sensitive matter and, as such, is governed closely by DOD guidance on the subject. Such guidance as is given deals primarily with the Services' approach to and conduct of the debrief. DOD directives pertaining to medical treatment are generally broad and leave explicit procedures to the discretion of the Services. This is primarily due to the fact that the Services already have well-established medical channels and evacuation procedures which are adequate to handle returned PW's. There is, however, some gray area of overlapping responsibilities between medical processing and debriefing procedures. These areas are discussed in detail in Chapter 6, Postinternment. DOD guidance on rehabilitation is minimal. By default, the procedures for rehabilitation, both medical and psychiatric, are left up to the individual Services.

(2) (U) Processing and Evacuation:

(a) In a June 1968 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that the respective Services have the responsibility for processing their own returned PW's.[11] Service affiliation, however, does not take precedence over the individual's immediate evacuation from the release point. In a later memorandum the Secretary directed that the returnees be evacuated as expeditiously as possible from the release point without regard to Service affiliation. Such evacuation will be by the fastest means commensurate with medical considerations and will terminate at a single processing point in-country.[12] However, at this point Services are to assume control of their own personnel as soon as possible.

(b) The Deputy Secretary and DOD recognize the special requirements in handling former PW's. In both of his memorandums, the Secretary stressed the need for assuring the PW's health and welfare is not jeopardized. The pertinent paragraphs from each memoranda are reproduced below:

> The welfare and morale of returned personnel shall be of prime importance. All reasonable efforts will be made at all stages to provide for their personal, psychological, and spiritual needs. (DepSecDef Memo dated 8 June 1968)

> All Services will insure that the returnee's immediate needs and the requirements of the Services will be fulfilled. Time required to accomplish this phase, with proper regard for the health and welfare of the men, security and other administrative matters, should involve a minimum of 36 hours at the central processing location, but not more than 72 hours unless exceptional circumstances require variance from these norms. (DepSecDef Memo dated 18 January 1969)

It is important to note the 36 to 72-hour processing time requirement. It is an effort on the part of the military to insure that sufficient time in-country is available to make an initial diagnosis of matters of immediate tactical importance, but not so long as to draw criticism for delaying the former PW's return to CONUS and his NOK.

(c) Two other areas indirectly related to the processing and evacuation phase are covered by DOD memoranda. The First of these is release of public information concerning the releasees. In the June 1968 memorandum, three factors which must be considered prior to release of information are given. They are:[13]

> Security requirements.
>
> The welfare of the returned personnel and their families.
>
> The safety and interests of other personnel who may still be detained.

Perhaps more key to the release of information to the public than the three factors listed above is the guidance that any such release must be "factual."[14]

(d) The other area indirectly related to evacuation and processing deals with the government's assistance in reuniting the returnee with his NOK. In a November 1968 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized the Services to either reimburse or provide military transportation to appropriate persons for the purpose of visiting returned PW's hospitalized in the United States.[15] Most Services have construed "appropriate persons" to include the secondary NOK; i.e., the parent(s) of a married PW.

(3) (U) Debriefing:

(a) (U) DOD guidance on debriefing of returnees directs the conditions under which the debriefing is to be conducted. By far the preponderance of current guidance deals not so much with the facilities and form but on the tenor of the debriefing and the absolute need to protect the returnee's rights. Because of the perishability of the tactical information, DOD directs that immediate intelligence/counterintelligence debriefing is essential and should be conducted concurrently with medical treatment and evacuation whenever possible.[16] The debriefing tasks are to be accomplished consistent with the significance and perishability of the information.[17] The medical staff has primary responsibility for the returnee and, therefore, has the responsibility for providing optimum debriefing conditions consistent with treatment.[18] The actual debriefing programs by all the Services are to be coordinated by the Defense Intelligence Agency.[19]

(b) (U) The major emphasis at DOD in debriefing matters is on the intricacies and legalities of the debriefing process. In a June 1968 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the following guide lines for debriefing.[20]

> Returnees will be accorded all of the legal rights and privileges to which they are entitled as military personnel at every stage of processing, including intelligence debriefings. In view of the physical and/or psychological pressures to which they may have been subject, particular care must be taken to insure that their rights and privileges are in no way compromised or diluted. Inter-Service cooperation should

> be pursued to insure uniform interpretation of laws and regulations governing the conduct of returnees. In the event there is evidence of misconduct on the part of a returnee, it will be referred to the Service concerned, and any case of suspected misconduct will be disposed of in accordance with normal practices.

