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One of a series of Defense Intelligence Agency analyses of key government leaders around the world whose demise or ouster could have farreaching implications for US military plans and policies: Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, 12 Jan 1966

Supplement, Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana

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### **DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



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This responds to your request under the Freedom of Information Act dated 28 February 2005, case #0168-2007. Therein you requested records from the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning Kwame Nkrumah. The Federal Bureau of Investigation located one document which originated with the Defense Intelligence Agency and referred it for our review.

The document is enclosed for your use without redactions.

Sincerely,

Margaret A. Bestrain Chief, Public Access Branch

Enclosure a/s

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#### SUPPLEMENT

#### NK DIMAN KWA ME PRESIDENT OF GHANA

This is the 28th of a series of analyses of key government leaders around the world whose demise or ouster could have far-reaching implications for US military plans and policies.

Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah is the undisputed ruler of that country, which he in effect created and which he has pushed to a position on the world scene far out of proportion to its size, population, or strategic importance. No real challenge to his leadership is now apparent and he seems likely to continue in office indefinitely. Nevertheless, his dictatorial rule, his suppression of political opposition, his disastrous financial policies, and his pro-Communist sympathies and policies have inevitably led to dissatisfaction among various elements in Ghana and could eventually force a change.

The military might instigate his overthrow, although this is not now considered likely unless popular discontent deriving from economic unrest should result in widespread instability. Should Nkrumah die or be assassinated, a power struggle is likely, and chaos could ensue. At that time, the armed forces, heretofore largely aloof from political activity, would probably determine the outcome by imposing direct military rule or by assuring that Nkrumah was followed by a man of more conservative policies. Such a successor government would probably be more truly nonaligned than the present regime. 100-355099

Early Years and Rise to Power

Nkrumah was born in the primitive coastal village of Nkroful in what was then the Gold Coast, a British Colony. His father was a goldsmith, and his mother -one of several wives -- a petty trader. Originally named Francis Nwia Kofi Nkrumah, he later took the name Kwame, which in his Nzima tribal dialect means "Saturday's child" since he knows only the day of the week on which he was born. He has accepted the estimated birthdate, 21 Sep 09, given him by the Roman Catholic NOT RECORDED

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priest who baptized him, but he may have been born in 1906.

Nkrumah spent eight years in elementary school and became a student teacher at Half Assini for a year. He then enrolled in Achimota College, Ghana's leading secondary school, and after graduating in 1930 taught for several years in local elementary mission schools and then at a Roman Catholic seminary. During this period, he seriously considered becoming a Jesuit priest.

In 1935, aided financially by his uncle, Nkrumah came to the US to study at Lincoln University, a Negro institution in Pennsylvania. After four years of unexceptional academic work, he earned a BA degree. In the next five years, he received a BD from the Lincoln Theological Seminary, and an MA and an MS from the University of Pennsylvania. During his ten years in the US, Nkrumah suffered great financial hardship and held a variety of menial jobs. Although never a top student, he was active in African student organizations and read widely in political theory and philosophy.

Nkrumah went to England in 1945 and enrolled at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He undertook the study of law but failed the course, probably as a result of his many outside activities in student organizations. He helped set up the fifth Pan-African Congress, held in Manchester in 1945, which endorsed a program of revolutionary rather than evolutionary African nationalism. During his stay in the UK, he was sought out by leftists and Communists and learned much from them about organization and agitation. He has, however, vigorously denied ever having been a member of the Communist Party, although he attended meetings in London.

At the invitation of Dr. J. B. Danquah, Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast in November 1947 to serve as general secretary of the newly formed Nationalist Party, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). His fiery oratory, charm, and organizational ability

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quickly established for him a large personal following. A trade boycott and demonstrations in 1948 resulted in riots, and Nkrumah was arrested along with other UGCC leaders who blamed him for their detention. When he was released, he was demoted from his position as secretary general of the party but continued to organize mass support and, when the UGCC refused to reinstate him as secretary general, Nkrumah and his followers broke away and founded the Convention People's Party (CPP) on 12 Jun 49.

The more radical CPP quickly eclipsed the UGCC and embarked on a program of "Positive Action" -strikes, boycotts and noncooperation -- which in 1950 led to Nkrumah's conviction on three counts of sedition, for which he was sentenced to three years in jail. Imprisonment increased his popularity, however, and the general elections of 1951 brought the CPP to power. He was elected to Parliament and, on 12 Feb 51, was freed to become Leader of Government Business.

