Description of document: Two 1970s State Department documents related to China

Requested date: 01-March-2005

Released date: 16-November-2007

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Title of Documents  (Formerly) SECRET/NOFORN Dept of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Research-Study: PRC Leaders Chou’s Relationship with the Reascendant Teng Hsiao P’ing, February 14. 1974 and,

27 JAN 1979 (formerly) CONFIDENTIAL telex from the Secretary of State, Washington DC to various agencies, SUBJECT: Visit to the US of Chinese dignitaries

Source of document: Freedom of Information Act
Office of Information Programs and Services
A/ISS/IPS/RL
U. S. Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20522-8100
FAX: 202-261-8579
http://foia.state.gov/foiareq/foialetter.asp
I refer to your letter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated March 1, 2005, requesting the release of certain material under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

That material, consisting of two documents, was referred to us for direct reply to you. We received this referral on July 2, 2007.

After careful review, it has been determined that documents numbered F1 and F2 may be released with excisions. Please note that page 2 of document F2 is illegible but it is the best copy available to us.

The material in the excised portions of the documents is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12958 in the interest of national defense or foreign relations. As such, it is exempt from release under subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information Act.

With respect to material withheld by the Department of State, you have the right to appeal our determination within 60 days. Appeals should be addressed to the Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/ISS/IPS/PP/LC, SA-2, Room 8100, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-8100. The letter of appeal should refer to the case number shown above. A copy of the appeals procedures is enclosed.

The FBI has also made excisions in these documents. The appropriate exemption appears next to the excised information. You may appeal these denials by writing to the following address within sixty days: Co-Director,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Margaret P. Graefeld, Director
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures:
As stated.
§171.52 Appeal of denial of access to, declassification of, amendment of, accounting of disclosures of, or challenge to classification of records.

(a) Right of administrative appeal. Except for records that have been reviewed and withheld within the past two years or are the subject of litigation, any requester whose request for access to records, declassification of records, amendment of records, accounting of disclosure of records, or any authorized holder of classified information whose classification challenge has been denied, has a right to appeal the denial to the Department's Appeals Review Panel. This appeal right includes the right to appeal the determination by the Department that no records responsive to an access request exist in Department files. Privacy Act appeals may be made only by the individual to whom the records pertain.

(b) Form of appeal. There is no required form for an appeal. However, it is essential that the appeal contain a clear statement of the decision or determination by the Department being appealed. When possible, the appeal should include argumentation and documentation to support the appeal and to contest the bases for denial cited by the Department. The appeal should be sent to: Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/ISS/IPS/PP/LC, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, DC 20522-8100.

(c) Time limits. The appeal should be received within 60 days of the date of receipt by the requester of the Department's denial. The time limit for response to an appeal begins to run on the day that the appeal is received. The time limit (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) for agency decision on an administrative appeal is 20 days under the FOIA (which may be extended for up to an additional 10 days in unusual circumstances) and 30 days under the Privacy Act (which the Panel may extend an additional 30 days for good cause shown). The Panel shall decide mandatory declassification review appeals as promptly as possible.

(d) Notification to appellant. The Chairman of the Appeals Review Panel shall notify the appellant in writing of the Panel's decision on the appeal. When the decision is to uphold the denial, the Chairman shall include in his notification the reasons therefore. The appellant shall be advised that the decision of the Panel represents the final decision of the Department and of the right to seek judicial review of the Panel's decision, when applicable. In mandatory declassification review appeals, the Panel shall advise the requester of the right to appeal the decision to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel under §3.5(d) of E.O. 12958.
February 14, 1974

Summary

The rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-p'ing is a political event of major significance. Contemporaries in age and seniority in the Chinese Communist movement, Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing as youths were similarly influenced by the intellectual ferment of the May Fourth movement, joined the same organization of political activists in Shanghai, and were sent to Paris together for higher education as part of an elite "worker-student" group. When they returned to China, Chou and Teng embarked on separate courses. At no time do they appear to have been either personally or professionally close.

In the seven years before the pivotal Ts'ui Conference of 1935--where Mao Tse-tung asserted his unchallenged primacy with the support of both Chou and Teng--Chou had become a near-legendary figure who rivalled Mao in importance and was directly involved in the formulation of top party policy. In contrast, Teng was a lesser figure respected for his achievements in underground party-building, recruitment of armed forces, and peasant organization. After the Communists established themselves in Yenan at the end of the Long March, Chou became the Chinese Communist Party's chief negotiator with the Kuomintang and spent most of the wartime years in Chungking, while Teng became a Red Army political commissar.
In the late 1940's Teng won a reputation for astute generalship in the advance across the Yellow River, the Huaihai battle, and the march into Szechwan, so that when he was transferred to Peking in August 1952 as Vice Premier under Chou, it was as an independent presence and potential rival rather than as a protégé. Teng's rise was accelerated by his service to Mao in smashing the Kao Kang - Jao Shu-shih challenge of the early 1950's; he was appointed to the Politburo in 1954.