Although such guidance as this had merit, the Services were still at odds in their interpretations of exactly what had to be done to afford full protection to the rights of individuals. There was particular uncertainty as to exactly when and for what reasons should the debriefer warn a returnee as to his rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice. In partial mitigation of this problem, the Deputy Secretary of Defense published another memorandum dated 18 January 1969 which stipulated:[21]

> To provide the proper environment for the return of these men and to maximize the intelligence obtained, a returnee will be given the warning specified in Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and advised of his rights to counsel only when the individual has been charged with having committed an offense punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or when previously acquired reliable information clearly indicates that he has committed such an offense or when his responses lead the debriefer reasonably to believe that he has committed such an offense and that an investigation should be made.

(c) The above sorely needed guidance sufficiently explains the first two instances under which Article 31 should be read. Unfortunately, the Services are still apprehensive about the ability of their debriefers to select the appropriate time to stop the debriefing and read the returnee his rights in accordance with the third and last circumstances cited.

(4) ~~(c)~~ Medical Treatment:

(a) ~~(c)~~ In the area of medical treatment, DOD has elected to leave the specifics to the individual Services. It did, however, direct two specific actions to which all Services must comply. Contrary

to the sea-evacuation that took place following the cessation of hostilities in Korea, DOD has directed that all returnees will return to CONUS by aeromedical evacuation. Further, DOD stipulated that all returnees will be accompanied by an escort from their parent Service.[22]

(b) ~~(C)~~ Earlier guidance was far more general but still valid. Services are to place returned personnel under medical auspices as soon as possible and evacuate them to an appropriate facility (normally in CONUS) as soon as it is medically and operationally feasible. Services will use the normal medical channels for evacuation; however, based on the most current guidance, the theatre-to-CONUS travel must be aero-evacuation.

(5) ~~(C)~~ Rehabilitation. As stated in the introduction to this section, there is no definitive guidance from DOD to the Services on the programs to be undertaken for the physical and psychiatric rehabilitation of returned USPW's. It can be taken for granted that the physical rehabilitation offers no major problem to the Services inasmuch as existing channels and programs exist to handle the diseases and injuries inherent to captivity. The major gap is more adequately addressed in Chapter 6, Postinternment, this study.

2. (U) SUMMARY:

a. As can be seen from this discussion, the amount of guidance from DOD to the Services in matters relating to captured/detained U.S. military personnel is limited. What exists is direct in its approach, and on the subjects covered, relatively comprehensive. The preponderance of guidance deals with the welfare of the individual and the welfare of his family. The sole exception to this is DOD Directive 1300.7 which places considerable requirements upon the Services to properly orient the U.S. soldier on what to expect and what is expected of him should he become a prisoner of war.

b. Additional guidance is currently being formulated and will be forthcoming as a result of the formation of a Prisoner of War/Missing-in Action Task Group which DOD has established under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA). This Task Group, established by a SecDef Memorandum dated 13 February 1971, has the primary function of providing close and continuing coordination of all activities in DOD in the PW/MIA area. In accordance with policy guidance, it will insure that responsible offices and agencies work together in planning, programming,

assessing, and carrying out all required actions.[23] The Task Group will have representation from the Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Public Affairs; the Department of Defense General Counsel; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs; and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Working under this Task Group will be a series of working panels; each panel designated to address specific problem areas in the captured/detained U.S. military personnel (e.g., NOK affairs, Intelligence, Public Affairs, etc.).

c. The guidance that is in effect and that which may come into effect places a direct requirement upon Department of the Army to establish doctrine which is commensurate with that guidance. In the next section of this chapter, the requirements generated by both DOD guidance and national policy will be enumerated.