Once in a position of political power, Nkrumah realized the necessity for convincing the British that an independent Gold Coast would be viable and moderate. With this in mind, he made an about-face under the slogan of "Tactical Action" and began a campaign of close cooperation with the authorities, expelled Communists from the ranks of the CPP, and forced the Trades Union Congress to affiliate with the Westernoriented International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. By March 1952, he had so impressed the British as a responsible and moderate leader that he was given the formal title of Prime Minister.

For the next several years, Nkrumah generally continued to exhibit a moderate pro-Western posture, while at the same time building the CPP into a national mass party by the use of repressive tactics against the opposition and by gaining control of labor and farmers' organizations. By 6 Mar 57, when the UK granted independence to Ghana, the CPP was in unquestioned control of the government and Nkrumah in unquestioned control of the CPP. On 1 Jul 60, Nkrumah became the first president of Ghana, which became a republic but retained membership in the British Commonwealth. He began a second five-year term on 11 Jun 65

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when he was proclaimed President by Parliament after it had been decided to dispense with the formalities of the electoral process since no opposition candidates to the CPP's nominees had filed for election.

#### Nkrumah the Man

Nkrumah is an extremely complex man whose most marked characteristic is his egocentricity. His usually friendly, easy-going manner belies the resolute determination with which he has accomplished so much. His charm, personal magnetism, and sense of humor have favorably impressed most observers, but he has a tendency to be less than frank and to tell his listeners what he thinks they want to hear; the resulting inconsistencies between what Nkrumah says and does have over the years considerably lessened his impact on those he wishes to impress. He is an effective public speaker, a quick thinker, and adroit at parrying questions.

Nkrumah is enormously energetic and resilient but suffers from periods of depression during which he is apt to become distracted and to indulge in fits of crying. He is increasingly concerned about his health and almost obsessively fearful for his safety, particularly since the assassination attempts of the past few years. His rather vague Christianity does not preclude his superstitious use of fetishes and oracles. He is bored by economics and frequently refuses to accept unpleasant facts, traits which in part explain his seeming lack of serious concern about the state of Ghana's economy.

Nkrumah is of medium height, has a comb of frizzy hair on his balding head, and has big soul-eyes and a manner that has been described as messianic. He normally wears Western clothes, but frequently dons the toga-like native dress for ceremonial occasions. Until December 1957, Nkrumah flatly asserted that he intended to remain a bachelor; thus, his marriage at the end of that month to a 26-year old Coptic Christian Egyptian woman whom he had never met, and who spoke no English, came as a stunning surprise. Mrs. Nkrumah does not play a prominent social role, and

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their marriage has apparently not been a great success. The couple have three children, however, and Nkrumah also recognizes an illegitimate son, Francis Nkrumah, a doctor born about 1935 who is reportedly opposed to his father's regime.

#### Pro-Communist Policies

Nkrumah began in 1960 to display openly his pro-Communist, anti-Western beliefs. Under his influence and with his encouragement, Ghana negotiated a number of economic agreements with Communist nations, waged increasingly strident campaigns against "capitalism, imperialism, and neocolonialism," and generally championed positions and policies in world affairs which support and further Communist aims. Moderates within the government were eliminated or lost their influence, while radicals and leftists assumed positions of importance and leadership and became increasingly influential in guiding Ghana further to the left.

Despite all of this, however, Ghana today is not as far into the Communist camp as would seem probable. That Nkrumah and his like-minded followers have not succeeded in more closely identifying Ghana with the Communist world is due to a number of factors -- the Western culture and tradition ingrained over the years of British rule; the fact that Ghana's economy is still closely tied to Western markets; the fact that the governing party is far from being a monolithic organization and has never fully exercised the powers it theoretically possesses; the opposition of the armed forces to closer military ties with the Communists; and the fact that the Communist nations have been increasingly reluctant to shore up the deteriorating economy, thus forcing Nkrumah not to alienate completely possible sources of Western assistance.