The 8th Party Congress of 1956 witnessed the further elevation of Teng, who delivered a major speech on the revised Party Constitution, acquired a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee, and was named the Party Secretary General. This gave him representation on both the policymaking and policy-implementing organs (in contrast, Chou was not named to the Secretariat); at the same time, because he remained Vice Premier, he maintained his foothold in Chou's bailiwick.

Although Chou's concentration in the state machinery and Teng's preoccupation with the party machinery may in part have represented a calculated division of labor between the regime's foremost organization men, their overlapping concerns during this period provided ample room for personal competition, if not rivalry. By 1961 Teng was clearly displacing Chou in the all-important dealings with the USSR; by 1963-64, when Chou was absent on an extended tour, Teng's prestige was such that he was named Acting Premier. By this time it was widely rumored that Teng was actively seeking to undercut Chou.

Teng probably believed that he had Mao's tacit support in gradually expanding his authority. In naming Teng Secretary General, Mao had indicated that he had in mind the smooth succession of leadership. Mao may also have hoped to keep potential challengers - Teng, Chou, and Liu Shao-ch'i - in line by using "divide and rule" tactics.

In retrospect Chou seems to have played his cards wisely during the period of relative Liu-Teng
ascendancy (1959-65). When at the beginning of the sixties Liu and Teng openly carped at Mao and Maoist policy failures, Chou cemented his loyalist status by outspoken support of Mao the person. When China's economy had demonstrably recovered by 1963-64, Chou again shifted gears and coupled his earlier defense of Mao with an unmistakable, though veiled, denunciation of Liu and Teng. When Mao again took the offensive in 1965, Chou was thus a logical choice to assist in carrying out the purge of Liu and Teng. Chou seems to have been in the forefront of those singling out the "Liu-Teng clique" by name as targets for Red Guard "bombardment"; even had he been able to intercede on Teng's behalf, it is unlikely that he would have done so, given the probable personal animus.

We would hypothesize that the impetus for Teng's rehabilitation, a remarkable political event of major significance, came from Mao himself. The decision was the subject of acrimonious debate and extended negotiation. While Chou surely concurred in the decision, there is no evidence to suggest that he was the initiator, an enthusiastic supporter, or a beneficiary of Teng's undying gratitude. While Teng's return surely represents an unspoken rebuke to prominent "radicals," and in that sense signifies a probable plus for Chou and his coalition, Chou was both an opponent of Teng and an instrument of his downfall. This being the case, it seems plausible to speculate that in the process of returning to a leading political role, Teng would have sought and may have obtained from Mao, Chou, and other top leaders a firm delineation of his authority and spheres of particular responsibility. However, there is absolutely no evidence on the specific contents of any such understanding.
Chou and Teng as Young Communists

Contemporaries both in age and in seniority in the Chinese Communist movement, Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing followed somewhat parallel courses in their rise to eminence and authority, though Teng was far less prominent than Chou before 1949. Following graduation from middle school, Teng went to Shanghai in 1919. There he joined a "worker-student" group of political activists which included Chou En-lai, who by then had already acquired about two years of experience in political agitation. The following year the group was sent to France for higher education. Although information is sketchy, it is apparent that politics rather than education was the group's prime interest; in 1921 Chou, Teng, and others founded the Chinese Communist Youth Party in Paris.

Returning to China two years before Teng, Chou joined the Chinese Communist Party in Canton in 1924. Through a combination of timing and talent, Chou rose rapidly within the first KMT-CCP United Front of 1924-27. As acting director of the political department at Whampoa Military Academy, then headed by Chiang Kai-shek, Chou was ideally positioned to assign Communists to key slots as political workers in the Kuomintang military forces. Although arrested in March 1926 for clandestine Communist activity and removed from his Whampoa position, Chou was allowed to continue as an instructor at the KMT's Peasant Movement Training Institute in Canton, where he first established a working relationship with Mao Tse-tung. By the end of 1926, Chou had been named head of the newly established Military Department of the CCP and had also been charged with responsibility for all CCP operations within Chiang Kai-shek's National Revolutionary Army as the Northern Expedition began.