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SECTION III: (U) DOCTRINAL REQUIREMENTS

1. (U) GENERAL:

a. In order for Department of the Army to have valid doctrine for captured/detained U.S. military personnel, it is esential that it conform to the guidance it receives in this area from national policy and the Department of Defense. In most cases, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the two, except to say that national policy is broad guidance evolving from historical concepts while DOD policy, though still broad, is more explicit. In effect, this guidance from the higher levels can be equated to doctrinal requirements which must be satisfied by Department of the Army. This section enumerates these requirements keying them to the respective DOD directives/memoranda discussed in Section II above. Current Army doctrine in the three phases: pre-internment, internment, and postinternment will be compared against these requirements in succeeding chapters.

b. As would be expected, a significant portion of both national policy and DOD guidance deals with countering the effects of Communist treatment of USPW's. The requirements that the U.S. soldier be instructed in the interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation techniques and in the provisions of the Geneva Conventions have been identified in the preceding chapter on Communist PW management principles. Equally so, the policy and guidance that the U.S. soldier must instinctively keep faith with his country and fellow PW's with the attendant ramifications have also been recognized in prior discussion. To avoid duplication, those which equate to requirements previously identified in Chapter 2 will be listed here but will refer the reader for discussion to the appropriate requirement(s) listed at the conclusion of Chapter 2.

c. The concepts and goals of national policy are incorporated in the directives which have been published by Department of Defense. As an example, the strict adherence to the principles embodied in the 1949 Geneva Conventions is reflected in the guidance of DOD Directive 1300.7 that all Service members must receive instruction on the Conventions. The Code of Conduct is both a matter of national policy and DOD policy. In listing the requirements generated by national and DOD policy no attempt is made to separate the two. For clarification and because it is the more explicit, each requirement listed is referenced against a specific DOD directive, instruction, or memorandum. The requirements as listed have been categorized into the three phases of internment.

2. (e) REQUIREMENTS:

a. (U) Pre-internment:

#1: EVERY U.S. SOLDIER MUST HAVE AN INGRAINED POSITIVE ATTITUDE THAT HE CAN AND MUST SUCCESSFULLY RESIST ANY ENEMY OF HIS OWN COUNTRY.

Reference: DOD Dir 1300.7, 8 July 1964

#2: THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED THAT SHOULD HE BE SUBJECTED TO COERCION HE WILL AVOID ANY ACTION OR STATEMENT HARMFUL TO THE UNITED STATES OR DETRIMENTAL TO HIS FELLOW PW'S OR WHICH WILL PROVIDE AID OR COMFORT TO THE ENEMY.

Reference: DOD Dir 1300.7, 8 July 1964

Note: See Requirements #1, #2, #3, and #10, Section V Chapter 2.

#3: THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED THAT PW COMPOUNDS ARE IN MANY WAYS AN EXTENSION OF THE BATTLEFIELD AND AS SUCH THE INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES OF RANK AND LEADERSHIP, MILITARY BEARING, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE, TEAMWORK AND DEVOTION TO FELLOW SERVICEMEN, AND THE DUTY TO DEFEAT ANY ENEMY OF THE UNITED STATES REMAIN.

Reference: DOD Dir 1300.7, 8 July 1964

Note: See Requirements #2, #8, #9, Section V, Chapter 2.

#4: THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED ON HOW TO RESIST INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION, AND EXPLOITATION.

Reference: DOD Dir 1300.7, 8 July 1964

Note: See Requirements #1, #4, #11, #13, and #20, Section V, Chapter 2.