#### Attitude Toward the US

Ghana, at Nkrumah's direction or at least with his approbation, carries on a continuing propaganda campaign against the leading Western nations, but the US has been by far the favorite target of leftist

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The US is regularly attacked by the press and venom. radio as the leading imperialist power, for its alleged subversive activities in Africa, and for its policies throughout the world. Nkrumah's latest book, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, contained such scathing charges against the US as to provoke an official protest from Washington. Despite Nkrumah's apparently sincere conviction that the US is bent on bringing about his downfall, however, his personal relations with many US Embassy and other official personnel have often been marked by apparently warm friendliness and, despite public charges that the Peace Corps is engaged in subversion in Ghana, Nkrumah has shown no desire to dispense with its services.

#### Aspirations for African and World Leadership

Nkrumah, who is driven by ambition to be far more than Ghana's leader, aspires to be recognized not only as the predominent African political personality but as a man to be reckoned with on the international stage. His dreams of grandeur have led to a number of attempts to make Ghana the focal point of wider African political entities -- the abortive Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, the defunct Joint African High Command, and his current project of a united Africa -all of which have foundered in the face of reality and because of the refusal of other African leaders to accord Nkrumah the position of predominance implicit in all of his schemes. Instead, Ghana has become increasingly isolated, and Nkrumah has earned the distrust of most African leaders and has even alienated his erstwhile radical cronies in Guinea, Mali, and the UAR.

On the international scene, Nkrumah's conception of himself as a world leader has led him to make contacts with other leaders whose real or fancied friendship he values highly. <sup>5</sup>His self-created role has also resulted in frequent offers of gratuitous advice in resolving non-African problems, the details and complexities of which he is largely ignorant. He has thus attempted to insert himself in the Cuban missile crisis, the Sino-Indian border conflict, the Arab-Israeli

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dispute, the nuclear-disarmament question, and the Vietnamese situation. Nothing has come of any of these efforts.

Although he has succeeded in projecting himself into the African and international scene to a greater extent than most African leaders, Nkrumah is considered by most world leaders to be more of a nuisance and a figure of ridicule than a statesman. These rebuffs, and Nkrumah's consequent sense of extreme frustration, are in part responsible for his policy of encouraging and abetting subversion in Africa, activity which he also rationalizes on the grounds that many African nations -- including all of his close neighbors -- do not support the radical policies which he advocates and are followed by his government.

#### Nkrumah's Position in Ghana

Although he has suffered reverses abroad, Nkrumah still reigns supreme in Ghana; he is the personification and living symbol of his nation and its people. he has achieved this position in part through his genuinely charismatic quality and the manner in which his considerable vanity has exploited every means of keeping his name before the public. His official title is "Osagyefo" (The Redeemer), and there are overtones of deification in the adviation which he sanctions and probably encourages. Nkrumah's name and likeness are everywhere in Ghana -- on its currency, postage stamps, street names, statues, and schools, and in "Nkrumahism," the murky and confused embodiment of his Marxist-Leninist-African socialist-religious philosophies.

Despite Nkrumah's encouragement of the cult of personality and his genuine popularity with many of his people, his position has been frequently challenged and he has been the object of several assassination attempts. Overt political opposition has been suppressed over the years since Nkrumah came to power, however, and there is at present no known organized group within the country which is soon likely to have the capability to overthrow him. There is some resentment of Nkrumah's pro-Communist policies within the military and several coup plots have been under

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consideration in the past two years, but the armed forces have so far been unwilling to take a step which is not in character with their apolitical position. Popular dissatisfaction is on the rise, however, due to the growing impact of Ghana's disastrous financial policies, and the greatest potential threat to Nkrumah's continued rule lies in the country's deteriorating economy.

Nkrumah is well aware, despite his egocentric nature and the fact that he is surrounded by sycophants, that he is not universally loved. As a result of a number of assassination attempts -- at least two of which were almost successful -- he has an obsessive fear for his personal safety and has surrounded himself with a number of safeguards, including the President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR). The POGR, although nominally part of the army, is directly responsible to Nkrumah, and its commander and personnel of its battalion (now being expanded to two) have been chosen for their loyalty to him. The POGR is equipped in part with Soviet materiel -- the only army unit to be so provided -- and several Soviet security officers are on hand. Because of his own anti-Western, anticapitalist beliefs, Nkrumah tends to attribute any and all opposition to the intrigues of imperialists and neocolonialists, and he is apparently convinced that the US is actively attempting to bring about his downfall.