Teng, meanwhile, returned to China around 1926, after a few months in the Soviet Union. Joining the CCP in Shanghai, he worked in the party organization there until Chiang's April 1927 purge of Communists. Chou, a far bigger figure in the Communist hierarchy, was arrested and
sentenced to death in Shanghai, where he had gone in early 1927 to pave the way for seizure of the city by Chiang's advancing expeditionary forces. Teng managed to evade arrest, and Chou either escaped or was released by sympathetic captors.

The Kiangsi Soviet, the Long March, and Wartime Responsibilities

By the time Chou and Teng arrived separately at the Kiangsi Soviet in 1930-31, Chou had become a near-legendary figure equal in importance to Mao Tse-tung. Appointed to the CCP Politburo in 1927, he planned and executed the Nanchang uprising the same year, attended the 6th congresses of the CCP and the Comintern in Moscow in 1928, and took a leading role in underground work in Shanghai from 1929-31. In accordance with this background, Chou was named first political commissar of the Red Army at Kiangsi. Teng, on the other hand, was no more than a respected party worker whose organizational and intellectual abilities were admired; accordingly, he was appointed as a section chief in the propaganda department, editor of the army journal Hung Hsing (Red Star), and instructor at the Red Army Academy at Juichin.

Despite their shared experiences in Paris and Shanghai, there is no evidence of a close personal relationship between Chou and Teng in the early 1930's. In the seven years before the pivotal 1935 Tsuni Conference, where Mao's bid for undisputed leadership of the CCP was supported by both Chou and Teng, Chou was associated with Li Li-san and his advocacy of urban insurrections and thus was in direct opposition to Mao. Teng for his part was engaged in activities more compatible with Mao's approach to revolution; he organized the 7th Red Army in 1927, organized the Paise Uprising in Kwangsi in September 1929, involved himself in collective farming in Yukiangi Kwangsi, the same year, and arrived in Kiangsi in 1930 at the head of troops from the merged 7th Red Army and 8th Red Army. In editing the army journal, Teng gave prominence to Mao's views on peasant revolution.

In subsequent years Chou and Teng assumed responsibility in unrelated areas of the Communist effort. Chou became the CCP's chief negotiator with the KMT during the wartime Second United Front and accordingly spent most of
the period of 1940-45 in Chungking. Teng became a political commissar during the Long March and continued in that capacity with Liu Po-ch'eng's forces up to 1949. By the end of World War II Teng was a top political figure in the Red Army and was elected to the Central Committee in 1945. He enhanced his reputation for astute generalship in the advance across the Yellow River in 1947, the Huaihai campaign in 1948, and the march into his native Szechwan in 1949. Teng emerged as one of the ranking CCP officials in the Southwest, concurrently holding the positions of secretary in the Southwest Bureau, political commissar of the Southwest Military District, and Vice Chairman of the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee.

Teng's Meteoric Rise

When Teng was transferred to Peking in August 1952 as Vice Premier under Chou, it was therefore as an independent presence and potential rival rather than as a protégé. Teng acquired in rapid succession a seat on the State Planning Commission, the Finance Ministry portfolio, and the vice chairmanship of the Finance and Economic Committee. Teng's meteoric rise was accelerated by the Kao Kang - Jao Shu-shih affair, in which he apparently played a significant role in support of Mao. Selected to deliver the Central Committee report on the conspiracy, Teng was elevated to the Politburo, though this was not formally announced until the 8th Party Congress in September 1956.

At the 8th Congress Teng at last drew abreast of Chou, who had for so long overshadowed him. Although Chou was still officially listed as the third-ranking member of the Politburo behind Mao and Liu, in terms of votes cast Teng emerged in the number-three position, while Chou had slipped to fifth. More significant than formal rankings, however, was Teng's accession to the post of Party General Secretary and his election to the Politburo Standing Committee. Teng delivered a major speech at the conclave, reporting on the revised Party Constitution, which he presumably had been instrumental in drafting.

In essence the new Constitution established a new decisionmaking center in the party machinery, and in this setup Teng fared somewhat better than Chou. Both men held seats on the Politburo Standing Committee, defined as the policymaking organ which acted in place of the Politburo.
But on the new administrative Secretariat, charged with interpreting party policy and managing party-government relations, Teng as General Secretary was in overall charge, while Chou was not even a member. At the same time, Teng maintained his foothold in Chou's bailiwick, retaining his position as Vice Premier.