#5: THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED ON HOW TO AVOID CAPTURE, EVADE DETECTION AND SURVIVE WHEN OPERATING IN AN ENEMY TERRITORY. AND IF CAPTURED, HOW TO CONCENTRATE ALL HIS RESOURCES TOWARD ESCAPE BY HIMSELF AND WITH OTHERS.

Reference: DOD Dir 1300.7, 8 July 1964

Note: See Requirements #5, #6, #7, and #17, Section V, Chapter 2.

#6: THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED IN PW CAMP ORGANIZATION TO INCLUDE A NEED FOR OVERT AND COVERT SYSTEMS OF ORGANIZATION.

Reference: DOD Dir 1300.7, 8 July 1964

#7: THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE FULLY INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION FOR PRISONERS OF WAR (GPW).

Reference: DOD Dir 1300.7, 8 July 1964

Note: See Requirements #18 and #19, Section V, Chapter 2.

#8: CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING PROGRAMS AND TRAINING MATERIALS WILL BE CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

Reference: DOD Dir 1300.7, 8 July 1964

b. (U) Internment:

#9: THE U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE INSTRUCTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SECURE HIS RELEASE AND THAT HIS DEPENDENTS AND MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY WILL BE FURNISHED WITH SUCH INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS WHEREABOUTS AS MAY BE AVAILABLE AND WILL BE PROVIDED ALL THE SUPPORT AND CARE TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED.

Reference: DOD Dir 1300.7, 8 July 1964

Note: See Requirements #2, #12, Section V, Chapter 2.

#10: IN THE EVENT A U.S. SOLDIER BECOMES MISSING IN ACTION OR CAPTURED WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY, HIS NEXT OF KIN MUST BE NOTIFIED AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE IN A DIGNIFIED, HUMANE, AND UNDERSTANDING MANNER.

#11: THE NEXT OF KIN OF A CAPTURED/DETAINED U.S. SOLDIER MUST BE REGULARLY KEPT INFORMED OF THE PW'S STATUS UNTIL THE CASE IS FINALLY RESOLVED.

Reference: DOD Instruction 1300.9, 6 April 1967

#12: AN ASSISTANCE OFFICER MUST BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE NEXT OF KIN OF A CAPTURED/DETAINED U.S. SOLDIER WITH THE TASK OF PROVIDING GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE TO THE NOK IN MATTERS RELATED TO THE SERVICEMAN'S STATUS. CONTACT BETWEEN THE NOK AND THE ASSISTANCE OFFICER WILL BE MAINTAINED UNTIL THE CASE IS RESOLVED.

Reference: DOD Instruction 1300.9, 6 April 1967

c. ~~(U)~~ Postinternment:

(1) ~~(U)~~ Processing and Evacuation:

#13: ~~(C)~~ DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY MUST ASSUME CONTROL OF THE RETURNED USPW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 8 June 1968

#14: ~~(C)~~ PROCESSING OF ARMY RETURNEES MUST BE AS UNIFORM AS INDIVIDUAL CASES PERMIT AND COMPARABLE WITH THAT CONDUCTED BY THE OTHER SERVICES.

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 8 June 1968

#15: ~~(U)~~ DURING PROCESSING, THE WELFARE AND MORAL OF THE RETURNED USPW WILL BE OF PRIME IMPORTANCE AND ALL REASONABLE EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO PROVIDE FOR HIS PERSONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SPIRITUAL NEEDS.

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 8 June 1968

#16: ~~(C)~~ RETURNED USPW'S MUST BE EVACUATED FROM THE RELEASE POINT AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT REGARD TO SERVICE AFFILIATION.

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 18 January 1969

#17: ~~(C)~~ IMMEDIATE PROCESSING OF A RETURNED USPW PRIOR TO EVACUATION TO CONUS WILL INVOLVE NO LESS THAN 36 HOURS AND NO MORE THAN 72 HOURS UNLESS EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE A VARIANCE FROM THESE NORMS.