He is also extremely distrustful of the security forces and suspects -- with some reason -- that certain of their leaders have contemplated removing him. To forestall such attempts, the police were disarmed following the January 1964 assassination attempt, and in mid-1965 Nkrumah abruptly dismissed the two top army officers, replacing them with men in whom he has more confidence -- although it remains to be seen how long they will retain their positions in view of Nkrumah's highly suspicious nature. In September 1965, he was presented with the Supreme Commander's Baton of Office. a gesture intended to emphasize that he is the operational commander of the armed forces. His latest move to curtail the power of the military was the creation in December.of a "people's militia," supposedly formed

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to prepare for armed action against Rhodesia but apparently intended to provide a counterforce to the army. Whether this new organization will ever be one, however, seems highly questionable.

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#### When Nkrumah Goes

Like many other rulers who have concentrated political power in their persons, Nkrumah has made no provision for a successor. Should he leave the scene, a scramble for control would be likely to ensue among the several factions of the government party, and a period of instability would be probable. In such an event, the military might play an important -- and perhaps decisive -- role. If a strong successor of moderate leaning were to emerge, the military would probably follow and support him. If, however, a leftist were to succeed, or should dissension and chaos result as political figures vie for control, the army would probably set up an interim government pending the selection or emergence of a president it would be willing to accept.

Thus, it seems likely that a successor government would probably be more moderate and adopt more truly neutralist policies than those followed by Nkrumah. It would probably still feel the compulsion to be no less nationalistic than the present government, however, and probably be less stable since any successor would lack Nkrumah's popularity and his identification not only with the people but with Ghana itself. Further, the existence within the governmental hierarchy of moderate and leftist factions would probably continue to engender conflict as contending groups struggled for control. (SECRET NO FORETON DISSEM)

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NKRUMAH SIGNIFICANT DATES

<b>2</b> 1 Sep 09 (estimated)	.Born at Nkroful, Gold Coast.
1935-1945	.Studied in the US.
1945–1947	.Studied in England.
Nov 1947	Returned to Gold Coast; began political career as Secretary General of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC).
	.First arrest for political activi- ties.
12 Jun 49	.Broke with the UGCC; founded the Convention Peoples Party.
22 Jan 50	.Second arrest; convicted of sedition; sentenced to three years in jail.
8 Feb 51	.Elected to Parliament; released from jail on 12 February to become leader of Government Business.
5 Mar 52	Named Prime Minister.
6 Mar 57	.Ghana received independence; Nkrumah Prime Minister.
l Jul 60	.Ghana became a republic within the Commonwealth; Nkrumah President.
11 Jun 65	.Proclaimed President for second term.
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## India May Export Nuclear Products

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A May Export Nuclear Products The Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) has proposed to the State Trading Corporation that India start exporting domestically produced nuclear equip-ment and radio solopes. The TAEOTCLAIMS the country can design and manufacture one to five megawatt research reactors as good as those purit. The PS and PK and at less than analy the Drice. The PAEC iso believes fadioisotopes can be sold for about half the PS price and that developing countries can probably use and boll times more than India is now experting.

The fAEC thinks india can help other countries build metallurigical/refining plants" for thorium, uranium, and plutosium. It cites the prufonium extraction plant at Trombay as an illustration of national capabilities and suggests that such facil-ities can be constructed for other countries well below prevaring international prices.

These which proposels indicate how well the Indian methan energy program has advanced in recent-years. Much of the growth has resulted from for-eign assistance, but steadedly growing domestic capa-bilities now allow these sports of some materials; equipment, and technology. The IAEC has, however probably underestimated the cost of providing such aid, and india wild find it different to sell its products sebstantially below prevailing prices. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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#### India May Export Nuclear Products

The Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) has proposed to the State Trading Corporation that India start exporting domestically produced nuclear equipment and radioisotopes. The IAEC claims the country can design and manufacture one- to five-megawatt research reactors as good as those built in the US and UK and at less than half the price. The IAEC also believes radioisotopes can be sold for about half the US price and that developing countries can probably use up to 10 times more than India is now exporting

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These JAEC proposals indicate how well the Indian nuclear energy program has advanced in recent years. Much of the growth has resulted from foreign assistance but steadily growing domestic capabilities now allow the export of some materials, equipment and technology The IAEC has, however probably underestimated the cost of providing such. aid, and India will find it difficult to sell its products substantially helow prevailing prices. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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