Rivalry Between Chou and Teng

Chou's concentration on the state machinery and Teng's preoccupation with the party machinery arguably represented a calculated division of labor between the regime's foremost organization men, and the conclusion from Teng's rise at Chou's apparent expense that there existed rivalry between them is a tenuous one. Nonetheless, there was ample room in such a setup for personal competition; possessing different organizational perspectives and the power of appointment, both men built systems staffed by their personal supporters and protégés.

The same sort of likelihood attends Teng's increasing involvement in foreign affairs. In the mid-1950's Chou personified PRC foreign policy, initiating and directing the "smiling diplomacy" of Bandung. Initially, Chou may have sought a lightening of his own burden: he abruptly resigned from the Foreign Ministry in early 1958, relinquishing his formal responsibilities to his old associate, Ch'en I. But by 1961 Teng was displacing Chou in the all-important dealings with the USSR and North Korea: Teng attended the 20th CPSU Congress in Moscow in 1956, played a prominent role in subsequent talks in Peking with Mikoyan's Soviet delegation, accompanied Mao to Moscow for negotiations on inter-party unity in 1959, and played the principal role in the Khrushchev visit to Peking in 1959. In the last-ditch attempt to smooth over Sino-Soviet differences, at the November 1960 Moscow Conference, Teng, as second-ranking member of the Chinese delegation headed by Liu, incurred Khrushchev's enmity and gained a reputation as a Soviet-baiter. In an unpublicized meeting with Khrushchev, Teng is said to have risen to Mao's defense against the charge that he was an "ivory-tower theorist"; he apparently also accused the Soviets of permitting a new "personality cult" to flourish in Moscow and of attempting to subvert the Chinese leadership. In July 1963, leading a CCP delegation to the USSR for high-level party talks, Teng enhanced his unyielding anti-Soviet reputation.
By the winter of 1963-64, when Chou embarked on a three-month tour of Africa and Southeast Asia, Teng's prestige was such that he was named Acting Premier, and rumors were heard that Teng was actively attempting to undercut Chou.

If Teng really was trying to build himself up at Chou's expense, he probably thought he had Mao's tacit support. That Teng figured prominently in Mao's plans for the succession is indisputable; Mao explained at the October 1966 Central Committee Work Conference that his intent had been to place Liu and Teng in the first of two "fronts" of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, where Liu would "preside over ... important conferences" and Teng would "take charge of the daily operations of the party." In this way Mao had hoped "to foster these people's authority so that no great changes would arise in the country when the time came for me to meet my Heavenly King." Mao perhaps also intended to keep potential challengers in line through divide-and-rule tactics, just as he had adroitly balanced off his opponents during his rise to power.

Chou Rebounds

In retrospect Chou seems to have played his cards with acumen during the period of relative Liu-Teng ascendancy (1959-65). China's domestic crisis from 1960-62 apparently precipitated criticism of Mao's Great Leap Forward policies by Teng and other "first line" leaders, charged with fostering economic recovery. This carping was of two kinds, however, and the distinction is a key one; as Mao subsequently explained, "the P'eng Chen group" had criticized him "secretly" while "the Liu Shao-ch'i-Teng Hsiao-p'ing group" had made its criticisms "openly."

In contrast, Chou, finding himself like Mao relatively on the sidelines during the critical 1960-62 period, defended Mao against his critics without endorsing the substance of the policies under attack. When by late 1964 China's economy had recovered substantially and Mao's position was strengthening, Chou shifted gears again and coupled his earlier defense of Mao with an unmistakable denunciation of Liu and Teng. Delivering the major work report at the Third National People's Congress in December 1964, Chou characterized a number of the emergency policies and programs of the 1960-62 period as the handiwork of "class enemies." With Mao resuming the offensive, Chou,
the proven loyal supporter, was a logical choice to
assist in carrying out the purge of Liu and Teng.

Chou apparently was quick to name the Liu-Teng group
as appropriate targets for Red Guard "bombardment." Yet
Teng's fate was presumably sealed by his earlier oppo­sition -- albeit "open" -- to Maoist policies and by Mao's
belief that Teng had treated him as a respected but
irrelevant elder statesman, and it is doubtful that Chou
could have interceded successfully on Teng's behalf even
had he desired to do so.