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 18 January 1969

#18: ~~(C)~~ APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS MUST BE IN EFFECT TO INSURE THAT PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING RETURNED USPW'S IS

FACTUAL AND GIVES PROPER CONSIDERATION TO (1) THE WELFARE OF THE RETURNED PERSONNEL AND THEIR FAMILIES, (2) SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND (3) THE SAFETY AND INTERESTS OF OTHER PERSONNEL WHO MAY STILL BE DETAINED:

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 8 June 1968

#19: (U) NEXT OF KIN AND MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY OF A RETURNED PW WILL BE REIMBURSED FOR EXPENSES INCURRED WHILE TRAVELING TO VISIT HIM WHEN HE IS HOSPITALIZED IN THE UNITED STATES.

Reference: SecDef Memo, 27 October 1970

(2) (C) Debriefing:

#20: (C) DEBRIEFING OF A RETURNED USPW WILL BE CONDUCTED CONCURRENTLY WITH MEDICAL TREATMENT AND EVACUATION WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 8 June 1968

#21: (C) US ARMY RETURNEES WILL BE ACCORDED ALL OF THE LEGAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED AS MILITARY PERSONNEL. PARTICULAR EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO INSURE THOSE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES ARE IN NO WAY COMPROMISED OR DILUTED.

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 8 June 1968

#22: (C) US ARMY RETURNEES WILL BE GIVEN THE WARNING SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 31, UCMJ AND ADVISED OF HIS RIGHTS TO COUNSEL ONLY WHEN THE INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH HAVING COMMITTED AN OFFENSE PUNISHABLE UNDER THE UCMJ OR WHEN PREVIOUSLY ACQUIRED RELIABLE INFORMATION CLEARLY INDICATES THAT HE HAS COMMITTED SUCH AN OFFENSE; OR WHEN HIS RESPONSES LEAD THE DEBRIEFER REASONABLY TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAS COMMITTED SUCH AN OFFENSE AND THAT AN INVESTIGATION SHOULD BE MADE.

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 18 January 1969

(3) (C) Medical Treatment:

#23: (C) US ARMY RETURNEES WILL BE PLACED UNDER MEDICAL AUSPICES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WILL BE EVACUATED TO AN APPROPRIATE FACILITY (NORMALLY IN CONUS) WHEN MEDICAL AND OPERATIONAL CONDITIONING PERMIT.

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 8 June 1968

#24: (C) US ARMY RETURNEES WILL BE EVACUATED THROUGH NORMAL MEDICAL CHANNELS AND WILL BE PROVIDED WITH A SUITABLE ESCORT DURING SAID EVACUATION.

Reference: DepSecDef, 8 June 1968

#25: (C) ALL US ARMY RETURNEES WILL BE RETURNED TO CONUS BY AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION.

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 18 January 1969

#26: (C) MEDICAL PERSONNEL WILL PROVIDE OPTIMUM DEBRIEFING CONDITIONS CONSISTENT WITH TREATMENT.

Reference: DepSecDef Memo, 8 June 1968

SECTION IV: (U) SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS

1. GENERAL:

a. This section provides the results of the analysis of National and Department of Defense policy in as concise a form as possible.

b. The findings given below are the basis for the subsequent Conclusions and Recommendations found in Chapter 7.

2. FINDINGS:

a. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW-1949) and the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States are the cornerstones of US nation policy on prisoners of war. The GPW-1949 is the framework for US policy when dealing with other states on PW issues while the Code represents the conduct expected by the US government of its armed forces personnel should they be captured.

b. The United States employs two principal means to gain better treatment for USPW's held by foreign states. First, by strictly adhering to the principles of the GPW-1949 in its treatment of enemy PW's, it seeks to apply moral pressure upon the foreign state for reciprocal treatment of US prisoners. Secondly, it solicits favorable world opinion to apply pressure for humane treatment. Results from these efforts in past conflicts involving Communist states have been marginal to unsatisfactory.

FOOTNOTE REFERENCES

SECTION 1: NATIONAL POLICY

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