Teng's Rehabilitation -- Mao Proposes, Chou Disposes

Teng's full rehabilitation -- to Vice Premier last
April, to the Central Committee at the 10th Party Congress
in August, and to the Politburo and possibly the Military
Affairs Committee in January 1974 -- was a remarkable
political event of major significance. While the evidence
is scanty and indirect, we would hypothesize that the main
impetus for Teng's rehabilitation came from Mao Tse-tung
himself. The scenario which emerges is:

-- a decision in principle to rehabilitate
all purged cadres not guilty of collusion
with "the enemy" or secret opposition to
Mao (it was explained that the P'eng Chen
group criticized Mao secretly but the
Liu-Teng group openly);

-- a process throughout 1972 and early 1973
of categorizing purged cadres and deter­
mining those eligible for rehabilitation,
in which Mao seems to have taken the lead,
suggesting names and prodding reluctant
powerholders to restore their former adver­saries to positions of genuine authority;

-- Teng's submission of a lengthy self­
criticism to Mao;

-- Mao's circulation in early 1973 of his
favorable assessment of Teng's self­
criticism, a generally favorable evaluation
of Teng's past service, and an instruction
that Chou and the Central Committee review these documents; and

-- a decision in March-April 1973 to restore Teng to his previous state position but to reserve judgment on his former party posts.

The decision to rehabilitate Teng was obviously the subject of acrimonious debate and extended negotiation within the CCP. While Chou must have concurred, there is nothing to suggest that he was the prime mover or even an enthusiastic supporter of the idea, or that he is the beneficiary of Teng's particular gratitude. Teng's return undoubtedly represents an unspoken rebuke to such "radicals" as Chiang Ch'ing and Yao Wen-yuan, who stridently reviled Teng and his "pragmatism" and in that sense signifies a probable plus for Chou and his coalition. Yet it should not be forgotten that Chou was both an opponent of Teng and an instrument of his downfall. This being the case, it seems plausible to speculate that in the process of returning to a leading political role, Teng would have sought and may have obtained from Mao, Chou, and other top leaders a firm delineation of his authority and spheres of particular responsibility. However, there is absolutely no evidence on the specific contents of any such understanding.
STATE DEPT. DECISIONAL REVIEW
☐ Retain Class' n  R Change to
☐ Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958,25X( ) ( )
☐ Declassify ☐ After
☐ With concurrence (not obtained)
IPS by Date 9/25/1979

E.O. 12065 ADS 3/5/79 (TELFORD, SIDNEY T.)

TAGS: ASEC

SUBJECT: (U) VISIT TO THE U.S. OF CHINESE DIGNITARIES

USSS FOR ID AND LIAISON, FBI FOR
DOMESTIC SECURITY / TERRORISM - ATTN: SMSIG NOSA, NSA FOR
NSOC-VI: HARRI SUTLFF, ATF FOR LIAISON, USAF FOR
HEADQUARTERS AND AFSI/IVO, CUSTOMS FOR NICK BARBELLA
2. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE OF SECURITY, HAS
THE PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FOLLOWING CHINESE
DIGNITARIES WHO WILL BE VISITING THE UNITED STATES FROM
JANUARY 28 TO FEBRUARY 5, 1979:

MADAME ZHUO LIN, WIFE OF VICE PREMIER DENG XIAOPING,

MADAME YIN SEN, WIFE OF VICE PREMIER FANG YI,

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HUANG HUA, AND HIS WIFE,

MADAME HE LILIANG.

3. THEIR ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS:

JANUARY 28--
0120 HOURS - ARRIVE ANCHORAGE, AL., FOR REFUELING
1400 HOURS - ARRIVE WASHINGTON, D.C.

FEBRUARY 1--
0900 HOURS - DEPART WASHINGTON, EN ROUTE ATLANTA, GA.
1035 HOURS - ARRIVE ATLANTA, GEORGIA

FEBRUARY 2--
0900 HOURS - DEPART ATLANTA, EN ROUTE HOUSTON, TEXAS
1200 HOURS - ARRIVE HOUSTON, TEXAS
FEBRUARY 3--
1200 HOURS - VICE PREMIER FANG DEPARTS HOUSTON
1440 HOURS - VICE PREMIER FANG ARRIVES LOS ANGELES, CA.
1500 HOURS - VICE PREMIER DENG DEPARTS HOUSTON
1720 HOURS - VICE PREMIER DENG ARRIVES SEATTLE, WA.

FEBRUARY 4--
1430 HOURS - VICE PREMIER FANG DEPARTS LOS ANGELES
1700 HOURS - VICE PREMIER FANG ARRIVES SEATTLE, WA.

FEBRUARY 5--
0930 HOURS - THE DELEGATION DEPARTS THE UNITED STATES.